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PART ONE 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1986 

THE EVOLUTION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN 
ECONOMY IN 1986 
I. GENERAL TRENDS 
In 1986 the evolution of the Latin American economy was marked by contradictory changes. While 
the main variables used to measure domestic economic performance showed some improvement, the 
situation of the external sector worsened considerably. Thus, although the rate of economic growth 
picked up and unemployment and inflation slackened, the terms of trade worsened, the trade surplus 
fell and the balance-of-payments deficit increased sharply (see figure 1). 
1. The recovery of economic activity 
Following a recovery in 1984 from the declines of the two preceding years and another slowdown in 
1985, the rate of economic growth rose slightly. The region's gross domestic product increased by 
3.9%, which was similar to its rate for 1984 and higher than the 2.7% recorded in 1985. As a result, 
the per capita product rose by 1.6% after having risen by barely 0.4% the previous year. Neverthe-
less, for the region as a whole it was still 7.6% lower than in 1980 —the year before the onset of the 
crisis— and was only slightly higher than in 1978. On account of the worsening of the terms of trade, 
and despite the drop in net payments of profits and interest, the trend in national income was less 
favourable than that of the product, as had also been the case in five of the six preceding years. 
Consequently, per capita national income —which provides a better indicator of the standard of 
living than the per capita product— has fallen considerably more than the latter since 1980 (see 
table 1). 
In addition to being somewhat more rapid, the expansion of economic activity was also less 
concentrated than in 1985. While the gross domestic product rose significantly only in Brazil in 1985, 
in 1986 it increased at a satisfactory rate not only in Brazil but also in Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Chile and Colombia; unemployment levels fell significantly in all of these countries as 
well. Nevertheless, this increase in economic activity was far from being a generalized phenomenon. 
Indeed, the rise in gross domestic product was insufficient to offset the impact of population growth 
in Bolivia, Mexico and Paraguay, as well as in all the countries of Central America and the Caribbean 
except for Costa Rica, Cuba and Panama. 
As in 1984, but in contrast with 1985, the rise in the rate of economic growth was based on a 
relatively rapid increase in the volume of imports of goods and services. While this had risen by less 
than 1% the preceding year, it increased by 7% in 1986. Nevertheless, due to the enormous decline 
seen in 1982 and 1983, imports were still 27% lower in real terms than in the years prior to the crisis. 
Fixed capital investment also grew more rapidly: 6.5% as against 4.4% in 1985. In this case too, 
however, the recovery was far from being sufficient to offset the huge drop which had occurred 
between 1981 and 1984. As a result, in 1986 fixed investment was barely three-quarters of what it had 
been in 1980, and the investment coefficient was one of the lowest recorded in the last 40 years. 
2. The downturn in inflation and the rise 
of remunerations 
The improvement in the internal economic situation was also reflected in the sharp fall in inflation. 
After having risen steadily during the six preceding years and having reached an all-time peak of 
275% in 1985, the average increase in consumer prices fell to 65% in 1986 (see figure 1). 
Although this decrease was partly a reflection of the slackening of inflation in the majority of 
the region's economies, its main cause was the sharp drop in the rate of consumer price increases in 
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Argentina, Brazil, Peru and above all Bolivia, these being the four countries which, together with 
Nicaragua, had the highest inflation in 1985. 
In spite of this progress, inflation continued to represent a serious problem for most of the 
countries of Latin America. Indeed, it was considerably above its traditional levels in El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Paraguay, while it remained high in Uruguay, intensified in Mexico and reached 
almost 750% in Nicaragua. Moreover, in Argentina, Brazil and Peru the sharp reductions in the 
annual variation of consumer prices brought about by the application of unorthodox stabilization 
programmes were not accompanied by a comparable slackening of basic inflationary pressures. As a 
result, the second half of the year saw a reversal in the downward trend followed by the annual rate of 
inflation since the third quarter of 1985 in Argentina and Peru, and much the same thing occurred in 
Brazil towards the end of the year. 
Due to the slower increase in the overall level of prices and the faster growth of economic 
activity, real remunerations rose in almost all the countries for which information was available. 
Nevertheless, in most countries these rises constituted no more than a partial recovery from the 
considerable declines in the real incomes of wage-earners observed in previous years. 
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3. The weakening of the external sector 
In contrast with the rather more satisfactory trends of domestic variables, external accounts worsened 
substantially. Due mainly to the collapse of international oil prices, the persistent downward trend in 
the prices of most other primary products, and the excessive expansion of domestic expenditure in a 
number of countries, the value of exports fell by 15 %. This downturn was naturally more pronounced 
(-30%) in the petroleum-exporting countries, but was also appreciable in Argentina and Brazil. 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS" 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Short-term economic indicators 
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Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Urban unemployment ratec 
Consumer prices' 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
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Imports of goods and services 
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Net payments of profits and 
interest 
Balance on current account 
Net capital inflow 
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Net total external debt* 
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"All figures refer to the 20 countries listed in table 2, except Cuba. Provisional figures. ' Percentages. Up to 
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variation. Foreign exchange, plus Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), monetary gold valued at the London price per troy 
ounce fine, reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), less use of IMF credit. 'Gross total disbursed 
external debt, less official international reserves. 
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On account of the decline in external sales as well as of a slight increase in the value of imports 
of goods and services, the trade surplus was slashed by half, thereby continuing the downward trend 
which had begun the preceding year. 
The shrinkage in the trade surplus was also considerably greater than the drop in net payments 
of interest and profits. As a result, the deficit on current account, which had virtually disappeared in 
1984 but had then risen slightly in 1985, increased fourfold. As the growth in the deficit on this 
account was well in excess of the moderate expansion seen in the net inflow of loans and investment, 
the balance-of-payments deficit rose from an insignificant figure in 1985 to US$6.3 billion in 1986 
(see table 1). 
The increase in net capital inflow, together with the decline in net payments of interest and 
profits resulting from the gradual but steady fall in international interest rates, helped to reduce the 
transfer of resources abroad by one-third. Nevertheless, the amount transferred was still very 
considerable. Moreover, as the value of exports underwent a sharp decline at the same time, this 
transfer was equal to more than one-fifth the value of exports, which was an only slightly smaller 
proportion than that recorded, on average, during the four preceding years. 
II. PRODUCTION 
1. The rate and structure of economic growth 
As has already been mentioned, the 3.9% increase in Latin America's gross domestic product was 
similar to that achieved in 1984 and somewhat higher than the mere 2.7% recorded in 1985. 
In a departure from the trend of the two preceding years, the expansion of economic activity in 
1986 was mainly concentrated in the non-petroleum-exporting countries, whose product grew by 
6.7%, a considerably higher rate than those recorded in each of the previous 10 years. In contrast, 
notwithstanding the vigorous recovery of economic activity in Peru and its upturn in Venezuela, the 
product of the petroleum-exporting countries as a whole fell by 1.4%, primarily on account of the 
almost 4% drop in Mexico's gross domestic product (see table 2). 
The uneven behaviour of the region's economies was also mirrored in the contrast between the 
high rates of growth of the product in Brazil (8.2%), Peru (8.1%), Uruguay (6.7%), Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile and Venezuela (between 5% and 6%) and the rates below those of the population 
increase recorded in Bolivia, Mexico and Paraguay and in all the countries of Central America and the 
Caribbean, except Costa Rica, Panama and Cuba (see table 3). 
As a consequence of this trend, the deterioration occurring since the beginning of the 1980s in 
the living conditions of the majority of the relatively poorest Latin American economies continued to 
worsen. Thus, in 1981-1986 per capita product fell by nearly 27% in Bolivia, 20% in Guatemala, more 
than 18% in Nicaragua, 16% in El Salvador and approximately 14% in Honduras and Haiti. During 
this period it also fell sharply in countries with considerably higher levels of income and development 
such as Venezuela (-19%), Costa Rica and Mexico (-10%) and, despite a recovery in 1986, in 
Argentina (-15%), Uruguay (-14%) and Peru (-8%) as well. 
As in 1985, the gross domestic product increased by more than 8% in Brazil in spite of the 7 % 
drop in agricultural production caused by a long and severe drought in that country. In contrast, 
industry and trade —which had already expanded markedly the previous year— grew by more than 
11% while construction rose by almost 18% (see table 4). The expansion of economic activity was 
fueled by the remarkable dynamism of domestic demand and made it possible to absorb most of the 
installed capacity which had been underutilized as lately as the beginning of 1986. The growth of 
production was also facilitated by the marked increase in non-petroleum imports for the second year 
running and by the diversion to the domestic market of a portion of the intermediate goods which had 
been exported in previous years. 
An increase in domestic demand and a better use of installed capacity were also the basic causes 
of the 8.1 % rise in Peru's domestic product. These factors played a particularly significant role in the 
case of the manufacturing industry, whose production rose by 15%, thereby completely recovering 
from its sharp fall in 1982-1983. The revival of construction —a sector which had been particularly 
hard hit by the crisis up to 1985— was even more vigorous (24%). The growth of economic activity 
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went hand in hand with an exceptionally large (45%) increase in the volume of imports —in 
particular those of consumer and intermediate goods— which was partly financed by the foreign 
exchange saved as a result of the government's placement of a ceiling on interest payments on the 
external debt. 
The fuller use of existing installed capacity prompted by the expansion of domestic demand was 
also the key factor in the 6% increase in economic activity in Argentina, which made up for the 4.6% 
shrinkage which had occurred the preceding year. This revival was especially pronounced in 
manufacturing, where production rose by almost 13% after having declined by 10.5% in 1985. In 
1986 construction also increased by nearly 9%, thereby bringing to an end its sharp and regular 
downward trend of the preceding five years, during which it fell by almost 50%. In contrast, the 
agricultural product declined for the second consecutive year, mainly on account of adverse weather 
conditions. 
In spite of the enormous impact of the steep decline in petroleum prices, the gross domestic 
product increased by 5.5% in Venezuela, thus halting the continuous drop seen since 1980. As a 
result, the per capita product rose for the first time in nine years. The recovery of economic activity 
was also helped by the 5% growth in manufacturing, the 6% increase recorded by the agricultural 
sector, the more than 7% expansion of mining and the sharp upturn (16%) in construction, 
following upon nine years of persistent decline. In turn, this progress reflected the policies applied by 
Table 2 


























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official calculations of the gross domestic product. The population figures used are the 
CELADE estimates published in the Demographic Bulletin, vol. XIX, No. 38, July 1986. 
"Preliminary figures. Refers to global social product. 
the government in an effort to cancel out the impact of the drop in petroleum prices on domestic 
activity. In line with these policies, the special incentives for agricultural products were maintained, 
and increases were made in the expenditures provided for under the special investment plan for the 
1985-1987 period which, mainly for administrative reasons, had been carried out only to a very 
limited degree in 1985. 
The domestic product also increased at relatively satisfactory rates in Colombia, Chile and 
Uruguay. In contrast to the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, the three countries' 
economic expansion was accompanied by considerable increases in exports and by significant 
improvements in their external accounts. 
The recovery which had begun in the Uruguayan economy during the last quarter of the 
preceding year gathered speed in 1986. After having fallen continually since 1982, in 1986 the gross 
domestic product recorded its first significant increase (6.7%) in the last five years. This expansion of 
economic activity was mainly accounted for by the highly favourable turnaround which took place in 
the external sector. After having shrunk by almost one-third between 1981 and 1985, the value of 
exports of goods rose by 27% in 1986, thanks to the progress made by both traditional and 
non-traditional exports as well as the extraordinary growth of sales to the European Economic 
Community (70%) and, above all, to Brazil (135%). The increase in exports made possible a 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY BRANCHES OF 

























































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Excluding Cuba. rDoes not include real estate or social and personal community services. 
social product. Includes fisheries, mining and quarrying and electricity. Mncludes transport and communications only. 
in the non-material sphere. 'Includes petroleum refining which official figures include under crude oil extraction. 
Including mining and quarrying. 'Refers to 
Includes commerce and other productive activities 
considerable expansion of the volume of imports, which had undergone a huge drop (54%) during 
the five preceding years and whose extremely low level had come to be the main factor hampering 
economic recovery. Owing to the fall in the price of petroleum, however, the increase in the value of 
imports was much less than that of exports. Thus, at the same time that the main constraint on 
renewed growth eased considerably, the trade surplus expanded. The turnaround in the country's 
external accounts —to which lower payments of interest and profits also contributed— had a 
favourable impact on the expectations of economic agents as well. Because of this and of the rise in 
real wages, both private investment and household consumption made a partial recovery from their 
huge drops of the preceding four years. 
In Chile overall economic activity increased by 5.5%, thereby almost regaining its pre-crisis 
level. However, due to the increase in the population, the per capita product was still 8% lower than 
in 1980-1981. As in the preceding two years, growth was mainly accounted for by the sectors 
producing internationally tradeable goods, whose expansion was spurred by the high real effective 
exchange rate and by the protection provided for certain agricultural and industrial activities by the 
policies of agricultural pricebands, tariff surcharges and incentives for minor export items. 
In Colombia, where the product grew by 5.4%, the main force galvanizing the economy was the 
exceptional expansion of exports. One contributing factor was that the fall in Brazilian coffee 
production sent the international price of coffee up sharply, and Colombia was thus able to increase 
considerably the volume of its coffee sales. In addition, its exports of coal and petroleum rose 
substantially as the major investments made in previous years began to bear fruit. As a result, mining 
grew by 27% for the second year running. In addition, the high level of the real exchange rate 
stimulated external sales of manufactures. Thus, the total value of exports of goods rose by 49%. The 
higher earnings of the export sector helped to expand domestic demand, particularly in coffee-
producing regions, as well as stimulating industry and commerce. 
In contrast to the rapid growth of the gross domestic product in the countries mentioned above, 
economic activity expanded only moderately in Ecuador, increased very little in the Dominican 
Republic and Cuba, remained stagnant in Haiti and Paraguay and fell in Bolivia. In all these countries 
except the Dominican Republic, the fundamental causes of their unsatisfactory economic perfor-
mance were to be found in quite serious exogenous disturbances. While in Paraguay a severe drought 
had an adverse effect on the agricultural sector (by far the most important sector in the economy and 
one whose ups and downs have a decisive impact on its overall performance), Ecuador suffered the 
consequences of the precipitous fall in the price of petroleum (a product which accounted for almost 
two-thirds of its merchandise export earnings in 1985) and Bolivia felt the effects of the collapse in 
the international price of tin and the drop in the price it received for its sales of natural gas, especially 
since these two products, taken together, generate more than 80% of its export income. Cuba's 
economic activity was also hurt by the drop in the international price of petroleum —which 
considerably reduced the value of its re-exports of fuel— and by adverse weather conditions which 
caused a notable decrease in sugar production. Mainly on account of these changes, import capacity 
fell sharply, with the consequent detrimental effect on the country's possibilities of economic growth. 
The decline in the international price of petroleum affected the performance of the Ecuadorian 
economy as well; while it had grown at an average rate of almost 5 % during the preceding two years, 
it expanded by only 3 % in 1986, a rate similar to that of its population growth. This slowdown sprang 
from the sharp drop in the growth of petroleum production (from more than 9% in 1985 to 2.5% in 
1986), the stagnation of manufacturing and the downturn in construction, whose effects were not 
offset by the satisfactory performance of the agricultural sector for the third year running. 
In the Dominican Republic economic activity increased by less than 2%, as a result of which the 
per capita product fell for the fourth time in the last five years. The slight increase in overall 
production was mainly accounted for by the recovery of construction —which rose by more than 15 % 
after having fallen by a similar percentage in 1985— as well as by a moderate upturn in manufactur-
ing. Agriculture and mining declined, however, for the second year in a row. In Cuba, the global social 
product rose by just 1.4%, the lowest rate recorded in the last six years. The fall in imports —the first 
to take place in the 1980s— and the shrinkage of investment were particularly important factors in 
the economy's loss of dynamism. The expansion of economic activity was even weaker (0.6%) in 
Haiti, which thus saw its per capita product drop for the sixth year running. 
The pronounced deterioration in the external environment also contributed to the decline of 
some 3% in Bolivia's economic activity. The international price of tin, which had already decreased 
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during the preceding two years, fell to less than half its former level in 1986 as a result of the 
suspension of the activities of the International Tin Council. Both as a result of this huge drop and as a 
means of reducing the losses of the State mining sector, operations in a number of mines were either 
cut back or closed down. Consequently, mining production fell by nearly 20% in 1986; this drop, when 
taken together with those of the preceding four years, meant that production shrank by more than 
50% between 1982 and 1986. The consequences of the steep decrease in the price of tin were 
compounded by the drop in the price of natural gas and by the negative impact on agricultural 
production of the floods and adverse weather conditions which prevailed during the first half of the 
year. In addition, the depressed purchasing power of wage-earners and the high level of real interest 
rates resulting from the country's stabilization programme, together with keener competition from 
imported goods, helped account for the slump in industrial production. 
The highly unsatisfactory trend of economic activity in the countries of Central America 
continued in 1986; in all of these countries except Costa Rica and Panama, the per capita product once 
again fell. In contrast to the situation of the petroleum-exporting countries, this downturn coincided 
with an improvement in the Central American countries' terms of trade which was due to the rise in 
the international prices of coffee, bananas and sugar and the collapse of oil prices. Furthermore, most 
of them saw a decrease in the interest payments on their external debts. However, these changes 
failed to offset the damage wrought by five years of economic recession and the weakening of 
intra-regional relations. This situation was further intensified by the uncertainty arising from the 
serious social and political tension prevalent in most of the countries of the subregion together with 
the harmful repercussions of the persistence or deepening of inflation in a number of them. 
Finally, the gross domestic product fell by almost 4% in Mexico, mainly on account of the sharp 
contraction of petroleum exports, whose value plummeted by nearly 60% due to the drop in oil prices 
and an almost 11 % shrinkage in the volume exported. In order to counteract the impact of this sharp 
deterioration in the terms of trade, the government launched an adjustment programme which 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL SUPPLY, DOMESTIC DEMAND 
AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME" 
Indexes ~ . Cumulative /ir.™ , m i Growth rates . . (1980 = 100) variation 
1984 1985 \<)tô 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986o 1981-1986'' 
1. Total supply (2 + 3) 95.5 97.9 101.8 -3.8 -4.7 3.8 2.5 4.0 1.8 
2. Gross domestic product 
at market prices 99.6 102.3 106.1 -1.4 -2.4 3.7 2.7 3.4 6.1 
3. Imports of goods and 
services 67.5 68.1 72.9 -19.5 -23.1 5.6 0.8 7.0 -27.1 
4. Exports of goods and 
services 125.8 125.9 124.1 -0.2 9.9 7.2 0.1 -1.4 24.1 
5. Domestic availability of 
goods and services 
(2 + 3 - 4) = domestic 
demand (6 + 7) 91.5 94.1 98.8 -4.4 -6.9 3.2 2.9 5.0 -1.2 
6. Final consumer expenditure" 98.0 100.6 105.3 -2.0 -3.9 4.0 2.6 4.7 5.3 
7. Gross fixed capital 
formation 68.3 71.3 76.0 -23.0 -19.1 -0.6 4.4 6.5 -24.0 
8. Terms-of-trade effect ... ... 
9. Net factor payments to 
rest of world 200.9 194.3 181.0 39.8 -6.0 6.0 -3.3 -6.9 81.0 
10. Real gross national income 94.8 97.1 100.4 -4.6 -2.8 4.3 2.5 3.4 0.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Nineteen countries. Preliminary figures. 'Includes variation in stocks. 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE SHARES OF COMPONENTS OF 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND OF GROSS NATIONAL 
INCOME AT 1980 MARKET PRICES" 




















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Nineteen countries. Includes variation in stocks. ' Preliminary figures. 
included major innovations in respect of the plans usually agreed upon with the International 
Monetary Fund, adopted a highly restrictive monetary and credit policy and introduced new cutbacks 
in public sector expenditure. As a result of these measures and of the further decline in real wages, 
domestic demand fell, industrial production dropped by almost 6% —in spite of the extremely rapid 
growth of exports of manufactures— and activity in the construction sector slowed by 9%. 
2. Total supply and demand and the domestic availability 
of goods and services 
Following upon its 2.5% increase in 1985, total supply went up by 4% in 1986. This rise was due to 
both the greater dynamism of domestic economic activity and a much faster expansion of imports, 
which increased by 7% in volume as against less than 1% in 1985 (see table 5). As a result, the import 
coefficient rose slightly after having fallen during the previous three years to the lowest levels 
recorded in the entire postwar period. Nevertheless, because of the huge drop which had taken place 
between 1982 and 1983, the volume of imports was still 27% lower than in the years prior to the crisis 
and was equivalent to barely 10% of the gross domestic product (see table 6). 
Partly as a result of the upturn in imports and partly as a result of the shrinkage in the volume of 
exports, the domestic availability of goods and services rose at a faster rate than the product for the 
second year running. Even so, it was still below the level it had reached at the beginning of the decade. 
Due to this fact and, even more importantly, to the region's demographic growth, the per capita 
availability of goods and services —which in the final reckoning is what determines the real standard 
of living of the population— was 14% lower in 1986 than in 1980. 
As in the preceding year, the greater availability of goods and services made it possible to 
increase both consumption and fixed capital investment. However, as a result of the huge drop 
(-32%) observed in such investment in 1981-1984, it was still 24% lower in 1986 than in 1980. For 
the same reason, even though the investment coefficient was higher than it had been in the preceding 
two years, it was nonetheless 25% below the average for the 1970-1980 period and was one of the 
lowest recorded in the last 40 years. 
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The shrinkage in investment was, moreover, an extremely generalized phenomenon. Indeed, 
gross fixed capital formation during the 1984-1986 period exceeded that of the 1979-1981 period only 
in Colombia, Haiti and Nicaragua. In all the other countries fixed investment has been far lower in 
the last three years than it was at the beginning of the decade. The decrease in fixed capital formation 
reached particularly vast proportions in Bolivia, Venezuela and Guatemala and, above all, in 
Argentina and Uruguay (see table 7 and figure 2). 
On account of the deterioration in the terms of trade and of the high level of net external factor 
payments, fixed investment also continued to represent a far lower proportion of the gross domestic 
product than domestic savings. In fact, even though net payments of interest and profits fell for the 
second year running, they were nonetheless equivalent to 4% of the gross domestic product and 
absorbed almost one-quarter of domestic savings (see table 8). Moreover, the impact of the decrease 
in these payments was more than offset by the deterioration in the terms of trade. Consequently, the 
gap between the domestic product and national income continued to widen and represented almost 
8% of the former. 
III. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
In 1986 urban unemployment fell for the second year in a row. In the 25 most heavily populated cities 
in Latin America as a group, the rate of unemployment declined to 6.4%, the lowest level recorded 
since 1981 (see table 9). 
Nevertheless, as in 1985, this drop was the net outcome of the quite different changes which 
took place in the various countries for which information was available. While the rates of unemploy-
ment fell sharply in Brazil, Chile, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela and slightly in Argentina 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 













































































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL INVESTMENT 





Dominican Republic | 
Brazil 





Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aPercentage variation of 1984-1986 average in respect of 1980-198Í average. Data for 1979 were not 
included due to the enormous drop in investment occurring in that year. 
and Colombia, they remained unchanged in Costa Rica and Mexico and rose in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Nicaragua (see figure 3). 
The most noteworthy improvements in the employment situation occurred in Brazil and Peru, 
which were also the two countries of the region in which economic activity increased most vigorously. 
The average rate of unemployment in the six largest cities in Brazil —which had already fallen from 
7.1% to 5.3% between 1984 and 1985— dropped to just 3.9% in 1986 —the lowest level ever 
recorded— and had decreased to less than 3% by the end of the year in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and 
Porto Alegre (see table 10). Although employment increased in all sectors, it rose particularly steeply 
in the construction sector, where unemployment was almost halved, and was thus brought down to 
the same rate as the also very low level recorded in commerce (see table 11). 
A marked decline also occurred in unemployment in Peru. In the case of non-agricultural 
activities, the rate of unemployment fell from the unprecedented level of almost 12% recorded the 
preceding year to slightly over 8% in 1986, the lowest figure in the last 10 years. This decline was 
largely accounted for by the decrease which took place in Lima, where unemployment fell from 10% 
in 1985 to 5.4% in 1986 (see figure 4). These changes were not only the result of the vigorous 
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expansion of domestic activity, but also reflected the effects of the determined employment policy 
applied by the government. In 1986, government job-creation programmes provided employment 
for 3% of the labour force in the country as a whole and almost 5% of the economically active 
population in Lima. The first of these, the Temporary Income Support Programme (PAIT), was set up 
in September 1985 with the aim of improving income distribution and allows public investment 
projects to be carried out through the hiring of mostly unskilled workers who are paid the equivalent 
of the minimum wage. In July 1986 another programme, known as the Emergency Employment 
Programme (PROEM), was added which gives temporary incentives to private firms in order to 
encourage them to hire additional manpower. In 1986 these programmes provided jobs for 150 000 
and 35 000 people, respectively, more than half of them in Metropolitan Lima. As a result, 
employment expanded in all sectors for the first time since 1981. Nevertheless, a simultaneous 
increase occurred in hidden underemployment, which affected almost 39% of the labour force, the 
highest figure recorded in the country (see table 12). 
In Chile and Uruguay, the rates of unemployment —which had risen extremely sharply in 
1982-1983— fell steeply for the third year running (see figure 3). In Chile unemployment nationwide 
went down from an average of almost 13% in 1985 to 10.5% in 1986 and was slightly below 9% in 
the last quarter of the year, while in the capital it fell from 16.3% to 13.5%. These downturns 
occurred in spite of the simultaneous reduction in government job-creation programmes, which 
accounted for 5% of the labour force as against 7.3% in 1985 and 13.6% in 1983. In Uruguay the rate 
of unemployment —which had fallen gradually during the previous two years— had dropped to 9.2% 
by the end of 1986, the lowest level recorded since late 1981. The vigorous recovery of overall 
economic activity and, in particular, the revival of construction in the closing months of the year were 
important factors in this decrease. 
Rates of urban unemployment also declined significantly in Venezuela (from 14.3% to 11.3%) 
and in Panama (from 12.3% to 10.2%). Inthe case ofVenezuela, this put an end to the rising trend in 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: FINANCING OF GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Coefficients in respect of gross domestic product 
1. Gross domestic savings 
2. Net external factor 
payments 
3. Unrequited private external 
transfer payments 
4. Terms-of-trade effect 
5. Gross national savings 
( 1 - 2 + 3 + 4) 
6. External savings 
7. Gross capital formation 
(5 + 6) 
Domestic savings/Gross capital 
formation 
Deterioration in terms of trade/ 
Domestic savings 

































































































LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: U R B A N UNEMPLOYMENT 






















































































































































































Source: ECLAC and PREALC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Weighted average for the 25 most populous cities in Latin America, except for Havana, Santo 
Domingo, Fortaleza, Guayaquil, San Juan (Puerto Rico) and Guatemala City (for want of comparable 
data). 'Nationwide urban rate, April-October average; 1986: October only. ''National total. 'Metropolitan 
areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Twelve-month average; 1980: June-
December average. ^ Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin. Average for March, June, September and December; 
1985: average for March, July, September and December; 1986: average for April, June, September and 
December. * Nationwide urban rate. Average for March, July and November; 1984: average for March and November; 
1986: average for March and July. *Greater Santiago. Average for March, June, September and 
December. 'National total, according to official estimates. 'Metropolitan areas of México City, Guadalajara and 
Monterrey. Four-quarter average. * National average. Metropolitan region. August of each year except 1977-
1979, for which data refer to nationwide urban unemployment; 1980: on the basis of data from the national census taken in 
February. "Asunción, Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo; 1981: first semester; 
1982: first quarter; 1983: average for September, October and November; 1984: average for August, September and October; 
1985: November-December average; 1986: annual average. "Non-agricultural activities. "Montevideo. Two-
semester average; as from 1981, four-quarter average. 'Nationwide urban rate. Two-semester average; 1986: second 
semester. 
unemployment observed since 1979 which had gone hand in hand with a steady decline in economic 
activity since that same year. The improvement of the employment situation was particularly 
influenced by the marked recovery in construction, following nine years of unremitting decline, and 
the less pronounced but nonetheless significant upturns in mining, manufacturing and commerce. 
The fall in unemployment in Panama also marked a halt in its upward trend of the preceding 
four years. However, this change coincided with a fairly pronounced drop in the participation rate, 
which was apparently associated with the shift of part of the labour force to the informal sector (see 
table 13). 
The drop in urban unemployment was considerably more moderate in Argentina and Colom-
bia. In the former, it fell from 6.1% in 1985 to 5.2% in 1986, primarily as a result of the decrease in 
unemployment in Greater Buenos Aires and Rosario, which more than offset the rises which 
occurred in Córdoba, Mendoza and Tucumán. 
In Colombia the average level of unemployment fell slightly (from 139% to 135%), but was 
nonetheless considerably higher than the figure recorded at the beginning of the decade (see 
figure 3). Until the middle of the year unemployment continued to rise in all the country's main cities, 
with the exception of Cali, due to the fact that the increase in employment brought about by the 
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Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Annual average rates) 

































* • Mexico * "V 
• * i 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
,/ Costa Rica 
Guatemala 
* * • • 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: UNEMPLOYMENT 













































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Weighted average for the 25 most populous cities in Latin America, except for Havana, Santo 
Domingo, Fortaleza, Curitiba, Guayaquil, San Juan (Puerto Rico) and Guatemala City (for want of comparable 
data). 'Figures for April and October. ''Twelve-month average; 1980: June-December average. 'Figures for 
March, June, September and December; 1985: March July, September and December; 1986: April, June, September and 
December. Quarterly averages. 'Includes Fernando de la Mora, Lambaré and the urban areas of Luque and San 
Fernando. Caracas Metropolitan area. Two-semester averages: 1985: first semester. 'Metropolitan Lima. 1985: 
official estimates. '1980: two-semester average; 1981-1986: four-quarter average. * Metropolitan area. Figures for 
March, July and November. Greater Santiago. Figures for March, June, September and December. 
growth of the economy was offset by a simultaneous rise in the participation rate. However, as the 
expansion of economic activity gathered speed in subsequent months, an overall decline occurred in 
unemployment. 
In spite of the slow growth of economic activity in Costa Rica and its shrinkage in Mexico, the 
average annual rate of urban unemployment remained unchanged in both of these countries. 
Nevertheless, in Mexico the overall employment situation worsened, particularly in the formal 
sector. During the course of the year employment in manufacturing fell by almost 4% (despite its 
17% rise in in-bond assembly plants) and employment in construction had decreased by 38% up to 
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September. At the same time, the number of persons registered with the Mexican Social Security 
Institute was down 2% and a slight drop occurred in the participation rate. 
In contrast, urban unemployment rose in the six other countries of the region for which data 
were available. In Paraguay, the increase over the relatively low level (5%) of the year before was 
moderate, and the country's gross domestic product fell by a very small amount due to the combined 
effect of the sharp drop in agricultural production, the partial recovery made by construction and the 
fairly rapid expansion which continued to be seen in services. 
The increase in unemployment was also slight in Honduras but was more pronounced both in 
Ecuador and Guatemala. However, in these three countries the rises constituted a continuation of the 
regular upward trend in unemployment of previous years, and the rates were therefore not only 
extremely high, but also well above the levels which had been usual at the beginning of the decade (see 
table 9). 
As in 1985, the highest rates of unemployment were those of Bolivia and Nicaragua. In Bolivia 
open unemployment affected the unprecedented proportion of one-fifth of the population and was 
well over three times the level recorded just six years earlier. The increase in unemployment was 
mainly the outcome of the serious crisis in mining and of the adjustment policy applied in the public 
sector with a view to balancing the central government's accounts and improving the competitive-
ness of State enterprises, which led to a decline in the number of civil servants and of workers in State 
enterprises. 
Unemployment was even higher in Nicaragua, where it reached 22 %, a somewhat higher level 
than those recorded in the two preceding years. This rise was due entirely to the increase in 
unemployment in non-agricultural activities (from 23% to 28%), since unemployment in agriculture 
fell markedly for the second year running. 
IV. PRICES AND WAGES 
1. Prices 
Inflation was down sharply in Latin America in 1986. The average rate of consumer price increases, 
weighted by population, which had increased steadily during the preceding six years and which had 
attained the record level of 275% in 1985, fell to 65%.. 
Table 11 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): URBAN 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE MAIN SECTORS 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 





































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Nationwide urban rate, April-October average; 1985: April. Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo 
Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Twelve-month average; 1986: January-November 
average. ' Metropolitan area of San José. Data refer to March of each year. Greater Santiago. Average for March, 
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Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): N O N - V O L U N T A R Y 
U R B A N UNDEREMPLOYMENT 
































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentage of the labour force that would be willing to accept a longer working day than at 
present. 'Greater Buenos Aires, April-October average. Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin. Average for 
March, June, September and December; 1984: average for March.June and December. 'National urban total. Average 
for March, July and November; 1983: November only; 1984: average for March and November; 1985: 
March. Metropolitan Lima. Excluding home workers. 'Percentage of wage earners receiving less than the 
minimum wage. Weighted average for the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, Sab Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Porto 
Alegre, Salvador and Recife; twelve-month average; 1982: second semester; 1985: first semester. 
Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: GLOBAL PARTICIPATION RATES" 













































































Source: ECLAC and PREALC, on the basis of official data. 
"Economically active population as a percentage of population of working age, according to household survey data. The lower 
age limit varies slightly from one country to another (see corresponding footnotes). 
'Preliminary figures. 'National total. Lower age limit lOyears. ''Metropolitan areas of Rio deJaneiro, São Paulo, 
Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. Lower age limit 15 years. Average for 12 months; 1986: January-
November average. 'Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin. Lower age limit 12 years. Average for March.June, 
September and December. 'National urban. Lower age limit 12 years. March of each year. 'Greater Santiago. 
Lower age limit 14 years. Average for March June, September and December. Metropolitan areas of Mexico City, 
Guadalajara and Monterrey. Lower age limit 12 years. Average for four quarters; 1986: first quarter. 'National total. 
Lower age limit 15 years. 'National total. Lower age limit 14 years. Average for four quarters. National total. 
Lower age limit 15 years. Average for two semesters. 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA: CONSUMER PRICES 









































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official price indexes provided by the countries. In some cases, these data were supplemented 
with figures published by the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, May, 1987. 
"The totals for Latin America represent the variations in the countries, weighted by their respective populations in each year. 
Moreover, this fall was quite widespread. The rate of inflation slackened in 13 of the 19 
economies for which data were available, and in most of them the drop was considerable. The 
downturn in inflation was particularly marked in Argentina, Peru, Brazil and above all Bolivia —the 
four countries which, together with Nicaragua, had experienced the sharpest inflation in 1985 (see 
table 14). 
This progress notwithstanding, inflation continued to constitute a serious problem in most of 
the countries of Latin America. Indeed, while consumer prices fell in Haiti, they rose by less than 7% 
only in Honduras, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Inflation stood at levels well above the 
traditional rates in El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay, remained extremely high in Uruguay, 
spiraled in Mexico and reached almost 750% in Nicaragua. Moreover, during the second half of the 
year the downward trend followed by inflation since the third quarter of 1985 in Argentina and Peru 
was reversed, as also occurred towards the end of the year in Brazil. 
Among those countries in which inflation slackened, the most spectacular slowdown occurred 
in Bolivia. This country —which in 1985 had suffered the first case of hyperinflation in the history of 
Latin America— saw the annual rate of increase in consumer prices fall steadily from the high of 
23 500% recorded in September 1985 to 66% in December 1986. Moreover, two-thirds of this rate 
were accounted for by the very large increases occurring in the consumer price index during the first 
two months of the year, which were mainly attributable to the payment of bonuses, for which the 
necessary financing was not available, to government employees. Subsequently, the monthly varia-
tions in prices, although erratic, remained below 2% on average (see figure 5). This sharp reduction 
of inflation was the outcome of extremely strict fiscal and wage policies as well as of the notable 
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Inflation also plummeted in Argentina, falling from 385% in 1985 to 82% in 1986. However, 
this decline conceals the considerable differences to be observed between the trends in inflation 
during these two years. While in 1985 inflation spiraled sharply until June before falling off steeply 
during the second half of the year as a result of the application of the Austral Plan, in 1986 the 
monthly price variations were small in January and February, but rose appreciably from March 
onwards and attained an average level of 6.6% in the second half of the year. As a result, after having 
fallen to 50% in June —the lowest figure recorded since December 1974— the annual variation in 
prices rose regularly in subsequent months. Nevertheless, during this period inflation remained 
considerably lower than prior to the application of the stabilization programme. 
One factor which initially contributed to this turnaround in the trend was the changeover from 
the generalized freeze on prices, wages, utility rates and the exchange rate established by the Austral 
Plan to a more flexible system of price controls. Thus, in January a wage increase (valid for three 
months) of 5 % in the public sector and of a maximum of 8.5 % in the private sector was granted, and 
at the beginning of April new rules relating to price adjustments were announced. In accordance with 
these rules, the exchange rate and public utility rates would periodically be raised by small percentages 
and price controls would be focused on a group of large enterprises through a system of agreements 
based on changes in costs. A decision was also taken to grant a further quarterly wage increase, and the 
trade unions and management were encouraged to begin talks aimed at setting basic wages which 
would incorporate the raises made in these remunerations in the preceding months. Such wages were 
henceforth to be renegotiated on a quarterly basis within "brackets" set by the government. 
In practice, however, wage increases frequently exceeded official guidelines, a fact which led to a 
considerable rise in the real wage in industry during the second quarter. As a result, business 
enterprises' costs rose appreciably, and after a time firms transferred this increase to prices. This was, 
in turn, facilitated by the rapid expansion of the money supply, which increased at a monthly rate of 
approximately 7% between June 1985 and July 1986. Although this rapid growth of the means of 
payment did not initially have inflationary effects due to the considerable expansion in the demand 
for money prompted by the sharp diminution in the rate of price increases, it ultimately surpassed 
this demand and thus came to constitute a further inflationary factor. The pressure created by the rise 
in wages and the expansion of the means of payment was compounded by the fact that the demand for 
food rose faster than supply and, in particular, by the effects of the seasonal rise in the price of meat. 
In an attempt to control the resurgence of inflation, at the end of August the government 
announced a set of measures which, in contrast with those applied during the first phase of the 
Austral Plan, were designed to gradually bring down the rate of price increases. They included, among 
others: increases of up to 3% in September in controlled industrial prices and in the rates charged by 
public enterprises, to be followed by progressively smaller rises in both during subsequent months 
such that by December the increases would be of 2%; an immediate 3% rise in the exchange rate and 
its subsequent readjustment by means of a system of small and periodic increases; a tighter monetary 
policy aimed at rapidly bringing down the growth rate of the means of payment; and a greater 
regulatory role for the government in wage negotiations between management and trade unions in 
order to ensure that the increases they agreed upon would be compatible with its gradual stabilization 
policy. The government also announced that these measures would be accompanied by a continuation 
of its efforts to diminish the public-sector deficit. 
Thanks to these measures, the monthly variation in prices, which had verged on 9% in August, 
fell regularly in subsequent months, although at a slower rate than forecast by the authorities (see 
figure 4). 
The slackening of the rate of price increases was also notable in Peru, although less so than in 
Bolivia and Argentina. As a result of the unorthodox stabilization plan implemented by the new 
government in August 1985, the annual rate of inflation fell from the all-time high of 192% recorded 
in that month to 63% in December 1986. This slowdown was largely due to the application of abroad 
programme of price controls, the decrease in production costs resulting from the lowering of interest 
rates, the reduction in the sales tax and the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. In order to mitigate 
the harmful repercussions of the exchange policy on the international competitiveness of sectors 
producing tradeable goods, the government raised some tariffs, prohibited or restricted certain 
imports and authorized producers of non-traditional exports to change an increasing proportion of 
their foreign currency earnings at the highest exchange rate prevailing on the financial market. Partly 
as a result of these measures and partly on account of the inflationary pressure generated by the 
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public-sector deficit and the rise in wages, after having fallen to an average of 3 % in the last four 
months of 1985, monthly variations in consumer prices were around 4% in 1986. Consequently, the 
annual rate of inflation, which had fallen steadily since September 1985, began to pick up slightly a 
year later. 
In order to deal with this situation, at the beginning of December the government announced a 
series of measures involving major changes in the stabilization policy hitherto applied. Hencefor-
ward most imports were to be paid for at the rate of exchange applying to financial operations (which 
was at the time 25% higher than the rate for commercial transactions). In addition, the authorities 
raised the proportion of income from exports that could be changed at the exchange rate prevailing in 
the financial sector and announced that in 1987 the rate of exchange would increase by 2.2% per 
month. They also announced that the price policy would henceforth be based on four groups of 
products. The prices of goods in the first group —made up of some 200 products, including, among 
others, food, medicines, gasoline and cement— were to be subject to controls; the prices of goods in 
the second group would be "regulated" and could not initially be increased by more than 6%-8%; the 
third group included public services and housing rents, whose prices were to be covered by special 
systems, while the last group was made up of goods whose prices were to be freely set by the market. 
Inflation also slackened a great deal in Brazil. As a result of the Cruzado Plan —which came into 
effect at the beginning of March following an eight-month period of extremely sharp price 
increases— the monthly variation in consumer prices fell from an average of almost 13% between 
August 1985 and February 1986 to below 1.5% in the following nine months. 
The basic assumption of the Cruzado Plan was that inflation in Brazil at that time was 
essentially the result of inertia. In other words, the plan was based on the idea that whatever the 
initial causes of price rises may have been in the past, in recent years they had mainly been the 
consequence of deeply-rooted inflationary expectations and of a widespread system of indexation. 
Under these circumstances, any alteration —either in demand or in supply— which, in theory, ought 
to cause a temporary increase in the level of prices, would, in practice, spark off a permanent increase 
in the rate of inflation. Furthermore, in the absence of exogenous changes, the effects of the system of 
indexation and of the interplay of inflationary expectations were such that price rises during a given 
period would tend to mirror those of the preceding period. This phenomenon was seen as the 
primary manifestation of the inertial, nature of the inflationary process. 
With this basic assumption as its starting point, the plan provided for the elimination of the 
system of indexation and, among its other main measures, called for: a) the creation of a new currency 
—the cruzado— equivalent to 1 000 cruzeiros whose value in terms of the latter would rise at a rate of 
approximately 15% per month for a period of one year in order to prevent unjustified profits or 
losses on term contracts drawn up prior to the application of the plan; b) the freezing of all prices at 
their levels as of 27 February until such time as official lists of ceiling prices were published; c) the 
establishment of a fixed exchange rate of 13.84 cruzados to the dollar (the authorities emphasized, 
however, that this parity might be revised, depending on the changes which occurred in the external 
situation); d) the setting of wages at 8% above their real average level during the preceding six 
months, and the freezing of the minimum wage at a level 15% above its real average for the previous 
six months; and e) the elimination of the indexation of financial assets having terms of less than one 
year and the freezing for one year of rents and housing payments owed to the financial system. 
With the application of these measures, consumer prices rose by an average of less than 1 % 
between March and July, while industrial production continued to show rapid growth and unemploy-
ment fell sharply. In fact, the main problem which emerged as a result of the application of the plan 
was not a shrinkage in economic activity, but rather the shortage of certain goods (such as meat, milk 
and automobiles) that was produced by the huge expansion of demand and by the fact that some 
prices were frozen at relatively low levels. 
To counteract this situation, at the end of July the government decided to reduce consumer 
credit by 40%, levied a 25% tax on the sale of tickets for international travel and on dollars sold to 
Brazilian tourists, and introduced a levy in the form of compulsory loans on sales of gasoline and 
alcohol (equivalent to 28% of the price to the consumer) as well as on purchases of automobiles (30% 
on new cars, 20% on those with two years of use and 10% on vehicles up to four years old). 
In spite of these steps and notwithstanding considerable increases in production and imports, 
monthly inflation rose slightly but systematically. Consequently, in an attempt to reduce excess 
demand and to correct the most striking distortions in the price system, in mid-November the 
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government announced a series of measures which, as a whole, were designed to reduce the 
public-sector deficit by the equivalent of 3% of the product. They included the following: a) readjust-
ments of 80% in postal rates, of 35% in the price of electricity for residential consumption and of 
10% in that used by industry, and of 30% in telephone and drinking-water rates; b) price increases of 
80% for new automobiles, 60% for gasoline and gasohol, 25 % for sugar, of from 45 % to 120% for 
cigarettes and 100% for beverages; c) the abolition as of March 1987 of treasury bonds which were 
readjusted in line with inflation and their replacement by non-readjustable floating-rate Central Bank 
bonds; d) the return to an exchange policy based on mini-devaluations of the cruzado and the 
adoption of a variety of tax measures designed to promote exports; e) the adoption as the new official 
inflation index of a consumer price index based on the basic shopping basket typically purchased by 
families whose income is equal to or lower than five minimum wages; and f) the immediate 
elimination of a number of State bodies and a ban on hiring in the government service until the end of 
1987, together with a variety of other measures designed to cut the fiscal deficit. 
Although the impact of these measures was not apparent in the November inflation figures 
(partly due to the date on which they were adopted and partly as a result of the change in the official 
index), they did lead to a significant rise in price levels in December and strengthened inflationary 
expectations. 
Inflation also fell in 1986 in the Dominican Republic, Chile and Colombia, although rather less 
so than in the countries mentioned above. 
In the Dominican Republic the annual variation in consumer prices dropped from over 28% in 
1985 to just 6.5% in 1986. The downward trend of inflation was influenced by the stability of the 
exchange rate (following its sharp rise in January 1985), the decrease in the price of fuels, the sharp 
reduction of inflation in the United States and a greater degree of monetary and fiscal discipline (see 
figure 6). 
The gradual but steady decline of inflation in Chile —from 26% in 1985 to 17% in 1986— was 
attributable to the very small increase in the prices of imported goods in Chilean pesos (owing to the 
decrease in external inflation which was mainly brought about by the sharp drop in the price of 
petroleum and the smaller increase of the nominal exchange rate in 1986); the pronounced reduction 
in domestic interest rates; the stability of real wages during most of the year; and the improved 
balance of fiscal accounts. 
In contrast, in Colombia the slight drop in inflation from 22.3% in 1985 to 21% in late 1986 
was entirely accounted for by the rates for May and June, when consumer prices fell in absolute terms. 
This drop was, in turn, due to the steep decline in food prices seen during these two months as a result 
both of more bountiful harvests —thanks to highly favourable weather conditions— and of the 
considerable contraband trade in agricultural products from Venezuela. Owing to these factors, the 
annual rate of inflation fell to 13.5% in June, the lowest figure recorded in almost 14 years. 
Subsequently, however, the rate of inflation rose persistently (see figure 7). 
In 1986 inflation remained extremely low in Honduras and Panama, where the rate of increase 
of domestic prices has traditionally followed that of international inflation, and, in particular, that of 
the United States. 
Inflation increased, however, in Venezuela as a result of the elimination of the preferential 
exchange rate for some imports, the readjustments made at the beginning of the year in agricultural 
wages and in the wages of lower-level civil servants and of workers not covered by collective 
bargaining, and of the more expansionary nature of the monetary policy. Early in 1986 a reversal also 
occurred in the downward trend followed by inflation in Costa Rica since the end of 1984. A similar 
turnabout began to take place in Ecuador as of August, mainly on account of the sharp devaluation of 
the sucre during that month which accompanied the adoption of a free exchange rate (see table 14 and 
figure 7). 
For the second year in a row inflation reached unusually high levels in El Salvador (30%) and 
Guatemala (26%), in both of which price variations had traditionally been among the lowest in the 
region. Their currencies had also been perfectly stable until 1986, in the case of the former, and 1985, 
in the case of the latter, when they sharply increased their exchange rates. Nevertheless, in 
Guatemala the rate of inflation fell sharply from August onwards. 
Price increases were even greater in Uruguay —where inflation jumped to over 70%, which 
was the highest rate recorded in the past 10 years except for those of 1979 and 1985—and higher 
yet in Mexico. In this country, the rate of inflation —which had already begun to rise in mid-1985 due 
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primarily to the sharp devaluation of the peso in July of that year— continued to gather speed 
unrelentingly in 1986 until reaching an all-time high of 106% by the end of the year. This trend in 
inflation constituted at one and the same time both the effect and the main cause of the repeated 
sharp rises in the exchange rate, the large and more frequent readjustments made in the current value 
of minimum wages, the high level of nominal interest rates and the reinforcement of inflationary 
expectations. 
Finally, in 1986 inflation soared for the second year running in Nicaragua. After having risen 
from 50% in 1984 to 335% in 1985, the consumer price index leaped by approximately 750% in 
1986. In this case too, the factors contributing to the worsening of inflation included the marked 
increases in the various exchange rates, the rapid expansion of the means of payment and the very 
considerable deficit of the public sector, which proved difficult to correct on account of, inter alia, the 
inflexibility of fiscal expenditure associated with the country's defence needs. The persistence of 
supply shortages and parallel markets on which goods were sold at prices far in excess of official ones 
also helped to intensify speculation and inflationary expectations. 
2. Wages 
In 1986 real wages generally followed quite positive trends in the countries for which data were 
available. Nevertheless, in most of them, the increases constituted no more than slight upturns 
following upon the considerable declines seen in previous years (see figure 8). 
Figure 6 
LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Figure 7 
LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN THE CONSUMER 
PRICE INDEX OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Figure 8 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE REAL WAGES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
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Undoubtedly, the factors which influenced the evolution of wages were different from one 
country to another. In a number of them —Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru— wage 
policy was purposefully expansionary with a view to offsetting previous decreases and stimulating 
domestic demand. Thus, in Costa Rica, the authorities decreed general wage increases, which were 
scaled so as to be of greatest benefit to workers earning the lowest incomes; in Peru, general wage 
rises which were higher than both past and projected inflation were granted; in Brazil, together with 
a price freeze instituted at the beginning of March, average wages were raised 8% above their real 
level of the previous six months; in Paraguay, the minimum wage was readjusted in January andjuly 
by higher percentages than inflation; and in Ecuador the same thing was done injanuary and August. 
Table 15 
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figures. Average total monthly wages in the manufacturing industry. Twelve-month 
'Average wages in basis industry, deflated by the consumer price index for Rio de Janeiro. Twelve-month 
''Average wages in the manufacturing industry i n the State of S3o Paulo, deflated by the cost-of-living index for 
Twelve-month average. 'Wages of manual workers in the manufacturing industry. Twelve-month 
^Average remunerations declared by persons covered by the social security system. * Average 
remunerations of wage earners in non-agricultural sectors. Twelve-month average. Average wages of persons covered 
by the social security system. ' Average wages in the manufacturing industry. Twelve-month average. 'Average 
industrial wages in the districts of Panama and Colón. Twelve-month average. Wage of manual workers in Asunción. 
Average for June and December. Wages of private-sector manual workers in metropolitan Lima. Average for February, 
May, August and November; 1986: average for February, Apri l , August and October. ""Real average wage index. 
Twelve-month average. " In comparison with the same period of the preceding year. 
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The increase in real wages in these countries was also influenced by the moderate rate of inflation in 
some cases (Costa Rica) and its sharp decline in others (Brazil and Peru). In these last two countries, 
the rise in wages was further facilitated by the strong expansion of economic activity. As a result, real 
average wages climbed by 25% in Lima, by between 8% and 26% in the major cities in Brazil and by 
6% in Costa Rica, while the purchasing power of the minimum wage increased by almost 18% in 
Paraguay and 8% in Ecuador (see tables 15 and 16). 
The downturn in the rate of inflation —although within the context of rather restrictive wage 
policies— and the rapid growth of total production were also the main causes of the rise in real wages 
in Colombia and Chile. In Chile the slight increase in average wages (1.7%) was fairly widespread, the 
main exception being the construction sector, where wages increased by 5 % and the public sector, in 
which they fell notably (see table 17). The purchasingpowerof the minimum wage fell, however, for 
the fourth consecutive year, although by a smaller percentage than in the preceding years (see 
figure 9). In Colombia, where the minimum wage was increased by 20% at the beginning of the year, 
the growth of national income and of domestic demand brought about by the rise in the international 
price of coffee and by the dynamic expansion of industrial and mining exports were contributing 
factors in the almost 5% increase in the purchasing power of industrial wages. 
The slight rise in real wages paid by the manufacturing industry in Argentina as well as the 
increase of nearly 6% in real wages in Uruguay were largely the result of intense pressure from 
labour, which prompted higher rises than those laid down by official guidelines. As of January, in 
Argentina the system of quarterly readjustments was reintroduced and a substantial increase was 
made in the minimum wage. In spite of this, the purchasing power of average industrial wages rose 
little, while real wages in construction and in the government service (which possess less wage 
bargaining power than other sectors) declined for the second year running. This was mainly the result 
of the revival of inflation during the second half of the year. 
In 1986 Uruguayan wage policy was based on four-monthly readjustments in remunerations 
according to the expected rate of inflation. Nevertheless, the increases granted were, in practice, 
considerably in excess of official guidelines, as was the actual inflation rate. Thus, real wages remained 
stable throughout the year. However, as they were considerably higher than those recorded in the 
first half of 1985, their average annual level was also higher than in that year. 
Finally, in 1986 the purchasing power of the minimum wage fell by nearly 7% in Venezuela and 
almost 9% in Mexico, while in Guatemala the average real wage of workers covered by the social 
security system fell by 18%. In Venezuela, where the real minimum wage had risen steeply in 1985, 
the decrease was due to the harmful repercussions of sharper inflation and to the fact that the 
adjustment to the minimum wage decreed at the beginning of 1986 did not actually enter into effect 
until November. In Mexico, where the minimum wage was readjusted three times in 1986 instead of 
the usual two, its purchasing power declined on account of the sharp resurgence of inflation. This was 
also the main cause of the shrinkage in real wages in Guatemala, although the virtually total 
stagnation of economic activity was also a factor. 
V. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
The collapse of the international price of petroleum, the continuation of the persistent downward 
trend in the prices of almost all primary products and the successive reductions in international 
interest rates had a profound influence on the evolution of Latin America's external sector in 1986. 
These changes had an extremely diverse impact on the balance of payments of the various countries 
of the region, whose external-sector performance also reflected the equally marked differences in 
their policies on exchange rates, trade and external indebtedness. 
1. Foreign trade 
a) Exports of goods 
After having fallen by 6% in 1985, the value of exports of goods declined by 15% in 1986 as a 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. National minimum wage. 'Minimum wage for the city of Rio de Janeiro, deflated by the 
corresponding consumer price index. Minimum wage for upper urban sectors. 'Minimum 
wage. Minimum overall living wage, calculated on the basis of annual minimum living wages and legal supplementary 
benefits. "Minimum wage for non-agricultural activities in San Salvador. Minimum daily wage paid in industrial 
firms. 'Minimum wage in the Central District and San Pedro Sula, for manufacturing. ' Minimum wage in Mexico 
City deflated by the corresponding consumer price index. Minimum wage for industrial workers in the Department of 
Managua. Minimum wage applying to all activities except construction and domestic service. ™ Minimum wage in 
Asunción and Puerto Stroessner. " Minimum wage in Metropolitan Lima for non-agricultural activities. "National 
minimum wage for workers over 18 years of age. ' National minimum wage for non-agricultural activities, deflated by 
the consumer price index for the lowest income quartile. 'In comparison to the same period of the preceding. 
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Table 17 

























































































































































































































































average. 'Hourly labourer's wage in Rio de Janeiro; 12-month average. Average cost of labour in Bogota; 12-
month average. 'Average wage accoiding to household surveys. Average for March, June and November; 1984: average 
for March and November. ^Up to 1983: salaries and wages for average construction work; from 1984: average wage in 
the sector; 12-month average. 'Minimum wage for construction in the Central District and San Pedro 
Sula. ''Average cost of labour in the country; 12-month average. 'Average wage of persons covered by social 
security; 12-month average; 1985: January-October average. 'Collective agreement wage in Panama City; annual 
average. Average wage of manual workers in Asunción; average for June and December. Average wage in the 
Lima Metropolitan area; average for February, May, August and November; 1986: average for February, Apriljune, August 
and October. "'Average cost of labour in the country; 12-month average; 1986: January-August avetage. "In 
comparison with the same period of the preceding year. 
This decline was primarily due to the sharp drop in the exports of the petroleum-producing 
countries, which fell by 30% in value as a result of the steep reduction in the international price of 
hydrocarbons, in spite of the considerable expansion of non-petroleum exports from Mexico and 
Ecuador. However, in 1986 the exports of Paraguay, Brazil, Haiti, Argentina and Nicaragua also fell 
by between 10% and 20% and those of the Dominican Republic by 2% (see table 19). 
In contrast, the value of exports rose spectacularly (49%) in Colombia. This was partly due to 
the increase in the price of coffee, but an even more important factor was the dynamic growth of the 
volume of exports of coffee, as well as of petroleum, coal and manufactures. External sales also rose 
sharply (27%) in Uruguay —which took advantage of the huge expansion of Brazilian imports and 
also considerably increased its sales of traditional and non-traditional goods to Europe— and in 
Panama (23%) as a result of a particularly robust expansion of re-exports. The value of exports also 
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Figure 9 
LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN 
REAL WAGES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
Average wage in the manufacturing sector 
Minimum urban wage 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Table 18 
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATIONS IN EXPORTS 













































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Up to 1975, includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; from 1976 onwards, also includes Mexico 
and Peru. 'From 1976 onwards, does not include Mexico or Peru. 
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grew by more than 10% in Costa Rica and Honduras (largely on account of the improved interna-
tional prices of coffee, sugar and bananas) as well as in Chile, where the expansion was due to a 20% 
increase in exports other than copper. 
b) Imports 
Notwithstanding the shrinkage in exports, in 1986 the recovery of imports continued for the 
third consecutive year, following upon its enormous 42% drop of the 1982-1983 period. The increase 
in the value of imports, albeit weak (1.8%), was quite widespread. In fact, their value fell in only six 
countries and markedly so only in Mexico, Guatemala and Haiti. While the growth rate of the value of 
external purchases in the remaining economies of the region varied widely, in most cases the 
expansion in volume was considerable. This was particularly true in Peru (45%), Uruguay (37%), 
Argentina (29%), Bolivia (22%) and Brazil (19%), although the increase was also significant in 
Paraguay, Panama, Chile, Costa Rica and El Salvador. Nevertheless, in most of these countries the 
volume of imports remained considerably lower than that recorded prior to the crisis (see table 20). 
Table 19 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
























































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes sales of non-monetary gold. If these sales were excluded, the rates would by-11.6 for the 
value index and -1}.6 for the volume index in 1984. 
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Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: IMPORTS OF GOODS FOB 
























































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 
c) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports 
In spite of the decline in the unit value of imports for the fifth year running, Latin America's 
terms of trade fell by 9%, for a total decline of approximately 20% over the last six years (see 
table 21). 
However, unlike what had occurred in 1985, this deterioration was wholly accounted for by the 
petroleum-exporting economies (whose terms of trade worsened severely); by Argentina (where 
they fell by 4% on account of further declines in the international prices of cereals and meat); and by 
Paraguay (whose terms of trade were much less favourable due to the slump in cotton and soya bean 
prices) (see tables 22 and 23). 
In the remaining economies of the region, a marked improvement occurred in the terms of 
trade. The improvement was particularly pronounced in Brazil (where petroleum constitutes a 
particularly significant import); in the Central American countries (which drew benefit both from 
the fall in the international price of petroleum and from the substantial rises in the prices of coffee 
and bananas, as well as from the partial recovery of sugar prices from their extremely low 1985 level) ; 
and above all in Colombia (on account of the considerable significance of coffee in its total exports). 
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Table 21 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE FOB/FOB (GOODS) 



























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Uruguay. c Preliminary 
figures. 
Table 22 
LATIN AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE FOB/CIF (GOODS) 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, Monthly Bulletin of Commodity Prices, Supplements, 1960-1980 and July 1987; International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbooks, 1981 and November 1987; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1987 
(various issues); ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Note: Unrefined sugar, FOB Caribbean ports, for export to the free market. Coffee, Colombian mild arabica, ex-dock New 
York. Cocoa beans, average of daily prices (futures), New York/London. Central American bananas, CIF Hamburg. 
Cotton, Mexican M 1-3/32", CIF Northern Europe. Wool, clean, combed, 50's quality United Kingdom, Beef, frozen, 
boneless, all sources, United States ports, Fish meal.all sources 64%-65% protein, CIF Hamburg. Wheat, United 
States, No. 2, Hard Red Winter, FOB. Maize, Argentina, CIF, North Sea ports. Soya beans, United States, No. 2, 
yellow, in bulk, CIF Rotterdam. Copper, tin, lead and zinc, cash quotations on the London Metal Exchange. Iron ore, 
Liberia, C.61 Fe, CIF, North Sea ports. Bauxite, Guyana (Baltimore). Oil, Venezuela (Tía Juana). 
"Preliminary figures. US cents per pound. 'Dollars per metric ton. Dollars per pound. 
'Dollars per barrel. 
As a result of the deterioration in the terms of trade and, to a much lesser extent, of the drop in 
export volumes, the purchasing power of exports fell by over 11.%. This contraction was mainly 
accounted for by the petroleum-exporting countries, where the purchasing power of exports has 
shrunk by one-third during the last two years (see table 24 and figure 10). In contrast, in most of the 
other economies in the region, and especially in Uruguay, Chile and the coffee-exporting countries, 
the purchasing power of external sales recovered significantly (see table 25). 
2. The balance of payments 
a) Tbe current account 
Due to the sharp fall in the value of exports and the slight increase in that of imports, in 1986 
the merchandise trade surplus was lower for the second consecutive year. After having followed a 
sustained upward trend since 1981 and attaining a record high of US$39.4 billion in 1984 (which had, 
however, fallen to US$33.4 billion in 1985), the surplus dropped to US$18.3 billion in 1986 (see 
table 26). 
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Most of this shrinkage was accounted for by the huge decline in the surplus of the petroleum-
exporting countries, which fell by 66% from US$17.6 billion in 1985 to less than US$6.1 billion in 
1986. As was to be expected, the decrease in the trade surplus was particularly staggering in Mexico 
(-US$3.8 billion) and above all in Venezuela (-US$5.8 billion). It was also very large in Brazil 
(-US$4.1 billion) and Argentina (-US$2.2 billion) and was significant in Peru (whose surplus of 
almost US$1.1 billion in 1985 was completely wiped out in 1986) and in Ecuador (where it was US$6 
million lower than in 1985). 
In contrast, Colombia's external trade underwent a favourable turnaround in 1986 when, after 
having ended 1985 with a slight deficit, it earned a surplus of more than US$1.8 billion. Guatemala 
and Costa Rica also managed to replace the previous year's deficits with surpluses, while the 
remaining countries in Central America, with the exception of Nicaragua, reduced their deficits and 
Chile and Uruguay considerably improved upon their 1985 surpluses. 
In contrast with the situation in 1984, the surplus on trade in goods failed to cover net transfers 
of profits and interest, even though the latter fell by US$4.3 billion as a result of the decline in 
international interest rates. The proportion of these payments financed by the merchandise trade 
surplus was also much lower (60%) in 1986 than in 1985 (96%). 
As a consequence of the sharp drop in this surplus and the increase in net payments for services, 
the deficit on current account increased fourfold to over US$14 billion. This accentuated the 
turnaround in the trend of the current account deficit, which, after having hit the unprecedented level 
of US$41 billion in 1982, was virtually eliminated just two years later, only to re-emerge in 1985 (see 
table 27). 
As in 1985, the increase in the deficit on current account was the result of conflicting changes in 
the different economies in the region. While Mexico and Venezuela —which in 1985, together with 
Panama, had been the only countries with surpluses— recorded considerable deficits in 1986 and 
while the deficit increased sharply in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, it underwent a 
spectacular turnaround in Colombia and fell for the second year running in Chile (the two economies 
which had recorded the heaviest deficits in 1985). The deficit also fell in the Dominican Republic and 
in all the countries of Central America (except Nicaragua) and was done away with completely in 
Uruguay, where the current account yielded a surplus for the first time since 1973. 
Table 24 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 




























































































Source:: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and 
Uruguay. 'Preliminary figures. 
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Figure 10 
LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED EXTERNAL TRADE INDICATORS 
(Indexes: 1980 -100) 
Volume of exports of goods 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aNineteen countries. t>From 1972 to 197S includes Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela; as from 
1976 also includes Mexico and Peru. cFrom 1972 to 1975 includes 16 countries; as from 1976 
excludes Mexico and Peru. 
As a result of the increase in the current account deficit and the shrinkage in the value of 
exports, the relation between the deficit and external sales, which had gone up slightly in 1985, rose 
sharply in 1986. Nevertheless, this coefficient (15%) although much higher than during the 
preceding three years, was less than half of what it had been, on average, between 1978 and 1982 (see 
table 28). 
b) The capital account and the net transfer of resources abroad 
As in the previous three years, net capital income was very low in 1986. Although it was slightly 
higher than in 1985, this rise, far from representing a significant and generalized expansion in the 
flow of loans and investment towards the region, largely reflected the turnaround which took place in 
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Mexico's capital account. After having ended 1985 with a deficit of more than US$3 billion, this 
account showed a surplus of US$2.2 billion in 1986. This about-face was accounted for both by the 
substantial bridging loans granted to the country by the governments of the industrialized countries, 
public international financial agencies and commercial banks and by the government's highly 
restrictive credit policy, which in 1986 led many firms to repatriate funds they had maintained abroad 
in order to finance their activities. 
Moreover, in the region as a whole, the increase in the net flow of loans and investments was 
considerably lower than that of the current account deficit. Consequently, after having closed 1985 
with a small deficit of US$170 million, the balance of payments yielded a deficit of US$6.3 billion in 
1986. 
On account of the expansion of capital inflows and the drop in net payments of interest and 
profits, the net transfer of resources out of Latin America declined by almost one-third. Nonetheless, 
at US$22 billion, it remained extremely high. Furthermore, as a result of the simultaneous decline in 
exports of goods and services, the transfer of resources out of the region was equal to more than 22% 
of its exports, which was only slightly less than the figure recorded, on average, for the preceding four 
years (see table 29). 
As in previous years, most of the transfer of resources abroad came from Brazil, Mexico, 
Venezuela and Argentina, although, especially in Mexico, it fell significantly (see table 30). Neverthe-
less, in all of these countries the transfer was equivalent to more than 24% of exports. The transfer 
was also relatively significant in Chile and the Dominican Republic, where, as in Colombia, it rose 
sharply in absolute terms. In contrast, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay and above all, Nicaragua, 
Bolivia and Haiti were the recipients of a substantial transfer of resources from abroad. 
Table 25 
LATIN AMERICA: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 

































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes sales of non-monetary gold. If these sales were excluded, the indexes and rates would be 
96 for 1982 and 109 for 1983, and 13.0 for 1983 and -7.8 for 1984. 
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Table 26 
L A T I N AMERICA: TRADE BALANCE 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis uf official data. 





L A T I N AMERICA: BALANCE OF P A Y M E N T S 






























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Excluding labour and ownership. Including net private unrequited transfers. 'Including long- and short-term capital, official unrequited transfers and errors and 
omissions. "Total balance is equal to variation in international reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
Table 28 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT AND THE VALUE OF 

































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Negative figures indicate a surplus on the balance-of-payments current account. Preliminary figures. 
VI. THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
1. The evolution of external indebtedness 
In 1986 the growth rate of the external debt was low, thereby maintaining the trend of the two 
preceding years. Indeed, the year-end debt balance was estimated at US$388 billion, which repres-
ented an increase of slightly less that 4% (see table 31). If the almost 2% increase in prices in the 
industrialized countries is taken into account, then the level of debt in real terms increased only 
slightly, after having remained stagnant in 1984 and declining in 1985- Moreover, almost the whole 
of the increase in the debt in 1986 was attributable to the revaluation of liabilities expressed in 
currencies other than the dollar as a result of the latter's decline in value on international markets 
during the year. Consequently, the region as a whole did not incur any additional debt in net terms. 
The increase in the individual countries' indebtedness was in keeping with the low average rate 
of growth of the debt. Furthermore, Venezuela's debt fell for the third year running, bringing its level 
to 10% below that recorded in 1983- The only debts to increase significantly were those of Colombia, 
Ecuador, Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic; this was largely accounted for by 
loans from official sources and, in the case of the last three countries, the accumulation of arrears with 
some creditors. 
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The available information on international capital transactions in 1986 indicates that the 
evolution of the debt in Latin America continued to be restricted by the virtual cessation of lending 
activity by private banks in respect of the region and the inability of official sources to offset this trend 
to any significant extent. Estimates made by the Bank for International Settlements indicate that in 
1986 net credit granted by private banks to Latin America increased by merely US$2 billion in 
nominal terms (1 %) over 1985 (see table 32). Moreover, this increase was due to the revaluation of 
loans expressed in currencies other than the dollar; if they are adjusted for variations in exchange 
rates, it emerges that the amount of credit granted by international banks in fact fell slightly in 
absolute terms.1 
The net commitments of the private international banking system fell in nominal terms in all 
the petroleum-exporting countries except Ecuador, where they rose by 3%. In the non-petroleum-
exporting countries, these commitments rose significantly only in Argentina, Costa Rica, Haiti and 
Paraguay, although this phenomenon, here again, was partly due to the revaluation of bank credits 
expressed in currencies other than the dollar. 
The data relating to United States banks provides a number of further criteria for assessing the 
nature of the cutback in external financing. At the end of 1986, the net commitments of United States 
banks in Latin America were 5 % lower than at the end of 1985 and 4% below their June 1982 balance 
(just a few months before the outbreak of the debt crisis) (see table 33). Although the net commit-
ments of the nine principal United States banks increased by 5% between J une 1982 and December 
1986, medium-sized and small banks reduced their commitments considerably (18%). This illus-
trates the fact that the largest banks are the creditors with the heaviest exposure in the region 
inasmuch as they have been compelled to participate in the involuntary package loans which 
constitute part of both the adjustment programmes sponsored by the IMF and the debt rescheduling 
Table 29 
LATIN AMERICA: NET INFLOW OF CAPITAL 
A N D TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 

































































































































































Source: 1976-1985: International Monetary Fund, 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
" Equivalent to net inflow of capital minus unregistered transactions. Corresponds to balance-of-payments item "errors 
and omissions". rPreliminary estimates. Does not include unregistered transactions for Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic. 
•The data on the volume of bank assets may to some extent underestimate actual loans due to the existence of 
writedowns, swaps and debt conversion operations. 
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Table 30 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the International 
"The net transfer of i 
Preliminary figures. 
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process. In contrast, small and medium-sized institutions, which in general have far lower commit-
ments in the region, have had much less of an incentive to participate in involuntary lending and have 
consequently reduced the absolute level of their net commitments. However, it should be pointed out 
that in 1986 all United States banks, regardless of their size, reduced their net commitments in Latin 
America. 
During the period of almost five years between June 1982 and December 1986, the net 
commitments of the United States banking system shrank substantially in most of the countries of 
Latin America. This was even the case in countries which had not been affected by a debt crisis, such as 
Colombia. The system increased its commitments only in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, as 
the fresh loans from major banks more than offset the withdrawal of small and medium-sized 
institutions (see table 33). 
The retreat made by private banks means that official lending has become the sole source of 
additional net credit. Nevertheless, even this sphere has been beset by problems. During 1986, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) emerged as a net recipient of funds from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, since amortization and interest payments on earlier standby loans exceeded fresh disbur-
sements. Meanwhile, the net transfer of World Bank funds to the region fell to just US$200 million as 
against US$1.2 billion during the previous fiscal year. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
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also encountered problems in meeting its credit targets, since many Latin American countries found it 
necessary to devote a considerable percentage of their domestic savings to financing transfers of 
resources abroad and thus had little left over for the counterpart funds they would have needed to 
proceed with investment projects partly financed by the 1DB. 
The fall in international interest rates which had begun in mid-1984 continued in 1986. During 
the second half of the year the LIBOR rate stabilized at around 6%, which was its lowest level since 
1977 and a far more favourable one than that recorded in 1985 (see table 34). It has been calculated 
that this drop signified a saving of approximately US$5 billion for Latin America (excluding 
Panama) as against the payments of US$37 billion made in 1985. The countries which saved the most 
as a result of this lower rate were those which had a high proportion of variable rate loans with 
commercial banks: Mexico (85%), Chile and Venezuela (84%), Brazil (75%), Argentina (70%) and 
Ecuador (68%). 
Despite the decrease in international interest rates in nominal terms, debt servicing continued 
to constitute a heavy burden in 1986. The real LIBOR rate (the nominal rate adjusted for world 
inflation) remained virtually unchanged in comparison with 1985 and, for the sixth consecutive year, 
was more than double the 2% rate which is the approximate historical average (see figure 11). An 
alternative way of calculating a real rate is by deflating nominal rates by the price variations in the 
exports of the debtor countries. In view of the steep decline in export prices in 1986, the real rate of 
interest, when calculated on this basis, showed a sharp increase over the already high real rate 
recorded in 1985. 
Table 31 































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Includes debt with the IMF. Preliminary figures. 
information supplied by international financial agencies. 
'Public debt. Total debt according to official data and 
'Total debt according to World Bank data. 
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Table 32 























































































































































































Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
"Total assets. No adjustments have been made for changes in the exchange rate between the dollar and other 
currencies. Preliminary figures. 'Does not include Panama. 
The lower prices of exports of goods and services in 1986 also helped account for the fall in 
export income, which virtually cancelled out the foreign exchange savings derived from the lower 
international rates of interest. As a consequence, the region's interest/export coefficient (excluding 
Panama) remained at the high level recorded in 1985 (34%), which was roughly double the average 
ratio for the three-year period 1978-1980 (see table 35). 
The level of this coefficient differed depending on whether the debtors were petroleum 
exporters or not. In the case of the former, with the exceptions of Bolivia and Peru, export income fell 
as much as or more than interest payments; as a result, the coefficient for this group rose by three 
percentage points as against 1985 to the onerous figure of 35%. In the case of the non-petroleum-
exporting countries, on the other hand, the average coefficient was 34%, which was a drop of two 
percentage points. In countries such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and El Salvador, the fall in the 
interest payments/export ratio reflected a combination of lower interest payments and increased 
export earnings. The improved figure for Colombia, however, was entirely accounted for by the sharp 
increase in the value of its exports. In contrast, the fall in Nicaragua's coefficient was exclusively due 
to its lower interest payments, which more than offset the decline in exports. The rise in the ratio in 
countries such as the Dominican Republic and Paraguay reflected the repercussions of their increased 
interest payments and lower external sales; in other countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Haiti, 








































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council ( 1982, 1985 and 1986). 
Table 34 
































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, and International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
"Corresponds to the interest rate for 180-day Eurodollar deposits in London. Preferential rate granted by United States 
banks to their best clients. 'Nominal rate deflated by the consumer price index of the industrialized 
countries. LIBOR deflated by the unit value of Latin American exports of goods. 
Although interest payments fell in 1986, the region's capacity to finance them with the surplus 
from its trade in goods and services took a sharp turn for the worse. For Latin America as a whole 
(excluding Panama) the trade surplus was equivalent to 45% of interest payments, as against 82% 
and 90% in 1985 and 1984, respectively. This difference was primarily due to the sharp decline in the 
external sales of the petroleum-exporting countries, as a result of which the average percentage of 
interest payments financed by the trade surplus fell from 100% in 1985 to 40% in 1986. For the 
non-petroleum-exporting countries, this figure dropped from 68% to 49% (see table 36). 
There were nonetheless striking contrasts among those countries which earned a trade surplus. 
In the group of petroleum-exporting countries, Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador managed to 
obtain substantial surpluses, although they were lower than those recorded in 1985. In contrast, 
Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela saw their surpluses become deficits. In the group of non-petroleum-
exporting countries, Argentina's and Brazil's disappointing external trade performance pushed down 
their respective coverages from 93% and 97% in 1985 to 52% and 62% in 1986. The percentage of 
interest payments financed by the trade surplus in Colombia and Uruguay rose sharply, however, 
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reaching the equivalent of 97% and 93%, respectively. In Chile this percentage rose from 30% to 
39% while Costa Rica transformed its negative coverage into a slightly positive one. 
The slump in exports and the consequent increase in the debt burden was also apparent in the 
debt/exports coefficient. For the region as a whole, the ratio climbed steeply from 343% in 1985 to 
411% in 1986 (see table 37). This figure constituted an all-time high and was almost double that 
recorded in 1980. As was to be expected, the fall in petroleum prices led to a substantial rise in this 
coefficient for all the petroleum-exporting countries: the record average (420%) was 35% higher 
than in 1985 and was more than double the figure for 1980. Bolivia's coefficient broke the 500% 
barrier, while that of Mexico edged towards this level. 
Figure 11 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. 
aNominal rate deflated by the consumer price index of the industrialized countries. bPrime rate 
granted by United States banks to their best clientes. 
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Table 35 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN TOTAL INTEREST PAYMENTS 









































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund. 
Including interest on the short-term debt. Preliminary figures. 'Does not include Panama. 
In the non-petroleum-exporting countries the debt/exports ratio also rose, although more 
moderately, to a level of 405 %. This figure also constituted a new record, as it surpassed the highest 
level registered until that time (381% in 1983) and was 1.7 times higher than the figure for 1980. 
However, this regional average conceals the great diversity of circumstances existing in the 
different countries. Thus, the increase in the debt and the decline in exports caused a sharp rise in the 
debt/exports coefficient in Nicaragua and Argentina. In Nicaragua the coefficient soared by more 
than 500 points to almost 2 000%, while in Argentina it jumped by 100 points to 606%. For similar 
reasons, the coefficient also rose, although more moderately, in Brazil, Paraguay and the Dominican 
Republic. In contrast, in Colombia, Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica the debt/exports coefficient fell 
sharply. In the first two of these countries, the decrease was accounted for by the vigorous expansion 
of exports, while in the other two it was also due to the growth rate of the debt, which was very low in 
Chile and nil in Costa Rica. The coefficient also fell, although by less, in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Panama, where the expansion of exports was greater than the growth rate of the 
external debt. 
To sum up, the most noteworthy features of the region's external indebtedness in 1986 were the 
complete lack of net disbursements of credit by private banks and the deterioration in major 
indicators of the debt burden, which reached levels as bad as or even worse than those recorded at the 
onset of the crisis. 
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2. Debt renegotiations 
The year was an eventful one in respect of debt renegotiations. The opening of the year followed upon 
the increasingly insistent demands made by the debtor countries in 1985 for a more equitable sharing 
of the costs of the debt crisis, a sentiment which found its full expression in the "Emergency Proposal 
for Negotiations on Debt and Growth" presented in the Montevideo Declaration of the Cartagena 
Consensus in mid-December of that year. 
The already difficult circumstances surrounding debt negotiations were further complicated by 
the spectacular drop in world petroleum prices during the first quarter of 1986. This severely eroded 
the payment capacity of two of the region's principal debtors —Mexico and Venezuela— as well as 
that of other smaller debtor countries (Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia). It also precipitated the opening of 
a fourth round of negotiations on Latin America's external debt (see tables 38 and 39). 
Many of the events of the 1986 debt negotiations revolved around the Mexican case. The 
adjustment programme applied by Mexico began to run into difficulties in 1985. Accordingly, 
towards the end of that year consideration was given to a new global financial proposal for 1986 
which called for fresh loans of approximately US$4 billion, of which US$2.5 billion was to come from 
private banks. Nevertheless, after petroleum prices plummeted at the beginning of 1986, the 
Mexican authorities suggested during the first quarter of the year that they might need between US$9 
billion and US$10 billion in fresh financing. 
Mexico's creditors put up staunch resistance to its attempts to obtain fresh funds. Negotiations 
dragged on until mid-1986, when the recessionary conditions implicit in the creditors' counterprop-
osals prompted the Mexican government to harden its position. The resolute negotiating stance 
Table 36 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN THE TRADE SURPLUS 









































































































































































































Source: ECI.AC, on the basis of data from 
"A minus sign indicates a trade deficit. 
the International Monetary Fund 
'Preliminary figures. 'Does not include Panama. 
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Table 37 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATION BETWEEN TOTAL DISBURSED 



















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Relation between the external public debt and exports of goods and services. 
adopted by Mexico made it necessary for the creditors to give ground, as they feared the direct 
consequences which a unilateral declaration of a moratorium by Mexico would have for them, as well 
as the indirect demonstration effect that it, together with a break with the IMF, might have on other 
debtor countries. 
The new plan put forward by Mexico gave concrete expression to the principles set out in the 
Baker Plan and marked the beginning of the fourth round of debt reschedulings. In exchange for its 
acceptance of an adjustment programme agreed upon with the IMF involving the introduction of 
major reforms to liberalize the economy, Mexico received an explicit guarantee that the funds needed 
to finance growth of not less than 3% in 1987 would be forthcoming. 
The main innovation in this agreement was the provision that global financing would conform 
to the country's economic growth requirements rather than the reverse, as had been the case in the 
adjustment programmes agreed upon in the first three rounds of reschedulings. Thus, the amount of 
financing to be made available would be adjusted in accordance with circumstances on the petroleum 
market and economic growth trends: should the price of petroleum fall below US$9 per barrel, the 
supply of credit would automatically be increased; if, on the other hand, it were to rise above US$14, 
less credit would be made available. Moreover, if projections indicated that economic growth would 
fail to attain the minimum target set for 1987 (3%), Mexico would be entitled to US$500 million in 
fresh funds to stimulate public investment and economic activity. Within the US$9-US$14 petroleum 
price bracket, the proposal relating to global financing for the 18-month period up to December 1987 
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Table 38 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RENEGOTIATION 
OF EXTERNAL DEBT WITH PRIVATE BANKS 
(THIRD ROUND OF RENEGOTIATIONS, 1984/1985)" 
(Millions of dollars) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from the countries and from various national and international sources. 
Note: For detailed information concerning the first and second rounds of renegotiations, see ECLAC, Economic Survey of 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1983, pp. 66-72, and ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
1984, pp. 51-58. 
"Includes countries which signed final or provisional agreements during 1984 or 1985 covering payments falling due in 1985 
and/or preceding years. Also includes countries which had reached no final agreement with international banks during 
preceding rounds of renegotiations and which signed refinancing agreements during the third round. In addition, includes 
Bolivia and Honduras, which were in the process of negotiating with private banks in late 1985 but signed no agreement in 
that year. Does not include the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. 
Refers exclusively to each country's short-, medium- and long-term public and private debt with the private commercial 
banks that provided information to the Bank for International Settlements. Does not, therefore, include debts owed to 
governments and official agencies, to suppliers, or to those commercial banks which do not report to BIS. In some countries 
this last item is significant, and the corresponding figures may therefore underestimate the banking system's share in the 
total external debt. 
cUse of International Monetary Fund credit during 1985. 
In December 1984 Argentina reached a preliminary agreement with the committee of creditor banks which provided for: 1) 
the refinancing of US$13-5 billion in amortization payments on the external debt corresponding to the period 1982-1985; 2) 
new loans from international banks in the amount of US$37 billion and short-term commercial credits totalling US$500 
million; 3) maintenance of lines of short-term commercial credit amounting to US$1.2 billion at a spread of 1.13% over 
LIBOR and with a commission of 0.13%, and lines of short-term inter-bank credit for US$1.4 billion at a spread of 0.25% 
over LIBOR with a commission of 0.13% ; and 4) a commitment on the part of the government to pay nearly US$750 million 
in overdue interest at the end of 1984 and to pay US$750 million in March 1985 of a bridging credit which had been agreed 
upon in 1982 (this was done betweenjune and September 1985). In August 1985 the government signed the final contracts 
for the reprogramming of its external debt. 
' In June 1985 an agreement was reached with IMF which permitted the award of a US$483 million bridging credit; the United 
States Federal Reserve provided US$250 million of this loan and the remaining US$200 million was supplied by 12 
countries. 
^After a number of years of sporadic debt servicing, in April 1984 the government formally suspended amortization and 
interest payments to private banks. In September 1985 the government announced that it was going to ask the private banks 
to grant a 15-year grace period for loan amortization payments, a 10-year grace period for interest payments and a fixed 
annual interest rate of 6%. 
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Table 38 (continued) 
*In early 1985 the government reached a provisional agreement for the rescheduling of US$45 billion in amortization 
payments corresponding to the period 1985-1991 which provided for a spread of 1.25% over LIBOR, a 16-year term and a 
seven-year grace period. This agreement was not finalized, however, because IMF suspended its extended facility 
arrangement due to the country's non-fulfilment of certain monetary and fiscal policy goals specified therein. Lines of short-
term commercial credit in the amount of US$10 billion and lines of short-term inter-bank credit totalling US$5.8 billion 
remained open in 1985. Both of these were granted at a 1 % spread over LIBOR and called for the payment of a commission 
of 0.13%. In March 1986 the parties reached a provisional agreement for the refinancing of US$16.3 billion in amortization 
payments falling due in 1985 and 1986 (US$6.7 billion in 1985 and US$9.6 billion in 1986). In addition, the above-mentioned 
lines of credit remained open until March 1987. 
In July 1985 the country reached a provisional agreement with the committee of creditor banks for the refinancing of US$280 
million in amortization payments corresponding to the period 1985-1986 and for US$75 million in fresh credit. 
'In July 1985 the parties reached an agreement for the refinancing of US$82 million in payments falling due in 1985. In 
addition, lines of short-term commercial credit totalling US$373 million (at a 1.13% spread over LIBOR and with a 
commission of 0.13%) were renewed until September 1986. 
Jlnjune 1985 a provisional agreement was reached with the committeeof creditor banks which provided for the following: 1) 
The restructuring of US$5.7 billion in amortization payments owed by the public sector and by the private financial sector on 
government-guaranteed loans corresponding to the period 1985-1987. Commercial banks may obtain a government 
guarantee for the private financial sector's debt by paying a guaranty commission of 0.50% in 1987, 0.75% in 1990 and 
0.88% in 1994. 2) Fresh loans from private banks for 1985 and 1986 in the amount of US$1.85 billion (US$714 million in 
1985 and US$371 million in 1986). Of this amount, US$300 million was to be disbursed through a co-financing programme 
with the World Bank, under which the World Bank would guarantee US$150 million. 3) As in other countries, the 
international banks improved the terms and conditions of the contracts covering the amounts rescheduled during the first 
round of renegotiations (the interest rate structure applying to 1982/1983 maturities was modified soas to be equivalent to 
the structure for 1985/1987 maturities, and the spread over LIBOR was lowered to 1.75% for the new loans obtained in 
1983). 4) The maintenance until 1987 of lines of short-ter m commercial credit in the amount of US$1.7 billion at a spread of 
1.38% over LIBOR and with a commission of 0.13%. 
These figures correspond to 1985 and 1986, respectively, and include US$150 million guaranteed by the World Bank. 
In December 1984 Ecuador announced that it had reached a provisional agreement with the committee of creditor banks for 
the refinancing of US$4.2 billion of its external debt. This amount included amortization payments which had already been 
rescheduled during the first and second rounds of negotiations. The US$431 million in fresh credit granted by the banks in 
1983 was also restructured, with a 1.63% spread over LIBOR and a 10-year term with a two-year grace period. Lines of short-
term commercial credit totalling US$700 million were also maintained. In December 1985 the rescheduling of the external 
debt was completed and new loans for US$200 million were obtained. 
"Mn April 1985 the country signed a provisional agreement for the reschedulingof US$220 million in amortization payments 
corresponding to the biennium 1985-1986; in the end, however, this agreement did not go into effect. 
"In August 1984 Mexico reached a provisional agreement for the refinancing of US$48.7 billion of its public external debt. 
This sum was made up of the following: 1) US$23.7 billion in payments originally falling due between August 1982 and 
December 1984 which had already been rescheduled during the first round of negotiations; 2) US$20 billions in payments 
origianlly falling due between 1985 and 1990 which had not yet been rescheduled; and 3) US$5 billion in additional loans 
obtained in March 1983. In March 1985 the final contracts for the restructuring of US$28.6 billion were signed with about 
600 creditor banks. These contracts covered the payments mentioned in 1) above as well as the refinancing of the new loan 
arranged in March 1983 and provided for the prepayment during 1985 of US$1.2 billion, a spread of 1.50% over LIBOR and 
a 10-year term with a six-year grace period. In August 1985 final contracts were signed for the restructuring of another 
US$20.1 billion. In addition, lines of short-term credit from EXIMBANK amounting to US$2 billion remained open during 
1985. 
"In June 1985 the goverment reached an agreement with internatinoal banks to postpone US$300 million in amortization 
payments for one year. The government was to pay US$24.2 million in interest (i.e., 2%) during the 12 months ending in 
June 1986. In the past few years, the debt owed to private banks has increased significantly due to interest capitalization 
agreements and the build-up of arrears. 
''Injune 1985 the parties arrived at a provisional agreement for the refinancingof US$603 million in amortization payments 
for 1985-1986. Fresh credits in the amount of US$60 million were also granted. 
' In June 1985 the government reached a provisional agreement for the refinancingof US$790 million in public-and private-
sector amortization payments corresponding to the period 1985-1989. This amount included US$327 million in 
amortization payments which had been refinanced during the first round on different terms, as well as arrears accumulated 
during 1984. 
rIn December 1984 the committee of creditor banks authorized the deferral of amortization payments for six months; this 
was later extended until 30 September 1985. In February 1986 a provisional agreement was reached for the refinancingof 
US$1.7 billion in amortization payments on the public debt for the period 1985-1989. Also restructured were US$240 
million corresponding to a loan signed in 1983 which was refinanced at a spread of 1.63% over LIBOR. The final contracts 
for the refinancing of the debt were signed injury 1986. In October 1986 contracts were signed with 35 commercial banks and 
the World Bank for a US$90 million co-financing operation; the commercial banks are to provide US$45 million of this loan, 
which is to be used for an energy development programme. 
'The international banking system authorized the postponement of payments for three months beginning in October 1982; 
this deferment was extended on eight different occasions, the last one being up to July 1985. In September 1984 the 
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Table 38 (concluded) 
government announced that it had reached a provisional agreement with its creditors, without signing a stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF, under which it is to pay US$21.2 billion of its public external debt over a period of 12 years. In 
May 1985 it announced that it had reached a final agreement concerning a detailed plan for restructuring the public external 
debt which included the amortization of US$750 million in 1986. A novel aspect of this agreement is that it includes a 
contingency clause under which the terms of the agreement may be modified if the country is faced with an economic crisis. 
This clause was invoked in 1986 as a result of the drop in oil prices. Accordingly, the government amortized only US$650 in 
1986 and took steps to secure a new agreement under which its annual debt amortization payments would be reduced. 
represented a total figure of US$12 billion. Approximately half of this amount was to be provided by 
commercial banks, while the rest would come from official international public sources. 
A further innovation, and one which was necessary in order for an expansionary adjustment 
process to be carried out, was that IMF made its criteria for measuring fiscal deficits more flexible. In 
Mexico's case, for the first time the Fund excluded the impact of inflation on interest payments due on 
the domestic debt from its calculations of the operating deficit. As a result, it was estimated that the 
nominal deficit, which represented around 1,3% of the gross domestic product, was equal to an 
operating deficit of barely 3%. In accordance with the programme, Mexico undertook to gradually 
reduce its operating deficit to zero by the end of 1987. However, on account of the methodological 
change mentioned above, the reduction in the nominal deficit during the 18-month period would only 
be from 13% to 10% of the gross domestic product. 
The global financial package designed for Mexico constituted a continuation of the trend 
observed in the previous rounds of reschedulings, each of which had included progressively more 
favourable clauses for the debtors. In the fourth round, the banks agreed to renegotiate almost US$44 
billion of the debt falling due in 1985-1990 at a spread of 0.81% over LIBOR (in comparison to the 
spread of 1.13% charged in the third round and to that of 0.50% paid by some of the most solvent 
non-Latin American developing countries which have independent access to the Eurocurrency 
market). Moreover, the amortization period offered in respect of the rescheduled maturities was 20 
years, with seven years grace, as against a total period of 14 years in the preceding round. Nor was any 
provision made for the payment of commissions, a precedent which had been established in the third 
round of negotiations. The fresh bank loans of US$6 billion were also subject to a spread of 0.81 %. 
The amortization period for these loans was set at 12 years and no commission was charged (see 
table 40). 
However, because the international banking community was reluctant to provide the fresh 
funding which had been agreed upon, it held up the signature of a definitive agreement as well as the 
disbursement of the US$6 billion in additional financing. Consequently, in order to ensure that the 
country would have the external funding it needed during the intervening period, the creditor banks 
on the Steering Committee agreed to grant a short-term emergency loan, which was paid of fonce the 
country began to receive the US$12 billion credit.2 
Although Mexico was unquestionably the centre of attention during the 1986 debt negotiations, 
other countries also played leading roles in significant events. 
During the first quarter, after prolonged negotiations, Bolivia signed a special drawing rights 
agreement with IMF. This paved the way for negotiations with its creditors concerning the payment of 
capital and interest in arrears totalling approximately US$ 1 billion which had been accumulated since 
1982, mainly with foreign commercial banks. The agreement with IMF also made it possible for the 
Bolivian government to carry out renegotiations with the Paris Club concerning debts it had 
contracted with governmental creditors in which it requested a 10-year extension for maturities 
corresponding to 1986 and 1987. 
For its part, towards the middle of the year Brazil signed an agreement to renegotiate with 
private banks the payment of US$6 billion in arrears going back to 1985 and of US$9.5 billion 
maturing in 1986; in addition, it obtained lines of short-term commercial credit for US$15.5 billion. A 
spread of 1.13% over LIBOR was established for the rescheduled credits together with an amortization 
2The agreement was not finalized until March 1987, i.e. more than six months after the initial agreement was reached 
with the Steering Committee of creditor banks. 
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Table 39 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RENEGOTIATION 
OF EXTERNAL DEBT WITH PRIVATE BANKS 
(FOURTH ROUND OF RENEGOTIATIONS, 1986/1987)" 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from the countries and from various national and international sources. 
Note: For detailed information concerning the first and second rounds of renegotiations, see ECLAC, Economic Survey of 
Latin A rnerica and the Caribbean 1983, pp. 66-72 and ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin A merica and the Caribbean 
J984, pp. 51-58. 
"Includes countries which signed final or provisional agreements during 1986 or 1987 covering payments falling due in 1986 
and/or subsequent years and those which obtained additional loans as part of their debt restructuring. Also includes the 
countries which announced that they intended to negotiate a restructuring of their liabilities, either to eliminate arrears or to 
refinance debts about to mature. Does not include the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean. 
'Refers exclusively to each country's short-, medium- and long-term public and private debt with the private commercial 
banks that provide information to the Bank for International Settlements. Does not, therefore, include dets owed to 
governments and official agencies, to suppliers, or to commercial banks which do not report to BIS. In some countries this 
last item is significant, and the corresponding figures may therefore underestimate the banking system's share in the total 
external debt. 
'Use of International Monetary Fund credit during 1986. 
Beginning in April 1986 the international banking system twice authorized the postponement of amortization payments for 
six months. In April 1987 the parties reached a provisional agreement providing for: 1) the refinancing of US$29.5 billion in 
amortization payments on the external debt, with US$4.2 billion of that amount corresponding to the restructuring of fresh 
credits granted in 1983 and 1984; 2) loans amounting to US$1.95 billion (US$400 million of this sum corresponded to lines 
of short-term credit and another US$500 million was to disbursed through a cofinancing programme with the World Bank); 
and 3) the maintenance of lines of short-term credit totalling US$2.2 billion. 
'In February 1987, 15 industrialized countries granted a bridging loan for US$500 million while the country awaited the 
disbursement of the credit granted by IMF in response to the drop in export prices. 
^In April 1984 the government suspended amortization and interest payments to private banks. It continues to engage in 
talks with its creditor banks concerning the sums owed. As of the end of 1986, its interest payments in arrears amounted to 
US$300 million. In April 1987 the goverment made a formal offer to buy back its debt of US$670 million from the 
commercial banks at a tiny fraction of its nominal value. 
8In mid-1986 the government announced that it wished to negotiate with its creditors in order to reduce its transfer of 
resources to them from its current level of nearly 4% of the country's gross domestic product to 2.5%. Then, on 20 February 
1987, the government suspended amortization and interest payments on its external debt to commercial banks. This 
measure did not apply, however, to payments on short-term loans. In May 1987 the government requested a 90-day deferral 
of payments on lines of short-term commercial credit totalling US$10 billion and on lines of short-term inter-bank credit 
amounting to US$5 billion. In June 1987 the government stated that it would lift its partial moratorium if the private banks 
would agree to refinance 50% of the interest. 
The government suspended interest payments to private banks beginning on 7 May 1986. It then proposed a multi-annual 
reprogramming scheme in December 1986 (a term of 25 years, a grace period of seven years and a reduction of interest rates 
to4% in 1986-1987, to 5% in 1988 and to 6% in 1989). Asashow of good faith, italsobegan to pay US$5million per month 
to the private banks in part payment of the interest owed. 
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Table 39 (concluded) 
'In July 1986 the government requested the refinancing of its amortization payments for 1986 and 1987, suspended interest 
payments, and requested fresh loans for around US$300 million. In December 1986 it was informed that the banks were 
offering a credit of US$85 million, the reprogramming of US$75 million in amortization paymentsdue in 1986and the roll-
over of lines of short-term credit for one year. 
1
 Loans requested. 
In February 1987 the country reached a provisional agreement with the committee of creditor banks which provided for: 1) 
the restructuring of US$12.49 billion (US$10.6 billion of this amount corresponded to amortization payments to be made by 
the public and private sectors on government-guaranteed loans and payments to be made by the private sector on 
unguaranteed loans for the period 1988-1991; the remaining US$1.89 billion corresponded to the restructuring of fresh 
loans obtained during previous rounds of renegotiations); 2) the maintenance up to 1989 of lines of commercial credit 
amounting to US$1.7 billion at a 1.12% spread over LIBOR; and 3) an agreement that interest payments would by made 
once per year beginning on I January 1988. The final contracts for the refinancing of the debt were signed in June 1987. 
In January 1987 the government began to fall into arrears with its debt payments. In March it formally announced an 
indefinite suspension of amortization and interest payments. It was estimated that during 1987 interest payments to private 
banks would total US$450 million. 
"Mn May 1986 the United States Department of the Treasury granted a short-term (150-day) loan for US$150 million. 
"The government is once again making arrangements for the refinancing of US$218 million in amortization payments 
coresponding to 1985 and 1986 in addition to its 1987-1989 maturities. (In 1985 it had arrived at a provisional agreement, 
but this was never finalized.) Honduras submitted a proposal to the international banks for the conversion of US$43.4 
million in arrears into fresh loans and the refinancing of 100% of its outstanding maturities fora 19-year term with a three-
year grace period at an interest rate equivalent to LIBOR, without surcharges. The banks' counterproposal provided for an 
amortization period of 14 years and a 1.75% spread over LIBOR, conditional upon the immediate payment of 10% of the 
debt balance. Early in 1987 the international banks announced that if the country wished to continue the talks it would have 
to pay its interest arrears and sign an agreement with IMF. 
"In March 1986 the committee of creditor banks authorized the postponement of US$950 million in amortization payments 
which had been arranged for during the third round of renegotiations. In July 1986 the committee of creditor banks agreed to 
reschedule maturities and to grant US$6 billion in financing subject to the signing of an agreement with IMF; this condition 
was met during the same month. The agreement, which was signed in March 1987, covered the following: I) the 
restructuring of US$43.7 billion in amortization payments on the public external debt which had already been renegotiated 
during the third round; 2) new loans from private banks for 1986 and 1987 amounting to US$6 billion, of which US$500 
million are to be confinanced and hence guaranteed by the World Bank; 3) stand-by financing totalling US$1.7 billion, with 
the disbursement of this credit depending upon oil prices and the growth of the product and Investment In 1987; 4) 
maintenance up to 1989 of lines of inter-bank credit for US$5.2 billion; 5) the option, upon the signing of the agreement, of 
obtaining an additional US$6.4 billion from'the governments of the creditor countries and international lending agencies. 
'Private external debt registered with the exchange-risk coverage trust fund (FICORCA). 
'Includes US$1.6 billion in IMF credits, US$2 billion in World Bank loans, US$1 billion in investments by Japan, and the 
refinancing of debts through the Paris Club representing a saving of US$1.8 billion in short-term payments. 
'The government is in arrears with its interest payments on the external debt. 
"In October 1986 the international banks authorized a six-month postponement of payments which was then extended in 
order to allow the negotiation of a multi-annual external debt restructuring agreement. The attainment of an agreement has 
been hampered, however, by the difficulties encountered in fulfilling the requirements of a Structural Adjustment Lending 
(SAL) programme with the World Bank. On 1 June 1987 the government formally suspended payment on Interest and 
capital to government creditors and payments on the capital of debts owed to private banks. 
'In March 1987 a provisional agreement was reached for a second restructuring of USS20.45 billion in public-sector 
amortization payments which had already been refinanced in February 1986. This agreement permits the government to 
reduce the amortization payments arranged for under the preceding agreement from around US$1 billion to US$250 million 
in 1987, US$400 million in 1988 and US$700 million in 1989. 
"In December 1986 the government proposed a plan to the private banks for the rescheduling of US$6 billion in amortization 
payments on the private debt. This plan provides, inter alia, for a term of eight years and for quarterly amortization 
payments beginning with the first quarter of 1987. 
period of 12 years with five years grace, and no commission was charged. These were better terms 
than those obtained in Brazil's previous rescheduling, which had been carried out during the second 
round and had included a 2% spread over LIBOR, an amortization period of nine years and a 1% 
commission (see tables 38 and 40). 
Brazil succeeded in rescheduling its debt with commercial banks despite its refusal to accept an 
IMF programme, which has traditionally been a precondition for undertaking any rescheduling of 
commitments. However, the Paris Club proved less flexible, and its insistence that the country should 
sign an agreement with the Fund posed an obstacle to the rescheduling of Brazil's bilateral debt with 
each of the member governments of the Club. In the absence of a rescheduling agreement, Brazil 
accumulated arrears in its payments to government creditors; nevertheless, in mid-1986 it unilater-
ally began to deposit funds in the accounts of its creditors as a provisional solution to the problem. In 
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Table 40 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): TERMS OF RESCHEDULING 
OF EXTERNAL DEBT OWED TO PRIVATE BANKS 


















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data from the countries and from various national and international sources. 
"Column R refers to rescheduled maturities and column AC to the terms and conditions for additional 
credits. Calculated as a percentage of the total amount of the transaction and paid once only upon the signing of the 
loan contracts. There is evidence that some commissions were never declared, and these figures may consequently 
underestimate the commissions paid. ' Weighted average determined on the basis of the sums represented by 
rescheduled amortization payments and additional credits. Spread over LIBOR applying to rescheduled payments in 
the event that the commercial banks do not request a guarantee from the Government of Chile for the rescheduling of the 
private financial sector's debt. If the international banks were to use this option, they would have to pay a guaranty 
commission of 0.50';? in 1987, 0.759? in 1980 and 0.889? in 1994. 'A refinancing agreement was reached without the 
government having signed any arrangement with the International Monetary Fund. Terms for the refinancing of the 
public-sector debt. "During the first two years, the average applicable rate is to be 0.889? over LIBOR; during the 
following five years, the spread over LIBOR is to be 1.139?, and during the final seven years, 1.259?. Amortization 
payments are to be very low during the first few years and are then to increase over time. ' Exit bonds are to be made 
available to small and medium-sized banks if they did not wish to take part in the lending of fresh funds. The bond has a term 
of 25 years and a fixed annual interest rate of 39?. JThe term for the restructuring of new loans granted in 1983 and 1984 
is 12 years. * The spread over LIBOR is 1.139? for the restructuring of fresh loans obtained during previous external 
debt renegotiations. 
August the government also announced that, in order to support the process of investment and 
growth, it would seek an agreement with its creditors for the establishment of a negotiated ceiling on 
debt payments equivalent to 2.5% of the country's gross domestic product, a considerably lower 
percentage than the approximately 4% of the product recorded in 1984-1985. 
In February 1986, as part of the third round of negotiations, Venezuela signed a rescheduling 
agreement with its creditor banks (see table 38). The agreement provided for the postponement of 
US$21 billion in payments originally scheduled for the six-year period between 1983 and 1989. 
























































































































































agreement would be fulfilled. Indeed, in April the government invoked an escape clause contained in 
the February agreement, which allowed it to renegotiate the terms of the agreement should economic 
conditions take a turn for the worse. 
Towards the middle of the year the Venezuelan Congress drew up a new plan for the 
management of the registered private-sector debt, which was estimated at approximately US$7 
billion. This plan called for the elimination of the subsidized exchange rate of 4.3 bolívares to the 
dollar applying to the servicing of this debt. Debtors were also to be required to purchase dollar bonds 
issued by the government, which would unilaterally take the place of cash payments to banks. The 
bonds would have an amortization period of 15 years and would pay 5 % interest, which was below the 
market rate. Venezuela's creditors, together with a number of debtors in the country's private sector, 
put up determined resistance to the plan, and in August the government withdrew the proposal, 
although it maintained the devaluation of the exchange rate for the servicing of the private external 
debt. Along with the devaluation decreed in December, the government announced a fresh plan; 
while under this plan the government refused to guarantee private-sector debts, it did offer private 
debtors a guaranteed and subsidized exchange rate of 7.5 bolívares to the dollar (plus the payment of a 
premium to the Central Bank) for the servicing of their commitments to foreign bankers who offered 
a repayment period of no less than eight years. 
Cuba, which had not fallen behind in the interest payments on its debt, also encountered 
difficulties in 1986. The fall in sugar production and the decline in its profits from the re-export of 
petroleum combined to spark off an acute shortage of foreign exchange. Towards the middle of the 
year amortization payments were suspended together with disbursements in respect of interest. 
Subsequently, talks were begun with its creditors in order to find the best way of solving the problem. 
The government sought between US$300 million and US$500 million in fresh credit to refinance 
part of the interest owed and to reschedule amortization payments. Meanwhile, the maturities 
corresponding to 1986 were rescheduled with the member governments of the Paris Club. 
Costa Rica suspended payment of its debt in May due to a foreign exchange shortage. The 
problem arose partly as a result of the difficulties the country had in complying with the IMF 
programme, in view of which both this agency and the World Bank suspended the disbursement of 
previously-arranged credits. Subsequent to new agreements between the government and the 
creditors in respect of economic conditionally, the disbursements of the loans were resumed and 
conditions more conducive to solving the problem of payments were established. In October the 
government submitted an attractive proposal to its creditor banks. This proposal called for the 
reprogramming of outstanding debts over the next 25 years, with seven years grace. The rate of 
interest was to be 4% and would gradually rise to a 6% maximum in 1993, while no commission was 
to be paid. Under this plan total annual debt payments to banks were to be limited to the equivalent of 
approximately 1.5% of the gross domestic product. As an expression of goodwill, the government 
began to remit US$5 million per month to the creditor banks as part payment of the interest on its 
external debt. 
During the first half of the year Peru continued to apply its policy of restricting payments on the 
medium- and long-term public debt entered into before July 1985 to 10% of the country's export 
earnings. This policy set no limit on the servicing of the short-term debt, on that of the private-sector 
debt or on payment in kind. As regards the medium- and long-term public debt, priority was given to 
servicing commitments to those creditors which were actually providing the country with net loans; 
in respect of the others —for the most part commercial banks— the refinancing of payments and the 
capitalization of interest were imposed unilaterally. By the end of 1986, the arrears in interest 
payments owed to banks —which had in fact begun to build up towards the end of 1984 under the 
previous government— were in excess of US$1 billion. 
In July, after having assessed the country's payment capacity, the government decided to extend 
the 10% limit on the servicing of the medium- and long-term public debt for another year. The need 
to conserve the scant supply of foreign exchange in order to finance the country's growth also 
prompted the government to introduce a ceiling on payments of the private sector's medium- and 
long-term debt and to place a two-year restriction on the remittance of profits on foreign investment. 
Servicing of the short-term debt, however, remained normal. 
Further difficulties arose between Peru and the IMF during 1986. The country had actually been 
making a net transfer of resources to this agency, partly on account of its decision not to sign new 
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stand-by credit agreements. As a result, the Fund felt itself to be potentially at risk as a consequence of 
the Peruvian decision to place a limit on debt service payments, and proceeded to set a 15 August 
deadline for the payment by Peru of US$180 million in arrears of interest and principal which had 
been accumulating since September 1985. When the government set a US$35 million ceiling on 
payments, the Fund declared Peru to be "ineligible" to receive fresh loans. By the end of 1986, US$250 
million in arrears were owed to the Fund. 
Peru continued to experiment with plans to allow it to service its debt through payments in 
kind. In 1986 this form of payment (mostly to governments of centrally-planned economies) 
represented US$110 million, as against US$160 million the year before. However, a number of banks 
began talks with the Peruvian government concerning the possibility of payments in kind; Further-
more, negotiations with one United States bank concerning debt payments in the form of non-
traditional Peruvian exports were at an advanced stage. 
Chile continued to lead the field in taking advantage of the discounts on the nominal value of its 
external loan securities which are traded on secondary markets. Generally speaking, both foreign 
investors and Chilean residents and non-residents have the opportunity to use their own foreign 
exchange resources to purchase the country's debt certificates, which were being sold at a discount of 
between 30% and 35% on foreign markets in 1986. These certificates can then be converted into 
pesos in Chile at their nominal value, less a direct or indirect discount applied in the country, which is 
lower than that in force abroad. The payments in pesos can take the form of financial securities, cash 
or share capital, depending on the circumstances of the transaction and the preferences of the 
certificate holders. In 1986 the debt was reduced by approximately US$800 million by means of this 
mechanism. A number of foreign banks have made use of this programme in order to transform debts 
into shares in the Chilean financial sector. 
At the end of 1986, Chile also began negotiations with a view to a fourth round of rescheduling. 
One innovation in the initial proposal made to creditors was that the funds for the 1987-1988 
financial programme should not come from fresh loans, but instead from reductions in the interest 
rate and from the retiming of payments from a half-yearly basis to a yearly one. 
Jamaica's relations with its creditors became tenser in 1986 due to the country's difficulties in 
meeting the adjustment criteria set by the Fund. Arrears began to build up (approximately US$60 
million) during the year as the, government postponed the payment of its debts to the Fund. 
Finally, for the first time since the outbreak of the crisis, two Latin American countries whose 
debt had been rescheduled obtained voluntary private loans in 1986. In October, a French bank 
announced that it had set up a pre-export financing service for Ecuador involving US$220 million at a 
1.5% spread over LIBOR. This service, which is self-financing and consequently involves little risk, 
was found so attractive that it was oversubscribed by international banks. Uruguay also received a 
voluntary loan of US$45 million from a banking consortium, although this credit had the exceptional 




THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION BY COUNTRIES 

ARGENTINA 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The recovery of economic activity after six years of recession, the drop of the inflation rate below 
100% for the first time since 1980 and a pronounced deterioration in the external sector were the 
main features of the economy of Argentina in 1986 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The gross domestic product grew by 6.0% and although this figure was slightly higher than that 
of 1984, it still remained 7% lower than that of 1980. The rise in the production of manufactures 
(12.8%) was noteworthy and exceeded the increases observed in previous periods of recovery. Fixed 
investment rose by 11%, thereby breaking the sharp downward trend which began in 1981. The 
growth of capital formation —which still remained at a very low level— was apparently attributable 
to relatively widespread decisions in the private sector, prompted by the increased activity and lower 
degree of uncertainty, and to the continuation of works already started by the public sector. 
The consumer price index climbed 82%, which, although high by international standards, was 
the lowest recorded in the country since the mid-1970s. 
In the external sector, the increase in imports, the drop in international export prices and the 
smaller agricultural production combined to cut the merchandise trade surplus by half. Because of this 
change, and despite the lower interest payments, the current account deficit increased almost 
three-fold and international reserves declined by US$700 million. 
Although these results together compare favourably with those of recent years, the economy 
has been beset by the considerable tensions that have marked Argentina for a long time. 
When the Plan Austral was introduced in June 1985, the inflation rate plummeted but this did 
not cause a contraction in economic activity as had occurred with previous attempts at stabilization. In 
fact, after an initial slide, there was a marked recovery in demand and production in late 1985. 
Nevertheless, the economic policy-makers were faced with difficult decisions. After some months, 
the higher relative prices of basic consumer goods (meat and in particular fresh vegetables) and of 
private-sector services had pushed up consumer prices more than had been expected. Seeing that the 
freeze introduced in June was in force, this price increase set a kind of lower limit or "floor" for 
inflationary expectations, while it also eroded the initial gain in the purchasing power of wages that 
had been secured by the reduction in the "inflation tax". Consequently, towards the end of 1985, many 
private firms began to grant wage adjustments more or less proportionate to the consumer price 
increase. Strong pressures for wage increases were also felt in the public sector. Although the fiscal 
deficit had dropped considerably, especially because of the real increase in the amount of tax collected, 
it was obvious that public finances were going to need continued attention. Moreover, notwithstand-
ing the increase in activity, there was intense pressure to apply more expansionary policies and to 
reduce the real interest rates, which were still high. 
In such circumstances, the attempt to reach an even lower inflation rate could raise several 
problems. In particular, this would have meant keeping all the prices that are subject most directly to 
government control (exchange rates, public service rates, and to a lesser extent the prices of 
manufactured goods), constant, or allowing them to increase only very gradually, at the risk of 
distorting relative prices if the inflation rate did not approach the targeted level. In addition, tighter 
fiscal and monetary control would have been required, because if the aggregate demand slowed down 
while the private sector did not anticipate a further drop in inflation, this could have led to a drop in 
the level of economic activity. In view of the above, plus the intense distribution struggle and the very 
deep-rooted inflationary behaviour, it was foreseeable that any attempt to compress prices further 
could be expected to involve high potential costs. 
In the months immediately after the establishment of the stabilization programme, there was a 
fear that when the price freeze was lifted, this might result in the return of very high inflation rates. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1 (concluded) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnuaI growth rate. t> Average annual rate in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires. 
cPercentage variation from December to December. d u m i o n s 0f dollars. Percentages. 
Consequently, when the government decided to terminate the freeze in order to create a more flexible 
price and wage system, it tried to maintain guidelines that would forestall any sudden changes and 
keep inflation at a moderate level. Thus, in April 1986, when the economic authorities raised the 
exchange rate by 3.7% and increased public service rates, they also decreed that in future both these 
items would be subject to periodic adjustments. At the same time, they laid down provisions to 
regulate the prices of manufactures by means of a cost transfer system, concentrated on the largest 
companies. The authorities further announced that wages, which had been increased by 5% in 
January, would be adjusted by a further 8.5 % in the second half of the year, and companies and labour 
unions were convened to draw up new basic wage scales, taking into account the increases that had 
occurred during the freeze. 
The deficit of the non-financial public sector was kept low during the second half of the year, 
albeit with some difficulties. The monetary expansion was, however, significant, particularly because 
of the expansion of the rediscounts aimed at financing loans for housing and certain regional 
activities and at helping the banking sector. At the same time, the growth of demand for money 
(which had been very rapid at the start of the stabilization programme) was slowed down. The 
greater availability of liquidity pushed down nominal interest rates, but this did not affect the parallel 
exchange market, as was indicated by the fact that the gap between the parallel and the official market 
rates shrank to such a point that the difference was non-existent or even negative at times. 
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Although the lifting of the freeze did not trigger a sudden price increase, the inflation rate 
accelerated and in the second quarter of the year the consumer price index rose at an average rate of 
4.5% per month (see table 2). The rise in prices was fairly widespread and the variation in relative 
prices was less than in previous months. However, nominal wages substantially exceeded the limits 
set by the government, because in many cases the agreements between the companies and the labour 
unions entailed major increases in effective wages rather than merely keeping wages up to their 
existing level. In addition, public service rates and the exchange rate were gradually increasing 
although the latter rose more slowly than domestic prices. In a context of growing demand, these cost 
increases were reflected in prices. 
Consequently, inflation speeded up again during the third quarter, because of the way in which 
the price and wage liberalization instituted in April was carried out and also because of the permissive 
monetary policy. The announcement that consumer prices had risen by 7 % in July caused deep 
concern. The parallel exchange market reacted swiftly and many companies decided to accelerate 
their price mark-ups. The resurgence of inflation represented a serious challenge to economic policy 
because it called the programme's credibility into question and because, at a time when it appeared 
that indexation on the basis of past inflation was becoming habitual, there was the danger that high 
rates of price increases would be perpetuated. 
The government reacted to this situation by speeding up the rate of devaluation and increasing 
the regulated interest rate in mid-August. Early in September it announced a series of broader 
measures, aimed both at preventing a return to automatic indexation and at strengthening its control 
over monetary issues. These measures included: the slowing down of the increases in the charges for 
public services, the exchange rate and industrial prices; the application during the fourth quarter of 
the wage guidelines laid down in July for the second half of the year; a stricter control by the Central 
Bank of the factors of expansion of the monetary base; and the broadening of bank operations in an 
attempt to absorb the marginal credit market. During the weeks following these announcements, 
interest rates moved up sharply and the growth of industrial activity slackened. The rate of price 
variations also fell: the consumer price index, which had risen by 8.8% in August, recorded an 
increase of only 4.7% in December, while the growth rate of wholesale prices dipped even more 
sharply (from 9.4% in August to 3.0% in December). 
Nevertheless, the drop in inflation failed to dispel the prevailing uncertainty as to the future 
performance of the economy. The resurgence of inflation in the third quarter exerted pressure on the 
exchange market, which gave rise to a considerable gap between the parallel and the official dollar, 
and this gap did not narrow even after the interest rate climbed steeply and the pace of inflation 
slowed. This phenomenon manifested itself with particular force during December, when the 
economy began to feel the impact of economic agents' unfavourable expectations regarding the 
outcome of the negotiations with creditor banks, the forthcoming wage negotiations and the control 
of fiscal and monetary policies. 
In short, throughout 1986, the country's macroeconomic policy-makers attempted to ensure 
that the policies on aggregate demand and on price and income regulation would be consistent with 
one another in an effort to reduce the level of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the economy was subject to 
shocks, as was only to be expected given the severity of the existing external constraints, the 
limitations of supply and the intensity of the conflict regarding distribution. Towards the end of the 
year, the most pressing matters continued to be the control of the fiscal deficit and the definition of 
the government's policies on income for the coming year, especially in view of the fact that the 
convening of collective labour negotiations had already been announced. The definition of these 
policies would have a significant impact not only on future price trends but also on the outlook for 
economic activity, since the possibility of increasing the volume of available credit would depend on 
the expectations of economic agents and the public sector's financial requirements. The backdrop For 
all of these factors was a difficult international context which provided no indication that any 
recovery of export prices could be expected. 
Over and above considerations of short-term economic management and the problems which 
the debt burden continues to pose, it is obvious that for a long time now the Argentine economy has 
been bedeviled by serious functional difficulties which have prevented sustained growth. After the 
stabilization programme was launched, the debate over the reforms needed to change this situation 
grew more heated. Given the complexity of the issue, it is only natural that this controversy should be 
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a protracted one, but in 1986 some important measures were nevertheless adopted. These 
included a number of agreements which were signed with Brazil with a view to heightening the 
complementarity of the two economies in order to create additional investment opportunities and 
reduce domestic costs in both. Sectoral programmes aimed at promoting exports of manufactures and 
encouraging industrial investment were also announced. In addition, towards the end of the year the 
authorities made known a series of measures designed to reorganize the public sector. These basically 
consisted of eliminating superfluous jobs, establishing a wage structure within the government 
service and introducing guidelines aimed at making State entrepreneurial activity more efficient. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The wide swings seen in economic activity in Argentina since the beginning of the decade have 
had numerous but nonetheless clearly distinguishable causes: the adjustment of the economy to the 
severe external crisis of 1981-1982, the growth of domestic demand spurred by increased consump-
tion in 1983-1984, and the sharpening of inflation in 1985. 
The final months of 1985 saw a marked recovery in the level of activity which extended into the 
third quarter of 1986. This recovery differed from that of the 1983-1984 biennium in two respects. 
The first was its association with the abrupt subsidence of inflation observed in the second half of 
1985, which permitted a return to more normal economic conditions. The second was the fact that it 
was not based solely on the growth of consumption but also on an upswing in investment which 
marked a reversal of the steady downward trend of the latter since 1981. Although these two factors 
tend to place the present recovery on a sounder footing, it cannot be said that the conditions for 
sustained growth have been restored because the level of gross capital formation remains very low. 
The gross domestic product increased by 5.7% in 1986. As tends to be the case during the 
cyclical recoveries of domestic activity, the growth rate for imports was quite high (21%). Conse-
quently, total supply expanded by 6.6% (see table 3). 
The fastest growing component of aggregate demand was gross domestic investment, which 
rose 18.5% from its depressed level of 1985. Gross fixed capital formation climbed by 11%, which 
brought the fixed investment coefficient up to 12.3%; this figure was still, however, much lower than 
those recorded up to 1981. Even though the increase in investment was quite widespread, it was 
higher in machinery and equipment (21%) than in construction (7%). 
The increase in purchases of durable production equipment was associated with a greater 
utilization of installed capacity, which stimulated the replacement of such equipment. The availability 
of official lines of credit, as well as the decline in interest rates observed during a good part of the year, 
also had a positive effect, although interest rates headed back up during the last few months of 1986. 
The upswing in construction was attributable to the increased volume of public works (42%), 
since private construction dropped by 8% due to the fact that the effects of the insufficient supply of 
housing credit and of the high interest rates that prevailed during the second half of the year 
outweighed the potentially expansionary impact of the higher level of income. 
When the situation is considered from a longer-term perspective, it becomes evident that the 
functional problems of the Argentine economy continue to have an adverse effect on investment 
decisions. The greater control of inflation has unquestionably helped to diminish economic uncer-
tainty and instability, thereby stimulating a more active search for and utilization of investment 
opportunities. Nevertheless, there are problems which continue to stand in the way of a full recovery 
by capital formation. Specifically, the scarcity of resources caused by the country's external debt 
obligations and the capital market's lack of success in channelling a sufficient level of savings in this 
direction continue to restrict the amount of funds available for capital formation. Furthermore, 
because of the still considerable degree of economic uncertainty, business enterprises remain reluc-
tant to tackle new projects despite the slowdown of inflation and the upturn in economic activity. 
The changes observed in inventories once again played a contractive role in the economy, 
although to a much less significant degree than in 1985. Stocks of industrial products went down 
sharply with the launching of the stabilization programme in June 1985, and this trend continued into 
the first part of 1986. When sales slumped towards the end of the year, however, it appears that stocks 
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may have risen above the desired levels, particularly in view of the upward movement of interest 
rates. 
Consumption climbed by almost 8%, reaching a slightly higher level than that of 1984. The rise 
in available income contributed to the increase in the consumption of both non-durables and 
durables; in the case of durable goods (which showed above-average growth), the positive effects of 
the drop in inflation and the expansion of commercial credit were also factors. 
Lastly, Argentina's export performance was diametrically opposed to that of the preceding 
year: whereas in 1985 exports were the only component of aggregate demand which grew, in 1986 
they were the only component which decreased (-14%). This was accounted for by the decline in 
traditional exports and of cereals in particular, which resulted from the fall in international prices and 
from especially adverse weather conditions. 
b) The main sectors 
The increase in the gross domestic product was the outcome of a widespread recovery in the 
various sectors of production, with the exception of agriculture and mining, where activity declined 
slightly (see table 4). 
i) Agriculture. Output in this sector slipped by almost 1% due to poorer harvests of cereals and 
industrial crops, despite the expanded production of vegetables and legumes, wool, milk and 
farmhouse products (see table 5). 
The grain harvest during the 1985/1986 crop year was 12% smaller than the record harvest of 
1984/1985. This reduction was primarily attributable to the decline in the cereal harvest, which was 
due to the decrease in the area under cultivation and to the lower yields resulting from bad weather. In 
the case of wheat in particular, the heavy rains of late 1985 and early 1986 caused considerable 
flooding in the province of Buenos Aires and destroyed a large part of the harvest. Furthermore, the 
amount of land planted during the 1986/1987 crop year was about 2.4 million hectares (-11%) less 
than in the preceding year and 3.8 million hectares (-16.4%) less than the record land area sown in 
1983/1984. Unlike what had occurred during the preceding agricultural year, this contraction was 
very widespread: a decrease was seen, for the fourth consecutive year, in wheat and sorghum, as well 
as in all the other winter cereals; in addition, however, the 1986 reduction took in the sunflower and 
maize crops as well. The exception to the rule was soya, whose area under cultivation was expanded 
(see table 6). 
The decline in cattle herds which had begun in late 1984 became more marked in the 1985/1986 
stock-raising year. Between 1985 and 1986 inventories appear to have fallen by 1.5 million head 
(-2.8%), bringing their level as of June 1986 to 52.5 million head, which was much the same as in 
1982 and 11% lower than in 1977, when cattle inventories reached an all-time high (see table 7). 
A number of stock-raising indicators provided evidence of this trend in inventories. One of 
these was slaughtering, which, after having stabilized in the early part of 1986, increased again during 
the second half of the year, mainly as a consequence of the growth of domestic consumption. The 
proportion of total slaughtering represented by that of cows and heifers in 1986 did not provide any 
indication of variations in the trend of this cycle either. Nonetheless, some changes did occur during 
the -year which generally accompany the reversal of such a trend. Firstly, relative livestock prices 
continued their recovery, which was helped along by, inter alia, the increase in international prices. 
Hence, the price of steers, in terms of industrial goods, soared by 41 % between the first six months of 
1985 and the same period of 1986 and by 46% between the second half of the former year and the 
second half of the latter. A similar recovery was also seen in terms of crop prices (see table 7). 
Secondly, larger export volumes were recorded in the latter part of the year, and there were 
widespread expectations that Argentina's share of the international market would increase. 
As a consequence of the above and of the dissimilar behaviour of grain and meat prices, the 
prospects for the producers of these two items in 1986 differed. This change in relative prices may 
have contributed to a transfer of production resources from grain crops to stock-raising, although 
within the limitations inherent in the financial situation in this sector. 
ii) Mining. In 1986 both mining and petroleum output fell for the third year in a row (see table 
8). Among the various causes of the decrease in oil production, the most important may have been the 
decision taken by Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), a State enterprise, to cut back its drilling 
programme due to financial constraints. In addition, the drop in international prices constituted a 
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disincentive to the implementation of risk contracts which would have relied on the use of private 
capital for the exploration and exploitation of new areas under what is known as the Houston Plan. 
Nevertheless, a number of contracts were signed with national and international consortiums which 
provide for an investment of approximately US$200 million over the next six years. 
In contrast, the volume of natural gas injected increased somewhat more than 9%. Because of 
the relative abundance of natural gas, the country's energy policy continued to give priority to the 
substitution of natural gas for liquid fuels. The supply was further augmented by the discovery of 
another large natural gas field which is similar in size to the Loma de La Lata deposit. With respect to 
the latter, a number of investment proposals have been made by foreign consortiums to build a 
natural gas pipeline from Neuquén through Bahía Blanca to Buenos Aires. In addition, near the end of 
the year an agreement in principle was reached between the government and a Dutch consortium, 
Cogasco S.A., with respect to the current debt and early transfer of the Centro-Oeste gas pipeline to 
Gas del Estado, which would permit this enterprise to carry out the planned expansion of its 
transport capacity. 
The production of commercial coal —which had fallen by more than 20% in 1985— shrank 
almost 9%. Because of this decline and the increase in domestic demand, imports had to be raised by 
50%. 
iii) Manufacturing. The vigorous recovery of industrial activity which had begun in late 1985 
continued in 1986, especially during the first nine months of the year. The annual variation in the 
manufacturing industry's gross domestic product (almost 13%) was the highest in recent years and 
brought activity in the sector back up to its 1984 levels. 
The high growth rate of the first quarter decreased notably in the second (chiefly because of 
trade union conflicts in the metal manufactures and machinery sector), but rose again during the third 
quarter.1 Nevertheless, as a result of a slump in sales, the growth of production slackened in the last 
quarter of the year. 
Industrial expansion was widespread although, as is usual, the sectors which manufacture 
consumer durables and capital goods grew more rapidly than others. Business enterprises reacted 
cautiously to the increased demand: industrial employment showed little change and there were 
apparently no large increases in capacity. 
This evolution of the industrial sector was influenced by different factors of demand and supply. 
On the demand side, these factors included an increase in wage-earners' purchasing power and 
improved financing terms with the impact of the former being felt primarily in the sales of 
non-durable consumer goods, and the latter spurring the production of consumer durables. Supply-
side factors included trade-union conflicts during the second quarter and the constraints represented 
by the limited availability of production equipment. Indeed, during 1986 the use of installed capacity 
rose to such an extent that towards the end of the year many sectors were working at near full 
capacity. This was attributable to the entrepreneurial decision, which was taken on a very wide scale 
during 1986, to respond to the higher demand by raising the number of hours worked per worker. 
The expansion seen in the food and chemicals industries was considerable, but was even greater 
in the basic metals and the machinery and equipment industries. The textile and the non-metallic 
minerals industries also experienced vigorous growth. However, because both of these sectors were 
starting from their very depressed levels of 1985, neither of them managed to regain the level of 
activity reached in 1984. This was also true of the machinery and equipment sector. In contrast, the 
food industry far surpassed that level (see table 9). 
Food production increased by 8.5%. The domestic demand for these goods was stimulated by 
the improvement in the purchasing power of wage-earners, especially in the second quarter. The 
growth of production was also spurred by the increase in exports of oils, soya pellets and sunflowers. 
After a pronounced drop in 1985, the production of textile manufactures and clothing rose by 
22%. The sector's recovery began in the fourth quarter of 1985 and continued steadily in 1986. The 
need to replace stocks, combined with the greater purchasing power of wage-earners and the filling of 
pending orders from abroad, made possible this upsurge in activity. However, towards the end of the 
year the growth rate declined as a result of a slump in sales. 
'In the third quarter of 1986 the gross domestic industrial product was nearly 27'/? higher than the cyclical low recorded 
in the third quarter of 1985. 
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A similar trend was observed in the non-metallic minerals industry, where production had 
fallen by 2 8 % during the preceding two years but increased by more than 22% in 1986, mainly due to 
the rise in construction. For example, the cement industry's deliveries to the domestic market 
increased by 18% and its sales abroad exhibited a substantial expansion as well. 
The increase in construction was also an influential factor in the growth of the iron and steel 
sector, which was further stimulated by the greater output of durable goods, despite a trade union 
conflict which crippled activity in this sector during most of June, thereby causing an appreciable 
decline in the production indexes for the second quarter of the year. Export levels remained high 
notwithstanding low international prices. 
In 1986, the chemical industry, whose production rose by 9%, showed a very marked upturn 
during the first half of the year which, however, tapered off somewhat towards the end of the year. 
Four satellite plants were added to the existing ethylene plant in the Bahía Blanca petrochemical 
complex. Nevertheless, the chemical and petrochemical industry's exports were lower than those of 
the year before, chiefly as a consequence of the growth of domestic consumption and the decline in 
international prices. 
The automobile industry also recovered from its fall of the preceding year and produced around 
170 000 units (23% more than in 1985). One noteworthy event was the 85% increase in sales 
through pre-purchase savings plans. The production of tractors went up at a moderate rate but even 
so, its level was far below those of previous years. 
iv) Construction. Production in construction rose by almost 9% thus breaking the fall which 
had started in that sector in 1980 (see table 10). 
This recovery was attributable to the activity in the public sector, chiefly in the Piedra del Águila 
and Yaciretá hydroelectric works. In contrast, private works continued their downward slide. The 
high levels of construction costs in comparison to the depressed sales prices of finished units 
discouraged entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, financing restrictions, both in respect of repay-
ment periods and costs, had a dampening effect on demand. Although the Banco Hipotecario 
Nacional (the national mortgage bank) made resources available through various mechanisms in 
order to facilitate the acquisition or construction of dwellings, budgetary constraints ruled out a very 
expansionary credit policy. Nevertheless, government plans for building 40 000 dwellings were 
launched in 1986, and towards the end of the year the Inter-American Development Bank granted a 
loan of US$300 million to the National Housing Fund for the financing of various works indifferent 
regions of the country. 
v) Electricity. Electricity generation increased by 8.5%. This growth reflected the higher level 
of overall economic activity and, in particular, the greater demand of the manufacturing industry, 
which mounted by almost 18% in the country's capital city and in Greater Buenos Aires. Hydro-
electric plants contributed the largest share, producing 46.5% of the total electricity generated. The 
rise in production by gas turbine (57%) and steam plants (15%) was particularly rapid. In contrast, 
electricity generation declined in both nuclear power (-1%) and diesel plants (-3.5%). 
Work continued in 1986 on the Piedra del Águila and Yaciretá plants. The construction 
schedule for these projects was revamped, and it is now estimated that the first turbine will come on 
stream in 1991. In addition, the second line was laid between Alicurá and Abasto, and work proceeded 
on the extension of the National Interconnected System. 
3. The external sector 
a) Overall trends and the financing of the balance-of-payments deficit 
In 1986 the merchandise trade surplus was US$2.3 billion, which was 52% lower than the 
record surplus of 1985. This contraction was the result of a decrease of almost 17% in the value of 
exports and a build-up of 22% in external purchases. In its turn, the decline in exports was caused by 
both a considerable drop in the external prices of the country's main exports (particularly in those of 
cereals and oilseeds) and a reduction in the physical volume of the shipments. On the other hand, the 
increase in the value of imports was wholly accounted for by the substantial expansion of their 




Due to the fact that international interest rates declined for the second consecutive year, net 
interest payments for 1986 sank to around US$3.9 billion, which was almost US$1 billion less than 
the amount recorded in 1985. Remittances of profits and dividends totalled around US$500 million. 
As a consequence of these factors plus the shortfall registered by the real services account, the balance 
on current account exhibited a deficit of US$2.6 billion, which was 175% higher than that of the 
preceding year but only slightly greater than those recorded in 1982-1984. The bulk of this deficit was 
covered by capital inflows and by a reduction of international reserves of close to US$700 million (see 
table 12). 
The second quarter was a key period in the country's negotiations with multilateral financial 
agencies and its creditor banks. In April, after a slight delay caused by Argentina's failure to achieve 
the monetary and fiscal targets it had agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
country received US$265 million in funds corresponding to the third tranche of the stand-by credit 
agreement signed the year before and US$600 million of the US$3.7 billion loan which its creditor 
banks had made conditional on the fulfilment of the above-mentioned targets. In June, after intense 
negotiations aimed at solving additional problems of non-fulfilment, especially in respect of the fiscal 
goals, the government sent a letter of intent to the Fund in which it undertook to revise the rate of 
adjustment of public service charges and of the exchange rate. On the strength of this letter, the Fund 
issued a waiver which permitted the release of the fourth and final tranche (US$276 million) of the 
credit referred to above, thus enabling the banks to disburse another US$600 million. As the country 
was practically up-to-date with its international payments at that time, the new funds were added 
directly to its reserves. 
April also marked the beginning of negotiations with private creditor banks for the refinancing 
of foreign debt obligations. These talks focused on such topics as the inclusion of "Bonods" and 
promissory notes2 in the general negotiations, the capitalization of the debt and the implementation 
of the onlending system.3 In addition, an inflow of US$1 046 billion was obtained through negotia-
tions with the countries comprising the Paris Club. 
It is estimated that by the end of 1986 the external debt stood at US$50 billion, which was 3.5 % 
more than the figure recorded at the end of 1985. Since there was also a decline in the value of external 
sales of goods and services, the debt/exports coefficient skyrocketed to an all-time high of 600%, 
thereby doubling its average level as of the beginning of the decade. The interest/exports coefficient, 
on the other hand, declined slightly from the very high levels recorded during the preceding four 
years (see table 13). 
The amount of arrears, which at the end of 1985 totalled slightly over US$1.7 billion,4 had been 
reduced to approximately US$500 million by the end of 1986. Although full information is not 
available, it seems clear that the proportion of the total foreign debt represented by public externa) 
obligations as against private liabilities continued to rise owing to the ongoing use of the transfer 
mechanisms which had been created in 1981-1982 as a means of paying off matured private debts 
covered by exchange risk insurance. 
b) Exchange policy 
Exchange policy in 1986 can be separated into two distinct periods, with the termination of the 
general freeze in April serving as the dividing line. During the first quarter the dollar continued to be 
quoted at 0.801 australs, which meant that the real exchange rate against the dollar deteriorated. 
However, as the dollar in its turn underwent a sharp devaluation vis-à-vis the other hard currencies, 
the real effective exchange rate gained slightly during this period (see table 14). 
In April the economic authorities launched a new exchange policy in conjunction with the 
beginning of a phase of administered prices. The exchange rate initially rose by 3.7%; in order to 
maintain the real level of parity between the austral and the dollar, periodic adjustments of more or 
2Debt instruments used by the Argentine Government during the period 1981-1984 to pay for transactions involving 
private debts covered by exchange risk insurance. 
'A credit facility which accounted for two-thirds of the US$3.7 billion negotiated with creditor banks for 1986 and 
which these banks may then use to grant onward loans to other Argentine borrowers, making use of funds initially placed at the 
disposal of the Central Bank. 
••This includes the interest and non-refinanciable capital obligations which had fallen due as of }1 December 1985. 
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less 1% were made approximately every 10 days during the first three months and every seven days 
during the rest of the year. At the same time, larger corrections were made on an irregular basis in 
order to eliminate discrepancies between the devaluation target and the growth rate of domestic 
prices. 
The percentage between the parallel and official exchange rates for the dollar fluctuated up and 
down. After reaching double digit figures in the first months of the year, in April the gap gradually 
began to narrow until it bottomed out at around 2% in July. When inflation speeded up in August, the 
gap widened again and fluctuated between 10% and 20% during the rest of the year, despite the 
subsequent drop in the inflation rate and the rise in domestic interest rates. Towards the end of 1986 
the gap broadened considerably as a result of increased uncertainty as to the performance of the 
external sector, the outlook for the country's debt negotiations and the future course of the economy. 
In short, during 1986 Argentina's exchange policy had to meet a difficult challenge: on the one 
hand, the exchange rate had to be kept in line with the evolution of the external sector and incentives 
had to be provided to the traditional export sectors, which were faced with a difficult situation due to 
the low level of international commodity prices; on the other hand, sudden exchange rate adjust-
ments which might fuel the inflationary process had to be avoided. 
c) External trade 
i) Exports. After having increased at a moderate pace during the three preceding years, the 
value of exports fell by 17% in 1986. Furthermore, this decrease was quite widespread. While 
agricultural exports went down by 18%, exports of non-traditional manufactures shrank by 13%. 
Among the former, the drop in the exports of the crop-farming sector was particularly marked (a 
contraction of nearly 23% in terms of value), whereas the value of livestock products slipped by only 
about 3%. In contrast, the sales of fishery products rose by 36% (see table 15). 
The general decline in the prices of the main export items contributed to the shrinkage of 
crop-farming exports. Cereal prices, which had started on a downward trend in late 1984 and had 
dropped by 16% in 1985, fell by the same amount again in 1986. External sales of crop-farming 
products were also affected by the contraction of export volumes. There was an especially sharp 
decline in the volumes of wheat (-58%) and sorghum (-41%) as a result of adverse weather 
conditions and the disincentive that the decline in international prices represented for producers. 
Consequently, the value of wheat exports fell to US$400 million, which was the lowest point reached 
in the last six years. In the case of maize, even though the volume of exports grew by almost 5 %, their 
value was down by nearly 15% as a consequence of the lower prices obtained for them. An 
approximately 12% reduction in prices was also the cause of the 5% contraction in the value of 
oilseed exports. 
As mentioned earlier, the value of exports of livestock products went down by almost 3%, 
despite the fact that meat sales were up slightly as a result of the increase in international prices. On 
the other hand, the rise in the value of wool exports was due to the 11% expansion in the volume 
shipped, which offset the slide of around 5% in average wool prices. 
As regards non-traditional industrial exports, the 80% contraction in the value of fuel exports 
was too large to be offset by the 13% increase in the sales of other manufactures. One factor in this 
increase was the strong growth shown by exports of iron and steel products, which totalled US$600 
million in 1986 as against US$500 million in 1985- The volume shipped was more than 25% higher 
than the year before, while semi-finished products jumped 60%, thanks in large part to the sales 
made to China. Shipments of finished goods and especially of rolled steel sections increased as well. 
Exports of machinery also made a good showing by rising 23%, while aluminium sales climbed to 
US$160 million, US$40 million more than the preceding year. Exports of transport materials, 
however, sank 11 % due to the drop in sales of ship materials. All in all, industrial exports other than 
fuels accounted for around 27% of total exports in 1986. The government also announced measures 
aimed at strengthening their growth, such as drawback schemes, special procedures for the tempo-
rary admission of inputs and the improvement of pre-financing terms and conditions. 
Finally, the severe contraction of fuel exports was attributable to the widespread drop in both 
prices and the volumes exported. Thus, gas oil and fuel oil shipments fell by 70% and 72%, 
respectively, and the export volume of crude oil plummeted from 522 000 m5 in 1985 to a mere 
115 000 m' in 1986. 
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ii) Imports. There was an upturn in imports in 1986, chiefly because of the higher level of 
domestic activity. The value of imports rose by 23%, and their physical volume increased even more 
swiftly. This marked a turnabout of the sharp downward trend which had begun in 1981 following the 
preceding year's record high of US$9.4 billion. Thus, the value of imports in 1986 was still only 45% 
of what it had been in 1980 (see tables 11 and 12). 
With the exception of purchases of fuel and lubricants, which declined by 13%, imports 
increased considerably: purchases of capital goods jumped 31 % to their highest point in the last four 
years, imports of intermediate goods rose 28% and those of consumer goods were up 26% (see 
table 16). 
4. Prices, wages and employment 
a) Prices 
The variation in the consumer price index amounted to 82%, which was the lowest figure in the 
last 12 years. Wholesale prices climbed by 58%, a rate which was also much lower than those of 
previous years.5 The fastest-growing consumer prices were those of food and services. Within the 
category of wholesale goods, the variation in the prices of agricultural goods was almost twice as high 
as that of industrial prices (see table 17). 
The price freeze which remained in force from June 1985 to April 1986 can more properly be 
described as a frame of reference than a strictly-applied system. In fact, the prices of basic consumer 
goods (some of which were excluded from the freeze) increased so rapidly that between June 1985 and 
March 1986, the prices of meat, fruit and vegetables grew by almost 45% in relative terms with 
respect to the general consumer price index. Much the same thing, although to a lesser extent, 
occurred in the prices of services. Industrial prices, however, while showing some increases (owing, 
for example, to reductions in the discounts offered) varied very little. 
Nevertheless, even though inflation was much lower than during the preceding period, it 
continued to have some effect on expectations, and the demands for nominal adjustments in a 
number of variables placed a definite limit on the duration of the freeze (which, in any case, the 
authorities had presented as a temporary measure). Putting an end to the freeze entailed several 
problems, however. In the short term, it involved the risk of sparking a sudden increase in inflation 
and of allowing expectations to set off a price and wage spiral. This suggested the advisability of 
retaining certain guidelines with a view to maintaining order in the price formation process and 
achieving sufficient flexibility to permit changes in relative prices. Such a step was particularly 
necessary because, although the freeze had set a very broad range of nominal values (with the 
attendant "over-determination"), a system was still needed that would not unduly hinder market 
operation but would at the same time provide some kind of "ballast" for price changes as a whole. 
Accordingly, the policies announced in April provided for the replacement of the freeze by a 
price administration system, based on the transfer of costs, which focused on the larger firms. At the 
same time, a wage increase was set for the second quarter and negotiations were convened between 
trade unions and management to ratify the wage increase which had already occurred. Furthermore, 
there was an implicit understanding that the administration of the exchange rate and public service 
charges would be in keeping with the government's inflation target in an attempt to prevent any 
major lags in respect of the overall increase in prices. 
The lifting of the freeze did not involve an abrupt transition nor, despite relatively widespread 
fears, did it give rise to any sudden turnaround in the price trend. The very flexibility of the guidelines, 
whose aim was to prevent the development of any major imbalances, made it possible to accommo-
date any unexpected deviations in the inflation rate and limited the level that prices could be expected 
to reach. Nonetheless, given the growth of demand, the strong pressure for real wage increases, and 
the faint prospect of a drop in the relative prices of basic consumer goods, the possibility of an 
increase in inflation remained. Indeed, during the second quarter of the year the consumer price index 
'Between 1974and 1985 the wholesale price index increased at a rate equivalent to 2509? per year and between the end 
of 1980 and June 1985 the growth rate was 450Ç?. 
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grew at a monthly rate of 4.4% and the wholesale price index mounted by 3.4% per month (see 
table 18). However, while the gaps among the variations in the different categories of prices did not 
disappear, at least they were narrower than those observed in the second half of 1985 (see table 19). 
For example, the wholesale price index for non-agricultural goods rose at a monthly rate of 3.1% 
between March and June 1986 compared with the increase of somewhat less than 6% for agricultural 
goods, whereas between June 1985 and March 1986 non-agricultural prices had remained almost 
steady while agricultural prices had climbed at a rate of approximately 5% per month. 
Nevertheless, the upsurge of inflation in the third quarter demonstrated that there were still 
strong pressures for an increase in prices and revealed the volatility of expectations. Aside from 
incidental influences such as the further increase in the relative prices of agricultural goods, some of 
the contributing factors in this acceleration were probably the wage increases decided upon in the 
Figure 2 
ARGENTINA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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negotiations between trade unions and management and the adjustments in the exchange rate and 
public service charges made by the government after the upward trend had become evident. 
Moreover, the greater level of uncertainty, combined with the continued presence of a sustained 
demand, prompted many companies to try to regain their former profit margins or at least to take 
precautionary steps against what they perceived as a possible price and cost spiral. This behaviour 
was reflected in the price indexes: in the third quarter the consumer price index rose at an average 
monthly rateof 7.6% (reaching a high of 8.8% in August) and the wholesale price index increased at 
the rate of 7.1% (see table 18). 
Faced with the risk that the economy might be again indexed to these inflation rates, at the 
beginning of September the government announced the application of a more stringent monetary 
policy, the maintenance of the wage guidelines which had been set for the fourth quarter, and a 
slowdown in the upward adjustments of the exchange rate and public service charges. In addition, 
authorizations for transferring cost increases to industrial prices were no longer granted so automati-
cally. Although this policy of guidelines (which was applied with some flexibility) was operating 
within a context of uncertain expectations, it was aided by a lower increase in agricultural prices. 
Thus, from September onwards the monthly inflation rate slackened notably. 
The evolution of prices thus reflected the difficulties involved in achieving a sustained 
stabilization in an economy with a long history of inflation and of intense distributive conflicts. 
Because of the way in which the stabilization policy was handled, the authorities managed to lift the 
price freeze in April without causing any major shocks and later to prevent the consolidation of the 
upswing in inflation seen during the third quarter. Nevertheless, late in the year there was still much 
uncertainty as to the future movement of prices. Consequently, the economic authorities had yet to 
resolve the issue of how to ensure that aggregate demand and the income policy would be consistent 
with one another and how to design an income policy which would act as a co-ordination mechanism 
for pricing decisions without impeding the operation of the market. 
b) Wages 
In contradistinction to what had occurred in the preceding years, in 1986 there were striking 
differences in both the amount and the direction of the variations in real wages in the various sectors 
and activities. Although this makes it more difficult to attain an overall view of the situation, the 
growth observed in the consumption of goods and services does appear to indicate an increase in the 
purchasing power of wage-earners as a whole, which was probably linked to the increase in the total 
wage per worker in the manufacturing industry and to the higher level of employment in the tertiary 
sector. 
The groups which benefited the most were the workers in the banking sector, manufacturing, 
and public enterprises, all of whose wages rose by over 5%. As a result of the management decision 
taken within the manufacturing industry to cope with the upturn in demand without increasing 
employment, the increase in this sector was attributable to the greater number of hours worked per 
employee, since hourly wages declined slightly (see table 20). For their part, workers in the 
commercial sector and in provincial government services apparently maintained the real value of 
their wages. Wage-earners in the construction sector (whose real wages declined by 10%) and those 
in the national civil service lost the most ground. 
In the private sector, the main causes of these disparities were the dissimilar growth rates of the 
various production sectors and the unequal bargaining power of the different trade union organiza-
tions. In fact, the fluctuations in the level of industrial activity seen throughout the year reflected not 
only the variations in demand (which on the whole increased) but also labour conflicts, which at some 
points affected several industrial sectors simultaneously. Thus, in June the number of hours worked in 
the manufacturing industry declined by almost 20% compared with the preceding month mainly 
because of strikes. Consequently, both production and wages fell sharply during this period. 
With respect to the construction sector, in mid-1986 there was apparently a reversal of the 
downward trend which real wages had been following for several years. This turnaround, which was 
chiefly due to the increase in public works, was reflected in a recovery of wages in this sector. 
Consequently, they showed a positive variation between December 1985 and December 1986, even 
though their annual average was 10% lower than in 1985. 
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The wage policy in 1986 had three main features. The first was the lower frequency of wage 
adjustments, which, after the wage freeze implemented in the second half of 1985, were made on a 
quarterly rather than a monthly basis as had been the case prior to the introduction of the stabilization 
plan. The second was the attempt that was made to gradually transfer the responsibility for 
establishing the amounts and other modalities of the adjustments to the parties directly concerned 
(trade unions and business enterprises). The third was the marked differences between the wage 
policies implemented in the private sector and the public sector and, within the latter, among those 
applying to business enterprises, to agencies having special systems and the rest of the government 
services. 
With respect to the first feature mentioned, it should be recalled that when the anti-inflation 
plan was introduced in mid-1985, wages as well as the main variables of the economy (the exchange 
rate, public service charges and industrial prices) were frozen. Since inflation, although it fell 
dramatically, was not completely eliminated, it became evident that the purchasing power of wages 
was being eroded. However, notwithstanding the fact that a freeze was officially in force, some 
groups of workers continued receiving wage increases commensurate with the inflation index. 
Consequently, at the end of 1985 the government provided for a general increase of wages to 5% 
above the levels at which they had been frozen in June. A further adjustment was authorized in the 
private sector of up to 5% for improvements in productivity, while in the civil service a flat wage 
increase was granted to compensate for the elimination of the refreshment service which was 
particularly significant for the lower levels of the wage scale. In practice, the increase that was granted 
to the private sector merely reflected the increases which had in fact already been given and which had 
been paid either on an irregular basis or in the form of advances. Subsequently, it became the practice 
to grant quarterly adjustments in keeping with the government's guidelines; these raises were not, 
however, based on past inflation, but rather on the targeted level of inflation for the quarter in 
question, which was in turn established within the more general framework of the anti-inflation 
policy. 
As regards the second aspect of the wage policy, it should be noted that a provision enacted by 
the preceding government was still in force which reserved for the Executive branch the exclusive 
authority to set wage levels.6 This prerogative notwithstanding, when the overall wage increase of 
the first quarter was announced, entrepreneurs and workers were authorized to decide upon 
additional raises based on productivity up to a set limit, on the condition that these increases would 
not be reflected in the final prices of goods and services. Towards the end of the quarter, the 
government asserted that there was a need for the organizations representing employers and 
workers to join with it in establishing a tripartite "framework agreement" in respect of the income 
policy which would tie price and wage variations to one another and to the targets of the anti-inflation 
plan. Although this goal was not achieved, it was agreed that "mini" joint negotiations would be held 
among the organizations which had signed the last collective bargaining agreements (in 1975) in 
order to bring the basic wage agreements as of 31 March into line with reality.7 A general increase of 
8.5 % in these newly "aligned" wages was then set for the private sector. Finally, for the second half of 
the year, the government once again called on the organizations that had signed the 1975 agreements 
to hold restricted joint negotiations at which, without altering the other provisions of these 
conventions, the wage increases for each branch of economic activity would be established; these 
increases had to fall within a "band" having a lower limit of 14% and a ceiling of 20% for the six 
months and could not exceed 11% in the third quarter. In addition, the matter of the application of a 
6The demand for the repeal of this provision and for the reinstitution of free collective bargaining between employer 
organizations and trade unions has been one of the main causes of conflict between the trade unions and the government 
during the past three years. In view of the emergency economic situation in the country and the anti-inflation drive on which it 
has embarked, the government has deemed it inappropriate to permit unrestricted negotiations among the parties and has 
instead proposed new legislation which would enable it to set the bounds for such negotiations in accordance with the projected 
variations oí the other economic variables. 
'This process was necessary both because increases in excess of the official guidelines had been granted and because of 
the frequent omissions in this respect marking the series of wage adjustment decrees, which increased "take home" pay but left 
basic wages unchanged. 
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further productivity-based raise of up to 2% per quarter was left for discussion between each 
company and its employees. 
This gradual liberalization was designed to lead to full negotiations among the concerned 
parties by the end of 1986. However, the failure to reach an agreement concerning the power of the 
Executive branch to set certain limits during the economic emergencies blocked the parliamentary 
approval of the relevant legislation and hence the holding of these negotiations. 
Lastly, the third striking characteristic of the wage policy in 1986 —the differences between the 
provisions applying to wages in the private and public sectors— was essentially due to the govern-
ment's decision to reorganize the public sector. This decision was part of a more general strategy of 
redefining the role of the State which was intended to result in a substantial reduction of public 
expenditure. 
Public-sector wage-earners may be divided into three distinct categories: those covered by the 
collective labour agreements (mainly workers in government enterprises and banks), those covered 
by special schemes (i.e., those subject to special wage scales or who receive additional pay over and 
above the general wage scale) and those subject to the general wage scale. The purpose of the 
differentiated wage adjustment policy was to bring the relative wages of these three groups into line 
with one other and with those of the private sector. A parallel aim was to curb expenditures on 
personnel in keeping with the effort to reduce the fiscal deficit without resorting to drastic lay-offs. 
Thus, 5% increases were granted in public enterprises during the first and second quarters 
which, in both instances, absorbed any raises previously agreed on by the management of such 
enterprises and the respective trade unions. For the third and fourth quarters, special wage commis-
sions were formed and were given the option either of increasing wages by 7% on each occasion or of 
deciding how to distribute a 9% increase of the gross wage bill.8 The wage-earners covered by special 
systems were granted quarterly adjustments of 5%, 5%, 7% and 9%, respectively. Workers subject to 
the general wage scale received, in addition to the increases granted those governed by special 
systems, compensation for the elimination of the previously mentioned refreshment services; this 
payment was increased by 83% in the third quarter and 45% in the fourth quarter. During the final 
quarter they were granted an additional fixed-sum wage adjustment. Beginning in the third quarter, 
the senior categories were also granted differentiated increases with a view to restructuring the wage 
pyramid, which by that time had become overly "flat". 
In spite of these measures, wages in the public sector did not evolve exactly according to plan. In 
particular, this was due to the fact that there were large wage increases in some public enterprises 
during the first quarter as a result of court decisions concerning the payment of sums owed from 
previous periods. Consequently, in these cases the increases corresponding to government guidelines 
were applied to the higher wages awarded by the courts. In addition, strong movements were formed 
in certain State enterprises and in the government banks to demand that wage scales be placed on a 
par with those of private companies in the same sectors. In some cases this was done, either fully or 
partially, sometimes through legal rulings. Furthermore, the increase in tax collections, which 
exceeded the consumer price index by 10%, benefited those workers who received additional 
remunerations on that basis. 
Towards the end of 1986 the government announced a wage equalization and structuring 
programme for the civil service which was to be implemented over a three-year period beginning in 
January 1987. Under this programme it was provided that the additional income received by certain 
groups of agents was no longer to be linked to such variables as tax payments but instead to the 
"target wage" of the corresponding category set for each quarter. Along with this programme, the 
government also announced the standardization of working hours (to begin 1 January 1988) as well as 
a voluntary retirement plan for public employees. Through this plan, which includes a special 
compensation system, the authorities hope to reduce employment in the public sector by 20% in 
three years. 
"The gross wage bill, as defined in this case, did not include retroactive payments, overtime, the reimbursement of 
expenses, per diem allowances, salary bonuses or allowances for dependents. This option made it possible to give larger raises 
to the workers of companies which reduced their staff, to grant different percentage increases to different categories of 
employees and to exercise a stricter control over the enterprises's wage costs. 
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In 1986 open unemployment was down in Buenos Aires and especially in Rosario but it 
increased in Córdoba, Mendoza and Tucumán (see table 21). Employment in manufacturing, after 
having fallen steeply from the comparatively higher levels achieved in early 1985, appeared to be 
heading back up at the end of 1986. Be that as it may, it seems clear that manufacturing no longer has 
the job-creation capacity it used to have. This is not only indicated by the information periodically 
supplied by government and private surveys, but has also been confirmed by the preliminary results 
of the 1985 Economic Census (published at the end of 1986), which indicates that between 1973 and 
1984 the number of wage-earners in industry rose by only 3%- When this fact is considered in 
conjunction with the very low level of construction and the small number of jobs generated by 
primary activities, it is not surprising that there has been an increase in the relative importance of 
tertiary employment. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary and financial policy 
In 1986 the money supply increased by 85%, while the amount of quasi-money expanded by 
almost 130%. The fact that these variations were well below those recorded in the preceding years 
was directly traceable to the slackening of the inflationary process (see table 22). 
Indeed, the stabilization plan made it possible to begin a remonetization of the economy and to 
restore the conditions necessary to monetary control through the reorganization of public finances 
(which included the commitment to refrain from using monetary issues as a means of covering 
treasury imbalances) and the setting of the main prices of the economy —all of which had an impact 
on expectations. This remonetization continued up to the middle of the year, when a slight reversion 
of the trend occurred due to the resurgence of inflation in the third quarter. The monetary policy, 
which had been relatively permissive during the first half of the year —during which it was rudely 
shaken by the imbalances in the banking system and in the finances of the provincial governments— 
tended to become stricter in the final months of 1986. 
Although the government stood by its undertaking not to finance its costs through the Central 
Bank, from the first months of the implementation of the Plan Austral up to the end of 1985 the rate 
of monetary expansion was far greater than that of price increases. This growth was promoted by 
events in the external sector, especially the inflow of capital caused by the difference between external 
and internal interest rates and the reduced foreign exchange risk. Another factor was the credit which 
was granted to financial institutions, and particularly those loans intended to compensate for changes 
in the public's demand for assets and those given to help out institutions having financial difficulties. 
The response to this expansion was a boom in the demand for money. In consequence, the 
volume of currency outside banks (which had fallen to an absolute minimum equivalent to 2.5% of 
the product during the second half of 1985) doubled in real terms towards the end of the year. 
Although the rate of monetary expansion weakened over the following months, demand continued to 
increase with the result that the volume of currency outside banks reached the equivalent of almost 
6% of the gross domestic product during the first quarter of 1986. Although this figure was still 
substantially lower than the levels recorded prior to 1977, it was the highest since 1981. Meanwhile, 
interest rates, which had initially remained very high in real terms, gradually declined as the supply of 
funds increased and inflationary expectations subsided. 
This situation began to change in the second quarter of 1986. On the supply side, the pace of 
monetary expansion quickened, basically as a result of two factors. The first was the sizeable growth 
of rediscounts to assist the banking system and to finance loans for housing and for some production 
activities in various zones of the country; the second was the inflow of capital associated with external 
refinancing operations (i.e., the tranches of the loan agreed upon with the International Monetary 
Fund and the loans made by creditor banks). On the other hand, the growth rate of the demand for 
money began to slow down. Consequently, although the ratio between the amount of money in the 
private sector and the product continued to increase, it did so at a much slower pace than before. In 
response to this situation, a further contraction was observed in nominal interest rates, whose real ex 
post values were negative from May onwards, regardless of the deflator used to calculate them. Even 
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so, this phenomenon did not appear to have an adverse effect on the public's expectations, since the 
differential between the exchange rate for the dollar on the official and parallel markets gradually 
narrowed to a minimum of around 2% in July. 
The drop in interest rates was assisted by the adoption of measures designed to permit the 
exercise of greater control over financial institutions. Since the beginning of the year it had become 
obvious that the provincial government banks were causing major distortions. On the one hand, they 
were sidestepping the cash reserve requirements laid down by the Central Bank; on the other, under 
the pressure of the need to obtain resources both in order to back up their highly committed portfolios 
and in order to meet the fiscal requirements of their respective jurisdictions, they were offering high 
returns on deposits at non-regulated interest rates which were far above those offered by the other 
institutions of the system. Faced with this situation, the Central Bank prohibited these banks from 
receiving deposits at non-regulated rates as of 1 April and, at the same time, reduced their cash 
reserve requirements for deposits at regulated rates. Furthermore, it announced that rediscounts to 
these institutions would be made available only in emergency situations and would be limited to 
special lines of credit for specific purposes. Meanwhile, it augmented the capacity of the rest of the 
institutions in the system to attract deposits at non-regulated interest rates (by lowering the technical 
ratios required between non-regulated and regulated deposits and between them and the assets of 
each institution) so that they could attract the resources that would be freed by the provincial banks. 
As a counterbalance, it also cancelled out part of the greater lending capacity created by this measure, 
through a special interest-bearing cash reserve requirement. 
Although these steps brought down the average interest rate in the system and reduced the 
differences among the rates offered by the different entities, it is likely that some of the funds released 
by the provincial banks added to the volume of operations on the non-institutionalized market, where 
the returns offered were distinctly higher than those available within the institutional system. 
When the authorities realized that monetary expansion was one of the factors responsible for 
the swifter rise in prices observed in the third quarter, they took a series of steps which marked a 
turning point in monetary and fiscal policy. These measures consisted, firstly, of increasing the 
interest-bearing cash reserve requirement for existing deposits at non-regulated interest rates and 
reducing the reserve requirement applying to increases in them, thus promoting the attraction of new 
deposits by financial institutions. Secondly, major restrictions were placed on the rediscount policy 
and the fines for non-compliance with minimum reserve requirements and the other technical ratios 
stipulated by the Central Bank were considerably increased. Thirdly, in order to absorb excess 
liquidity, open-market operations were expanded by adding the sale of external bonds to the treasury 
bill transactions regularly carried out on that market. 
These measures, which rapidly had a contractive effect, were followed the next month by others 
which were basically aimed at neutralizing the informal credit market and shifting its operations to 
the institutionalized system. Specifically, financial institutions were once again authorized to carry 
out intermediation operations in third-party financial transactions (acceptances) and to guarantee 
lending operations involving government securities ("pass" transactions). In addition, increases in 
deposits at non-regulated interest rates were exempted from any minimum reserve requirement, 
which substantially increased the financial institutions' capacity to attract deposits. The balances of 
these deposits as of 30 September would be covered by a special interest-bearing deposit which would 
replace the reserve requirements in effect up to that date. Furthermore, the minimum reserve 
requirement for demand deposits in provincial government banks was reduced, thus increasing these 
institutions' lending capacity. Finally, the authorities once again stiffened the fines for non-
fulfillment of the technical ratios applying to financial institutions. 
The initial effect of these measures was that the free interest rates offered by financial 
institutions rose as they attempted to make full use of their increased capacity to attract deposits. At 
the same time, the Central Bank increased the regulated rate in order to prevent deposits from being 
drained out of the provincial banks. In the following months, a considerable portion of the informal 
market was absorbed by the institutionalized system. 
In the final months of the year it became apparent that the monetary authorities had gained a 
greater degree of control over the expansion of the money supply. Furthermore, the resurgence of 
inflation in the third quarter, along with the concomitant change in expectations, prompted a marked 
slowing of the increase in the amount of money in the private sector (particularly between August 
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and October), with the result that the ratio between this variable and the product fell to approxi-
mately 5.3% in the last quarter. The interest rate remained high, particularly in terms of its real ex 
post value, as inflation indexes declined month after month. Nevertheless, as the regulated interest 
rate on deposits was not high enough to compensate savers for the losses caused by inflation, the 
increase in holdings of monetary assets providing lower returns slowed down, while those affording 
greater protection against inflation grew. 
At the end of the year, the pessimistic expectations prevailing in the exchange market also 
affected the monetary and financial policy, hampering a reduction of nominal interest rates to levels 
closer to that of the variation in prices. 
b) Fiscal policy 
In 1986 a further decrease occurred in the non-financial public sector's financing requirements, 
which brought them down to the equivalent of 3.6% of the gross domestic product. This proportion, 
which had reached 16.8% in 1983 but had then fallen to 5.9% in 1985, was the lowest in the last 
15 years. The deficit was sharply reduced in the national government service and in public enterprises 
but no significant change was seen in the provincial governments, while the financial imbalances in 
the social security system increased markedly. 
This was primarily due to the increase observed in tax revenues and to the contraction of the 
operating deficit of public enterprises, inasmuch as public-sector expenditures on goods and services 
and transfers to the private sector grew moderately. 
The operating deficit of the Central Bank (a quasi-fiscal cash shortfall) was further reduced, 
bringing it down to the equivalent of 1.6% of the product. Nonetheless, it was still considerable, 
especially during the fourth quarter, as a consequence of the increase in interest rates. 
The deficit of the National Treasury was also cut in real terms to less than one-half of what it 
had been the year before, chiefly because of higher tax revenues (see table 23). the higher real value of 
the total taxes collected was, in turn, attributable to the reduced significance of the "fiscal lag" (owing 
to the slower rate of inflation) and to measures that had been being applied since the preceding year, 
whose basic effect had been to broaden the direct tax base and reduce tax evasion. 
Considerable increases were recorded in the collection of direct taxes (45 %), internal charges 
(29%) and the value-added tax (VAT) (22%); in contrast, customs duties fell (-17%), since the 
increase in the revenue from import duties (53%) occasioned by the larger volume of external 
purchases, while sizeable, was not large enough to compensate for the drop in tax withholdings on 
grain exports (-42%). This decrease was caused by the persistent decline of international prices, 
which made it necessary for the government to reduce the percentage of tax withheld as a means of 
improving the position of agricultural producers. 
As they strove to reduce the deficit, the authorities were faced with a number of problems due to 
the persistence of demands for greater outlays and the fact that the increase in tax revenues was less 
than had been expected. Thus, during the first quarter they had difficulty in meeting the fiscal targets 
that had been agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund. Although these problems were 
overcome during the second and third quarters, they reemerged in the fourth, as tax collection fell and 
expenditure rose sharply. Nevertheless, in 1986 the government was able to keep its promise not to 
use the Central Bank to finance its deficit. 
Thus, the Treasury's difficulties were, in the final analysis, the result of the inflexibility 
characterizing the national government's expenditures and of the imbalances in the rest of the public 
sector: the provincial governments, public enterprises and the social security system. 
The provincial governments' expenditures have climbed in the last few years without there 
being any matching increase in the local revenues. Moreover, the delay encountered in obtaining 
legislative approval for a new system of federal co-participation in respect of national taxes —to 
replace the one which expired at the end of 1984— made it necessary, in both 1985 and 1986, to 
substitute National Treasury remittances for provincial allocations of the funds which had previously 
been collected through this system, thereby creating tensions between these two levels of 
government. 
Meanwhile, in an attempt to lessen the operating deficits of public enterprises, the government 
took specific steps in accordance with the particular situation of each such enterprise, as well as 
adopting measures of a general nature. To this end, it instituted strict controls over the wage bill 
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(rather than over the wage rate) in an effort to facilitate the restructuring of wage scales within each 
company while at the same time curbing total expenditure. The Treasury also assumed responsibility 
for part of these companies' external debt servicing. For example, in view of the level of the State 
petroleum company's arrears in payments to its local suppliers and contractors, the government 
authorized the company to consolidate its debt by issuing one-year bonds that were freely negotiable 
on the stock exchange and backed by the Treasury. It thus paved the way for the normalization of this 
enterprise's dealings with the National Taxation Bureau as well as by regularizing the receipts from 
the fuel tax, which the company is responsible for withholding. 
The social security system, for its part, came to figure more prominently in the difficulties of the 
Treasury due to the progressively deteriorating position of this system. Several factors have contrib-
uted to this state of affairs: the rapid increase in the number of persons covered by the system, the 
effects of the growth in informal employment (and, consequently, in tax evasion) and the cessation of 
employer contributions since the beginning of the decade (which have been reinstituted only in part). 
In addition, in 1986 this situation was compounded by the government's decision to prevent any 
widening of the gap between the retirement benefits that are actually paid and those which are 
provided for under the laws in force. 
At the close of 1986, the government announced a series of medium-term measures designed to 
bring about a substantive change in the situation of the public sector. One major step was the creation 
of a Board of Directors for Public Enterprises. This board was charged with co-ordinating the 
operational management of these companies and was empowered to propose any reforms it deemed 
appropriate as regards the structure of each such enterprise. At the same time, the government 
spelled out in greater detail the responsibilities of the respective areas of government in the 
establishment of sectoral policies, explicitly excluding those enterprises whose role was regarded as 
being merely to execute such policies. In respect of the national government service, a voluntary 
retirement system was introduced —in which compensatory payments were offered as an 
incentive— with a view to reducing the total number of civil servants by 20% over a period of three 
years. In addition, a salary scale programme was set up with the object of phasing out unjustified 
discrepancies among the wages of civil servants who perform similar duties in different agencies. 
All of these measures, whose basic aim was to reorganize public spending, complemented the 
resource-related measures adopted as part of a comprehensive tax reform whose main purposes were 
to increase tax revenue (defining the tax burden in such a way as to replace the "inflation tax"), to 
make the system fairer and to distribute taxes more evenly among the different sectors of activity. 
Other objectives included the widening of the tax base through the elimination of exemptions and tax 
relief provisions and a general improvement in the overall efficiency of tax administration. Some of 
the most significant measures were the elimination of secrecy in banking and stock exchange 
operations and the requirement that all private securities issued in the country should be registered 
(the aim of both of those provisions being to facilitate the monitoring of taxpayers), the modification 
of fiscal procedures with a view to increasing the efficiency of the tax collecting agency, and changes in 
the VAT system (particularly the use of a single rate and the introduction of a simplified system for 
small taxpayers) designed to simplify the operation of the tax system and reduce tax evasion. 
However, since some of the tax reform laws were enacted late in the year, their effect was not 
felt in 1986. Their impact can thus not be fully evaluated until 1987, when the government also plans 
to reduce the public-sector deficit even further (particularly through the achievement by State 




ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Rate of unemploymentc 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Industrial workers' wages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expend 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net internacional 
reserves 
External debt" 


































































































































































Source: ECI.AC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Simple average of results of surveys for each year in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos 
Aires. 
debt. 




ARGENTINA: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION ON SOME OF THE 
MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1985 1986" 
III IV III 
Fiscal deficit/total expendi-
ture of Central Government 
(percentages) 
Unemployment rate 
Terms of trade 
(index: 1980 = 1 0 0 / 
Trade balance (goods) 
(in millions of dollars) 
Gross domestic product of 
manufacturing at factor cost 
(seasonally adjusted) 
Consumer prices 
Normal hourly wage of 
industrial workers (real)8 
Money (seasonally adjusted) 





























































Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Based on cash data supplied by the National Treasury of Argentina. cDoes not include the 
regularization of arrears in the Servicing of the guaranteed external debt registered in the accounts in December through the 
transfer of external loans from the Central Bank to the Treasury; this charge considerably raises both the deficit and total 
expenditures for December (and for the quarter), although it reflects operations which took place during the whole of the 
year and even during previous financial year. If this regularization is included, the ratio then increases to 44.3%. April 
and October surveys in the Federal Capital and Greater Buenos Aires; in 1986,June and November surveys. "Based on 
new estimates of foreign trade price indexes. Variation between the last month of one quarter and the last month of 
the preceding quarter. s Variation in the quarterly averages of monthly values, deflated by the average consumer price 
index in the month when the wage was payable and the following month. Average of end-of-month balances, 
seasonally adjusted. The variations shown are those between the value corresponding to the last month of a quarter and the 
last month of the preceding quarter. 
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Table 3 
ARGENTINA: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 
Total consumption 
Exports of goods and 
services 


















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Note: The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from IMF balance-of payments data expressed in 






ARGENTINA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY" 







Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Trade, restaurants and 
hotels 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate and 
business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 





















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
At constant 1980 market prices. Preliminary figures. 'Includes the livestock sector, forestry and fishing. 
Table 5 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Gross domestic product 

















































Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 
Preliminary figures. Also includes agricultural construction, hunting, forestry and logging. 
97 
Table 6 























































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Table 7 




































































































































Source: National Meat Board, Ministry of Agriculture and ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official data. 
"To 1 July. 'Total slaughtering for the period. 'Slaughtering in the period as a percentage of stocks at 1 
July. ''Average for the period. "Slaughtering under control of the National Meat Board, which represents between 
77 % and 80% of total (registered) commercial slaughtering. r Refers to registered slaughtering, which differs from the 
total in that it does not include estimates of slaughtering in situ (about 360 000 head per annum). "1970 
pesos. * Kilogrammes of wheat needed to purchase 1 kilogramme of live steer. 'Provisional figures and 
projections. ;Given the importance of seasonal factors, the six-monthly figures are comparable only with those of the 




ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF M I N I N G PRODUCTION 
Gross domestic product at 
factor cost 
(australs at 1970 prices) 














































Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina and Ministry of Energy. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of cubic metres. 'Thousands of tons. After deducting imports. 
Table 9 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF M A N U F A C T U R I N G PRODUCTION 
Gross domestic product at 
factor cost (australs 







Basic metal industries 
Machinery and equipment 
Other industries 









































































































































Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, Centro de Industriales Siderúrgicos, Asociación de Fábricas de 
Automotores, and Asociación de Fábricas Argentinas de Tractores. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of tons. 'Including sponge iron. Total finished rolled products in 
terms of hot-rolled products. "Thousands of units. Units. 
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Table 10 
ARGENTINA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product at 
factor cost (australs at 
1970 prices) 
Construction permits granted 































































Supplies of some contruction 
materials 




Deliveries to the domestic 
market of steel products for 

























310 284 219 306 -4.3 -8.3 -22.9 39.7 
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, and Instituto Argentino 
de Siderurgia. 
"Preliminary figures. Cumulative figures for nine months. 'Thousands of tons. 
Table 11 
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ARGENTINA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
ARGENTINA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































> 1 900 
-700 
700 
Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment! Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC.on the basis of 
official data. 
"Provisional figures subject to revision. includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 
assets and liabilities. Equals the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 13 






of goods and services 
Net interest/exports 
of goods and services 




Millions of dollars 
27 162 35 671 43 364 
14 459 20 024 26 341 












207 275 329 472 485 488 481 602 
10 27 48 54 55 49 47 
Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 




ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE RATES 
Annual and Nominal Indexes of real effective exchange rate" 
























































































Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics. 
" Represents an average of the indexes of the real exchange rate of the austral in relation to the currencies of Argentina's main 
trading partners, weighted by the relative importance of exports or imports, as appropriate, to or from these countries. From 
1970 to 1980 these weightings correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979. From 1981 on, they correspond to the 
average for the period 1982-1985. In these calculations, use has primarily been made of wholesale price indexes. For further 
information on the methodology and sources used, see the technical appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin America, 










Wool, animal hair and 
horsehair 
Hides and skins 
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Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of data from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, the National 
Meat Board and other sources. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 16 
ARGENTINA: VALUE A N D COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS OF GOODS 
General total 
Capital goods 
Fuels and lubricants 
Intermediate goods 
Chemical, plastic and rubber 
products 
Paper and pulp 
Metals and metal manufactures, 
electrical equipment and 
components, spare parts for 
machinery and transport 
equipment 
Other intermediate goods 
Consumer goods 
Millions of dollars 


















































































Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 
"Preliminary figures. 
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Table 17 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer prices 
Food and beverages 
Clothing 








Food and beverages 
Clothing 









1981 1982 1983 





















































































































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. 
Table 18 

















































































Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official data. 
"Monthly rates, equivalent to the variation between extremes for each period, in percentages. 
workers in manufacturing. 'Prices and charges of public enterprises, general level. 
imports of goods. 'Average of month-end balances, seasonally adjusted. Average 
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ARGENTINA: PRICE VARIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 







































































































Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of official data. 
¿> 
' Variation between extremes, in percentages. Prices and charges of public enterprices, general level. ' Exchange 
rate implicit in imports of goods. The method of calculating these measures took into account (besides the series 
shown in the table) a series with a constant value equal to zero, representing, for each period, the variation in the consumer 
price index in relation to itself. 'Preliminary figures. 
Table 20 
ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES IN MANUFACTURING" 
(Growth rates in relation to the preceding period) 
Variation between averages 
Variation between extremes 
Variation between averages 




Total average real wage per 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
12.0 -10.8 -14.5 22.8 











Normal average real wage per hour 
I 
1985 
II III IV I 
1986 

















Source: ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires, on the basis of data supplied by the National Institute of statistics and Censuses. 
"Deflated by the average CPI for the month of receipt and the following month; this is therefore a measurement of the 
purchasing power of wages paid monthly at the time of receipt or of that of wages paid fortnightly and spent uniformly over 




ARGENTINA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT 

























































































Source: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses. 
"As a percentage of the economically active population. The surveys used here were conducted injune and November in 
the Capital and Greater Buenos Aires and in May and October in the other cities. 'Indexes: 1970 = 100. 
Table 22 
ARGENTINA: MONETARY BALANCE 
Money (M,) 
Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
Government and public 
institution 
Advances for the Monetary 
Regulation account 
External financing supplied 
to Central Government (net) 
Other loans to government 
(net of deposit) 
Private sector0 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 
Other items (net) 
Year-end balances 
(millions of australs) 




































































































Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 
"Growth rates were calculated on the basis of non-rounded figures. 
institutions other than banks. Includes accrued resources. 
Estimates. includes credits to financial 
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Table 23 





Wages and salaries 





Current savings ( 1 - 2 ) 
Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Loans (net of repayments) 
Total expenditure^ + 4) 






















































































































Sales of securities 
Amortization of securities 




















Source: National Treasury of Argentina. 
"Estimates. 'includes financing for the economic emergency (compulsory savings). 'Includes regularization of 
arrears. ''includes regularization of arrears in respect of guaranteed debts (especially of public 
enterprices). 'Includes external financing granted to the Central Government, net of government foreign-currency 
deposits in the Central Bank. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The most outstanding achievement marking the management of Bolivia's economy in 1986 was the 
sharp reduction made in the dizzying speed of price increases. However, the overall economic picture 
was dimmed by a further decline in the gross domestic product which, in addition to causing an 
increase in unemployment, heightened the need for a reactivation of the economy. Other landmark 
events were the approval of the government's general budget; the enactment of tax, monetary and 
tariff reforms; the reaching of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund and of another 
with the Paris Club; and the reorganization of the Corporación Minera Boliviana. 
The 12-month variation in the general consumer price index amounted to a rate of 66%, 
compared with 8 170% in 1985, while the variation between annual averages plunged from 11 750% 
to 275% (see table 1 and figure 1). Public finances, the external sector and the government's policies 
concerning the exchange rate and wages all played an important role in bringing about this striking 
change in the inflation rate. 
The disequilibrium in public accounts was considerably reduced. The consolidated deficit of the 
non-financial public sector, which in 1985 has been equivalent to 14% of the product, fluctuated 
around 7%. The National Treasury, for its part, closed out its accounts with a surplus for the first time 
in the last 20 years. 
Three factors played a decisive role in producing these results: the first was the 16% increase 
observed in the income of the central government, measured in real terms; the second was the major 
reduction made in real expenditures in the national currency; and the third was the policy aimed at 
restructuring State enterprises, which led to the closure of several and forced others to sell their 
products at prices indexed to the exchange rate and to deposit the proceeds from their operations in 
the National Treasury. 
In keeping with the austerity policy, the authorities refrained from their former practice of 
financing the public-sector deficit through an expansion of the means of payment. This, in turn, 
contributed to a sharp deceleration in the growth rate of the money supply. Hence, M, increased by 
around 130% as against 5 900% in 1985, while quasi-money expanded by around 640% thanks to the 
greater confidence which economic agents had in the government's policies. 
At the same time, there was a significant change in the sources of money creation. The increases 
observed in the amount of external assets held by the monetary authorities and in the funds 
channelled to the private sector contrasted with the sharp decrease in the level of credit made 
available to the public sector. 
With the slowing down of the inflation rate, the real interest rates were positive for the first 
time in recent years. Nevertheless, the differential between the interest rates on loans and on deposits 
was relatively high, and credit for commercial and production activities was therefore quite 
expensive. 
The exchange policy also contributed to the success of the stabilization policy. Although the 
annual average for the official exchange rate rose by 330%, this rate was nonetheless very stable 
throughout most of the year. After having been pegged at 1 100 000 pesos to the dollar in September 
1985 (an increase of 1 450%), the official exchange rate climbed steeply in the latter part of that year* 
and in February 1986 it reached approximately 1 900 000 pesos. However, from then on, its increases 
were minimal and the peso/dollar ratio even dipped during one month of the year. 
This stabilization of the exchange rate was promoted by a number of factors: the maintenance 
of the system for the sale of foreign exchange which had been adopted the previous August; the 
greater degree of fiscal discipline, which resulted in a more moderate expansion of the monetary 
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variables and, hence, a slower increase in prices; a greater level of confidence in the government's 
economic policy, which was reflected in a reversal of expectations; and, finally the Central Bank's 
swift response to the demand for foreign exchange. 
Due to the perception of all these phenomena by economic agents, the exchange rate for the 
dollar on the parallel market was virtually the same as on the official market. In short, the steadiness 
exhibited by the foreign exchange market put an end to speculation against the peso and restored its 
status not only as a means of payment but also as a measurement of value. 
Another decisive factor in slowing down inflation was the wage policy. Basically, this policy 
sought to prevent wage increases from continuing to act as a feedback mechanism for price increases. 
As part of this effort, when the new government took office in August 1985 it provided that the 
remunerations of private-sector wage-earners were to be freely negotiated between the parties 
concerned. Public employees' wages remained frozen until November 1985 but were readjusted in 
December retroactively to August of that year. At the same time, the minimum wage was raised to 
30 000 000 pesos (about US$20); under the stabilization programme then in force, however, this 
wage would not be adjusted again until mid-1986. 
Meanwhile, the reorganization of staff structures and wage scales was continued and the 
budgets for staff payments in each public agency were set from that time until the middle of the 
following year. 
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In June 1986 the nominal minimum wage was raised by 33% to 40 000 000 pesos; public 
employees earning less than 300 000 000 pesos were given a proportional increase of 7.5% while 
those whose wages were below 140 million pesos received an increase of 13%. 
Owing to the rise in prices which occurred during the year, the very limited size of the 
readjustments granted and, particularly, the level at which wages had been frozen between August 
and December 1985, the average minimum wage plummeted by 30% in 1986. 
The evolution of the external sector was marked by the different types of trends displayed by 
the main components of the balance of payments. The most outstanding feature in this respect was 
the increase in the net international reserves held by the Central Bank. By the close of 1986 these 
reserves had risen to US$330 million, which was almost US$200 million more than the year before. 
This increment contrasted sharply with initial estimates, which had indicated a loss of between 
US$50 million and US$150 million, and was due to the fact that the surplus on capital account more 
than made up for the deficit on current account. 
The increase in the current account deficit was due entirely to the unfavourable turnaround in 
merchandise trade. With the value of imports of goods and services exceeding that of exports by 
US$200 million, the imbalance was greater than it had been in any year since the outbreak of the crisis 
in 1981. Non-traditional exports increased substantially, but not enough to offset the steep drop in 
traditional exports. Thus, although the quantum of exports increased by 36%, the unit value of 
exported goods fell by the same percentage. This was basically due to the slump in the price (-12%) of 
the natural gas sold to Argentina (whose volume, however, remained constant) and to an even 
greater contraction in the sales of metallic tin, whose volume and unit value plunged 30% and 40%, 
respectively. 
Furthermore, although net payments of profits and interest were lower than in 1985, they 
continued to represent a significant amount not only in absolute terms (US$310 million), but also as a 
percentage of total exports of goods and services. 
The surplus on capital account was attributable to short-term capital movements, since 
long-term movements resulted in an outflow of foreign exchange of around US$140 million. Official 
transfers, for their part, represented an inflow of an additional US$75 million. Finally, inflows under 
the heading of errors and omissions amounted to somewhat more than double that figure. 
In respect of external financing, the year was marked by two quite different events. The 
medium- and long-term public external debt went up to US$3.7 billion, which was 10% higher than 
the year before, and thus continued to weigh heavily on the economy. Net interest payments were 
equivalent to 40% of the exports of goods and services, but this ratio would have been much higher 
still if the payments due to private creditors had been made. The amortization and interest payments 
due to these institutions, which have been suspended since 1984 stood at approximately US$1.1 
billion. 
On the other side of the coin, in addition to the new bilateral loans that the country received in 
1986, agreements were signed with the International Monetary Fund, the Paris Club and the Andean 
Reserve Fund under which these institutions granted assistance for the Stabilization Plan imple-
mented by the government. 
The progress made in the stabilization effort and in respect of the balance of payments was, 
however, accompanied by a contraction of the gross domestic product (-3%) for the fifth year 
running, which brought the level of this variable down to 15% below that of 1980. As a consequence 
of this further decline and of population growth, the per capita product fell by almost 6%, making it 
the lowest since 1970. 
Although the slump in production was widespread, the goods producing sectors were the 
hardest hit. All told, these sectors showed a decrease of almost 7% while mining, one of the most vital 
activities of the economy, plummeted by about 20%. 
This situation and the determination of the authorities to reduce the size of the public sector 
helped to increase unemployment. According to official estimates (which are not always accurate), 
the unemployment rate rose from 18% in 1985 to 20% in 1986, while underemployment heldsteady 
at around 57%. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The year 1986 marked the fifth consecutive year of decrease in the total supply of goods and 
services. Because of this quasi-stagnation, during the year under review supply was at its lowest level 
since 1974. 
The decline in 1986 was due exlusively to a fresh drop (-3%) in the gross domestic product, 
bringing the cumulative loss during the last five years up to 15 %. In contrast, the quantum of imports 
expanded by around 20%, thereby more than doubling its growth rate of the year before and, for the 
first time in the 1980s, surpassing the level attained at the end of the preceding decade (see table 2). 
The fall of almost 6% in domestic demand reflected the unfavourable economic conditions of 
the recent past. The total decline in this variable over the period 1982-1986 was close to 20%. 
Unlike what had occurred in other years, the contraction in domestic demand was due to the 
slump in total consumption (-6%), which in turn was attributable to the cutback in consumption 
made by the government and, especially, by households. The 3% reduction in government consump-
tion, when added to that of previous years, yielded a total drop of over 10% during the five-year 
period from 1982 to 1986. The 7% decline observed in private consumption was far greater than the 
slight increases recorded during the two preceding years, with the result that this variable fell to 
below its 1978 level. 
The other component of total demand, gross investment in fixed capital, saw an increase (3%) 
for the first time since 1978. Nevertheless, because of the enormous cumulative loss suffered in the 
interim (-58%), the investment coefficient for 1986 (13%) remained far below that achieved during 
the second half of the 1970s. 
Finally, notwithstanding the adverse conditions confronted by the main export items, the 
volume of exports soared by almost 35%. External sales amounted to 21 % of the product, which was 
the largest percentage since 1977, and thus reached their highest level in the present decade except 
for 1981. 
b) The main sectors 
The slump in production activity was considerable, but it affected the various sectors in 
different ways. The production of goods —almost 45% of the product— decreased by almost 7%; 
this, on top of the other declines recorded since 1978, brought the cumulative drop up to 33%. In 
contrast, a slight expansion (1%) was noted in basic services. The output of "other services" (46% of 
GDP) remained virtually at a standstill, thus maintaining the trend of previous years (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. After two consecutive years of expansion, agricultural activity slackened by 2%. 
Basically, this was the result of the flooding caused when Lake Titicaca overflowed. Heavy rains fell at 
the beginning of the year as well, affecting 150 000 peasants and damaging many high plateau crops. 
Other factors which hurt production included the high cost of transport and weak demand. Nonethe-
less, the harvest of the wheat crop, which is one of the most important products in the population's 
diet, was up 9%. 
ii) Mining. The crisis in this sector, whose output has been falling steadily since 1977 (with the 
sole exception of 1980), was deepened in 1986 by a further decline of 19%. The cumulative drop 
during the period 1974-1986 thus totalled 80%, with more than one-half of this loss having occurred 
during the last three years. Asa result, the sector's share in the gross domestic product (almost 11%) 
was the lowest since 1970. 
There were several reasons for such a poor performance. Some of the factors having a more 
long-lasting effect were the lower metal content of the ores, the failure to discover new deposits and 
the obsolescence of the machinery and equipment used. In 1986, this situation was compounded by 
the slump in the international prices of the vast majority of the minerals exported by Bolivia, the 
decline in the productivity of virtually all the mines and, in particular, the reforms that were 
introduced along with the government's new economic policy. 
Tin production —which until recently was the most important activity in the economy— fell by 
almost 35%, bringing the cumulative decline for the five-year period to nearly 90% (see table 4). 
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In addition to the more general factors which have hurt mining activities as a whole, two other 
adverse circumstances exacerbated the situation with respect to tin in 1986. Throughout the year, the 
international market continued to be affected by the uncertainty which had arisen in October 1985 
when, due to a complex set of circumstances, the International Tin Council (ITC) halted its operations 
and international tin prices collapsed. In 1986 the average price quoted was 45% lower than it had 
been in 1985, when it had already slipped by almost 4%. A downward plunge of this magnitude 
—which in the opinion of the experts is not merely a cyclical phenomenon— could not fail to have an 
adverse effect on the value of mining exports and to create serious problems for business enterprises 
and the economy as a whole (see table 9). 
In response to this situation, the authorities embarked upon a plan to make sweeping reforms 
in the State mining sector. The object of this plan was to streamline the operations of the Corporación 
Minera Boliviana (COMIBOL) and to cut the enormous losses it had suffered in recent years, which in 
1985 alone had been on the order of US$240 million, while its debts approached US$500 million. 
In order to overcome the problems besetting it, COMIBOL began to decentralize its various units. 
In those which had recorded the greatest losses, workers were offered the opportunity to set up 
co-operatives and to rent the production facilities from the corporation. In spite of this initiative, 
however, around 11 000 out of a total of 27 000 mining workers lost their jobs. Unemployment also 
rose, although less sharply, in the private mining sector, with some 9 000 workers being laid off. 
The trend with respect to other minerals was equally negative in terms of both production and 
prices. Thus, the volume extracted was down in virtually all the remaining minerals. Although these 
output volumes have traditionally been small, in 1986 the decreases were dramatic (copper, -80%; 
lead, -58%; tungsten, -31%). Production of antimony and gold increased (by 16% and 38% 
respectively), but not enough to regain the levels reached at the beginning of the decade. 
The situation in respect of prices was much the same, since the international prices quoted for 
almost all the minerals also fell (copper, - 3 % ; tungsten, -30%). Even though the international price 
of gold rose by nearly 15%, the increase was not sufficient to offset the 25% decline of 1984-1985. 
iii) Hydrocarbons. During the first half of the year, crude petroleum production fell by about 
15% compared with the same period in 1985 (see table 5). Since there were no major changes in the 
sector's performance during the second half of the year, 1986 turned out to be the thirteenth 
consecutive year in which oil production declined. 
Domestic sales of almost all fuels were lower as well. Gasoline was the exception, in that its 
consumption remained at a standstill, but purchases of kerosene and fuel oil and, to a lesser extent, of 
diesel oil slumped. This was due in large measure to the depressed level of economic activity and to 
the considerable increases that were made in the domestic prices of energy products in an attempt to 
align them with international prices and to curb unregistered trade. 
The pricing policy was the same as that introduced during the preceding year. In other words, 
the domestic price of gasoline continued to be the equivalent of US$0.30 per litre, which was similar 
to that of neighbouring countries. 
The output volume of natural gas declined somewhat more than 7% during the first half of the 
year, making 1986 the third year in a row in which production decreased. Nevertheless, this fuel 
continued to be by far the main item of export. 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) continued to be required to deposit all its 
earnings (in both foreign exchange and Bolivian pesos) in the Central Bank, which was responsible 
for withholding the relevant taxes and royalties; after these deductions were made, the balance, in the 
national currency, was placed at the disposal of the company. In this way, the income obtained by YPFB 
from its fuel sales served to finance a part of the implementation of the stabilization plan. 
3. The external sector 
a) Overall trends 
The distinguishing features of the external sector's performance in 1986 were the exchange 
policy's effectiveness in stabilizing the official and parallel exchange rates, the establishment of 
agreements with the International Monetary Fund and the Paris Club, the new tariff policy, and the 
substantial increase observed in the country's foreign exchange reserves. 
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Bolivia signed a stand-by credit arrangement with the IMF and another agreement concerning 
compensatory financing for the decline in raw materials prices. Furthermore, as a result of the 
negotiations entered into with the creditor governments, the authorities rescheduled a significant 
part of the medium- and long-term public debt. Nonetheless, the servicing of the external debt owed 
to private creditors remained suspended. 
The new tariff policy, which was one of the vehicles for the liberalization process begun in late 
1985, provided for a uniform tariff on all imports that was lower than the tariffs in effect until that 
time. 
Lastly, thanks to an increase of almost US$200 million, the net sum of foreign assets held in the 
Central Bank amounted to some US$330 million, a level which had not been reached since 1974. 
b) Foreign trade 
i) Exports of goods. The further erosion of the value of exports of goods (-13%) resulted in a 
cumulative loss of around 50% over the last six years. Unlike what had occurred in 1985, the decrease 
was due entirely to the substantial reduction in unit value (-36%), which thus consolidated the 
downward trend observed in Bolivian exports since the beginning of the 1980s. The volume of 
merchandise exports, however, soared 36%, which more than made up for the setbacks of the 
preceding years (see table 6). 
The decline in external sales was particularly great in the case of traditional exports (-17%), 
which accounted forclose to 85% of the total. Within this category, exports of natural gas (more than 
one-half of total exports) were down by almost 12%, after three years of virtual stagnation. The 
largest buyer of this product continued to be Argentina, which, although it imported the same volume 
as before, paid a lower price (-12%) for its natural gas purchases. Furthermore, almost one-half of the 
value of fuel imports was paid to Bolivia in kind (see table 7). 
Exports of metallic tin and tin concentrate, which just one year earlier had accounted for 
approximately 30% of external sales, plummeted in 1986. The decline of close to 60% in the value of 
metallic tin exports reduced their relative share in foreign trade from one-fifth to less than one-tenth 
in the space of a single year. These types of decreases were caused by a drop in both the volume and 
unit value of exports. After having fallen by 25% in 1985, their volume again declined by 30%, while 
the decrease in the unit value (-41%) came on top of another of almost 7% in 1985 (see tables 
8 and 9). 
Although tin concentrate continued to be another of Bolivia's main export products (nearly 8% 
of the total), the value of the external sales of this metal declined by more than 7%. This was due to a 
reduction in its unit value (-52%) which was too large to be offset by the expansion in the volume of 
these exports, even though they almost doubled. 
The value of the remaining traditional exports followed an equally unfavourable course, except 
in the case of silver, where exports almost trebled. Non-traditional exports, however, increased 
substantially (188%). Exports of wood exhibited particularly vigorous growth and came to represent 
one-fifth of this category. 
ii) Imports of goods. Thanks primarily to the forceful expansion in their volume, the value of 
external purchases rose 25%, following the 12% increase recorded the preceding year. Even so, the 
value of imports remained below the level it had reached at the beginning of the decade because of the 
steep decline (-57%) that had occurred between 1982 and 1984 (see table 6). Imports of consumer 
and capital goods were the items showing the most growth. 
iii) The terms of trade. As a result of the sharp decline in the unit value of exports, the terms of 
trade worsened dramatically (-37%). Morever, since the increase in volume was cancelled out by this 
deterioration, the purchasing power of merchandise exports also declined (-15%) (see table 6). 
c) The balance of payments 
The deficit on current account approached US$500 million, which was an increase of 40%. This 
was chiefly due to the turnabout in the trade balance, since net external payments for factor services 
were lower and private transfers increased (see table 11). 
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Indeed, the country's trade in goods and real services showed a deficit of almost US$200 million. 
This imbalance, which was the first since 1981, was attributable to the results of Bolivia's trade in 
both goods and services. Thus, its trade in goods closed the year with a negative balance (US$-37 
million) for the first time in the 1980s, while the trade deficit in real services (US$-162 million) grew 
by 9% in what amounted to a continuation of the trend seen in previous years. 
Net remittances of profits and interest totalled some US$310 million, which was not only a 
decline of 17%, but also the smallest amount that the country had paid out under this heading since 
1981. Furthermore, net disbursements of profits and net interest payments to the exterior dropped by 
23% and 17%, respectively. 
The capital account yielded a surplus of around US$680 million, which was well above double 
that of 1985 and the largest since 1980. Long-term capital movements reflected an outflow of almost 
US$140 million, which was about US$100 million less than during the preceding period. In contrast, 
short-term movements of capital produced a positive balance of somewhat more than US$580 
million; this was twice as much as these movements had generated in 1985 and represented the 
largest amount of resources obtained by the country at least since the beginning of the decade. 
As a consequence of these changes and of the positive balance recorded under "errors and 
omissions" (US$165 million), in 1986 the country's international foreign exchange reserves climbed 
by almost US$200 million, bringing the total gross foreign assets held by the Central Bank to some 
US$410 million by the end of the year, an amount equivalent to two months of imports. 
d) The external debt 
The most significant events to occur with respect to external financing in 1986 were the signing 
of agreements with the International Monetary Fund and with the member countries of the Paris 
Club. 
Once the authorities' macroeconomic plans had been formulated and the government's general 
budget and the tax reform law had been approved, the government sought a stand-by agreement with 
the IMF in order to support its plans for a reactivation of the economy within a framework of price 
stability and an improved balance of payments. A restructuring of the external debt and the 
procurement of fresh loans having longer grace periods were regarded as measures which would 
contribute to the achievement of these goals. 
Once the usual fiscal, monetary and external-sector terms and conditions had been established, 
IMF granted a loan of US$50 million in support of the stabilization plan. It also made available 
another US$57 million in compensatory financing for the decline in the prices of raw materials and a 
US$20 million credit on whose use no restrictions were placed. 
In addition, the government's negotiations with the Paris Club resulted in the restructuring of 
approximately US$645 million of the US$1.64 billion owed to official creditors in the form of 
medium- and long-term public debt. Of the amount rescheduled, around US$440 million corres-
ponded to amortization payments either in arrears or falling due before July 1987, while the balance 
represented interest owed. 
During the renegotiation process, all capital and interest payments due as of 30June 1986 were 
deferred, and it was stipulated that the new period of payment would cover a term of five years 
commencing June 1990, with four years of grace. The capital and interest disbursements for the 
period June 1986-June 1987 were also rescheduled, it being agreed that at the end of a five-year grace 
period, these payments would be made over a term of four and one-half years. The arrangement also 
provided that the interest rate to be charged would be determined in negotiations between the 
Government of Bolivia and each creditor country. 
The level of medium- and long-term public external debt remained very high (US$3.7 billion). 
Although this amount was only slightly higher than that of 1985, it was equivalent to 5.5 times the 
value of exports of goods and services; the coefficient of debt servicing/exports of goods and services 
also continued to be very high. Total net interest payments alone absorbed close to 40% of exports 
(see table 12). This ratio would have been much higher still if the debts owed to private creditors had 
been serviced. These obligations stood at around US$1.1 billion and their servicing has been 
suspended since 1984. 
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e) Exchange and foreign trade policy 
One of the most striking successes of the authorities' economic policy was the high degree of 
stability of the exchange rate on both the official and parallel markets. The sale by the government of 
foreign exchange continued to be carried out according to the procedures which had been laid down at 
the time the new economic policy was adopted in late 1985. Under this system, the price of the United 
States dollar was determined in accordance with a weighted average of the sales to the public made by 
the Central Bank. This procedure was similar to that of an auction, i.e., the quotation for the dollar 
was set as a function of a base price established by the authorities and of the prices offered by agents 
prior to the opening of these transactions. 
The tight controls placed on fiscal variables and the resultant slower growth of the money 
supply, plus the greater confidence of agents in the government's economic policy, all helped to 
stabilize the exchange rate and to put a virtual end to speculation against the peso. 
The trend of the official and parallel exchange rates was thus quite similar to the pattern 
observed since the introduction of the new economic policy in August 1985, when the value of the 
dollar was set at around 1 100 000 pesos. During the final quarter of that year the average level of the 
official exchange rate increased moderately (18%), while in 1986 it was quoted at slightly above 
1 900 000 pesos, which represented an increase of approximately 320% over the 1985 rate. However, 
in this case, the annual comparison is not sufficiently representative. The question of whether the 
exchange rate deteriorated during 1986 must be answered with reference to the value set by the 
government which assumed office when the second half of 1985 was already well underway. On the 
basis of this criterion, the depreciation of the peso was fairly well controlled throughout 1986: 
although during the first quarter the peso/dollar ratio climbed by almost 50% in comparison to the 
last quarter of 1985, no major variations were observed during the remainder of the year, thereby 
reflecting a slight tendency for Bolivia's currency to appreciate. 
Furthermore, since in 1986 the average annual nominal exchange rate increased more than the 
inflation rate and, on the whole, the dollar fell against other currencies, exports became more 
profitable and imports more expensive. In fact, during the course of the year the real effective 
exchange rate for exports rose considerably, and the corresponding index soared from 55 to 90. 
Imports, for their part, became much more costly, with the real exchange rate index jumping from 60 
to 113 (see table 13). 
Nevertheless, the annual averages disguise the conflicting trends observed during the year. The 
quarterly figures reveal how small increases in prices and the stability of the nominal exchange rate 
progressively increased the cost of exports, with the result that by the end of the year they were much 
less attractive than at the beginning. In the case of imports the reverse occurred (see figure 2). 
With respect to trade in goods, a new tariff policy was introduced in August. In addition to 
streamlining the regulations governing this activity, the new policy provided for a uniform customs 
duty of 20%. In practice, this amounted to a non-discriminatory treatment of imports of consumer 
goods, raw materials and capital goods. It was also established, however, that exporting firms would 
be entitled to the reimbursement of the duties paid on imported raw materials. 
Finally, early on in the year the government contracted the services of Société Genérale de 
Surveillance, S.A. to monitor both public and private foreign trade and to prevent the underinvoicing 
of exports and the overinvoicing of imports. 
4. Prices, wages and unemployment 
a) Prices 
The greatest achievement of the stabilization policy introduced by the government in the latter 
part of 1985 was to bring hyperinflation under control. The 12-month growth rate of the general 
consumer price index plummeted from 8 170% in December 1985 to just 66% in December 1986, 
while the variation between annual averages slid from 11 750% to 276% (see table 14 and figure 3). 
All the components of the general index increased by similar percentages during the year. The 
prices of food products rose 62% and those of housing services went up by around 45%; larger 
increases were recorded in clothing and in the category of miscellaneous goods. 
117 
Wholesale prices followed a similar pattern. The variation between the annual averages of the 
general index was slightly over 170%, while the variation from December to December amounted to 
47%. 
The prices of domestic products rose more than those of imported goods both in terms of 
annual averages and of 12-month variations. According to the latter measurements, the prices of 
agricultural products increased by 57% and those of manufactures by 49% whereas those of imported 
goods only increased by 40%. 
The process of slowing down inflation passed through a number of clearly distinguishable 
stages following the implementation of the new economic policy. Between August 1985 and January 
1986 the monthly rates of variation in the general consumer price index were very erratic, fluctuating 
between 56% in September and -2% in October. In December 1985 and January 1986, the monthly 
increases sharpened once again (17% and 33%, respectively). However, thereafter the downward 
trend became stronger. In three of the subsequent 11 months, the monthly increase in the general 
consumer price index was lower than 1% and in another three it fluctuated between 1% and 3.5% 
(see figure 3). 
One of the main reasons for this progress was the strict control exercised by the authorities over 
public-sector expenditure, which in past years had been financed simply by expanding the money 
supply. The success of the policy aimed at stabilizing the exchange rate and the establishment of a 
lower and uniform tariff also played a very important role. 
Figure 2 
BOLIVIA: INDEXES OF THE REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE 
RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
(1980 -100) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data supplied by the International Monetary Fund. 
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Figure 3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
«The monthly variation was 182.8 per cent. 
b) Wages 
The paramount objective of the government's wage policy was to prevent wage increments 
from acting as a mechanism which would fuel further price increases, as had occurred in the past. 
In late 1985, a new minimum wage of 30 million pesos had been established, which was 
equivalent to somewhat less than US$20 according to the official exchange rate for December of that 
year. At the same time all public-sector wages had been frozen for a six-month period, while those in 
the private sector had been made subject to free bargaining among the parties involved. 
In June 1986, the minimum wage was set at 40 million pesos. Although this represented a 
nominal raise of 33%, at the official or parallel market exchange rate it was still equivalent to around 
US$20. The rest of the wage-earners in the public sector whose remunerations were lower than 300 
million pesos were given an increase of 7.5%, except for those earning less than 140 million pesos, 
who were granted a readjustment of 13%. No raise was given to those receiving salaries above 300 
million pesos. 
In nominal terms, the average minimum wage increased 250% in 1986. In real terms, however, 
due to price increases and to the level at which wages had been frozen in December 1985, the average 
minimum wage declined by 30%. This, in combination with the erosion of purchasing power which 
had occurred during previous years, meant that the average real minimum wage experienced an 
overall drop of close to 70% during the three-year period of 1984-1986 (see table 15). 
c) Unemployment 
Unemployment, which had increased steadily during the preceding years, reached 20% in 1986, 
thus becoming one of the main problems of the economy. Although the level of underemployment 
showed little change, it remained very high. In addition to the more long-standing causes of 
unemployment, the situation in the labour market was exacerbated by a number of short-term factors, 
some of which were of particular significance. 
The rise in unemployment was partly attributable to the implementation of the new economic 
policy. One of the pivotal features of this programme was the scaling down of the public sector and 
the attempt that was made to improve the competitiveness of State enterprises. This led to a cutback 
in the number of civil servants and of workers in State enterprises. The serious crisis affecting the 
mining industry added to unemployment in both the public and private enterprises of the sector. 
Finally, the authorities' policy of opening up the economy also contributed in some degree to the 
worsening of the employment situation since numerous enterprises had to shut down or suspend 
their operations because they were unable to withstand the foreign competition. 
In an effort to solve these problems, the government set up the National Employment 
Committee to design labour-intensive projects which did not require a long start-up period. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The policy applied in this area in 1986 was shaped by the strict control exercised by the 
authorities over the imbalances in the public sector, which allowed monetary variables to function 
autonomously once again, and by the monetary reforms undertaken towards the end of the year. 
Thus, during the period from January to October, the monetary base expanded slightly more 
than 140% in nominal terms (i.e., by about 45% after adjusting for inflation). Because of the abrupt 
decline in the growth rate of prices, the money supply (M,) increased more than 125%, which in real 
terms amounted to a bit over 35% (see table 16). 
Owing to agents' greater confidence in the government's economic policy, quasi-money grew by 
640% in nominal terms, while the expanded money supply (M2) climbed by 270%, i.e., 125% at 
constant values. 
Two of the factors which, in turn, contributed to the growth of M2 were the sharp increase in 
international reserves (360%) and the marked expansion in the credit extended to the private sector 
(240%). In contrast, the amount of funds made available to the public sector showed a substantial and 
widespread decrease, even in nominal values (see table 16). 
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Generally speaking, these trends were strikingly different from those observed in 1984-1985, 
the biennium during which the country experienced the most acute hyperinflationary process seen in 
Latin America. The drastic reduction in credit for the public sector and the increase in the funds 
granted to the private sector constituted one of the mainstays of the new economic policy. 
The smaller expansion of the amount of money in the economy and, above all, the dramatic 
slowdown in the growth rate of prices accounted for the pattern followed by interest rates. The 
monthly rates charged by the banks on loans fluctuated around 2% in real terms. During the first 
quarter these rates were slightly negative due to the resurgence of inflation between December 1985 
and February 1986, but as the monthly increases in prices became smaller thereafter, the cost of credit 
in Bolivian currency began to rise (see table 17). Interest rates on deposits followed a similar course: 
as a result of the size of the price increases seen during the first quarter, the returns on clients' bank 
deposits were negative, but as soon as inflation slowed down again, real interest rates became 
positive, although they remained low. 
Minimum reserve requirements were modified in September. The requirements on demand 
deposits were lowered from 50% to 40% for both national and foreign banks, while those applying to 
both domestic and foreign financial intermediaries with respect to fixed-term deposits were reduced 
from 10% to 8%. 
As part of the government's plan to introduce through-going changes in the economy, a 
monetary reform entered into effect late in 1986 which replaced the peso with the "boliviano", with 
the parity between the two being set at 1 million to 1 and the exchange rate for the dollar at 2 to 1. 
b) Fiscal policy 
As mentioned above much of Bolivia's success in its fight against hyperinflation was due to the 
stringent control exercised by the authorities over the behaviour of fiscal variables. 
Some of the main conditions laid down by the International Monetary Fund for the extension of 
the credits referred to earlier for the country's economic management in 1986 were: the approval of 
the general public-sector budget; the reduction of the fiscal deficit/gross domestic product coefficient 
from 28% in 1985 to somewhat less than 6% in 1986; an increase in the proportion of the product 
represented by fiscal revenue from 1% to 12%; the imposition of a hiring and wage freeze in the 
government sector until 31 May; and the passing of a tax reform act. However, during the period of 
hyperinflation, the fiscal situation became so critical that even if the IMF had not stipualted the 
foregoing requisites for lending its financial support to the government's stabilization plan, it would 
nevertheless have been imperative to reduce the size of the public-sector disequilibria. 
Until recently, the procedure of approving the general budget of the government was not 
always a clear or well-defined one. The mere fact that it was approved was in itself a way of limiting 
expenditures. 
In addition, although the available figures on the public sector's performance are limited and 
refer only to the National Treasury, they nonetheless indicate that a number of other substantive 
changes occurred during the course of 1986 as well. 
In real terms the central government's current income expanded by 16% (see table 19). Income 
from petroleum royalties stagnated, but continued to be the Treasury's principal source of funds 
(55% of the total), and although this proportion was lower than that of 1985, it was almost four times 
that of 1984 (around 15%). 
In striking contrast to the situation in the period 1983-1985, when a cumulative loss of more 
than 60% was recorded, in 1986 receipts from inland taxation soared by almost 55% in constant 
values and thus came to account for almost one-sixth of total tax revenues. Receipts from foreign 
trade also grew (19%), but they continued to represent a much smaller proportion of total earnings 
(12%). Finally, owing to the fact that the international tin market remained immersed in a major 
crisis, mining royalties at constant values fell dramatically for the second year in a row. 
As a result of all the above, the current income/product coefficient showed a marked improve-
ment which brought it close to the level that had been agreed upon with the IMF. 
The accounts of the National Treasury yielded a surplus for the first time in the last 20 years, 
and this was accompanied by a decline in the coefficient of the public-sector deficit/product. 
The tax reform law which made major changes in the existing legislation, introduced new taxes 
on the following: 
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i) The value added to sales imports and the provision of services (10%), except for the interest 
generated by financial operations and the purchase and sale of shares and securities in general; 
ii) Personal income from any source (10%) except stock dividends. (It was, however, provided 
that taxpayers could deduct value-added-tax payments from the tax on personal income.); 
iii) The value of the net assetts of public and private enterprises (2%), with the exception of 
mining, petroleum and electricity companies; 
iv) Rural property, with the rate of this tax depending on the geographical location of the land, 
the size of the holding and the fertility of the soil; 
v) Urban real estate; 
vi) Ownership of vehicles, automobiles, motorboats and aircraft, with a scale ranging from 
1.5% to 5% of the value thereof; 
vii) Commercial transactions (1%); and 
viii) Certain specific consumer goods (alcohol, tobacco, etc.), on which a tax rate of between 
30% and 50% was imposed. 
The passage of this new tax law was one of the conditions of the IMF for granting the funds 
needed for the stabilization plan. However, the only levy that became effective in 1986 was the tax 
regularization scheme, which operated as a tax amnesty. Its aim was to put the taxpayers' situation in 
order prior to the application of the new economic policy, even though in practice the tax regulariza-
tion scheme only covered the year 1985. Under this plan public and private enterprises, except for 
mining, petroleum and electricity companies, were required to pay the equivalent of 3% of the value 
of their net assets. For their part, individuals owning land, urban real estate or any kind of vehicle had 
to pay a surcharge of 50% over the rate established for such property in the new law. 
In sum, the basic aim of the new law was to increase the government's income, even at the cost 
of raising indirect taxes, which are usually less progressive. 
Along with the above law, a new body of regulations were adopted concerning the procedures 




BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986° 
. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (index: 1980 = 100) 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(index: 1980 = 100) 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Per capita gross national income 
Unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages 
Money (M¡) 
Current income of central 
government 
Total expenditure of central 
government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of central government 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic produce 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
















































































































19.1 -2.4 -9.5 -5.7 -4.7 -12.0 -8.5 
•26.4 37.7 -37.6 
9.2 -8.3 0.8 
ilillions of dollars 
199 -139 195 
262 362 411 
-53 -491 -202 
-105 494 230 
-148 19 34 
































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. National average in pesos at 1970 prices. The rates for the period 1983-1986 were calculated on 
the basis of the consumer price index for November 1982, when the value of the minimum wage was determined; this is 
therefore the wage referred to here. 'Percentages. Disbursed balances of the short-, medium- and long-term 
public external debt and of the non-guaranteed long-term private debt. The data for 1985 and 1986 refer only to the public 
debt. 
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Table 2 
BOLIVIA: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
(At 1980 market prices) 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 






Exports of goods and 
services 

















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures weighted according to the 1980 current price structure. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from IMF balance-of-
payments data expressed in dollars at current prices, which were then converted to constant 1980 values based on indexes of 
unit value calculated by ECLAC for that purpose. 
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Table 3 
BOLIVIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY BRANCHES 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 






































































































Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 108.3 109.1 110.2 111.5 6.0 7.7 2.1 0.7 1.0 1.2 
Other services 99.7 99.5 99.6 99.4 39-9 46.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 
Commerce, restaurants 
and hotels 98.4 97.5 99.5 101.0 10.8 12.6 -4.0 -1.0 2.1 1.5 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Minus: imputed bank 
service charge 
Plus: import duties 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. These series were calculated on the basis of official figures, which were reweighted according to 
the 1980 current price structure. 'Includes the livestock sector, forestry and fishing. 
Table 4 




























































































































































Source: National Association of Medium-Scale Miners. 
"Preliminary figures. Tons. c Kilogrammes. 
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Table 5 
BOLIVIA: HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY INDICATORS 
Petroleum 
Production of crude petroleum 
Exports of crude petroleum 
Processing of petroleum 
products 

























































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
" Preliminary figures. These data refer to the period January-June, and the rates were calculated with respect to the same period 
of the preceding year. Thousands of barrels. Annual data. ' Thousands of cubic metres. These data refer to 
the period January-June, and the rates were calculated with respect to the same period of the preceding year. 
Table 6 
BOLIVIA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Quantum of exports 
Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports of goods 
Purchasing power of 






























































































BOLIVIA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 




























































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 8 


























































































BOLIVIA: AVERAGE PRICE OF TIN ON THE 
LONDON METAL EXCHANGE 



































Unit value of 































Source: UNCTAD, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and ECLAC estimates based on official data. 
"Average annual figures. 'Preliminary figures. 
Table 10 
















Millions of dollars Percentage breakdown Growth rates 
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1983 1984 1985 1986° 1980 1986° 1983 1984 1985 1986° 










































































-45.7 -52.6 -33.3 
Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
"Preliminary figures. Includes unregistered imports. 
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Table 11 
BOLIVIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
BOLIVIA 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





















































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis 
official data. 
Preliminary figures subject to revision. 
assets and liabilities. 
Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 
This item is equal to the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign), plus counterpart items. 
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Table 12 
BOLIVIA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Total disbursed external debt 
Disbursed medium- and long-term 
public external debt 
Disbursements in each yearc 




Service on the medium- and 

















































Total disbursed external debt/ 
exports of goods and services 
Total disbursed public external 
debt/exports of goods and 
services 
Service on the medium- and 
long-term public debt/ 
exports of goods and services 
Service on the medium- and 
long-term public debt/ 
annual medium- and long-term 
public debt disbursements 
Total interest (net) /exports 
of goods and services 
Main indicators (percentages) 
























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data supplied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
"Preliminary figures. Includes IMF credit. 'Corresponds to figures published by the Central Bank. "The 
figures for total net interest payments were taken from the balance of payments and therefore include the interest on the 
short-, medium- and long-term public and private debt. 
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Table 13 




















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia and the International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics. 
"Indexes of the real (official) exchange rate for the boliviano in relation to the currencies of trading partners, weighted 
according to the relative importance of exports to or imports from these countries, as appropriate. From 1970 to 1980, these 
weightings correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979; from 1981 onward, they correspond to the average for the 
period 1982-1985. Wholesale price indexes have primarily been used for these calculations, but in Bolivia's case the consumer 
price index was employed. For detailed information on the methodology and sources used, see the statistical appendix to the 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. bThe exchange rate used for the period March-October 1982 was obtained 
from the average of the official rate (weighted 40%) and the average open-market exchange rate (weighted 60%). 
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Consumer price index 
Food 





Consumer price index 
Food 






















1980 1981 1982 1983 





















































































































BOLIVIA: MINIMUM WAGES 










































4 035 000 
6 240 000 
10 171 000 
30 000 000 
10 258 867 
30 000 000 
40 000 000 
























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Commission on Wages (CONALSA) and the Economic Policy 
Analysis Unit (UDAPE). 
"The consumer price index for November 1982 (which was when the value of the minimum wage was determined) was used 
as a basis for the conversion of nominal wages into real wages. In November a bonus of 22 500 pesos was added; this 
bonus was payable in three installments, the first of which was to be paid that same month. 'During several days in 
April, the minimum wage in force was that corresponding to March. The figure shown in the table, however, corresponds to 
the wage adjustment made in May, which was retroactive to 1 April. In addition, food and transport allowances were granted 
in April as well. The former amounted to 35 723 pesos, while the latter varied according to the number of daily trips to the 
place of work. 
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Table 16 
BOLIVIA: MAIN MONETARY INDICATORS 
1. Total liquidity (M2) 
International 
reserves (net) 
Credit to public 
sector (net) 
Central government 
Local and regional 
governments 
Public enterprises 




3. Money supply 
(M.) (1-2) 

























































































Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures given under the heading "year-end balances" 
rates were calculated in relation to the same month of the preceding year. 




BOLIVIA: AVERAGE M O N T H L Y B A N K INTEREST RATES" 
(Percentages) 
Loans 










Savings bank deposits 
Minimum nominal rate 
Real rate' 
Fixed-term deposits in 
national currency 






































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Bolivia. 
"These rates reflect the monthly cost of or return on loans and deposits during each year and quarter shown. Both annual and 
quarterly values were calculated as average of the monthly figures. Refers to the first nine months of the 
year. cReal rates were obtained by deflating the nominal rates according to the monthly variation in the general 
consumer price index. 
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Table 18 










Materials and supplies 
Fixed and financial 
assets 
Public debt 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The performance of the Brazilian economy in 1986 was strongly influenced by the implementation of 
an unorthodox stabilization plan (the Plan Cruzado) which succeeded in bringing down the 12-
month rate of price increases from 242% to 75%. At the same time, economic activity expanded by 
somewhat more than 8%, and the unemployment rate for the mainurban centres had fallen to below 
3% by the end of the year (see table 1 and figure 1). However, these results proved to be short-lived, 
as the excessive increase in demand led to a marked deterioration in the balance of payments and a 
vigorous resurgence of inflation during the last quarter of the year. 
The primary aim of the Plan Cruzado, which was unveiled at the end of February, was to make a 
drastic cut in the rate of price increases, which in the four preceding months had averaged over 14%. 
In order to minimize the social cost involved, and in view of the strong inertial component of 
Brazilian inflation, steps were therefore taken to eliminate the system of indexation. Basically, the 
Plan provided for a freeze on prices at their levels as of 28 February, the fixing of wages and housing 
rents according to their real average values during the preceding six months; the use of a conversion 
table which would eliminate the impact of projected inflation on obligations incurred in cruzeiros; the 
suspension of regular increases in the exchange rate; and the introduction of a new currency, the 
cruzado, whose initial unit value was set at the equivalent of one thousand cruzeiros. 
In order to mitigate the negative impact that these measures might have on economic activity, 
the government decreed an initial increase of 8% in all wages and on adjustment of 15% in the legal 
minimum wage in respect of their real average values during the previous six months. The 
authorities also established an automatic wage readjustment mechanism which was to go into effect 
whenever the cumulative level of inflation since the most recent wages negotiations reached 20% or 
more. In addition, unemployment benefits were to be provided to eligible persons for a period of not 
more than four months. 
During the first months of its implementation, the plan achieved its aim of drastically reducing 
inflation without creating a decline in employment or economic activity or eroding real remunera-
tions. In fact, spurred by the increase in both domestic consumption and investment, the expansion 
rate of the economy accelerated, unemployment fell rapidly and steadily and real wages rose 
considerably. The drop in inflation also helped to increase the demand for liquidity, and this in turn 
facilitated the financing of the public domestic debt. 
Because of its dynamic growth, industry quickly achieved the maximum levels permitted by its 
existing installed capacity. As a matter of fact, the production of capital and consumer goods grew by 
more than 20% in the course of the year. Nevertheless, during the second half of the year difficulties 
began to arise in the supply of raw materials as the existing idle capacity in intermediate goods 
producing activities was exhausted, and as a result, this segment of supply expanded by only 8%. The 
production of non-durable consumer goods also increased more slowly than overall industrial output, 
owing primarily to the very steep decline in agricultural activity. 
As a consequence of the very rapid growth of domestic demand (retail sales in Rio de Janeiro 
and São Paulo climbed by 25% and 35% in real terms) and the price freeze, there began to be 
shortages in a number of products and parallel markets came into being. Goods on these markets 
were sold at higher prices than those set by the government, which did not begin to revise the price 
levels it had established until late in the year. 
The sharp increase in domestic expenditure also contributed to a deterioration in the perfor-
mance of the external sector, especially during the last quarter. Up to August, merchandise trade was 
yielding a surplus of around US$1 billion per month, which v/as quite similar to the levels recorded 
during the two preceding years. However, these surpluses were partly due to the sharp reduction in 
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the value of fuel imports which was triggered by the steep decline in international oil prices. The 
surplus fell to just half its former level in September, and disappeared completely in the final three 
months of the year, when foreign trade showed a deficit of somewhat more than US$300 million for 
the quarter. 
This dramatic turnaround was chiefly attributable to the enormous decrease in exports, whose 
value was 46% lower than it had been during the same period of the preceding year. Consequently, 
the US$8.3 billion surplus recorded for merchandise trade was 36% lower than the surplus achieved 
in 1985. As a result, despite the 8% decline in net payments of interest and profits, the current 
account of the balance of payments (which in the preceding two years had been virtually at 
equilibrium) showed a deficit of US$4 billion. Since the net capital inflow amounted to US$400 
million, international reserves shrank by more than US$3.5 billion. 
At the time the authorities announced the launching of the stabilization plan, they believed they 
would be in a better position than before to manage the public deficit because they expected to obtain 
higher revenues as a result of the income tax increase which had been approved at the end of 1985, to 
have greater control over the loans made by the Banco do Brasil (which was no longer authorized to 
undertake the primary issue of currency), and to see a reduction in the service on the public domestic 
debt due to the projected drop in real interest rates. However, because of the public sector's financing 
requirements and the negative impact on the fiscal balance produced by various measures that were 
adopted during the year in order to maintain the price freeze, the public sector's operating deficit 
turned out to be far in excess of the level stipulated in the plan and was only a little lower than it had 
been the year before. 
The difficulties encountered in generating enough resources to meet the public sector's 
financial obligations and to finance a sufficient level of investment in basic sectors to sustain an 
annual growth rate of 7% prompted the government to set up the National Development Fund in 
July. This Fund was financed by the so-called compulsory loans which were imposed on sales of 
automobiles, gasoline and alcohol fuels, which provided some 15.4 billion cruzados (equivalent to 
more than US$1 billion) during the last five months of the year. 
In an effort to reduce excess demand and increase tax revenues, in November the government 
substantially raised the tax on a number of non-essential manufactures (automobiles, alcoholic 
beverages, cigarettes) and decreed major increases in the fuel prices (except for diesel oil) and 
electricity. 
These measures made it necessary to revise many of the prices which by law had remained 
frozen since February. Moreover, the increases in industrial costs stemming from wage readjust-
ments and from the payment of higher prices for raw materials than those set by the government, as 
well as the legal restrictions placed on the transfer of these higher costs to prices, prompted 
manufacturers and merchants to limit the supply of a number of goods, thereby heightening the 
shortage of various products during the final months of the year. The expectation that the freeze 
would be lifted exacerbated this situation, which was alleviated only by the increase in interest rates. 
This, in turn, made it more expensive to maintain large stocks for purposes of speculation. These 
pressures were ultimately reflected in the price index, which, after increasing at an average monthly 
rate of 1% between march and October, rose by 3% in November and by over 7% in December. 
The resurgence of inflation during the last two months of the year forced the government to 
establish new rules concerning the system of indexation, especially with respect to financial securi-
ties, and to resume the practice of making daily devaluations in the cruzado. Furthermore, as the 
official rate of inflation between February and December had reached a cumulative level of 22%, in 
January 1987 the remunerations of those workers whose collective wage negotiations had been 
conducted between February and May 1986 were readjusted by 20%. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The achievement of an annual growth rate of over 8% for the second year in a row was 
accompanied, for the first time in the 1980s, by an increase in imports of goods and services and by 
another substantial rise in domestic investment. Indeed, while the volume of imports grew by 16%, 
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investment expanded by 19% owing to the dynamic growth of construction and to the efforts made to 
modernize industry. Consumption also expanded at a very high annual rate (11%). The volume of 
exports, on the other hand, plummeted by more than 17% due to the strong growth of domestic 
demand and the decline in agricultural production caused by extremely bad weather conditions (see 
table 2). 
b) The main production sectors 
The greater purchasing power of the population and the attendant increase in domestic 
consumption stimulated growth in all the sectors of economic activity (except agriculture), which 
thus achieved growth rates similar to those of 1985. The sectors of production were able to satisfy this 
increased demand as long as a certain level of idle installed capacity remained, as was the case 
particularly in industry and construction. The limited financing available for new public investments, 
however, prevented what might have been an even greater expansion in such basic services as 
electricity and water and in the production of some minerals, services and goods supplied by State 
enterprises (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. After three years of steadily mounting growth, agricultural production showed a 
decline of some 7% due to a persistent drought in the southern central region which more than 
cancelled out the excellent yields obtained in the north-east thanks to the expansion of the area under 
cultivation and the favourable weather conditions that prevailed in that zone. 
The drought caused decreases in the production of peanuts (-36%), soya (-27%), beans (-13%) 
and maize (-7%). The coffee harvest was also hard hit as the average yield per hectare declined by 
about 41%. By contrast, the use of new irrigation techniques increased the rice harvest by 15% to a 
record high of 10.4 million tons, and a 26% expansion in wheat production raised it above the 
5-million ton mark (see table 4). 
The slump in beef production (-16%) and the drop in milk output (-4%) were largely 
responsible for the 3% decline in livestock production. Although the stabilization plan boosted the 
demand for these products, the livestock sector was not in a position to expand its supply at the prices 
which had been set at the end of February. Hence, producers kept their cattle in the fields in the hope 
of obtaining better prices. The result was that the demand for beef substitutes became stronger, 
thereby stimulating poultry and pork production, which increased by nearly 4% and 5 %, respectively. 
ii) Mining. The growth rate of this sector (4%) was substantially lower than the average rate 
(15%) recorded for the four preceding years due to the sharp decrease in the incorporation of new 
petroleum deposits. The addition of such deposits had made it possible to expand the extraction of 
crude oil by 27% in 1983, 40% in 1984 and 18% in 1985, whereas in 1986 output increased by only 
5%. Production of the other major minerals was discouraged by the steady decline in their prices on 
the international market. Thus, coal production fell by 8% and the output of manganese by 16%. In 
contrast, iron ore extraction rose by 5% (see table 5). 
iii) Manufacturing. Industrial production went up by 11%, a rate which had not been recorded 
since 1976. By bringing about sharp increases in both real wages and employment, the stabilization 
plan enhanced the role of domestic demand in promoting industrial growth. 
The production of capital goods and consumer durables experienced particularly vigorous 
growth (over 20%). As regards specific products, the production of television sets increased by 43%, 
refrigerators by 16%, trucks by 29%, buses by 38% and tractors by 25%. Some consumer non-
durables also saw substantial increases, such as beverages (23%) and toiletries and pharmaceuticals 
(22% each), as a result of the improvement in the population's purchasing power (see tables 6, 
7 and 8). 
The manufacturing industry might well have expanded even more, had it not been for the 
depletion of the idle capacity of the final goods industry and the bottlenecks which arose in the 
industrial inputs sector. For example, because the annual production of steel ingots increased by only 
4%, the volume of exports had to be reduced by 13% in order to meet the needs of the domestic 
markets. In addition, since the shortfall in domestic supply was not quickly and adequately covered by 
imports, it became difficult to maintain the prices of end products. Because of these cost pressures and 
the expectation that the restrictions on domestic prices would be removed, during the last quarter of 
the year industrial enterprises began to cut back on the supply of the products they sold at the official 
price or to sell them at higher prices. 
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Figure 1 (conclusion) 
Source: EC LAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. *> Average annual rate in the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, SSo Paulo, 
Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador and Recife. cThe December-December percentage variation 
corresponds to the consumer price index for Rio de Janeiro up to 1979 and to the index for the whole country 
from 1980 onwards. dBillions of dollars. ePercentages. 
c) Employment and unemployment 
Urban unemployment fell to an average of 4% in 1986, the lowest level thus far in the decade. 
Indeed, almost one million new jobs were created during the year, thus increasing employment in the 
formal sector by 5.5% (see table 9). 
The faster rate of economic growth pushed up the demand for labour. Processing industries 
took the lead by expanding their hiring by 9%, while employment in construction and in commerce 
rose by 8% and 7%, respectively. 
The steady decline in unemployment spread to all the main urban centres in the course of the 
year. Thus, the average unemployment rate in the six largest cities in the country fell to 2.2% in 
December and was even lower in Sao Paulo (1.8%), which suggests that thesecities had succeeded in 
providing full employment for the economically active population (see table 10). 
The improvement in the employment situation was also demonstrated by the fact that few 
claims were made for the unemployment insurance established under the Plan Cruzado, which 
provided benefits for up to four months to people who had been without work for more than 30 days. 
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During this period, unemployed persons were to receive between 70% and 150% of the minimum 
wage, depending on their previous wage level, provided that they had paid in to the social security 
system during at least 36 months out of the preceding four years and had been employed during the 
last six months. 
3. The external sector 
a) General trends 
The international climate was conducive to an improvement in the country's external accounts, 
and thus provided the Plan Cruzado with sufficient leeway to focus on eliminating domestic 
imbalances. The price of imported petroleum plummeted by 43%, international interest rates 
declined (the LIBOR rate dropped from 8.2% to 6%), and the valueofthe dollar fell against the major 
European currencies and the yen. The first two factors resulted in a substantial savings in foreign 
exchange disbursements, while the latter enhanced the competitiveness of Brazilian exports vis-a-vis 
products from the European Community and Japan. Although the lower rate of economic growth in 
the industrialized countries, the difficulties encountered in trade negotiations with the United States 
and the feeble recovery of the markets of the less industrialized regions had an adverse impact, on 
balance, the positive factors far outweighed the negative ones. 
However, as the year unfolded this favourable external situation was more than offset by the 
pressure of domestic factors. Consequently, the balance on current account closed with a deficit of 
US$4 billion (whereas in 1985 it had registered only a very small negative balance) notwithstanding 
the fact that in February the experts had been predicting a surplus of US$500 million. As capital 
movements yielded a net inflow of US$400 million, the balance-of-payments deficit turned out to be a 
little over US$3.6 billion. 
The freeze that was placed on the exchange rate until October in an attempt to bring the 
inflationary expectations of economic agents into line with the demands of the stabilization plan, 
resulted in a progressive overvaluation of the cruzado which eroded the competitiveness of exports 
and stimulated imports (see table 11). Real wage increases also diminished the profitability of 
external sales. Furthermore, the strong growth of domestic demand, which was boosted by both 
private consumption and public expenditures, gave rise to two main processes, each of which had a 
negative impact on the country's foreign trade. The first was the reduction of the amount of 
manufactures and especially of agricultural products which was left over for export (a situation that 
was compounded by the fact that the supply of the latter had already declined because of a drop in 
agricultural production). The second was the increase in imports. Indeed, in order to meet the greater 
demand while maintaining the level oí prices, the government authorized a significant increase in 
external purchases, especially of foodstuffs and other consumer products. Another contributing 
factor was the expansion of output, since this heightened the demand for imports of capital goods and 
intermediate inputs. 
b) External trade 
The total value of exports of goods fell by almost 13%, i.e., by about US$3.2 billion. This decline 
was concentrated in the last four months of the year. As a matter of fact, during the first four months 
exports climbed by more than 10% compared with the same period in 1985, with most of this 
increase being accounted for by sales of manufactures. However, between May and August external 
sales reverted to their 1985 levels, and from September onwards they fell so sharply that by December 
they were equivalent to just one-half of the total recorded for that month in 1985. 
The drop in exports was the result of the build-up of various types of pressures for which the 
implementation of the stabilization plan was chiefly responsible. In addition, beginning in October 
the growing expectation of a substantial change in the exchange rate led many exporters to postpone 
their shipments. 
The decline in the value of exports was wholly attributable to the sharp drop in their volume 
(-17%), which was too great to be offset by the rise of almost 6% in their unit value (see table 12). 
The contraction in the volume of exports was also very widespread: 8% in commodities, 17% in 
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manufactured goods and even more in the chief agricultural export products (66% in soya beans, 
43% in coffee beans and 24% in soya meal). 
Nevertheless, the international prices of some products did decline appreciably, with the most 
striking decreases being in orange juice (-43%), petroleum products (-27%), tin (-43%), soya oil 
(-49%) and cotton (-48%). 
The value of sales of manufactures —which generated two-thirds of export earnings— fell by 
nearly 12%. The decreases of 7% in exports of transport equipment, 17% in iron and steel 
manufactures and 9% in machinery, boilers and mechanical apparatus demonstrate the magnitude of 
the effects of the pressure exerted by domestic demand (see table 13). On the other hand, exports of 
television sets and radios increased markedly (77 %) —bringing their value to over US$390 million— 
and aircraft exports expanded by 58%, thereby topping the US$220 million mark. 
Commodity exports, however, fell even more sharply (-14%) as a result of the steep drop in the 
value of coffee, sugar and soya sales. 
In contrast, purchases of goods from abroad increased by 7%, and their total value thus 
amounted to somewhat more than US$14 billion. Nevertheless, this overall increase fails to illustrate 
the major changes which occurred in the trends of the main types of imports. On account of the sharp 
drop in international oil prices, fuel purchases, which in 1985 had represented over 40% of the total 
value of imports, dropped to just half that figure. The substantial savings of foreign exchange 
(US$2.7 billion) that this entailed was used for capital goods purchases, which rose by 40%, and 
especially for purchases of foodstuffs, which more than trebled (see table 14). Imports of consumer 
goods, for their part, were used as a means of maintaining the stability of domestic prices, as is 
demonstrated by the fact that special imports of powdered milk, beef, rice, maize and a number of 
processed food products —for a total of over US$1 billion— accounted for much of the 228% increase 
observed in external purchases of consumer goods. 
In the sphere of trade policy, the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina signed several agreements 
in June with a view to promoting a greater degree of economic integration between the two countries; 
under these agreements, emphasis was to be placed initially on developing the capital goods sector 
and agriculture, especially wheat production. In another step, the Brazilian government decided to 
include the bulk of Uruguay's exportable supply in its co-operation programme with that country. 
This signified a substantial reduction in the tariffs on Uruguayan products. 
c) The balance of payments 
In 1986 the balance of payments showed a deficit seven times greater than that of the preceding 
year, and this led to a sharp decline in net international reserves (see tables 15 and 16). 
This was due entirely to the fact that, as shown in figure 2 during the last quarter of the year the 
country's usually large trade surplus gave way to a deficit. On the other hand, the decline in 
international interest rates lowered Brazil's interest payments on its external debt by a little more 
than US$1 billion. However, this decrease was partially counteracted by a reduction of US$540 
million (almost 40%) in the interest received. 
The capital account recorded a net inflow of just US$400 million. These additional resources 
were-provided by multilateral agencies, whose disbursements increased by 60%, producing a net 
inflow of around US$1.3 billion under that heading. By contrast, the prevailing uncertainty as to the 
course of the exchange rate, the profitability of operations in the country and the future legal 
treatment of the repatriation of profits was reflected in a large outflow of foreign investment in net 
terms for the first time in the last 20 years. 
d) Tbe external debt 
Brazil's total external debt rose 6% to nearly US$ 110 billion by the end of the year. Rather than 
being the result of greater direct borrowing, this increase was chiefly due to the decline of the United 
States dollar against the other hard currencies.1 At the same time, since the value of exports of goods 
and services fell, both the debt/exports ratio and the debt servicing coefficient rose substantially, 
reaching their highest levels in the past five years (see tables 17 and 18). 
•Approximately 25% of Brazil's external debt is denominated in currencies other than the United States dollar. 
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Negotiations with private international banks culminated in March with the roll-over of the 
US$6.1 billion in amortization payments corresponding to 1985, which were rescheduled over a 
seven-year term with a five-year grace period, and of those for 1986 (US$9.5 billion), which were 
restructured in the same manner. In both cases the spread over LIBOR was lowered to 1.125. It was also 
agreed that the lines of short-term credit would remain open up to 1987 (US$10 billion for trade 
operations and US$5.4 billion for inter-bank deposits in agencies of Brazilian banks abroad. 
Negotiations with government agencies through the Paris Club did not fare well in 1986. The 
refusal of the Brazilian government to sign an agreement with the International Monetary Fund was 
one of the key points of disagreement with the country's governmental creditors which stood in the 
way of the renegotiation of this debt. Thus, Brazil's cumulative arrears of principal and interest with 
the member countries of the Paris Club rose to some US$3.3 billion. 
4. Prices and wages 
The Plan Cruzado formed the centre piece of the country's economic policy in 1986. This plan, whose 
objective was to bring inflation quickly to a halt without causing a recession, was founded on the 
assumption that Brazilian inflation was primarily inertial in nature. Thus, the plan was based on the 
idea that the continuous rise in prices was attributable to deeply-entrenched inflationary expectations 
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and to the wide-ranging indexation system rather than to excess demand. Another concept embodied 
in the plan was that the operating deficit (which does not include increases in nominal interest 
payments caused by inflation) had been relatively low the previous year and would be eliminated by 
the tax reform approved in late 1985. On the strength of these assumptions the stabilization 
programme focused on managing the expectations of economic agents and on dismantling indexa-
tion mechanisms. 
The plan, which was introduced in February, succeeded in lowering the variation in the 
consumer price index from the rates of over 10% observed during the preceding months to levels of 
around 1 % up until October. It also brought about a considerable increase in real wages. These results 
were short-lived, however, because the rise in demand which gave such a sharp boost to the levels of 
production, employment and wages also, during the last quarter, led to a resurgence of inflation and a 
decline in the purchasing power of workers (see figure 3). 
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a) Prices 
Under the Plan Cruzado the government placed price controls on virtually all merchandise. To 
this end, regional tables were drawn up which fixed maximum retail prices. In respect of those 
products not included in the tables, the controls sought to keep prices at the levels that were in effect 
as of 28 February. The prices of some products such as clothing, were not affected by the freeze, 
however, because of the impossibility of comparing the value of individual items. 
When the freeze was extended,difficulties arose in regard to the supply of a number of products 
whose prices had been frozen before the readjustments programmed for the beginning of March, as 
this eroded their profitability. The subsequent supply problems first surfaced in connection with 
dairy products. In response to this situation, the government granted a 30% subsidy to producers of 
these items and imported additional supplies of powdered milk. These measures made it possible to 
hold prices steady for a time, although at the cost of increasing the fiscal deficit. Injuly, beef began to 
become scarce and this, in turn, resulted in a shortage of beef substitutes such as eggs and chicken. 
The maintenance of the freeze in respect of manufactured goods was hampered by the practice 
of introducing minor changes into such goods so that they might be presented as new products, at 
higher prices. In addition, due to the great demand for certain goods, illegal surcharges became 
widespread. 
These practices made it more difficult to determine the actual level of inflation. The stabiliza-
tion plan provided for the creation of a new consumer price index using the prices effective as of 28 
February as the basis for the corresponding calculations. This index incorporated the weightings of 
the extended national consumer price index (1PCA) but changed the period of reference from that 
extending from the fifteenth day of one month to the fifteenth of the next to a period running from 
the first to the last day of each calendar month. 
The difficulty of measuring the inflation rate accurately increased injuly, when the government 
decided to exclude the effect of "compulsory loans" from the index on the grounds that these 
resources would be repaid within three years to the persons affected, i.e., purchasers of automobiles, 
gasoline and alcohol fuels. If the effect of the loans had been taken into account in calculating the 
index, the variations in prices would have amounted to 1.7% injuly and 3.6% in August, instead of 
1.2% and 1.7%, which were the official figures. In addition, in order to prevent the tax increases 
decreed in November in respect of certain non-essential products from being transferred to the rest 
of the economy through the automatic indexation of wages, the government proposed that a new and 
more restricted index should be created which excluded such goods. The trade unions rejected this 
proposal, however, and the government therefore resumed its use of the weightings of the restricted 
national consumer price index (INPC) as the official inflation indicator. As a result, the official price 
variation in November was 3.3%, whereas that shown by the IPCA was 5.5%. 
In November, increases in the prices of cigarettes (between 50% and 120%), alcoholic 
beverages (100%), automobiles (80%), gasoline and alcohol (60%), sugar (25%), and in postal 
(80%), telephone (35%) and electricity (10% for the industrial sector) rates made it imperative to 
hasten the review of the other prices which had been frozen since February. Thegovernment drew up 
new price tables, but product shortages then forced it to authorize additional increases. As a result, the 
official inflation index in December (7%) more than doubled that of the preceding month. 
Thus, as shown in table 20, even though inflation was much lower in 1986 than during the five 
preceding years, towards the end of the year inflationary pressures were very strong. 
b) Wages 
The increases in production and in the level of employment as well as the abrupt drop in 
inflation observed during the first half of the year paved the way for substantial rises in real wages. 
One of the original features of the Plan Cruzado was that nominal wages were set according to their 
average real level during the preceding six months. The cumulative variation in the extended 
consumer price index (IPCA) for the six-month period from September to February was used in 
calculating this level, to which a premium of 8% was then added. In the case of the minimum wage, 
the additional adjustment was 15%. Thus, unlike other recent stabilization programmes, the Plan 
Cruzado did not freeze remunerations or change the annual dates of wage negotiations for the various 
categories; in addition, it instituted an automatic readjustment system that was to be implemented 
whenever the cumulative level of inflation reached 20%. 
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The object of these measures was to safeguard the purchasing power of wages and maintain a 
suitable level of demand in order to ward off a recession. As it turned out, these mechanisms made it 
possible for workers to secure further increases through their annual wage negotiations, thanks to the 
increase in production and the growing shortage of labour. Consequently, although there were 
significant differences in wage trends from one region to another, on the whole real wages rose 
sharply: between 8% in Rio de Janeiro and 26% in Sao Paulo (see table 21). As a result of these 
increases and of the considerable expansion in employment, wage earners' share in national income 
climbed. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
The introduction of the fiscal and monetary policy reforms which made the implementation of the 
stabilization plan possible began in late 1985 with the amendment of legal provisions concerning the 
income tax. In January 1986, the Banco do Brasil ceased to perform the central banking functions 
which it had carried out until that time. 
a) Monetary policy 
The country's monetary policy underwent major changes during the course of the year. In 
January, the government approved the institutional reform of the monetary system, and eliminated 
the account providing for movements between the Central Bank and the Banco do Brasil through 
which the latter had obtained resources from the Central Bank to cover various operations, especially 
those relating to the National Treasury and to certain special programmes. Consequently, from 
February onwards the federal government's operations with the Banco do Brasil were to be carried 
out using resources supplied by the National Treasury for that purpose, while the Banco do Brasil was 
to draw upon its own reserves for its normal operations. By this means the government expected to 
be able to exercise greater control over monetary expansion. 
With the stabilization of price levels, the demand for money shot up. Until that time, high 
inflation rates had generated such a heavy demand for indexed financial assets that by late 1985 
monetary assets (paper money and demand deposits) did not account for even 12% of the total. 
When the rate of inflation plummeted, however, the tendency was to hold money, thereby producing 
a "monetization" of the economy. In March alone, the means of payment expanded by 80%, and 
between February and June this variable soared by almost 190% (see table 23). This growth in the 
money supply was made possible by the purchase of government securities held by the public, with 
the result that the annual growth rate in real terms of the federal public debt was brought down from 
42% in March to -1.2% in July. 
Under the stabilization plan, the indexation mechanisms applying to securities and financial 
operations having terms of less than one year were eliminated. The plan also proposed the 
introduction of fluctuating interest rates and of a scheme whereby capital gains would be taxed in 
inverse proportion to the loan periods involved. However, the prevailing uncertainty as to the results 
of the plan was not conducive to the creation of such mechanisms. Indeed, the imposition of taxes on 
financial assets and their low nominal yields prompted a massive withdrawal of funds, especially 
from passbook savings accounts. 
With a view to facilitaing its management of monetary policy, injune the government created 
negotiable Central Bank drafts (LBCs) having the same yield as overnight loans. The Central Bank was 
thus able to offer a short-term instrument (up to 90 days) which provided a rate of return That was 
nearly equivalent to the variation in price levels. 
During the second half of the year, the Central Bank reverted to a more conservative policy as 
regards the expansion of the money supply and reduced its purchase of securities. Its adoption of this 
position was in response to the public sector's financial needs, which were again exerting pressure in 
respect of the issue of money. At the same time, in an attempt to control domestic demand, the 
Central Bank gradually raised the interest rate applying to securities markets. 
Partly for the purpose of mitigating the impact of this measure, the authorities introduced 
changes designed to reduce the taxes on private financial securities, on which the sale of LBCs had had 
a detrimental effect. On another step, when inflation worsened it was decided that the monthly yield 
on LBCs would be used as the deflator in calculating the real yields of taxable financial operations. 
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In November, the system for financing housing construction was modified. The National 
Housing Bank ceased to function, and its regulatory duties were assumed by the Central Bank while 
the financing operations it had carried out were transferred to the Federal Economic Fund. This 
reform gave the Central Bank greater control over financial institutions having links with the 
construction sector. In addition, the transfer of resources from compulsory deposits on passbook 
savings accounts to the Central Bank eased the pressure being exerted by the public sector for an 
expansion of the monetary base. 
The Central Bank's policy became stricter in December when inflation picked up. In order to 
prevent the build-up of stocks for speculative purposes, the Central Bank began to reduce the private 
sector's level of liquidity through the sale of public securities, which it had not done since February; as 
a result, the monthly interest rate on loans rose to 9% (see table 26). 
b) Fiscal policy 
The fiscal reform introduced in December 1985 was aimed at balancing public accounts in order 
to permit the implementation of the stabilization plan. The chief reforms consisted of making 
personal income taxes more progressive, especially in regard to the tax brackets corresponding to 
incomes in excess of 40 minimum wages, and the levying of new taxes on capital gains from financial 
operations. In addition, a National Treasury Department was created in January with a view to 
permitting the exercise of greater control over public administrative expenditures. 
These measures, in combination with the sharp decline in interest payments on the public debt, 
seemed to herald a substantial decline in the public sector deficit. However, in actual fact the 
expenditures of this sector increased more than its income (74% and 24%, respectively, in real 
terms). 
The expansion of economic activity increased the government's tax receipts, especially from 
indirect taxes, such as those levied on manufactured goods and imports, whose yields rose by 292% 
and 237% in nominal terms. The relative share of total receipts provided by the tax on financial 
operations also increased, with the amount collected from this source soaring by 226%. Income tax 
receipts went up by only 171%, however, owing to the changes made in the way the tax was applied 
(see table 27). 
The revenues of the various state governments also expanded, particularly as a result of the 
increase in receipts from the sales tax (213%)-The tax reform introduced in late 1985 gave the states 
and municipalities a greater share of the revenues from income taxes and from taxes on transactions 
involving manufactured goods, and this resulted in a real increase of 39% in transfers by the federal 
government. 
The rise in federal tax revenues was not large enough, however, to cover its expenditures. The 
main source of pressure on treasury outlays was the transfer of resources made to the Central Bank, 
with the percentage of total revenues represented by such transfers climbing from 6% to 23%. In 
turn, the main reason for this increase was the fact that the federal government failed to implement 
the administrative reforms it had announced it would undertake in the public sector and, conse-
quently, the level of its current expenditure remained the same. 
State enterprises also encountered difficulties in financing their operations. As the economic 
authorities had not readjusted the rates charged by these enterprises before the freeze was announced, 
they were obliged to operate on the basis of rates which, in real terms, were lower than those charged 
in 1985. On account of this, even though the volume of these companies' operations expanded as a 
result of the upturn in economic activity, their earnings failed to cover their costs, which rose 
substantially owing to the increase in real wages and the external debt burden they had to shoulder. 
This shortfall had to be financed with loans from the Central Bank and through a substantial 
expansion of the debt owed by these enterprises to institutions within the local financial system (see 
table 28). 
In order to create additional sources of funds so that these imbalances might be eliminated, in 
July, the government established the National Development Fund using the revenue obtained from 
so-called "compulsory loans" on sales of gasoline, alcohol fuel and automobiles (both new and used), 
from the levying of a 25% tax on international ticket sales and on the purchase of dollars for tourism 
purposes, and from the transfer of 66% of the mandatory reserves maintained by private social 
security institutions to the Treasury. 
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The maintenance of the freeze on prices and rates over a long period heightened the inflation-
ary pressures stemming from the more rapid pace of economic growth. Instead of controlling demand 
and beginning to decontrol prices, the government chose to raise the tax rates applying to certain 
industrialized goods such as alcoholic beverages, cigarettes and automobiles by as much as 240%. To 
this same end, electricity and postal rates as well as fuel prices were also readjusted. 
The public sector's total operating deficit was equivalent to 3-7 % of the gross domestic product, 
which was less than it had been the year before (4.3%), but one percentage point higher than it had 
been in 1984. 
Table 1 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Gurrent value of imports of goods 
and services 
Consumer pricesc 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
General price index, domestic 
availability 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Money 
Wages* 
Urban unemployment rate 
Current income of government 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 
Total external debt 









































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross domestic product plus the effect of the terms of trade for goods and services. 
'Extended National Consumer Price Index. Data revised on the basis of the information gathered during the latest surveys 
round. This price index is a weighted average of the wholesale price index (60%), the cost-of-living index for Rio de 
Janeiro (30%) and the index of construction costs (10%). 'Average nominal wage in industry. 1986: average nominal 
wage in industry in Sâo Paulo. Weighted average of the unemployment rates in the main metropolitan regions. 
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Table 2 
BRAZIL: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery 
Changes in stocks 
Total consumption 
Exports of goods and 
services 




















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Accounts Division of the Brazilian Geographical and 
Statistical Institute (IBGE), the Central Bank of Brazil and the Getulio Vargas Foundation. 
"Preliminary figures. Changes in stocks are included in private consumption. 'Includes changes in 
stocks. The figures on exports and imports of goods and services were obtained from balance-of-payments data in 




BRAZIL: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND 
OF ECONOMY ACTIVITY 







Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 




































































































insurance, real estate, 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Ajustment for banking services 
94.1 102.3 112.4 
126.4 139.0 149.8 




-5.0 6.4 8.7 9.9 
5.6 7.7 10.0 7.2 
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 




BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of the agricultural 
product (1980 = 100) 
Production of main crops 













































































































































































































Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), Levantamento sistemático da produção agrícola. 




BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Index of mining production 
(1980 = 100) 
Production of some 
important minerals 
























































Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), National Petroleum Council, National Department of 
Mineral Production, Central Bank of Brazil and Non-Ferrous Metals and Iron and Steel Council (CONSIDER). 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of cubic metres. 'Millions of cubic metres. 
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Table 6 
BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Manufacturing production'' 
























Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 















































































































































































































Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE). Indexes of Industrial Production, revised series 1975-1986. 
'Indexes calculated on the basis of figures at constant 1980 prices. Includes mining. 'Billions of kWh consumed by 




BRAZIL: MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
Motor vehicles in general 
Automobiles 




Vehicles fueled by 
alcohol" 





















































































Source: National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (ANFAVEA). 
"Included in the total number of vehicles. Includes exports of CKD vehicles. 
Table 8 
BRAZIL: PRODUCTION OF METALS 































































Source: Non-ferrous Metals and Iron and Steel Council (CONSIDER). 





















































BRAZIL: FORMAL URBAN EMPLOYMENT 










































































































Source: Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados - Act 4.923, Ministry of Labour. 
"Processing industry. This total also includes the mining extraction, public services and government service sectors. 
Table 10 
BRAZIL: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN MAIN URBAN CENTRES 
Main 
cities 










































































































Source: Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute Foundation (FIBGE), monthly employment survey. 
"Weighted by the economically active population of each city. 
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Table 11 


















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund, International ¡•'mandai Statistics. 
"Corresponds to the average of the indexes of the real exchange rate of the cruzado with respect to the currencies of Brazil's 
main trading partners, weighted according to the relative importance of exports or imports to or from these countries, as 
appropriate. From 1970 to 1980 these weightings correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979. From 1981 they 
correspond to the average for the period 1982-1985. For the most part, wholesale price indexes were used in making these 
calculations. For the methodology and sources used, see the technical appendix to the liconomic Survey of Latin America, 
1981. Does not include the following petroleum-exporting countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nigeria. 
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Table 12 
BRAZIL: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 




























































































Terms of trade (goods) 100.0 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods 100.0 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods and services 100.0 
Volume of exports 100.0 
Volume of imports 100.0 
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Table 13 
















































































































































































































































Source: Banco do Brasil, Carteira de Comércio Exterior (CACEX) and Central Bank of Brazil. 
"Preliminary figures. Does not include itabirite. 'Includes consumption on board aircraft and ships, re-exports 
and special transactions. 
Table 14 























































































BRAZIL: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official figures. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. Includes net loans granted and other 




BRAZIL: VARIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Year-end balances in millions of dollars) 
I. International liquidity 
Reserves, excluding golcT 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange 
Gold, national valuation 





Use of IMF credit^ 
C. Net reserves (A-B) 
D. Counterpart adjustments 





































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Brasil. Programa Económico. Ajustamento interno e externo, vol. 14, February 1987. 
"Preliminary figures. Data published by the Central Bank of Brazil. ' Data published by IMF. Method of 
calculation used to calculate balance-of-payments performance within the framework of the corresponding goal agreed with 
IMF. 'Repurchase obligations. Balance of payments result according to the methodology agreed with IMF. 
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Table 17 
BRAZIL: EXTERNAL DEBT 
{Year-end balances in millions of dollars) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986° 
Total external debt, registered 
and unregistered 71 878 83 205 91 362 99 765 103 142 109 374 
Total 
I. Medium- and long-term debt (registered) 
53 848 61411 70 198 81319 91 091 95 857 101 540 
Compensatory loans 
United States Government 





Inter-American Development Bank 
International Finance Corporation 
Official bilateral agencies 






Import Bank (Eximbank) 






Resolution No. 63 
Law No. 4131 
Other credits 
544 2 645 3 967 4 608 





















































































































Commercial credit lines 





Arrears in debt payments 
Paris Club and other operations 
II. Short-term debt (unregistered) 
































300 134 536 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Brasil, Programa Económico. Ajustamento interno e externo, vol. 14, February 1987. 
"Preliminary figures. Law No. 480 of the United States, loans from the Canadian Wheat Board and other credits for 




BRAZIL: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1982 1983 1984 




Registered external debt/exports of 
goods and services 
Registered external debt service/ 
exports of goods and services 
Net interest/exports of goods 
and services 
Registered debt service/disbursements 
1985 1986° 










































Source: ECLAC, with data from the International Monetary Fund and the Central Bank of Brazil. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 19 
BRAZIL: PUBLIC EXTERNAL DEBT 




States and municipalities 




















































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Brasil, Programa Económico. Ajustamento interno e externo, vol. 14, February 1987. 
"Preliminary figures. Commercial lines of credit. 
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Table 20 
BRAZIL: DOMESTIC PRICES 
General price index" 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 







Consumer price index, 
Rio de Janeiro 
Food 
Construction costs, 






General price index 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 
Wholesale price index 
Total supply 
Domestic availability 
Consumer price index, 
Rio de Janeiro 
Construction costs, 






























































































































































Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura económica, and Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo Mensal, (several issues). 
"This price index isa weighted average of the indexes of wholesale prices (60%), the cost of living in Rio deJaneiro (30%) and 
construction costs (10%). Up to February 1985, this entry corresponds to the index of building costs in Rio deJaneiro. 
From February 1985 onwards, itrepresentsconstructioncostsinBrazil. rTherwo indexes use different weightings. The 
weighting of the 1NPC include the expenditures of families having incomes of up to five minimum wages, whereas thelPCA 
is weighted for the expenditures of families having incomes of up to 30 minimum wages. These data were revised on the basis 




BRAZIL: AVERAGE WAGES IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 



































































































Source: Industrial Federation of the State of Sao Paulo (FIESP); ABDIB. 
"Cost-of-living index for the city of S5o Paulo. Cost-of-living index for the city of Rio de Janeiro. 
Table 22 
BRAZIL: PRIVATE SECTOR LIQUIDITY 
































Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura económica, February 1987. 
Note: M2 = M, + demand deposits. 
M, = M2 + deposits. 
M4 = M, + securities outside the Central Bank. 
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Table 23 














































Means of payment 
During Over 12 













Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 





BRAZIL: M A I N F A C T O R S O F E X P A N S I O N A N D C O N T R A C T I O N 
OF T H E M O N E T A R Y BASE 
(Variations in billions of cruzados) 
1984 1985 
A. Factors of expansion 
Credit to agricultural sector 
Export credits 
Credit to public sector 
Public debt* 
Special operations' 
Credit from Central Bank 
Other credits from Banco do Brasil 
Exchange operations' 
Other accounts (net variation) 




Resources of Central Bank 
Time deposits in Banco do Brasil 
Public Debt 
Obligatory deposit on savings 
deposits 
Compulsory loans and 
travel tax 


















































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Informativo mensal, January 1987, and the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Conjuntura 
Económica, February 1987. 
"Preliminary figures. Net purchases of federal government public debt securities. ' Refers to payments made by 
the Banco do Brasil on the external debt of State enterprises and other National Treasury operations with the monetary 
authorities. ' As of February 1986, the Banco do Brasil ceased to be a part of the monetary authority. ^Refers to 
reserve operations plus variations in foreign-currency deposits in the Central Bank. 
Table 25 
BRAZIL: DEPOSITS A N D O T H E R DOMESTIC OBLIGATIONS O F 
T H E F I N A N C I A L SYSTEM W I T H T H E PRIVATE SECTOR 
































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Average monthly rates. 1985: General price index, with reference to domestic availability 1986: Extended national 




BRAZIL: CURRENT INCOME OF THE NATIONAL TREASURY 
AND OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS 




Gross tax revenues 
Physical persons 
Legal persons 
Taxes withheld at source 
Refunds 
Manufactured products 
Gross tax revenues 









Taxes earmarked for social 
programmes^ 
Other taxes 
Other current income 
Rates 
Miscellaneous income 
Tax on goods traffic 
Sab Paulo 




National treasury transfers 
in respect of taxes destined 








































































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Boletim mensal, January 1987. 
"Comprises the States of Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. 
171 
Table 28 
BRAZIL: PUBLIC SECTOR F I N A N C I N G NEEDS 
(Millions of cruzados) 
1984 1985 1986 
A. Nominal financing 
Federal government 
Federal public securities 




State and municipal governments 
State government public securities 




Federal public securities' 




Social security system and other agencies 
Federal public securities' 
Financial system 
Funds and programmes 
Credit from Central Bank 
Financial system 
External financing' 
B. Monetary and exchange correction 




























































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil. 
"Includes interest on foreign-currency deposits in the Central Bank, interest on deposits, projects and renegotiated short-term 
loans. Operations outside the Central Bank. Includes Banco do Brasil and other financial institutions. 'Net result 
of the withdrawal of funds deposited in foreign currency and relending operations minus amortization payments. 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1986, the Colombian economy benefitted from the sharp rise in the international price of coffee. 
Thanks to that, and to the strong growth in external sales of petroleum and coal, the value of exports 
of goods increased by almost 50% and the external position of the country strengthened considerably. 
For the first time since 1979, both the trade balance and the balance-of-payments current account 
showed surpluses and net international reserves increased by more than US$1 400 million (see 
table 1). 
Even so, the macroeconomic policy maintained the guidelines defined the previous year, with 
the aim of consolidating the long-term adjustment of the economy. The exchange policy continued to 
assign importance to the regular devaluation of the national currency, with the result that the real 
effective rate of exchange increased markedly for the second year running. The fiscal policy continued 
to be of a rather restrictive nature and the budget deficit fell to only 1.4% of the domestic product: the 
lowest level in recent years. At the same time, the monetary policy succeeded in moderating the 
expansionary effect the increase in international reserves had on liquidity. 
In this way, the economic policy helped to achieve a slight drop in inflation from 23% in 1985 to 
21 % in 1986. At the same time, economic activity recovered from the relative stagnation experienced 
in previous years and grew by 5.4%, the highest figure recorded since 1979. As the terms of trade 
improved considerably at the same time, the increase in national income was a good deal greater (see 
figure 1). The domestic recovery had positive effects in almost all economic sectors, the increases in 
mining (27%), manufacturing (7%) and commerce (6%) being the most prominent. The agricultu-
ral product showed a more moderate increase (2%). In contrast, construction fell by almost 5%, 
mainly due to the drop in public investment. 
The upturn in the economy had a favourable effect on labour force indicators. Because of the 
greater economic activity and the slowdown in inflation, real wages rose in all sectors excepting 
construction. Economic growth also helped to increase urban employment. However, due to the 
increase in the rates of participation, unemployment fell only slightly. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
In 1986, total supply increased by 5%. Contrary to what occurred in the three previous years, when it 
grew at a very slow rate and the volume of imports experienced a noteworthy and sustained decline, 
the increase in 1986 was due both to the expansion of the product and to the partial recovery of the 
volume of imports (see table 2). The growth in the economy originated mainly in the strong 
expansion of the volume of exports (17%) and in the improvement of the terms of trade. The 
resulting increase in income from exports favoured, in turn, a moderate increase in domestic demand. 
In these circumstances, all sectors, excepting construction, grew in 1986 at rates higher than those 
recorded in 1985 (see table 3). 
Following its complete stagnation the previous year, the agricultural product increased by 2% 
in 1986. This greater dynamism originated in the increased production of those crops used as 
industrial inputs (especially sorghum and soya) (see table 4). Harvests of food crops for direct 
consumption also increased, although more moderately. In contrast, production of the main export 
crops dropped slightly, including coffee production, which fell by almost 5%. However, owing to the 
use of the big stocks accumulated from previous years, the volume of external coffee sales increased 
significantly, thereby making it possible to take advantage of the marked rise in the international 
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Figure 1 
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 
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 r Urban unemployment^ 
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COLOMBIA 
Figure 1 (conclusión) 
Net movement of capital^ 
Current account balance^ 
Net factor payments^ 






Total external debtd 
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Exports of goods 
and services 
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1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. b Average annual rate in Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellin and Call. 
Percentage variation from December to December. ¿Billions of dollars. «Percentages. 
price of coffee (see table 5 and figure 2). Domestic coffee prices, for their part, were adjusted 
regularly as from January and at the end of the year they were almost double those recorded 12 
months earlier (see table 6). 
Mining was again the most dynamic area of activity showing an increase of 27%. Due to this 
rise, together with the very rapid growth in previous years, mining production almost doubled over 
the last three years. This remarkable expansion reflected the high level of investment carried out in 
previous years. Thus, coal production —which had already grown rapidly in the previous three 
years— grew by 19% and was more than double that achieved in 1981. At the same time, exploitation 
of the oil deposits discovered in the eastern plains area enabled extraction of petroleum to increase by 
more than 70% to over 110 million barrels, the highest figure in the country's history (see table 7). In 
turn, the greater availability of crude oil made it possible to increase output of petroleum products, to 
eliminate imports of crude and to achieve a 44% increase in the value of external sales of hydrocar-
bons. Due to this, the energy balance was markedly positive for the first time in the present decade 
(see table 8). 
The reactivation was also noteworthy in manufacturing and commerce, in both of which the 
growth rates achieved (7% and 6%, respectively) were the highest in recent years. Commerce 
benefited mainly from the increased internal demand brought about by the rise in income from coffee. 
1 7 5 
In the industrial sector, the most dynamic branches were those directed towards exports: textiles, 
leather, petroleum products and chemicals. Production of consumer goods for the domestic market 
grew at a more moderate rate, since a significant part of the increased demand for consumer goods 
was satisfied through imports, legal or clandestine1 (see table 9). 
On the other hand, construction, which had been declining over the last three years, fell by 
almost 6% in 1986. This decline was due especially to the termination of various public investment 
projects —the impact of which was especially marked in medium-sized cities— and to the slight 
contraction in housing construction (see table 10). 
The recovery in levels of domestic activity allowed some improvement to occur in the labour 
force situation, which had been manifestly worsening since 1982. Thus, employment began to 
increase once more in most economic sectors following four consecutive years of generalized falls. 
However, as the rate of participation continued to increase at the same time, the average unemploy-
ment rate only went down from 13.9% in 1985 to 13.5% in 1986. Indeed, during the first half of the 
year unemployment continued to rise, especially in Bogotá and Barranquilla. Nevertheless, it did fall 
considerably in all the main cities in the second half of the year (see table 11 and figure 3). 
Figure 2 
COLOMBIA: COFFEE PRICES ON THE NEW YORK COMMODITY EXCHANGE8 
(Dollars per pound) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Coffee-Growers' Federation. 
a
"Other milds" variety. 
'During 1986, smuggling of consumer goods —in particular foodstuffs— from Venezuela became noticeably more 




COLOMBIA: QUARTERLY EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN THE FOUR MAIN CITIES 
| 1982 —{— 1983 —J— 1984 —\— 1985 -—f— 1986 1 
Source: EC LAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
3. The external sector 
The external position markedly improved in 1986 owing to the large increase in coffee exports, the 
effects of the exchange policy, and easier access to external financing. 
Due to the drought which affected Brazil, the world's leading coffee producer, the price of coffee 
on the international market rose substantially as from the end of 1985, soaring in a few months to its 
highest level in this decade. Because of this, in February 1986 the quota-fixing mechanism agreed 
upon in accordance with the International Coffee Agreement was suspended. Although as a result of 
this change the price fell slowly in the ensuing months, so that towards the end of the year it had 
fallen below the level recorded at the start of 1985, its yearly average was nevertheless a third higher 
than that recorded the previous year (see figure 2). Consequently, both the terms of trade and the 
purchasing power of exports rose sharply, and for the first time during the decade the terms of trade 
exceeded the level reached in 1980 (see table 12). 
The rise in the price of coffee on the international market and the considerable expansion of the 
volume of this commodity exported helped coffee salés abroad to increase to almost US$3 billion: 
74% more than the previous year. 
Despite the improvement in the terms of trade, the policy of regular devaluation of the 
Colombian peso with respect to the dollar at a rate exceeding internal inflation was maintained. Due 
to this and to the fall in the United States currency with respect to other main currencies, the real 
effective exchange rate rose considerably for the second year running, registering an increase of 
almost 50% over the last three years (see table 13). 
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This policy particularly benefitted exports of manufactures, the value of which rose by more • 
than 30%. Even greater was the increase recorded in external sales of coal, which rose by 75% and 
were well over five times higher than those registered only two years earlier. The value of 
hydrocarbon exports also rose markedly as a result of the considerable increase in the domestic 
production of crude, despite the great fall in the price of oil on world markets. Altogether, non-coffee 
exports increased by nearly 23 % and accounted for 47 % of the total value of sales to the exterior (see 
table 14). 
The increase in domestic production of crude and petroleum products and the fall in the 
international price of oil also allowed external oil purchases to be reduced to one-third of their former 
level. In contrast, imports of finished goods increased greatly, both because of the domestic reactiva-
tion and as a result of the policy of liberalizing imports applied during 1986. Thus, although the 
system of monthly budgeting of the amount of foreign exchange to be made available for imports 
continued to be used, the foreign exchange supplied for this purpose increased by 15 % with respect to 
the previous year. At the same time, the number of tariff items governed by the prior licensing system 
was reduced considerably. This particularly benefited purchases of consumer goods, which increased 
by 37%, whilst purchases of capital goods increased by 7%. Despite this, the total value of imports 
declined by about 7%. Due to this fall and to the even greater declines recorded in the three previous 
years, which were a result of the adjustment policies applied, the value of imports was 35% lower in 
1986 than in 1982 (see table 15). 
As a result, the trade balance for goods —which in 1982 had exceeded US$2.2 billion— 
experienced a dramatic upturn, moving from a slight deficit of US$20 million in 1985 to a surplus of 
nearly US$2 billion in 1986, and despite the deficit registered once again in respect of real services, 
the overall trade balance recorded a surplus of US$1.2 billion, the first in the present decade (see 
table 16). 
In contrast, net payments of interest and profits did not vary greatly with respect to the 
previous year, since the effect of the fall in international interest rates was almost completely offset by 
the increase in the external debt balance. At the same time, private transfers increased markedly, 
mainly as a result of the repatriation of capital in response to the improved expectations of the 
economic agents and the increase in the real level of the exchange rate. Consequently, the balance-of-
payments current account closed with a surplus of almost US$500 million after six consecutive years 
of deficits. 
The capital account continued to show a surplus, but it was a good deal less than in previous 
years. This was due to the higher sums paid out in respect of amortization of the external public debt 
and to the policy followed in relation to indebtedness, which was directed towards reducing short-
term commitments through the advance payment of some of these credits.2 As a result, short-term 
financial operations showed a negative balance of US$1.3 billion. At the same time, however, the 
long-term debt flows were maintained, including the disbursement of credit amounting to US$1 
billion contracted in 1985 with the commercial banks (the first voluntary loan granted by those banks 
in Latin America since 1982) and the placement of public bonds worth US$40 million on the Japanese 
market. 
Hence, the total external debt increased very sharply (15%), so that at the end of 1986 it stood 
at nearly US$15 billion. This very large increase was due exclusively to the expansion of the public 
debt, since that of the private sector diminished slightly. However, due to the even greater increase 
which exports of goods and services experienced at the same time, the indicators which measure the 
debt burden improved markedly, even though their levels were double those existing at the beginning 
of the decade (see table 17). 
The increase in the net external debt for its part, was less than 5%, since the net international 
reserves increased by more than US$1.4 billion to a year-end figure of almost US$35 billion, 
equivalent to eight months of imports (see tables 17 and 18). 
2For example, payments were made in respect of part of the external debt of the National Coffee Fund, part of the 
balance-of-payments loan granted by the Andean Reserve Fund in 1985, and a significant part of the outstanding debts of a 




COLOMBIA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
, 4. Prices and wages 
In 1986, inflation went down slightly. The annual variation in consumer prices was 19% and that of 
wholesale prices 22%, both rates being somewhat lower than those recorded the previous year (see 
table 19). The slowdown in inflation was due almost exclusively to the reduction in the rate of 
increase of food prices, which in turn reflected the substantially greater availability of agricultural 
products, due both to the intensive smuggling of these products, especially from Venezuela, and to 
climatic factors. Owing to the drop in food prices, inflation fell markedly during the first half of 1986, 
reaching its lowest level for almost 14 years in June. In contrast, during the second half of the year 
prices again started to increase steadily (see figure 4). 
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After a year of generalized falls, wages began to increase once again in real terms as a result of 
the domestic reactivation and the slowdown in the rate of inflation. The most noticeable increase was 
recorded in commerce, reflecting the dynamism of this sector in 1986. Agricultural wages also 
increased significantly, thus recovering from the marked falls of the previous year. In contrast, in 
construction —an activity which stagnated in 1986— real wages did not vary at all (see tables 20, 
21 and 22). 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
Both monetary and fiscal policies were aimed at absorbing the excess liquidity generated by the 
increase in income from coffee, through the raising of public and private saving levels. Thus, sales of 
public bonds on the financial markets increased more than three-fold and an agreement was entered 
into with the National Coffee-Growers' Federation to channel the bulk of the surpluses from the 
National Coffee Fund3 into the Central Bank. Through these measures, it was possible to absorb a 
large part of the expansive effect caused by the marked growth in international reserves, with the 
result that finally the 28% increase in the monetary base was only slightly greater than that recorded 
in 1985 (see table 23). 
The means of payment, for their part, grew a little more slowly (23%) due to the application of 
a somewhat restrictive credit policy, under which credit granted to the government decreased by more 
than 20% whilst that given to the private sector increased at a much slower rate than in the previous 
year. Even so, the temporary application of ceilings on interest rates during the first half of the year 
caused some reactivation of the domestic credit market and in particular a significant increase in loans 
by the commercial banks. In these circumstances, interest rates remained at lower levels than in 1985, 
even after the controls imposed on them were removed at the end of June (see table 24). 
As in the case of monetary affairs, fiscal policy was relatively restrictive. Due to the termination 
of various public works projects, especially in the energy sector, investment expenditure grew by only 
20% as compared with 47% in the previous year. In contrast, the growth rate of current expenditure 
increased noticeably, mainly as a result of the expansionary effect of the devaluation on external debt 
interest payments (see table 25). 
Current earnings, for their part, grew much more markedly than expenditure. Tax revenue 
increased by more than 40% for the second year running, benefitting this time from the domestic 
reactivation, the greater volume of imports of consumer goods and the increase in coffee earnings. 
For its part, non-tax income —profits due to exchange rate movements and income from sales of 
gold— was more than double that of the previous year. 
As a result of these changes, the government deficit was reduced considerably for the second 
year running, sinking to only 1.4% of the product: the lowest figure in the last five years. 
'This agreement, signed in January 1986, allowed part of the value of coffee sales to be handed over to the producers in 




COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
be 
Urban unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries' 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. ' Annual average rate in Bogotá, Baiianquilla, Medellin and Cali. National 
index foi manual workers. 'Average real wages of manual workers in manufacturing. Surplus. 
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Table 2 
COLOMBIA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 








Exports of goods and 
services 
Indexes 















































































































































COLOMBIA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY" 







Electricity, gas and 
water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 




Minus: commission for 
bank services 
Plus: import duties 
Indexes 

























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, ün the basis of official figures. 
"A t constant 1980 market prices. Preliminary figures. 'Includes livestock sector, forestry and fishing. 
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Table 4 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production (1980= 100) 
Production of the main 
crops 





















Slaughtering of livestock 


































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Banco de la Repúbl ica and the National Coffee-
Growers' Federation. 
"Preliminary figures. Agricultural year. 'Production of oil pulp. Production of raw sugar. 'Coffee-

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Coffee-Growers' Federation. 
"Preliminary figures. At the end of the period. 
Table 6 







































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics from the Banco de la República. 
"Dollars per pound. Corresponds to the New York commodity market quotation for the variety "other milds", plus 
$0.02. Minimum price in dollars per 70-kilo bag of unroasted coffee that the exporter must repay to the Central 
Bank. c Pesos per 125-kilo load of parchment coffee. 
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Table 7 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Gross mining product 
(index: 1980 = 100) 
Volume of output of the 
principal products 









1980 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
100.0 130.7 149.3 189.1 240.3 1.8 14.2 22.0 26.6 27.1 
3 901 5 990 6 637 8 974 10 703 10.3 10.8 14.3 35.2 19.3 
491 453 444 439 
108 684 482 
508 8.5 -2.1 1.8 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of 42-gallon barrels. c Thousands of Troy ounces. 
-1.1 11.6 



















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the Banco de la República. 
Table 8 
COLOMBIA: PETROLEUM INDUSTRY INDICATORS 
Production 
Extraction of crude oil 
Output of petroleum products 
External trade 
Imports of crude oil 
Imports of petroleum 
products 
Exports of crude oil 















1983 1984 1985 1986" • 




























































































Leather and leather products 
Footwear 
Wooden furniture 
Printing, publishing and 
allied activities 





Paper and paper products 
Industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Petroleum products 
Other petroleum and coal products 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Glass and glass products 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Basic iron and steel industries 
Basic non-ferrous metal industries 
Capital goods 
Metal products, excepting machinery 
Machinery, excepting electrical equipment 
Electrical machinery and equipment 
Transport equipment 





































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. Includes permits approved in the metropolitan area of Yumbo. 





































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. Excluding coffee processing. fIn the four principal cities. Percentage of economically active 
population of working age. In the four principal cities. 
Table 12 









Terms of trade 
Terms of trade (FOB/CIF) 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 

























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Volume of exports of goods, adjusted by the respective terms-of-trade index. 
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Table 13 




























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the International Monetary Fund. 
"This corresponds to the average of the indexes of the real exchange rate of the peso with respect to thecurrencies of the main 
trading partners of Colombia, weighted according to the relative importance of exports or imports, as the case may be, to or 
from those countries. From 1970 to 1980 these weightings correspond to the average of theperiod 1975-1979 and from 1981, 
to the average of the period 1982-1985. In the calculation the use of wholesale price indexes has been preferred. For 
information regarding the methodology and sources used, see the technical appendix of the Economic Survey of Latin 
America 1981. Preliminary figures. 
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Table 14 










































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 15 


















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. ;,?'' 
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Table 16 
COLOMBIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance'' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
" Preliminary figures, subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 
assets and liabilities. Equivalent to the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 17 
COLOMBIA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Balances 




Total external debt 
Amortization payments 
Interest 
External public debtc 
Amortization payments 
Interests 
Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing of debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Net interest'/exports 












































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República and the International Monetary Fund 
"At the end of September 1986. 
guaranteed by the public sector 
account. 'Interest paid, less interest received 
* At the end of each year. 1986: at the end of September. ' I ncludes private debts 
^Corresponds to the item "interest paid" in the balance-of-payments current 
Table 18 
COLOMBIA: N E T I N T E R N A T I O N A L RESERVES" 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Net international 
reserves (millions of dollars) 
Months of imports 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"At the end of each year. 
5 416 5 630 4 991 3 079 1 796 2 067 3 478 
12 11 9 6 4 5 8 
1 9 3 
Table 19 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Total, manual workers 
Food 
Total, non-manual workers 
Food 










Consumer price index 
Total, manual workers 
Food 
Total, non-manual workers 
Food 










1980 1981 1982 1983 

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by 





























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
'Preliminary figures. Percentage variation in nominal wages, deflated by the consumer price index for manual 
workers. 'Crop farming, stock-raising, forestry, hunting and fishing. Applicable to the remaining economic 
activities. 'In the departmental capital cities and adjacent municipalities. In the remaining municipalities. 
Table 21 
COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF REAL WAGES 





























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics (DANE). 
"Preliminary figures. Average wages, deflated by the consumer price index for non-manual workers. 'Average 
wages, deflated by the consumer price index for manual workers. 
consumer price index for manual workers for the same city. 
Average cost of labour in Bogotá, deflated by the 
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Table 22 
COLOMBIA: AVERAGE DAILY WAGES IN AGRICULTURAL AND STOCK-RAISING 
Cold (upland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Hot (lowland) areas 
With food 
Without food 
Cold (upland) areas 
With food 
Without food 












Source: ECLAC, on the basis of d 











1984 1985 1986° 
Crop farming 






























ata supplied by the National Bureau of Statistics 









































same period in 




COLOMBIA: EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL MONETARY INDICATORS 
Monetary base 
Means of payment (Mt) 
Currency 
Current account deposits 
Quasi money (M2) 
Deposits in housing 
corporations 
Savings deposits 
Time deposit certificates 
Expanded money supply (M[ + M2) 
Central Bank credit (domestic) 
To government (net) 
To rest of public sector (net) 
To private sector 
Loans by the financial system 
Total 
Commercial banks 
Savings and housing corporations 
Bank multiplier 






























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the Banco de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes financial sector. 
Table 24 
COLOMBIA: BANK INTEREST RATES" 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Nominal effective rate 
Inflation rate 























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Banco de la República. 
"Corresponds to time deposit certificates. 
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Table 25 
COLOMBIA: EFFECTIVE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 








2. Current expenditure 




3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2+4) 




Variation in reserves 
(- indicates increase) 
Current savings/capital 
expenditure 
Deficit (or surplus)/total 
expenditure 





































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the Banco de la República and the Tesorería General de la República. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes loans to non-financial public enterprises. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The economic performance of Costa Rica improved considerably over the past four years after the 
sharp decline in production during the period 1980-1982. During that period, inflation grew at an 
unprecedented rate, the exchange rate parity underwent abrupt changes, and financial imbalances 
reached critical proportions. This led to a drop of approximately 15 % in the per capita gross domestic 
product and to a widespread climate of uncertainty. 
In the period from 1983 to 1985, economic policy was aimed primarily at achieving domestic 
stability and reducing the external payments imbalance. This objective was partially achieved, 
through the establishment of controls on the various factors that determine price increases and 
through management of the exchange rate. The implementation of this policy received substantial 
support from the international financial community through loans and donations from abroad. 
However, it was not possible to return to the rate of economic activity or to the per capita income 
levels that prevailed in the late 1970s. 
During 1986 the economy grew by 4%, within the context of a somewhat more favourable 
external environment and a slight reduction in domestic financial imbalances. However, the per 
capita product was 10% less than the 1980 level, unemployment levels remained almost unchanged 
and inflation picked up again during the second half of the year (see table 1 and figure 1). 
All sectors recorded better performances than in 1985, except agriculture, which was affected by 
the drop in production of coffee and rice, although in the first case the effects of lower output were 
offset by the increase in the price of this commodity in international markets. Growth in the 
industrial sector was particularly vigorous, aided by the favourable trend in domestic demand; in 
contrast, exports of manufactured goods to the rest of Central America continued to decline. 
The acceleration of growth in productive activity was reflected only to a limited extent in 
employment levels. Such new jobs as were created were mainly in housing construction, agriculture 
and commerce. There are indications, however, that the informal sector continued to expand. 
The factors that contributed to this economic recovery include in particular growth in private 
sector expenditure on investment and consumption and the marked improvement in the terms of 
trade. Gross investment was the most dynamic component of domestic demand, due primarily to the 
increase in expenditure on machinery and equipment and, to a lesser extent, on private construction. 
However, the overall investment coefficient continued to be lower than the 1980 level. For its part, 
private consumption once again increased, encouraged by a further rise in real wages and salaries and 
greater export earnings. 
Although the net flow of resources from abroad declined significantly, the considerable 
reduction in the balance-of-payments current account deficit made possible an increase in interna-
tional reserves. Higher coffee prices and the sharp drop in the international price of petroleum led to 
a marked improvement in the terms of trade. The drop in petroleum prices also permitted 
considerable savings in foreign exchange and facilitated the reconstitution and expansion of reserve 
stocks of crude. As a result, fiscal income increased both on account of greater revenue from export 
taxes and increased transfers from the national refining company. The drop in international interest 
rates also had a favourable impact on public finances and on the balance of payments. 
Generally speaking, economic policy continued to be geared towards the liberalization of the 
economy so that market forces would determine the allocation of resources and the setting of relative 
prices. This involves the privatization of a number of public enterprises and services, the cessation of 
subsidies and other forms of State interference, and the reduction of the protection given to the 
system of production. The general trend was towards an open external policy, the assumption being 
that, in this way, the various sectors will achieve higher levels of efficiency. 
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Figure 1 
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Gross domestic product3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. b Annual average rate, nationwide. 
to December. ^Millions of dollars. Percentages. 
cPercentage variation from December 
Although in reality only limited progress was made in the desired direction, this led to 
controversies among the economic agents. Some of the measures adopted by the authorities stem 
from commitments undertaken with the international organizations with a view to renegotiating the 
debt and securing an increase in net inflows of capital. However, grave difficulties were encountered 
in attempting to fulfil those conditions,1 since the resultant economic policy did not conform to the 
expectations of various social groups: a fact of special importance in a country with a long tradition of 
broad political participation. 
A cautious monetary policy was pursued for most of the year. The practice of seeking to restrain 
central government financing was continued; moreover, up until November overall limits on credit 
for the private sector continued to be applied. The increase in the volume of money in circulation was 
due mainly to the substantial rise in the level of net international monetary reserves, the monetiza-
tion of the resources provided by the Agency for International Development —which were chan-
nelled to the private sector—, and to an expansion in net domestic credit to the National Production 
Council (CNP). 
1
 Early in the year an allocation of US$40 million was obtained under a structural adjustment agreement with the World 
Bank. At the same time steps were taken to conclude a new agreement for US$200 million. In March a stand-by agreement with 
the IMF expired and negotiations were begun with a view to concluding a new agreement. 
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The wages policy, which sought to restore the purchasing power of wages and salaries, was a 
factor that stimulated demand and forestalled a further deterioration in the income distribution 
profile, at least as far as the labour sector was concerned. 
In the area of fiscal policy, the increase in current expenditure during the first months of the 
year prevented any significant reduction of the central government deficit, measured as a proportion 
of the gross domestic product. However, this coefficient did fall for the public sector as a whole, 
thanks to the efforts to place the finances of public enterprises and decentralized units on a sound 
footing. At the same time, the policy aimed at reducing the relative size of the public sector continued 
to be pursued through the sale of companies which were subsidiaries of the Costa Rican Development 
Co-operation (CODESA). 
In keeping with the economic policy agreed upon with the international financial organiza-
tions, the undervaluation of the colón was maintained, a new tariff schedule (on average offering 
lower nominal protection) was introduced, and new reductions in import surcharges were decreed. 
Despite the relatively satisfactory performance of the economy, a number of deep-seated 
problems persisted and are expected to continue to affect the development of the economy in the 
years ahead. Firstly, servicing of the external debt continued to be a major obstacle to sustained 
growth, since the country had to devote a very high proportion of its export earnings to honouring its 
external obligations. Against this background, a new round of negotiations related to those being held 
with the international financial agencies was initiated with the private banks and the Paris Club 
during the year. 
On the other hand, although the size of the public sector deficit in relation to the gross domestic 
product was successfully reduced, the relative size of the central government deficit once again 
increased. In order to halt this trend, the authorities submitted to the Legislative Assembly a tax 
reform proposal whose implementation would, according to official sources, reduce the size of the 
consolidated public sector deficit from nearly 6% of the GDP to 4%. In 1986, however, the central 
government had to finance a high proportion of its expenditure by placing bonds on the domestic 
stock market. This move, apart from channelling a sizeable share of national savings to the central 
government, obliged the monetary authorities to transfer a large part of the resources of the financial 
market to the public treasury, which made it difficult to sell the monetary stability bonds. 
At the same time, there was heightened debate on the question of the new development 
strategy, which seeks to reduce the economic role of the State and to increase the process of opening 
up the economy to the outside world. In fact, the aimed liberalization measures have already created a 
number of problems. For example, the reduction of agricultural subsidies has affected the production 
of staple grains, while the lowering of tariff protection may have severe repercussions on the 
emerging industrial sector. The dispute concerns not only the objectives of the measures already 
adopted and those planned for the future, but also the rate at which they should be implemented. In 
essence, the debate reflects the difficulties involved in the attempt to reconcile a new model of a more 
open economy —which seeks to achieve a high level of efficiency— with the traditional form of 
organization in Costa Rica, where the State has played a decisive role in bringing about past 
achievements in the areas of equity and fairness of distribution. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply grew by more than 5% as a result of the slight increase in domestic economic 
activity and the considerable increase in the volume of imports (see table 2). The gross domestic 
product, for its part, grew by 4% following its slight increase the previous year. Purchases of goods 
and services grew by more than 10% in real terms, thus continuing for the fourth consecutive year 
their trend towards recovery after the drastic decline (-40%) suffered in the 1980-1981 biennium. 
Contributing to this increase were the high elasticity of imports for the productive sector, increased 
foreign exchange earnings on account of the recovery of the international prices for some of the main 
traditional export products, and the high rate at which exports of new products requiring imported 
inputs continued to grow. 
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As in 1985, the increase in total demand was due largely to the strength of domestic demand. On 
this occasion, however, the effects of the recovery of exports of goods and services also played a part. 
Gross domestic investment grew very rapidly ( 15 % ), on account of the large build-up of stocks, 
particularly of coffee, and the 9% increase in fixed investment. Private sector capital formation 
increased substantially, more than compensating for the slight decline recorded in public sector 
investment. While residential construction expanded considerably, investment in major public works 
was restricted by the smaller availability of external resources and the limitations imposed by the 
need to control the fiscal deficit. The last-mentioned factors also explain why government consump-
tion once again grew only slightly. Indeed, it is likely that its increase of barely 2% may have led to 
some deterioration in the quantity and quality of a number of public services (such as education, 
health, social security, family allowances, etc.) which directly affect the level of well-being of a broad 
sector of the population. 
Private consumption, in contrast, increased by more than 4% thanks to the growth in real 
wages and salaries and the higher incomes received by own-account workers in the export sectors. 
Even so, however, because of the steep decline suffered in the 1981-1982 biennium it still did not 
recover its 1980 level. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
In almost all sectors, production grew faster than in 1985 (see table 3). This was particularly 
true of the basic services activities (6%), in which the production of electrical energy recovered from 
the previous year's decline. The goods-producing sectors grew more slowly than services, on account 
of the virtual stagnation of agriculture, which was in contrast with the vigorous growth of 
manufacturing. 
i) The agricultural sector. The changes in the direction of economic policy were also largely 
reflected in the agricultural sector. Since early in the past decade a policy had begun to be structured 
which was aimed at achieving a satisfactory level of food security and, through the provision of 
subsidies, correcting distortions created by the market forces themselves. In contrast, the new 
economic policy, which reinforces that applied since the start of the present decade, tends to severely 
limit subsidies and other forms of State intervention, even when this involves the temporary 
reduction of certain activities which are not internationally competitive. 
While the sectoral product failed to record even a 1% increase, the performance of the 
individual items was very dissimilar (see table 4). Coffee production fell by 6%, mainly owing to 
cyclical factors which brought about a decline in productivity, whereas the production of bananas 
increased by 7% following its sharp drop in the previous year. This increase was due both to greater 
productivity resulting from technical improvements to the fertilization and drainage systems, and to 
the rehabilitation of a large banana-growing area that had been damaged by heavy winds during the 
previous season. Export taxes on this product, which had already been lowered the previous year, 
were further reduced from 55 cents per box on 31 December 1985 to 27 cents in 1986. These measures 
were supplemented by an export promotion plan which provided for the establishment of a US$10 
million fund to finance the planting of crops in high yield areas, in replacement of areas with lower 
yields. These efforts were designed to restore the production levels and the jobs lost in 1985, when a 
transnational corporation suspended its operations owing to the financial problems of its parent 
company. 
Sugar cane production declined by almost 1%, mainly through reduction of the area under 
cultivation in face of the uncertainty which the cut in the quota granted by the United States created in 
the international market. This quota was set at only 35 000 tons, as against just over 52 000 tons in 
1985, and it is likely to be reduced still further. The cocoa crop, on the other hand, again increased 
(9%), due to a sizeable expansion of the area in which modern methods of cultivation are used. 
As regards the production of staple grains, only that of rice fell (-7%), as a result of the policy 
aimed at reducing the accumulation of excess stocks and at avoiding exports at prices below 
production costs, and also due to shortfalls in anticipated yields. In contrast, the bean harvest 
increased by 16% to unprecedented volumes, thanks to the use of better production techniques and to 
the price-support policy. After a two-year upward trend, sorghum production almost stagnated; the 
1985/1986 harvest was very favourable, since there were increases in both the area cultivated and in 
yields, but the 1986/1987 harvest is expected to yield much less, since the gradual elimination of 
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subsidies will lead to a significant contraction of the area sown and yields will decline. Short-cycle 
oilseeds —cotton and soya— suffered a sharp drop in international prices. Cultivation of the African 
palm, for its part, continued to expand on account of the favourable evolution of both domestic and 
export prices. 
Among the new agricultural items, increases were recorded in the production of macadamia 
nuts, cardamom, ornamental plants, and flowers, whose prospects in external markets are good. 
Stock-raising activity grew slightly, mainly on account of increased slaughtering of beef cattle 
for meat exports and the authorization to sell cows abroad. Although there was no shortage of supply 
on the domestic market, it is likely that the national stock of cattle diminished. 
The agricultural policy pursued by the new administration reflected substantial changes in the 
institutional support framework for the sector. The National Production Council (CNP), a body set up 
to regulate the production of staple grains, was transformed into the executing agency of the 
development policy aimed at making agriculture more efficient. Also of importance was the com-
mencement of operations by the National Rice Bureau, which completely severed the CNP's connec-
tion with the production of this staple. Lastly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Stock-raising 
underwent substantial restructuring, including the setting up of a Planning Board to co-ordinate and 
focus institutional efforts in the area of agricultural activity. 
ii) Manufacturing. Following its recovery in the previous three years from the severe crisis that 
affected it during the 1981-1982 biennium, manufacturing activities expanded by over 7%, making it 
the most dynamic sector in the economy (see table 5). This growth was helped by efforts to 
strengthen the domestic market and by the stimulus of external demand, particularly from extra-
regional markets, within the framework of the government policy of promoting exports. In contrast, 
exports to the countries of the Central American Common Market declined even more than in 1985.2 
Of particular note was the dynamic growth in the metal products and machinery industry and in 
the production of intermediate goods, especially petroleum refining. The metal products and 
machinery branch increased its production by 15%, although levels of output continued to be lower 
than in 1980. The spectacular growth in petroleum refining (51%) is due to the policy aimed at 
reconstituting stocks of hydrocarbons, taking advantage of the drop in the prices of crude on the 
international market. 
With regard to consumer goods, the printing and publishing sector grew at a faster rate than 
the sector as a whole. Lastly, the rate of expansion in the sector of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, 
which has a heavy weighting among manufactured goods, fell to around 3%, due to contractions in 
sugar refining and coffee processing. 
The employment created through manufacturing activity rose by only by 1%. This feeble 
increase, which was a good deal less than that of the labour force, shows the scant possibilities of 
relieving unemployment offered by the manufacturing sector, with the possible exception of the 
emerging subcontracting industry. 
iii) Construction. The value added in this sector increased by only a little over 1 % for the second 
year running.3 This result was due to the sluggishness of public investment, mainly caused by the 
completion of a number of infrastructural works, budgetary limitations and the reduced inflow of 
resources from abroad. In contrast, the area constructed expanded by more than 17% (see table 6). 
This result was helped by the measures adopted by the government to streamline the procedures for 
requesting loans and the availability of credit resources for housing. In this regard, the establishment 
of the Housing Bank and the Credit System of the National Institute of Housing and Urban Affairs 
(1NVU), played an important role. 
iv) The electricity sector. The generation of electrical energy rose by almost 4.5 % as the result 
of a recovery in the production of hydroelectricity. Nevertheless, this output was much lower than in 
1984, when heavy rainfall, which considerably increased the water level in reservoirs, coincided with 
the start-up of operations of the Arenal-Corobici plant (see table 7). 
2In line with this growth profile, the importance of the manufacturing branches which arc most closely linked to the 
Central American market —and which have not been able to adapt to the decline of that market— has been decreasing. This is 
the case, for example, of textiles, leather and footwear, where the increase in domestic demand has not been able to compensate 
for the above-mentioned decline. 
'For methodological reasons this estimate did not include improvement work in agriculture, which in 1986 came toan 
appreciable amount. If this had been taken into account, construction would have registered an increase of approximately 6%. 
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Work continued on the 97 000 kW Ventanas-Garita hydroelectric project (scheduled to begin 
operations in the second half of 1987) as well as on the related transmission facilities. Another 
noteworthy achievement was the completion of work on the interconnection of the electricity system 
with Panama, which included the expansion of substations and the construction of a transmission 
line. Work was also completed on the project designed to supply adequate energy to the southern part 
of the Nicoya peninsula. 
Domestic consumption of energy, particularly for residential purposes, again rose rapidly. The 
increase in the consumption of energy for residential purposes has been largely due to subsidized 
tariffs and extensive programmes to provide electricity services to rural areas. As a result of this, and 
notwithstanding its increased output, the country over the last few years has become for the first time 
a net importer of electrical energy to cover its domestic needs, purchasing electricity from Honduras. 
c) Employment and unemployment 
According to official reports,4 between July 1985 and July 1986 more than 30 000 new jobs were 
created, thus reducing the national unemployment rate for the fourth consecutive year so that it stood 
at 6% (see table 8). 
Unemployment has been reduced in both rural and urban areas thanks to the establishment of 
new companies whose production is exported out of the Central American area, as well as to the 
vigorous growth of the private construction sector, commerce and finance. The decline of unemploy-
ment in rural areas seems to be related to improvements to the agricultural sector achieved through 
the expansion of the credit programme for the sector, using resources provided by the Agency for 
International Development (AID), which were allocated through co-operatives. Other factors that 
helped to expand job opportunities were the cocoa development programme, improvements in some 
crops —coffee and African palm— and the undertaking of other labour-intensive activities. 
According to official information,5 public sector employment in December was slightly less 
(422 fewer jobs, out of a total of slightly more than 140 000) than the level recorded 12 months 
previously. In keeping with the provisions of the first phase of the Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme concluded with the World Bank, the government is sticking to its commitment to reduce 
these posts to the number at which they stood in March 1984. 
3. The external sector 
In the field of external trade, 1986 witnessed a significant increase in foreign exchange earnings from 
exports and a moderate increase in the value of imports. The terms of trade for goods improved by 
almost 20%, on account of the substantial increase in coffee prices, a slight upturn in the prices of 
bananas and a drop in petroleum prices (see table 9). These factors, combined with a drop in 
international interest rates, partly offset the marked contraction in the inflow of external capital. For 
their part, the international reserves again increased, although to a lesser extent than in 1985. This 
increase, however, may turn out to be only temporary, bearing in mind the delays which have occurred 
in the servicing of the external debt. 
As a result of the export promotion programme, exports of non-traditional products to 
countries outside of the Central American area recorded a further considerable increase, but it did not 
prove possible to halt the downward trend in sales of manufactured goods to the Central American 
market. For its part, the external debt continued to constitute one of the most intractable problems 
facing the country, since debt servicing absorbed more than half of the income earned from exports of 
goods and services. 
a) Evolution of tbe exchange rate 
The policy of gradually raising the exchange rate continued to be applied in 1986 in order to 
promote the growth of exports. By the end of the year, the colón had depreciated 10% in nominal 
••See Primer informe de gobierno, a progress report by President Arias to the Legislative Assembly, published in the 
newspaper La República on 2 May 1987. 
'Technical Secretariat of the Ministry of Finance, Office of the Budget. 
205 
terms against the dollar; however, the competitive position of the Costa Rican currency deteriorated 
slightly since the rate of depreciation was lower than the evolution of the ratio between domestic 
prices and prices in the United States. Furthermore, in real terms the colón appreciated against the 
currencies of Guatemala and El Salvador —the principal trading partners of Costa Rica in Central 
America— on account of the substantial devaluations of the currencies of these countries. Neverthe-
less, mainly as a result of the depreciation of the dollar against the yen and against the principal 
European currencies, the real effective exchange rate again climbed and attained its highest level 
since 1981 (see table 10). 
b) Merchandise trade 
The value of merchandise exports rose by more than 15%, thus substantially exceeding for the 
first time the levels recorded in the 1980-1981 period. This good performance was due to exports to 
countries outside the region, the increase in which more than compensated for the sharp drop in 
exports to Central America (see table 11). 
Coffee exports rose by nearly 18%, thanks to the fact that the average price of this product was 
almost double the 1985 level. This increase more than offset the drop in the volume exported caused 
by the ill-advised withholding of stocks by producers in the hope of receiving better prices. In fact, 
prices began to decline towards the end of the year (see table 12). After the suspension of the quota 
system in February, negotiations were begun for a higher quota more consistent with the volume of 
national production, since the quota covered barely 50% of this. 
In contrast with the sharp decline of the previous year, banana exports rose 10% following the 
rehabilitation of plantations that had been damaged by storms in 1984 and the substantial govern-
ment assistance which this sector received through the Banana Development Plan. Meat exports rose 
substantially, thus offsetting the decline in international prices, while the value of sugar exports also 
increased significantly —mainly due to higher export volumes— though it remained far below the 
1984 level. 
Non-traditional exports to countries outside of Central America grew markedly. The vigorous 
government programme to promote such exports was largely responsible for their increase to a value 
of approximately US$300 million: an amount higher than that received from exports of bananas. 
Among other products, this category includes flowers, ornamental plants, fresh fruit and wooden 
furniture. The promotion policy followed in previous years was supplemented in 1986 by, inter alia, 
100% exemption from taxes on income earned from subcontracting activities. Moreover, Tax Return 
Certificates (CATS), which cover 15 % of the FOB value of exports and which are negotiable in the stock 
market, continued to be used. The Free Port régime was also strengthened (with freedom in the use of 
currency) and, generally speaking, the entire institutional framework for promoting exports was 
reinforced. Substantial financial assistance was received for this purpose from the Agency for 
International Development (AID). 
The value of merchandise imports increased by almost 4%. However, mainly as a result of the 
drop in the price of petroleum —which resulted in savings of approximately US$60 million—, this 
modest rise concealed a considerable increase in the volume of imports for the fourth year running. 
Even so, this volume was still 10% less than that of 1980 (see table 13). Although detailed figures are 
not available, it is estimated that a large part of the increase in purchases from abroad corresponded to 
inputs for industry and construction, together with machinery and agricultural equipment. Imports of 
non-durable consumer goods, in contrast, probably remained at the same level as the year before. 
Trade with other Central American countries continued to decline in 1986. The value of exports 
fell by 29% and the large amounts owed to Costa Rica by El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua 
obliged the Central Bank to refuse to authorize the export of certain products to these countries. 
c) Factor payments 
The negative balance on factor services decreased from almost US$330 million in 1985 to less 
than US$290 million in 1986, mainly on account of the reduction in effective payments of interest on 
the external public debt. From July onward, payment of interest on the public debt contracted with the 
commercial banks was suspended until the rates originally agreed upon are renegotiated. Despite the 
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fact that the servicing of this debt was resumed in October, arrears of interest amounted to US$35 
million. The drop in international interest rates —as a result of which the country saved approxi-
mately US$30 million— prevented this amount from being greater (see table 14). 
d) Tbe current account balance and its financing 
The negative balance on current account was reduced by more than a third, thus reaching its 
lowest level in the present decade. This result was due to the upswing in the merchandise trade 
balance and to the delays in the payment of interest. At the same time, however, the net flow of 
financial resources from abroad declined considerably owing to the lower transfers to the public 
sector and, in particular, to the sharp reduction in the inflow of long-term capital. The decrease in 
transfers, particularly those from the AID, was due to the suspension of planned disbursements in face 
of the difficulties which the country was experiencing in concluding a new agreement with the IMF. 
For its part, the turnaround in the performance of the long term capital account —which from a 
surplus of almost US$400 million in 1985 fell to a negative balance of over US$30 million in 1986— 
was due to a more than 50% decline in the value of loans received by the official sector and to a further 
considerable increase in amortization payments. In contrast, short-term capital movements, which 
during the previous three years had shown substantial negative balances, generated a surplus of 
US$130 million. 
The sharp drop in flows of external capital to the public sector, resulting partly from the 
contraction in the total amount negotiated and partly from the suspension of transfers from the 
commercial banks, far exceeded the increase in loans to the private sector. This led to serious 
problems of international liquidity, which were reflected in delays in the processing of requests for 
foreign exchange for import purposes. 
e) Tbe external debt 
Although the external debt decreased for the first time in 17 years, it continued to be one of the 
most serious obstacles to the country's growth, since debt servicing continued to absorb more than 
50 % of foreign exchange earnings. By the end of the year, the external debt stood at US$3.7 billion, of 
which approximately 90% corresponded to public sector debt (see table 15). 
In order to lighten the debt burden, the government requested in September a new round of 
negotiations with the creditor commercial banks in order to secure better conditions as regards 
repayment periods and rates of interest for the US$1.6 billion owed to these entities. Using the 
argument that the servicing of the debt should be consistent with the country's capacity to pay, the 
government proposed a term of 25 years (with a seven year grace period) and the payment of a fixed 
rate of interest lower than the market rate. However, the negotiations were hampered by difficulties 
in concluding a new agreement with the IMF. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
During 1986 the modest inflation recorded since 1984 continued. The average annual increase 
in the consumer price index declined from 15% to 12%, but the 12-month variation to December 
rose from 11% to 15%, following the acceleration of the inflationary process during the second half 
of the year (see table 16 and figure 2). 
The factors that caused this trend include the excessive expansion of the means of payment 
associated with the fiscal deficit, and the removal of price controls for some widely-used products, for 
which subsidies were eliminated in keeping with the new economic policy. Moreover, devaluation 
continued to raise the prices of imported inputs. These factors were compounded by increases in the 
tariffs and prices of goods and services supplied by the public sector, particularly electrical energy 
(15%) and drinking water (33%), which were applied with effect from September. 
Food prices rose much more than the average, on account of the marked increases in the price of 
basic goods such as rice, eggs and sugar, particularly in June and July. 
207 
b) Wages 
The objective of the wages policy continued to be to restore to wages and salaries the purchasing 
power which they had had prior to the crisis. Under this policy, the variations in the prices of a set of 
widely-used products, known as the "basic wage basket", are used to determine adjustments to wages 
and salaries. The increase in the value of this basket, into which new products have been incorporated, 
exceeded for the fourth year running the increases in the consumer price index. As a result, real wages 
and salaries again rose, even though their purchasing power continued to be lower than before the 
crisis (see table 17). 
Figure 2 
COSTA RICA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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With regard to wages and salaries paid by the private sector, during the second half of the year 
the consumer price index began to be used as an element in determining wage increases, and from 
1987 this method will be used to fix wage adjustments in the public sector. 
The wages policy has enabled the economic adjustment programme to have a positive effect on 
production and has permitted costs to be distributed in a more or less equitable manner among the 
various economic agents. These results underline the effectiveness of the present labour organization 
in the country. 
The lower minimum wage increased by almost 6% in real terms, bringing it up to a level that 
was 19% higher than that of 1980. However, the upper minimum wage fell by 5%, resulting in an 
overall loss of more than 9% in the last biennium. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
The financial situation of the public sector improved, and the ratio between its deficit and the 
gross domestic product fell from 7.3% in 1985 to 5.6% in 1986. This was due to the reduction of 
exchange rate losses by the Central Bank and, above all, to the major effort of financial reorganization 
made by public corporations, which enabled them to register surpluses. Of particular note in this 
respect was the favourable balance of the National Production Council (CNP), which was achieved 
through the reduction of subsidies on staple grains and the termination of this agency's involvement 
in the marketing of rice. 
In contrast, the central government's deficit rose from 4.1% to 7.1% of the gross domestic 
product (see table 18). This deterioration was due to the rapid increase in expenditure during the first 
quarter, when an attempt was made to complete a number of infrastructural works begun by the 
previous administration. 
Consumption expenditure increased considerably (47%), both under the head of wages and 
salaries and under that of purchases of goods and services. Wage adjustments and transfers approved 
at the end of 1985 were implemented in 1986. The rigidities which these measures introduced into 
the budget were compounded by those resulting from the increases granted during the course of the 
year. At the same time, expenditure in respect of both current and capital transfers to public 
corporations and decentralized institutions rose sharply. Investment expenditure, however, under-
went a further significant contraction, even in terms of current values (-10%), after its slump of the 
previous year (-25%), as a result of the reduced availability of external resources. 
Although the current income of the central government increased by 20% in real terms, it was 
not sufficient to finance the sharp rise in expenditure. As regards tax revenue, income from export 
duties rose significantly owing to greater inflows of the ad valorem tax on the increased coffee sales. 
On the other hand, earnings from the banana tax fell by half following the reduction of the duty levied 
on each box exported; real earnings from import taxes also declined following the implementation of 
the new schedule of customs duties, whose tariffs on average offer lower nominal protection. 
A factor which contributed to current income was the unscheduled transfers to the central 
government by the Costa Rican Petroleum Refinery (RECOPE), resulting from savings made on 
petroleum purchases. 
The fiscal deficit of the central government constituted one of the principal obstacles to the 
negotiation of a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund, and it also hampered the 
renegotiation of that part of the external debt that was contracted with the private banks. In order to 
correct this situation, in December the government submitted a proposal to reduce the deficit 
through tax reforms designed to compensate for the lower tax earnings of recent years attributable to 
the incentives granted in order to promote exports and to develop tourism and activities in the areas 
of forestry, banana growing and co-operatives. This additional income was expected to come mainly 
from a tax on luxury consumption. 
The fiscal deficit of the central government was financed mainly from the sale of bonds on the 
financial market. While such sales have led to a substantial transfer of financial resources from the 
private to the public sector, they have helped to push up interest rates. 
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As regards the para-State sector, the policy of selling off the subsidiary companies of the 
government-owned Corporación de Desarrollo (CODESA) was continued. Thus, several of these 
subsidiaries were sold, liquidated or relocated within the public sector. This process is expected to be 
concluded in mid-1988. 
b) Monetary policy 
Monetary and credit policy remained within the general guidelines of the agreements with the 
international financial organizations and was applied cautiously during most of the year, in order to 
keep inflation under control. During the first nine months the money supply (ML) remained stable at 
about 35 billion colones, but it rose sharply in the last quarter, reaching almost 42 billion colones in 
December. Thus, despite efforts to implement a restrained monetary policy, the means of payment 
expanded by 31 % during the course of the year (see table 19). This expansion, which was largely due 
to the considerable increase in net international reserves, far exceeded the needs of the productive 
system and contributed to the resurgence of inflation in the last quarter.6 
The monetary authorities resorted mainly to the quantitative control of credit and to open 
market operations (sale of stabilization bonds by the Central Bank). On the other hand, the increase 
in bank reserves decreed by law the previous year influenced the monetary performance in 1986 and 
was largely responsible for the reduction of the multiplier which relates the money supply to the 
monetary base. As regards credit to the public sector, an item of particular significance was the 
financing granted by the Central Bank to the National Production Council —both directly and 
through the issue of bonds— and to the commercial banks. However, a large part of the increase in 
credit to the public sector took the form of loans for renegotiation of the external debt; public 
institutions may thus appear as owing money to the Central Bank, while the latter may show up in the 
records as owing money to foreign creditors. 
Credit to the private sector grew at a rate which was similar to that of 1985 and was slightly 
higher than the rate of inflation. Of particular note were loans to the construction sector, especially 
for the construction of dwellings. Progress continued to be made towards the gradual elimination of 
limits on the credit granted by the commercial banks: in fact, the monetary authorities decided to 
completely eliminate portfolio limits according to the destination of loans and only maintained 
overall limits on credit. In November, however, the latter limits were eliminated too in order to 
enable the banks to decide on the amount of credit which they would grant in line with the volume of 
deposits by the public. 
In order to enhance the role of the market in the allocation of resources, in late 1986 the 
economic authorities authorized financial intermediaries to freely determine interest rates on loans 
and deposits in national currency.7 Partly as a result of this, interest rates throughout most of the 
banking system were positive in real terms. In fact, preferential rates were granted only to the 
agricultural sector, and transactions in this area represented only a negligible proportion of the total 
credit granted to the private sector. 
Despite the more favourable interest rates offered, savings and term deposits in the banking 
system increased by only 14%, as compared with more than 20% in 1985. This slow growth was 
largely due to the central government's active efforts to attract financial resources by offering interest 
rates higher than those given by the national banking system. This reduced the possibility of 
providing more financing for the private sector and of the Central Bank absorbing the excess money 
in circulation through net sales of stabilization bonds, which represented only a quarter of the total 
amount of bonds issued by the central government. Furthermore, central government deposits in the 
Central Bank declined during the year. 
6The build-up of the debt owed to the Central Bank by a number of public sector institutions also contributed to the 
growth of the means of payment. As well as suspending the servicing of the debt owed to the commercial banks, the public 
institutions delayed their deposits in the issuing entity, maintaining extra balances in their current accounts. 
7
 In order to avoid excessive dispersion, it was laid down that the minimum lending rate should be equal to the interest 
rate for six-month deposits, while the maximum lending rate should be 10 percentage points greater than the minimum 
lending rate, with this spread being gradually reduced to eight points. 
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It is estimated that the inflationary impact of the exchange rate losses borne by the Central 
Bank8 was not significant, since only a small percentage of those losses was monetized, another 
portion was financed from external resources and its equivalent in national currency remained on 
deposit in that bank, and the remainder was recorded as an accounting adjustment without any 
monetary consequences whatsoever. As in 1985, the issuing agency tried to lessen the inflationary 
effect of the losses and to reduce their amount. To this end, the Central Bank increased the rate of 
interest paid on deposits in foreign currency and raised the rate charged to commercial banks for 
certain loans. In addition, the issuing agency began to use the resources of the Exchange Losses Fund, 
to which only the commercial banks had had access previously. 
"Exchange rate losses were mainly due to the gap between the interest received on assets and the interest on liabilities 
in foreign currency resulting from the growing external indebtedness contracted by the Central Bank to cover the disequilibria 
in the balance of payments. 
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Table 1 
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Domestic product at market prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
8. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Rate of unemploymentc 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
M 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 




































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 'Annual average of rates based on four-monthly household surveys. 
''Refers to disbursed medium- and long-term debt. 
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Table 2 
COSTA RICA: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
COSTA RICA 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
















Exports of goods 
and services 


























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. fcThe figures for exports and imports of goods and services were obtained from balance of 




COSTA RICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 






Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 













































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 




COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of production 




























Indicators of forestry 
production 
Woode 



















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of tons. 
cubic metres. 
"Millions of litres. Millions of units. 'Thousands of 
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Table 5 
COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of value added 
(1977 = 100) 
Consumer goods 





Textiles, leather and footwear 
Furniture and wood 




Paper and paper products 





Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 
Consumption of electricity 
by industry (1970= 100) 



















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 6 
COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Area constructed 














































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
" Preliminary figures. Permits granted for building, extension and remodelling. rOn the basis of an estimate of the 




COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION, 


















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) and the Central Bank of Costa 
Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. Including electricity consummed in ICE construction projects. 
Table 8 






































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Statistics and Census 
Bureau. 
"Annual average of the figures recorded in the household surveys which are carried out every four months in the 
country. Labour force as a percentage of total population. ' Average of surveys carried out in March and 
November. Preliminary figures for the average of the surveys for March and July. 
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Table 9 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 

























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
° Corresponds to the average real exchange rate indexes for the colón in respect of the currencies of the principal countries with 
which Costa Rica trades, weighted by the relative importanceof exports or imports toor from these countries, as the case may 
be. Between 1970 and 1980, these weightings corresponds to the average for the period 1975-1979, while from 1981 onwards 
they correspond to the average for the 1982-1985 period. Wholesale price indexes were primarily used in the calculations. For 
the methodologies and sources used, see the Statistical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. Data 
supplied by the IMF, except for the period October 1980-December 1983, when exchange rates provided by the Central Bank 
of Costa Rica were used. 
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Table 11 
COSTA RICA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
To Central America 



















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Costa Rica and the Statistics and Census Bureau. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 12 





























































Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 















































































































COSTA RICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total change in reserves 
(- sign indicated and increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 






































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook,}une 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official figures. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Including other non-factor services. 'Including net loans granted and 




COSTA RICA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 














Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Debt servicing/exports of 
goods and services 






















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. Medium- and long-term disbursed external debt. 
Table 16 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Wholesale price index 
Imported products 
Domestic products 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Wholesale price index 
Imported products 
Domestic products 
































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Statistic and Census Bureau and the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Corresponds to middle- and low-income consumers in the San José metropolitan area; the base year is 1975. Base year 
1978 = 100. 
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Table 17 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES A N D SALARIES 



























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
Preliminary figures. 
metropolitan area. 




COSTA RICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Billions of colones Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 1983 1984 1985 1986" 




On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current saving ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit or surplus 
(1 -5 ) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 
Central Bank 




Current saving/capital expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/current expenditure 




























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 19 
COSTA RICA: MONETARY POSITION AND INDICATORS 
Money (M,) 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To public sector 
Central government (net) 
Public institutions 
To private sector 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings 
and time deposits) 
Long-term external loans 









Velocity of circulation: 
GDP/M, 
Balance at end of year 















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes buns. 'Includes adjustments for variation in the rate of exchange. 
''Calculated on the basis of the annual averages (of theend-of-month balances) for the monetary base, money (M,) , and money 
plus quasi-money (M2). 'For the purposes of this table, the monetary base is defined as monetary issue plus demand 
deposits by commercial banks in the Central Bank of Costa Rica . 
226 
CUBA 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
After a period of sustained growth (albeit with some fluctuations) during the first half of the decade, 
Cuba's global social product increased by only 1.4% in 1986. This rate was lower than that forecast in 
the Plan and was reflected in an almost negligible increase in the per capita product (see table 1). 
Hurricane Kate, which struck the island in November 1985, caused serious damage to the sugar 
cane harvest and to other agricultural products, while in 1986 the country experienced the worst 
drought in the last decade and there were other serious disturbances in rainfall which damaged 
tobacco production in particular. These natural phenomena adversely affected the supply of goods for 
export and for domestic consumption and increased the need to import certain items. 
A number of factors of external origin also contributed to this crisis. Foremost among these was 
the deterioration of the terms of trade with the free market economy countries. Although the 
international price of sugar was somewhat higher than that of the previous year it still failed to offset 
the combined effect of the sharp slump in oil prices and the increase in the prices of imported goods. ' 
Furthermore, the weakening of the dollar against the currencies of the OECD countries hurt the 
Cuban economy on account of the large volume of trade and external financing with countries whose 
currency appreciated. This factor made trade relations with Japan, Canada and some European 
countries especially difficult. 
The reduction in the exportable supply of sugar contributed to a radical change in the patterns 
of Cuba's trade with the rest of the world. In the case of the Socialist-bloc countries, the sugar quota 
commitments were respected to high degree. Consequently, the balance that could be exported to 
other countries was reduced, to the detriment of Cuba's import capacity. 
The external strangulation in terms of the shortage of freely convertible currency has thus been 
steadily becoming the main problem facing the economy, and it worsened at the end of 1986. The 
process of debt renegotiation, including the talks with the Paris Club, was slow and arduous because 
the country's monetary authorities had failed to meet the targets which they had set themselves. The 
situation became critical in the last months of the year, when Cuba was in arrears in respect of certain 
commitments because of the persistent erosion of its international monetary reserves. 
These factors severely hindered the implementation of the State budget, and a series of 
corrective measures had to be adopted. An attempt was made to adjust the incomes policy to the new 
situation. However, the increases in rates and prices ordered towards the end of 1986 for the dual 
purpose of increasing government income and recovering some liquidity from the public would only 
begin to have some effect in the following year. Furthermore, these increases were partially cancelled 
out by some salary rises. 
With regard to expenditure policy, one of the most noteworthy events was the decision to speed 
up works that could help to promote the export of goods or services —such as hotel construction— or 
which were of major social importance. On the other hand, it was decided even to halt entirely work 
on some investment projects that were regarded as not being of high priority. 
According to official information, the loss of dynamism of the global social product was not, at 
least in 1986, accompanied by any reduction in the capacity to meet the basic requirements of the 
population such as food and health. 
1
 In recent years, the sale of petroleum products has been second only to sugar among export items. Under agreements 
signed with the Soviet Union, crude oil imported from that country which is surplus to requirements as a result of the domestic 
attempt to save oil and substitute other energy sources can be refined and exported by Cuba in accordance with international 
market conditions. Thus, although che raw material is imported at a reduced price, the refined petroleum can be exported at a 
substantially higher one. 
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Finally, a heightened interest in streamlining and efficiency was observed. This was the issue of 
greatest concern in both the debates and resolutions of the Third Congress of the Communist Party of 
Cuba and at all levels of State activity. The functioning of the systems for the control and regulation of 
labour and wages was critically examined, as were the methods of management and administration. 
The critical financial situation —especially the shortage of freely convertible currency— possibly 
helped to highlight the shortcomings in the performance of a large number of variables, the 
execution of production programmes, the fulfilment of goals and the exercise of regulatory functions. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) The use of the global social product 
Although the global social product was lower than stipulated in the annual plan, the decision 
not to restrict consumption, especially that of the masses, was respected. A number of policy 
measures were therefore applied in order to reach that target, especially in the area of the production 
and the distribution of staple items. Similarly, intermediate consumption increased rather more than 
global activity. 
Despite the critical economic situation, the main indicators of the population's well-being 
increased once again in 1986. Thus daily per capita calorie consumption came to 2 967 units per day 
and protein consumption to 79.9 grammes per day. Among food items, there was a sharp increase in 
fish consumption —which had declined over the last two years— and a smaller increase in fruit 
consumption. The consumption of meat products also increased (see table 2). Cuba thus persisted in 
its effort to improve the main indicators with regard to the satisfaction of staple food requirements, 
to which end it has recently been forced to sacrifice other important goals in its development 
programmes. 
There was an increase in the provision of clothing, substantial in the case of certain items. 
Furthermore, in line with the criteria of selectivity in the use of resources, it was decided to give 
higher priority to direct consumption by persons than that by organizations which provide services to 
the population or which meet collective needs.2 
On the other hand, both fixed and variable net capital formation declined. The difficulties 
caused by the shortage of freely convertible currency and the dispersion of the investment projects, 
which was excessive in view of the limited financial and physical resources, made greater selectivity 
and strictness in the use of these resources imperative. It was decided to concentrate on completing 
priority projects in the shortest possible time and to postpone for the medium and long term less 
important ones which were already in progress or about to be started. Consequently, despite the fact 
that the full impact of these measures will not be felt immediately, there was already in 1986 a decline 
of 1.5 points in the fixed investment coefficient, which in turn caused a 2 % reduction in the real fixed 
capital formation. At the same time, the stocks of both intermediate goods and of others destined for 
consumption or export contracted sharply (see table 3). 
Industry continued to be the sector with the largest concentration of investment, although the 
absolute amount of the latter fell by 12%, in contrast with the higher investment observed in the 
agricultural and transport sectors. In the non-productive sphere, the main works executed were in the 
social sectors such as education, health and housing. In the last-named sector, this was partly to repair 
the damage to dwellings caused by the hurricane. At the same time, an effort was made to begin work 
on priority projects such as the Cienfuegos nuclear power plant, the oil refineries at Cienfuegos and 
Santiago de Cuba, and the nickel plant at Punta Gorda. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The material product (which represents close to two-thirds of the global social product) and the 
non-material product both expanded at similar rates (see table 4). Within the first-named, the 
2This refers to consumption by institutions responsible for education, public health, sports, tourism, etc. (including the 
depreciation of buildings, equipment and installations of these institutions) and by bodies responsible for furthering science, 
public administration, finance and other non-productive activities (including the annual depreciation of their basic facilities). 
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agricultural sector as a whole increased more rapidly than construction and even more than industry, 
despite the unfavourable climatic conditions. In industry, mining, metallurgy and electricity produc-
tion grew satisfactorily, but manufacturing stagnated after a long period of sustained expansion. It 
was precisely in this activity that the effects of the external liquidity crisis were felt more keenly, and 
this triggered off a significant drop in the supplies of raw materials and intermediate products from 
abroad. 
In the area of the non-material product —of which commerce generates some two-thirds of the 
total— the communications sector maintained its dynamism, while transport and commerce 
increased at lower rates than in previous years. 
i) The agricultural sector. Climatic conditions once again adversely affected results in this 
sector. The period of rainfall was very irregular for the second consecutive year—with unusual spells 
of both intense drought and unseasonal rainfall— resulting in damage to various crops and to the 
livestock subsector. Furthermore, the weather created serious problems in the operation of the 
sector's basic infrastructure —such as dams— and in the storage of vital inputs or of products which 
were already harvested and were awaiting distribution. On top of this, the effects of Hurricane Kate 
were keenly felt in the case of several export items. Added to this, the shortage of foreign exchange 
created difficulties in respect of some inputs, including fodder for cattle. 
The introduction of modern methods and mechanization in sugar cane cutting and processing 
increased the output of sugar cane, despite the natural disasters already described. Because of the bad 
weather, however, jt was impossible to bring in the harvest with the available machinery, and once 
again it was necessary to use a much larger work force to harvest the cane manually, with the 
attendant administrative and financial problems, apart from the need to take away resources from 
)ther sectors. Furthermore, because of the drop in the industrial yield, sugar production declined by 
10% even though the volume of cane milled increased by somewhat more than 2% (see table 9 
below). 
The cereals harvest yielded the best results in non-sugar cane agriculture, amply making up for 
the previous decline. Rice and maize production increased by between 9% and 10%, while the 
production of beans rose by 25% (see table 5). The good performance in the case of the first-named 
items was attributable to the fact that in Granma province unprecedented harvests were obtained 
through the use of modern technology and the availability of adequate dam capacity, and this amply 
compensated for the considerable decline in the harvest in Pinar del Rio province on account of the 
drought. Improvements in productivity were also the determining factor in the success achieved in 
maize and bean cultivation, since the area that could be cultivated was reduced because of the drought. 
In some cases, substitute crops had to be planted, for example, beans instead of rice in Pinar del Rio 
province. 
In contrast, there was a generalized decline in vegetable production, although the harvest of 
potatoes (the main root crop) increased for the third consecutive year. 
With respect to fruit, the citrus harvest improved on account of the continued expansion of the 
area under cultivation as part of the export promotion programme. In addition, the introduction of 
modern agricultural methods has produced better yields. The hurricane damaged a large area of 
banana plantations, while the drought adversely affected the flowering and growth of other fruits 
such as mango and guava. Coffee plantations were also affected by these climatic disturbances. 
After three years of decline in the area of pastures and fodder, 1986 witnessed a reversal of this 
trend. Nevertheless, the increase in the areas allocated to pasture failed to compensate for the damage 
caused by the drought, and cattle-raising was seriously affected. For some time, half a million head of 
cattle had to be kept enclosed and fed on sugar cane refuse, under a joint programme of the Ministries 
of Agriculture and Sugar. In the face of this situation, over the last two or three years dozens of centres 
have been established to conduct research and experiments in order to exploit more fully the various 
sugar cane by-products which can be used as inputs in raising livestock. 
Pig-raising was not affected by the problems described above, because for some years now pigs 
have been reared in special installations. Poultry rearing did not escape the effects of the climatic 
disturbances, however, even though a considerable part of this activity takes place in specialized 
plants. As a result, there was greater growth in the pig-rearing industry both in terms of stocks and 
slaughtering. 
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Production of two key food items —milk and eggs— declined once again. This downturn 
generated a major deficit in national food production and increased the demand for imports at a time 
when the country was suffering serious problems of external liquidity. 
ii) Fisheries. The total fish and shellfish catch went up from 220 000 tons to 245 000 tons. This 
increase of over 11% was substantially higher than that of the global social product, although it was 
not as great as the growth recorded in the previous two years. The government continued its policy of 
developing this sector both in order to provide the population with a larger supply of seafood 
products of high protein content and to increase foreign exchange earnings through exports. 
iii) Petroleum, mining and metallurgy. There has been a gradual increase in petroleum activity 
in recent years. Thus, in addition to exploration and extraction, the energy saving programme was 
continued, under which the surplus imported crude is processed and re-exported at international 
prices. The slump in the international price of hydrocarbons was one of the greatest setbacks during 
the period. Crude oil extraction, which at the beginning of the decade accounted for only 4% of the 
petroleum processed, has continued to increase and in 1986 accounted for over 14% of the total. On 
the other hand, over the last three years crude petroleum processing has virtually stagnated (see 
table 6), although construction work on the Santiago and Cienfuegos refineries has proceeded. 
In the non-ferrous mining metals sector, the production of nickel and cobalt increased, after 
falling sharply in 1984 and stagnating in 1985, while that of copper concentrate continued to show 
some dynamism. As regards ferrous mining and metallurgy, the production of refractory chromite 
showed a significant increase. 
iv) Manufacturing. Notwithstanding Cuba's efforts in the field of import substitution, the 
manufacturing sector still remains heavily reliant on external sources of supply, and to a significant 
degree these inputs come from the market economies. Manufacturing was thus one of the sectors 
most severely hurt by the country's financial problems, which triggered off a decline in imports of 
essential inputs and made it necessary to concentrate on priority investment projects. 
For the first time in the decade, the material product of the sector stagnated, even though its 
level was 53% higher than that of 1980 (see tables 7,8 and 9). The industry most affected was that of 
non-durable consumer goods, because a high proportion of it was occupied by the sugar industry and, 
to a lesser extent, the tobacco industry. Clothing production, on the other hand, registered rapid 
growth. 
The performance of the various components of the intermediate goods sub-sector was very 
uneven. Textile activity showed encouraging growth, because the plants which had come into 
operation in recent years were used to full capacity. 
Finally, the production of durable consumer and capital goods stagnated in 1986. Within this 
sector, the electrical equipment and electronics industry continued to expand in line with the 
application of a policy designed to increase the supply of these products and as a result of the 
promotion of an industrial profile which has been increasingly linked to certain CMEA countries in 
this field of activity. Nevertheless, the supply of intermediate goods from countries within the freely 
convertible currency area is still fairly significant (although declining), and has become increasingly 
difficult because of financial problems. However, the opening of trade relations with Brazil and the 
signing of a partial tariff agreement with Uruguay are worthy of mention in this connection. 
Similarly, some agreements for the supply of agro-food products and various kinds of installations 
have been signed with Argentina. 
v) Construction. The construction sector has become one of the most dynamic in the Cuban 
economy and its share of the global social product increased to almost 9% in 1986, despite the fact 
that over the last two years its growth rate has declined noticeably (see table 10). The difficult 
economic situation led to a rather uneven performance as regards the supply of the imported inputs 
required by this sector. At all events, however, cement production expanded at a higher rate than that 
of the global social product as a whole, partly because it was sometimes possible to export a certain 
percentage of it. Textured steel rods were another of the inputs that maintained their dynamism. On 
the other hand, the production of some construction materials was seriously affected, mainly because 
of the external bottleneck. This was so, for example, in the case of the production of sheet glass and to 
a lesser extent that of prefabricated concrete elements and tiles. 
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Housing construction appears to have suffered a decline after having increased up to 1985, 
when over 74 000 units were erected. However, the exact size of this decline cannot be determined 
because the figure of approximately 66 000 which has been given excludes the units for the defence 
sector. Construction in connection with energy generation and improvements in the agricultural 
sector and in roads and communications maintained its level. The evolution of the construction sector 
as a whole was affected by the enforcement in 1986 of a strict order of priorities in the capital 
formation process which gave preference to the execution and termination of projects that will make 
possible import substitution or the expansion of production for export in the future. On the other 
hand, the activities of Cuban construction enterprises abroad, particularly in the African countries, 
remained at a high level. 
vi) Electricity. Both gross generation and electricity consumption regained their dynamism in 
1986 after a slight downturn the previous year (see table 11). Consumption by type of user grew at a 
steady rate (between 7% and 8%), except in the case of commercial users, which are of minor 
importance. 
During the year the "Tenth of October" thermoelectric plant came into operation with a 
capacity of 125 megawatts. Towards the end of the year, several energy projects were under way, of 
these the Havana thermoelectric plant (with a capacity of 300 megawatts) and the Matanzas 
thermoelectric plant (with a capacity of 330 megawatts) were scheduled to be completed in 1987. 
3. The external sector 
From the standpoint of the external variables, 1986 was another difficult year for Cuba, for although 
the balance-of-payments current account deficit in freely convertible currency was lower than that of 
1985 (of the order of 400 million pesos, compared to somewhat more than 500 million), difficulties of 
a much more serious nature began to emerge during the year. 
This situation was the result of a decline in the volume of exportable supply, the movements in 
the international prices of certain products (both exports and imports), and the depreciation of the 
dollar. These factors combined to worsen the scarcity of freely convertible currency, and this state of 
affairs was further aggravated by the external debt situation with the market economy countries, 
which reached the point of suspension of payment on the principal. 
a) Trade in goods 
i) Exports of goods. The current value of exports of goods declined by 11 %, primarily because of 
the reduction of the volume of sales of sugar and to a lesser extent to the substantial decrease in 
re-exports of petroleum and petroleum products. Although the policy of expanding non-traditional 
exports and diversifying markets did not overall achieve satisfactory results, in the cases of citrus and 
fish there was unprecedented success and there was also a very encouraging increase (40%, equival-
ent to 60 million Cuban pesos) in a series of products whose importance had previously been 
negligible (see table 12). 
As already mentioned, sugar production fell to a level similar to that of 1983 (7.5 million tons), 
thus reducing the exportable supply. Furthermore, as a result of the price and mutual supply 
programmes agreed on with the socialist countries, especially with the Soviet Union, a new price for 
purchases made by the latter country came into effect, which was 15 % lower than that of the previous 
year. Even so, this price of 38 U.S. cents per pound was more than five times that which Cuba received 
in convertible currency and more than six times the average world market price (see table 13). 
Although there was no significant variation in the percentage breakdown between the volume 
exported to the market economy countries and that sold to the socialist countries, within the latter 
group the volume of sugar exported to the Soviet Union rose considerably, whereas the amount 
shipped to the other CMEA member countries fell substantially. 
Fluctuations in the international price of sugar continued. Although between 1985 and 1986 the 
price rose from four to just over six U.S. cents per pound (which in any event was less than what Cuba 
obtained in freely convertible currency), the world sugar market grew increasingly unstable. 
Moreover, the protection given to producers unable to withstand the test of comparative advantages, 
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combined with the high world sugar stocks and the increase in the number of suppliers, explain the 
skepticism prevailing with regard to the future outlook. The fact that the CMEA member countries 
provide Cuba with a virtually guaranteed market at prices much higher than those on the world 
market explains the increase in the volumes sold to them, especially to the Soviet Union (see 
table 14). 
ii) Imports of goods. After an increase of over 70% in their current value during the first five 
years of the decade, external purchases of goods went down by 5 % in 1986 (see table 15). This change 
was the direct consequence of the weakening of external liquidity which especially affected trade with 
the market economy countries. Although in relative terms purchases of consumer goods suffered the 
steepest decline, in absolute terms the sharpest fall was in intermediate goods (see table 16). 
In the face of the restriction on external purchases of intermediate goods, Cuba tried to exploit 
its stocks to the maximum, keeping them at the lowest levels compatible with the requirements of the 
productive process; this explains why so much emphasis was placed on improving the organizational 
and administrative system. At the same time, however, the restriction in question severely affected a 
number of industrial activities, such as the production of steel plate. 
On the other hand, external purchases of capital goods declined relatively slightly, despite the 
sharp drop in imports of transport equipment for both cargo and passengers (see table 17). The 
effects of this contraction were mitigated because the fleet of such vehicles had evolved positively in 
previous years and the number of units in circulation had increased. 
iii) The terms of trade. The terms of trade with the market economy countries deteriorated 
slightly. The relative improvement in the price of sugar was offset by a marked decline in the average 
price of petroleum, which for some years past has accounted for a significant proportion of external 
sales to this area. Moreover, the average dollar price of imports, the bulk of which are supplied by the 
European countries and Japan, increased with the revaluation of the yen and the main European 
currencies against the dollar. This produced a major decline in the terms of trade in freely convertible 
currency. 
Concerning trade links with the socialist countries, during the year a number of changes were 
agreed upon in the five-year forecasts previously established, but the principle of maintaining the 
terms of trade was always respected. Thus, while the price of sugar exported to the Soviet Union fell, 
the prices of other imported goods declined in the same proportion. 
b) The balance of payments in freely convertible currency^ 
For the third consecutive year there was a large deficit on current account —this time of almost 
400 million pesos— which could not be covered by the net capital income. This deficit was reflected in 
a considerable decline of 144 million pesos in the international reserves. This meant that the decline 
in the year 1986 alone was greater than the total cumulative deficit during the first five years of the 
1980s (see table 18). This result was attributable to a combination of several factors. 
In the first place, there was the already mentioned decline in the total value of exports as a result 
of supply problems. On the one hand, the fall-off in the sugar harvest and the fulfilment of the 
growing export commitments with the socialist countries led to a drastic reduction in the supply 
available for the countries in the area of freely convertible currency (see table 19). Similarly, in order 
to meet a number of commitments previously made with the market-economy countries, a certain 
amount of sugar had to be purchased on the New York Commodity Exchange, with the attendant 
financial cost. Furthermore, the deterioration in prices —as in the case of exports of crude petroleum 
or the sale of refined petroleum in the country—eroded the foreign exchange earnings from external 
sales. In addition to this, there was a decline in the production of a number of other export items such 
as tobacco and nickel. The increase in exports of manufactures as part of the effort to diversify 
external sales compensated only minimally for the decline in export earnings due to these changes. 
'In Cuba the balance of payments in freely convertible currency records the transactions in goods and services and it) 
capital with the market-economy countries and the exports to the CMEA countries which the latter pay for in transferrable 
roubles or in freely convertible currency. 
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The current value of imports declined by a much smaller percentage than that of exports. As has 
been planned, during the first half of the year an attempt was made to maintain a level of imports 
which would not depress consumption or the supply of various types of equipment and inputs. 
However, this level of imports could not be maintained in the second half of 1986, when the shortage 
of liquidity became more acute and made it necessary to modify some aspects of the economic policy 
adopted. Even so, the value of imports in freely convertible currency could only be brought down by 
approximately 100 million pesos, or 9%. 
The devaluation of the dollar affected the Cuban balance of payments in freely convertible 
currency more seriously than the corresponding accounts of other Latin American countries because, 
on the one hand, commitments contracted in currencies other than the U.S. dollar have greater 
relative weight in the Cuban external debt, yet on the other hand most income is received in U.S. 
dollars. Thus, for example, the higher value of the yen and the German mark meant that the average 
price of imports as a whole did not go down, but as this coincided with a drop in export prices there 
was a deterioration in the terms of trade in freely convertible currency. 
On top of the elements referred to above, there was additional financial strain as the negotia-
tions to renegotiate the external debt became more complex. Consequently, in 1986 the current 
account balance in freely convertible currency showed two significant changes compared with the 
previous year. On the one hand, the net long-term capital income, which had been 360 million pesos, 
showed a negative balance of over 110 million, and on the other, the short-term capital income almost 
doubled (from 194 million pesos to 367 million), due partly to the reduction in amortization 
payments4 (see table 20). 
c) External indebtedness in freely convertible currency 
Because of the decline in the external sector, a much more extensive renegotiation of the 
external debt than those made since 1983 became imperative (see table 21). Cuba asked its creditors 
to postpone the amortization payments on the total debt due in 1986 and 1987, the short-term 
deposits due in September 1986 and the interest payable in 1986 and 1987 except that corresponding 
to the debt renegotiated in 1983. It also requested additional financing to cover the balance-of-
payments deficit, which, if the above conditions had been met, would have verged on 180 million 
pesos. 
However, these requests were not granted. The renegotiation agreement signed in July 
postponed for IO1/2 years (with agrace period of six years) the payment of principal and interest due 
in 1986 on the debt outstanding in 1982 and 95% of the debt renegotiated in 1983, but the creditor 
banks laid down new conditions. Fundamentally, these were that the interest payments would not be 
postponed in the same way as the principal, and instead Cuba was offered lines of credit of between 
150 and 170 million marks to meet these payments. Additionally, the creditors only accepted a 
one-year postponement in respect of the short-term deposits mentioned above. 
The additional financial requirements would therefore have increased to 300 million pesos and 
in July the country entered into arrears of payments, which would have already occurred in May if it 
had not been for the co-operation of the socialist countries. 
4. Employment, wages and prices 
From the middle of the decade a number of imbalances began to be perceived in the equilibrium of 
average wages, employment, prices, productivity and profitability and between the monetary income 
of the population and the resources available for consumption. A series of measures had, therefore, to 
be adopted to rectify these imbalances, and one of the principal measures taken was a review of the 
labour standards system and the procedures for its execution and control. 
4According to official information, the exchange rate of the U.S dollar went from 0.9174 Cuban pesos in 1985 to 0.8664 
pesos in 1986. 
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a) Employment 
Despite the fact that in 1986 the growth rate of the global social product at 1981 prices fell to 
only 1.4%, the number of workers in the State civil sector increased by almost 3%, and the rate was 
even somewhat higher in the non-productive sphere (see table 22). As early as 1985 it had been 
pointed out that although the employment provided by the economic system appeared to be 
satisfactory, the government was concerned that the system was not being fully exploited,5 especially 
in some services. This led to the application of a strict policy to prevent any expansion of employment 
which did not exactly correspond to increases in production or investment in productive enterprises. 
According to official information, this policy was intensified during 1986, within the framework of 
the goal of improving the efficiency of the productive units and putting their finances on a sounder 
basis. 
Given these circumstances, it is noteworthy that the number of civil workers has increased 
more than production. This could be explained by the principle that there must not be any open 
unemployment.6 Similarly, because of the upheavals in production caused by the climatic disturban-
ces, a large number of workers had to be used in agriculture, especially in sugar cane harvesting, 
because it became impossible to do such work mechanically. This factor explains almost 40% of the 
increase in the labour force in the State civil sector. In the case of the non-productive sector, the 
increase could be explained by the uninterrupted expansion of public health, social welfare, sport and 
tourism services. 
Although no detailed information is available, it is also possible that the statistical data under 
analysis may have included the State civil sector workers who previously worked in the non-civil area 
but performed duties belonging to the former. This would be a result of the administrative 
reorganization efforts made in search of greater efficiency and productivity, as previously mentioned. 
b) Wages 
In 1986, the policy of revising labour regulations begun in 1982 was more strictly applied. As a 
result, the elasticity of the wage mass declined further with respect to the global social product. The 
average wage level remained practically stable throughout the entire economy, declining by 0.6% in 
the productive area compared with an increase of almost 2% in the non-productive area (see 
table 23). From these results, it could be inferred that controls on additional payments for over-
fulfilment of the minimum working standards have been more effective in the productive sphere, but 
problems persist in the case of certain services, where anomalies are more difficult to detect. 
In 1986, the tendency towards uniformity of remunerations between the productive and 
non-productive areas reached its culmination, although a number of differences still persist due partly 
to changes in the relative importance of their components, i.e., transfers of workers to other sectors 
or branches in pursuance of the reorganization and administrative improvement policy. 
c) Prices 
In Cuba, the same product may be distributed at different prices on four different markets: the 
regulated or rationed market; the parallel State market, on which rationed goods are sold, but without 
restriction as to quantity or price; the free State market, on which any goods may be sold without any 
form of restriction; and finally the so-called "free peasant market", where individual peasants can 
market their own products in accordance with the market laws. This latter system has had very little 
impact on the total flow of goods distributed. Since the distribution methods for the same item are so 
diverse, it is difficult to trace the weighted variation of the consumer prices of certain specific goods. 
However, according to official information, in 1986 no major fluctuations were recorded in 
retail prices, which for the most part have remained officially frozen since 1982, when the parallel 
market emerged. Although there have been some price variations in the overall group of products, 
'See ECLAC, Notas para el estudio económico de America Latina, 198), Cuba, LC/MEX/R.43, 11 July 1986. 
6According to official information, in Cuba the unemployment rate is minimal and purely "ftictional". See ECLAC, 
Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1985. 
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these have generally been due to changes in the structure of the products offered to the public. These 
changes may be due either to the priority given to the purchase of raw materials that can enable 
improvement to be made to certain items such as clothing, or to the substitution of some foreign 
suppliers for financial reasons. 
Some changes have been made in the distribution and prices policy with the aim of encouraging 
distribution through the parallel markets and eventually eliminating the controlled market. 
Moreover, in May the free peasant market was eliminated. The State assumed responsibility for 
the collection and sale of the products which until then had been sold by the peasants themselves, and 
it incorporated these sales into the parallel market. It was expected that the elimination of the 
peasant market would bring a reduction in the sales price of certain consumer products, with the 
removal of a series of additional intermediaries. The application of this measure forced some 
companies to reorganize and expand the distribution network nationwide. Moreover, in order to 
simplify that task and prevent the price range from becoming too broad,7 during the year a series of 
purchasing and storage enterprises of the Ministry of Agriculture which until then had been under 
the Ministry of Domestic Trade were brought under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
In a situation where the availability of freely convertible currencies has become the main financial 
constraint, it is increasingly important to ensure that monetary and fiscal policy is coherent with 
foreign trade and other macroeconomic policies. Consequently, the steps being taken to renegotiate 
the debt and its consequences have become the primary concern of the monetary and fiscal 
authorities. 
a) Monetary policy 
Apparently, growth of the factors of expansion has continued to be more rapid than growth in 
production. There were also significant increases in income in the private sector (this embraces the 
peasants, transport workers, craftsmen and other organizations) and in the "others" category (which 
includes retirement benefits, benefits granted to individuals, loans by the banking system, interest on 
savings exchange of foreign currency, and drafts and transfers received). Both these types of income 
increased faster than workers' wages (see table 24). 
The measures adopted by the monetary authorities gave priority to factors of contraction and 
this sharply decreased the amount of money in the hands of the public, while there was an increase in 
savings deposits. In this connection, there was renewed activity by the People's Savings Bank (BPA), 
which was established in 1983 and which extended its coverage throughout the country and succeeded 
in securing a growing volume of savings from the population. At the same time, although the number 
and value of personal loans granted was smaller, priority continued to be given to loans for the 
purchase of electrical appliances (see table 25). The interest rates on these loans continued to range 
from 10% for motor-vehicle purchases and a minimum of 3% for the building of dwelling units by 
the population. 
Another aspect of these policies that should be highlighted was the assumption by the People's 
Savings Bank, as from the middle of 1985, of responsibility for granting housing ownership titles 
under the conditions stipulated in the General Housing Law. 
b) Fiscal policy 
Since 1984, a very stringent expenditure policy has been applied through the State Finance 
Committee as part of the government's goal of increasing economic efficiency and reducing the 
foreign trade deficit. The aim has been to generate saving by improving the administrative organiza-
7ln Cuba not all domestic trade comes under the Ministry of Domestic Trade. This Ministry is responsible for 
approximately 70% of distribution, and some products come under other State agencies such as the Ministry of the Food 
Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Basic Industry (which governs activities in respect of certain fuels) or the 
Ministry of Public Health (which regulates pharmaceuticals). 
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tion and controls. The same guidelines will continue to be applied in 1986, perhaps with even greater 
rigour. During the year, current income fell by almost 5% (see table 26). Although a variety of 
reasons may have combined to produce this result, the main one is undoubtedly the weakening of the 
resources obtained from foreign trade. As the total outlay evolved in a similar manner to income, the 
deficit remained more or less the same. 
In view of the persistence of this imbalance, towards the end of 1986 a series of measures was 
adopted whose impact will be felt in due course. One of them was the Basic Law on the Budgetary 
System, which has been applied experimentally since January 1986 and which contains provisions 
designed to link income and expenditure more closely in specific areas of the country. In some cases, 
the actual income of these areas is not enough to meet the cost of certain activities in health or 
education, and these have to be met from the national budget; whereas in other areas the income is 
higher than their needs. The main object is to improve the financial ratios within a given locality and 
to improve efficiency. With the same aim in view, a number of measures were also adopted to 
improve the financial ratios within enterprises. 
At the end of the year the scales of charges for certain services, such as urban transport and 
electricity, were also increased, with a view to increasing the saving and improving the incomes of the 
enterprises providing these services. Similarly, it was decided to make changes for some services 
which had previously been provided free at the workplace and to apply certain wage measures which 




CUBA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Basic economic indicators 
Global social product (millions of 
1981 pesos)6 
Population (thousands of inhabitants)c 
Per capita global social product 
(1981 pesos) 
Global social product 
Per capita global social product 
Current State income 
Total State expenditure 
Budgetary deficit/total State 
expenditure 
Budgetary deficit/global social 
product 
Average annual wage 
Current value of exports of goods 
Total 
Sugar 
Current value of imports of goods 
Total 
Petroleum and petroleum products 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods) 
Soviet Union 
Other socialist countries 
Rest of world 
Balance on current account' 
Balance on capital account' 
Variation in international reserves' 
Disbursed external debt' 
19 109 22 173 23 024 24 153 25 890 27 092 27 458 
9 724 9 724 9 801 9 897 9 994 10 098 10 200 






































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the State Statistical Committee, the National Bank of Cuba and other 
international statistics. 
"Preliminary figures. See footnote " of table 4. c Annual average. Percentages. 'In freely convertible 
currency. Excludes much of the trade with member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assitance (CMEA). 
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Table 2 
CUBA: INDICATORS OF PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
Foodstuffs 
Calories (units per day) 
Proteins (grammes per 
Meat'' 
Fish'' 




















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of f 












































































































ipplied by the State Statistical Committee. 





































































CUBA: USE OF GLOBAL SOCIAL PRODUCT AT 1981 PRICES 
(Percentages) 
Global social product 
Intermediate consumption 
Final consumption 
Consumption by the population 
Personal consumption 
Consumption by organizations 
serving the population 
Consumption by organizations 
meeting collective needs 








































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
'Preliminary figures. Of productive goods and services. 
Table 4 
CUBA: GLOBAL SOCIAL PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS" 
















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"The global social product is equivalent to the value of gross production. According to official sources "the basic criterion for 
recognizing gross production and ascribing it to a given sector, branch and sub-branch is the nature of the basic activities 
carried out by the enterprise, establishment or department with an independent balance in which the economic activity is 
carried out" (see State Statistical Committee, Bases metodológicas del sistema de balances de la economía nacional, Havana, 
November 1981, p. 9). Consequently, the information contained in this table does not relate solely to sectors and branches of 
origin; the classification adopted records not only the main production of the entrepreneurial units but also the secondary 
production carried out in those units, whether or not it corresponds, by origin, to the same branch of activity. If a system of 
classification based strictly on sectors of origin were adopted (in accordance with the criterion adopted by the United Nations 
in the ISIC), the conclusions at sectoral and branch levels would bedifferent. Thus the data on the agricultural sector included 
secondary production of industry and construction not computed in these sectors. Nevertheless, these differences are 
cancelled out in the total material products. Preliminary figures. ^Corresponds to real, not rounded-off 
figures. JAt 1965 prices. 'Includes public food supply, external trade, technical and material supplies, collection 
and storage of agricultural products, collection of scrap iron and useful raw materials as well as domestic wholesale and retail 
trade. •'includes: work on technical projects, mechanical and automatic data processing and other productive activities. 
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Table 5 
























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Preliminary figures. Correspond to real, not rounded figures. 'Thousands of tons, with the exception of 
henequén (expressed in millions of bunches) and cultivated pasture and fodder (millions of tons). In State 
firms. 
of units. 
'Thousands of head. 
'Tons. 'Including the non-State sector. 
Millions of head, final stock. 'Thousands of tons of live weight. Millions 
Table 6 
CUBA: PRINCIPAL PETROLEUM, MINING AND 
METALLURGICAL PRODUCTION 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products 
Crude petroleum extraction 





Ferrous mining and metallurgy 
Refractory chromite 
Ordinary steel 
Textured steel bars 
Non-ferrous mining and 
metallurgy 































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 




CUBA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION" 
Total'' 
Non-durable consumer goods 
industry 
Foodstuffs (excluding sugar) 
Sugar and sugar products 
Beverages and tobacco 
Ready-made clothing 
Printed matter 




















: of material 
















































































Consumer durables and capital 
goods industry 164.3 330.9 336.4 17.5 17.6 11.1 -0.1 
Construction of non-electrical 
machinery 175.5 360.4 345.7 16.0 18.1 8.5 -4.1 
EJectrotechnical and electronic goods 148.7 351.1 386.2 28.4 24.8 22.5 10.0 
Metal products'' 140.3 260.1 281.2 17.5 10.8 13.9 8.1 
Other manufactures' 127.0 196.7 205.7 8.7 10.8 5.0 4.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"At constant 1981 prices. Preliminary figures. 'Correspond to real, not rounded figures. Excluding basic 




CUBA: MAIN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 









Total catch landed 
Outer clothing0 
Intermediate consumer goods 
Textiles 
Gray cement 
Paints, enamels and varnishes 







Unbleached cardboard and 
paperboard 




Television se ts ' 
Sugar-cane combines 
Buses 

































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied bj 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands 


















































































































/ the State Statistical Committee. 
;. 'Millions of 



























































































































































1960-1970: Central Pla 








































nning Board, Statistical Bureau, 
provided by the State Statistic' 
























































, 7970; 1975-1984: Anuario 
begining of May of the following year). Preliminary 
milled per 




















CUBA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Total 
Construction and installation 
Agriculture 













Other production marketed 
Geological exploration, drilling 
and geodesic surveys 
Design of construction projects 
Production of selected building 
materials 
Textured steel barsc 
Steel barsc 
Gray cementc 




Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the State Statistical Committee, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 1984. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Correspond to real, not rounded figures. 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of cubic 
metres. 'Millions of units. •'Thousands of square metres. 
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Gross production 
(thousands of pesos 
at 1981 prices) 




















































148 160 173 






































































































































12.1 7.7 8.2 






















CUBA: ELECTRICITY INDICATORS 
CUBA 
Gross generation 
Ministry of the 
Electricity Industry 

































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the State Statistical Committee. 
"Preliminary figures. Correspond to real, not rounded figures. 'Excluding the consumption of the Ministry of the 
Sugar Industry, the nickel-producing enterprises and that corresponding to "other producers". 
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Table 12 
CUBA: EVOLUTION OF EXPORTS OF GOODS (FOB) 
Total 
Soviet Union 
Other socialist countries 
Other countries 
Re-exports1 
Rest of sales 
Soviet Union 








Other socialist countries 
Other countries 




















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
convertible currency. 


















































































US cents per pound 
Price received 





























Source: ECLAC, on che basis of figures from che Anuarios Estadísticos de Cuba, cheScaceScatiscical Committee, che Statistical 
Yearbook of the Soviet Union and ocher international data. 
"Raw sugar, base 96° of polarization. Calendar year. ' Price paid for sales of sugar covered by agreements. These 
exclude sales co che USSR, in convercible currency, ac market prices. Price of shipments of sugar in the current year, 
occasionally agreed upon previously at fixed prices. 'Prices under the International Sugar 
Agreement. Preliminary figures. 
2 4 9 
Table 14 





Rest of socialist countries 
Rest of world 
Volume 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist countries 
































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the State Statistical Committee. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 15 
CUBA: EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE 
Total exports 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 
Rest of world 
Total imports 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 
Rest of world 
Overall trade balance 
Soviet Union 
Rest of socialist 
countries 


































































































statistical Committee, the National Bank of Cuba and oi 

























CUBA: IMPORTS OF GOODS (CIF) 
Total 




Petroleum and petroleum products 
Fertilizers 
Herbicides and pesticides 
Rolled steel products 





Buses and tracks 
Others 
On the basis of SITC sections 
Food and live animals 
Beverages and tobacco 
Inedible raw materials, except 
fuels 
Fuels and lubricants, 
minerals and related products 
Animal and vegetable oils 
and fats 
Chemical products 
Manufactured goods, classified 
chiefly by material 
Machinery and transport equipment 













































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis oí figures from the Sute Statistical Committee. 
" Preliminary figures. 
Table 17 
CUBA: I M P O R T S OF G O O D S (CIF), BY AREAS OF O R I G I N , 
USE A N D E C O N O M I C PURPOSE 
1984 1985 1986° 
Con- Inter- Capi- Con- Inter- Capi- Con- Inter- Capi-
Total sumer mediate tal Total sumer mediate tal Total sumer mediate tal 





















































1 587 7 983 
862 5 373 
442 1 345 





































































































CUBA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN FREELY CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY" 
(Millions of pesos) 











Transport and insurance 
Interest paid 
Other 
Other net transfers 



























































































































































































































Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 6 -14 1 242 -189 106 -48 144 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Bank of Cuba. 
"Includes all commercial and financial movements with market economy countries but only some of the movements with 
socialist countries. Preliminary figures. 'These balances also include the net movements of other assets and 
liabilities in freely convertible currency, along with the adjustments for variations in the exchange rates of the currencies in 
which they are expressed. 
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Table 19 
CUBA: STRUCTURE OF GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of pesos) 
Total0 
Gold and precious metals 
Cash and deposits in freely 
convertible currency in foreign 
banks 
Deposits in transferable roubles 


























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics from the National Bank of Cuba. 
"Preliminary figures. End-of-year balance in millions of pesos. 
Table 20 
CUBA: EVOLUTION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE 

























































CUBA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
IN FREELY CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY" 
(Millions of pesos) 
Total disbursed debt 
Bilateral official debt 
Multilateral official debt 
Suppliers 
Financial institutions 
Medium-term bilateral loans and loans 
from consortia 
Short-term deposits 























































































Amortization payments medium- and 
long-term debts 
Ratios (percentages) 
Total disbursed debt/global social 
product 
Total debt service/exports of goods and 
services 
Total debt service/disbursements 
Total debt service/global social 
product 











Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Bank of Cuba. 
"Includes commitments with maturities of one year or less. Preliminary figures. 'Includes long- and short-term 
loans received, according to the balance of payments. Previous notes included the long- and short-term capital 
amortization payments, as given in the balance-of-payments in freely convertible currency. From 1985 onwards, more 
accurate information is given on amortization payments on the medium- and long-term debt: such information has been 
available only since 1983. 
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Table 22 












Community and personal 
services 
Science and technology 
Education, culture and art 
Public health and social 
welfare, sports and tourism 
























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the State Statistical Committee. 














Community and personal 
services 
Science and technology 
Education, culture and art 
Public health and social 
welfare, sports and tourism 





































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the State Statistical Committee. 
"Includes only civilian employment in the State sector. Preliminary figures. 
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Table 24 
CUBA: MONETARY LIQUIDITY 
Factors of expansion 
Workers income 
Private sector income 
Other income' 
Factors of contraction 8 467 9 086 9 721 10 150 10 676 11.3 7.3 7.0 4.4 5.2 
Expenditure on goods and 
services 8 086 8 654 9 242 9 641 10 136 11.3 7.1 6.8 4.3 5.1 












ions of pesos 
1984 1985 
9 927 10 315 
7 928 8 122 
574 600 


















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes income earned by peasants, transport workers and artisans from sales of goods and 
services to the State, to co-operatives and to other organizations. 'Includes retirement benefits, pensions, grants to 
individuals, loans granted by the banking system, interest on savings, foreign currency exchange by bank draft and transfer 
received. 
drafts and transfers. 
Includes amortization and interest on loans, subscriptions to political, sporting and social organizations, 
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Table 25 
CUBA: BANKING SYSTEM AND PERSONAL SAVINGS 
AND CREDIT OPERATIONS 
Number of banking agencies specializing in 





Monetary savings of the population (1974 = 100) 
Number of loans to the population (thousands) 
Electrical appliances 
Motor vehicles 
Construction material and house repairs 
Others 
Value of personal credits (millions of pesos) 
Electrical appliances 
Motor vehicles 
Construction material and house repairs 
Others 

































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the People's Saving Bank. 
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Table 26 
CUBA: BUDGET OF STATE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Current income 
Contributions from the 
State sector 
Taxes and other contributions 
from the non-State sector 




Housing and community services 
Education and public health 
Other socio-cultural and 
scientific activities 
"Poder Popular", Central 
State Government, Tribunals 
and Public Prosecutor's 
Office 






























































































































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
Three main factors had a strong influence on the performance of the Chilean economy in 1986. The 
first was the extended Fund facility programme which the government agreed upon with the 
International Monetary Fund, together with the structural adjustment loan granted by the World 
Bank in 1985. The second was the government's macroeconomic programme, which called for a 
major expansion of production activity in 1986 and for a suitable form of financing for the country's 
external accounts. This programme was based on a consistent set of exchange, fiscal and monetary 
policies which were in keeping with the objectives and restrictions set forth in the arrangement with 
the Fund. Finally, a third very important factor was that the external trade situation was much more 
favourable than had been expected; this resulted in a significant improvement in the terms of trade 
and permitted the government to apply a more expansionary monetary policy than it had initially 
projected without compromising its balance-of-payments position. 
The priority goals of the authorities' economic policy concerned three main areas. In the 
macroeconomic sphere, the targets included a sustained growth rate of 3%-5% per year; the 
reduction of external credit requirements through a lowering of the deficit on the balance-of-
payments current account to approximately US$1.3 billion; and a decrease in the annual rate of 
inflation to 15%-20%. As regards the structural adjustment of the economy, the policy objective was 
to speed up capital accumulation, with the public sector and foreign investment being called upon to 
play a particularly significant role in achieving this end. Finally, the government's economic 
programme was also aimed at making rapid progress in the normalization, recapitalization and 
reprivatization of the banking and industrial enterprises that had been the hardest hit by the crisis of 
1982-1983. 
All of the authorities' macroeconomic goals were either fulfilled or surpassed, with aggregate 
indicators reflecting the best economic showing of recent years. The gross domestic product grew by 
5.4% and thus came quite near to the record high achieved in 1981; inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index fell from 26.4% to 17.4%; the deficit on current account was brought down to 
US$1.135 billion; and, although a reduction in unemployment did not figure among the explicit goals 
of the programme, the average nationwide level of unemployment dropped to 10.5%. The decrease 
in unemployment was all the more significant because it was accompanied by a considerable reduction 
in the number of persons enrolled in the government's emergency job programmes. The counterbal-
ance to this increase in employment was the fact that real wages, rose less than 2%, thus making no 
more than a very slight recovery from the cumulative drop of around 15% recorded during the 
preceding four years (see table 1 and figures 1 and 2). 
The targets of the adjustment programme agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund 
were, in general, amply met as well. By the end of 1986 the Central Bank's net international reserves 
stood at nearly US$110 million more than the projected level, while the margin with respect to its 
domestic assets amounted to 27 billion pesos. The deficit of the non-financial public sector was also 
lower than had initially been anticipated. 
The maintenance of a high real exchange rate played an important part in the expansion of the 
sectors of the economy which produce tradeable goods (both exportable and importable) and in the 
growth of agricultural and industrial exports. In keeping with the policy of reconverting the 
production structure, some of the fastest-growing sectors were fishing (10%), agriculture (9%) and 
manufacturing (8%). 
The international economic situation contributed to the good showing made by Chile in respect 
of its external accounts, since the drop of over 40% in oil prices saved the country about US$150 
million on its fuel imports bill. There was also an increase in the international prices of fish meal, 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1 (conclusion) 
Source: EC LAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. b Annual average rate for Greater Santiago. cPercentage variation from 
December to December. dl}¡ii¡or,s of dollars. Percentage. 
wood pulp and other major Chilean exports. These changes resulted in a 12% improvement in the 
terms of trade for goods despite the fact that the average price of copper, which is by far the country's 
largest export item, decreased almost 3%. In all, agricultural and industrial exports climbed 21% in 
nominal terms. In contrast, even though the volume of merchandise imports rose 15%, their value 
increased by only 5% thanks to the decline in international fuel prices. 
The deficit on the current account of the balance of payments of slightly over US$ 1.1 billion did 
not lead to a like increase in the external debt, which grew by only US$300 million, owing to the 
considerable expansion in debt paper conversion transactions. These operations accounted for an 
amount bordering on US$1 billion during 1986, for a cumulative total of nearly US$1.3 billion since 
such transactions were first begun in September 1985. 
The government's fiscal policy did its part in helping to accomplish the goal of increasing 
capital accumulation. As a proportion of the product, public-sector investment rose from 7% to 
7.7%, while public savings climbed from 3.8% to 4.4%. Nevertheless, the coefficient of fixed capital 
investment remained very low (13%), thereby showing that much remains to be done if investment 
is to serve as a means of speeding up the country's growth. 
Taking advantage of the subsidence of inflationary expectations and the favourable trend in the 
balance of payments, the authorities directed their monetary policy along clearly expansionary lines. 
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The basic monetary aggregates rose by over 20% in real terms, while real interest rates on operations 
denominated in the local currency dropped to the lowest levels observed since interest rates were 
decontrolled in 1975. 
The process of applying various measures in order to put the financial sector back on a normal 
footing was virtually completed in 1986, as the recapitalization of banks and financial institutions and 
further portfolio sales to the Central Bank restored the financial system to solvency. In addition, in 
November a number of major amendments to the banking laws were promulgated whose purpose 
was to limit the risk positions of banks and financial institutions and to increase their transparency, as 
well as to ensure that the effects of any future problems of solvency would be confined to the system's 
investors and depositors. Thus, by the end of the year it was thought that the steps taken to promote 
the purchase of shares in the country's two largest private banks (by means of a system referred to as 
"people's capitalism") would make it possible for the process of reprivatizing the banking system to 
culminate in the total return of this system to the private sector by early 1987. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) The product and income 
In 1986 the Chilean economy maintained the dynamism which it had begun to exhibit towards 
the end of the preceding year. The rate of increase of the gross domestic product (5.4%), which was 
more than double the rate recorded in 1985, surpassed the initial projections. This growth was led by 
the sectors producing tradeable goods, which expanded by 6.5%, and by basic services, which showed 
an increase of 7.5%. 
Gross national income rose 7% thanks to the partial recovery of the terms of trade for goods 
and services (which improved by nearly 9%) from the substantial deterioration suffered during the 
two preceding years (see table 1). Two factors that played a decisive part in this upturn in the terms of 
trade were the drop in oil prices and the rise in the international prices of some export products, such 
as fish meal, wood and wood pulp. 
b) Total supply and demand 
The expansion in the gross domestic product was accompanied by a sharp increase ( 16%) in the 
volume of imports. As a result, the total supply of goods and services (which was virtually stagnant in 
1985 due to the scant increase in the product and a 10% drop in imports) climbed 7% in 1986 (see 
table 2). 
Among the various components of total demand, exports again attained a vigorous growth rate 
(10%). As a result, export activity generated almost 30% of the gross domestic product; this 
unprecedented percentage provides compelling evidence of the degree to which the economy has 
been opened up to international trade. Government consumption, on the other hand, dropped once 
again (-2%), bringing its share of the product down to 11%. This was in line with the policy applied 
by the authorities, which was aimed at reducing current government expenditure for the dual purpose 
of lessening the relative weight of the public sector in the economy and of raising government saving. 
In contrast, private consumption increased 6%, which more than made up for its decrease during the 
preceding year. Finally, gross fixed capital investment rose 7%, for a cumulative increase during the 
three-year period from 1984 to 1986 of over 30%. Nevertheless, owing to the steep decline in such 
investment in 1982-1983, it was still far lower than it had been during the boom of 1980-1981. 
Gross domestic saving continued to rise, verging on 23% of the gross domestic product, which 
was the largest percentage recorded in the past 20 years. The improvement in the terms of trade and 
the decrease in net payments of profits and interest both contributed to the recovery made by gross 
national savings, which, although they did not regain their 1979-1980 level, nevertheless did show an 
increase for the fourth year running. The effects of this rise were partly offset, however, by the decline 
in external savings (see table 3). 
c) Tbe main sectors of production 
As noted earlier, the growth of the Chilean economy in 1986 was primarily due to the good 
performance turned in by the sectors that produce tradeable goods, including agriculture and 




CHILE: QUARTERLY TRENDS OF MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
Percentage variation with respect to corresponding quarter of previous year. b Average r a te. 
cVariation, in millions of dollars, with respect to the preceding quarter. 
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that it showed an increase of less than 1.5%. The dynamism displayed by the tradeable-goods 
production sectors was a direct consequence of the country's structural adjustment policy, which 
provided for a high and stable real exchange rate as an incentive for both export and import-
substitution activities. The effects of this policy were, moreover, heightened in 1986 by the partial 
recovery of the terms of trade. This expansion was also buttressed by the increase in basic services, 
whose growth rate was higher than that of economic activity as a whole for the third year in a row (see 
table 4). 
i) Agriculture. With an increase of 9%, agriculture rounded off three years of rapid growth. 
Traditional crops, fruit production and fishery activity all contributed to this achievement in 1986. 
The value (at constant prices), of Chile's traditional crops climbed 18% to an all-time high (see 
table 5). This rise was chiefly attributable to the 40% increase in the wheat harvest (whose volume 
has trebled over the past three years) and to the exceedingly rapid expansion of industrial crops 
—rape (204%), sunflower (67%) and sugar beets (24%). These increases were largely a result of the 
expansion of the area planted, which, when considered in conjunction with the reduction in the land 
area devoted to other crops, indicates that there is a trend towards specialization in these items. The 
cultivation of rice and sugar beets was also encouraged by the continuation of the policy of 
establishing price bands and, as was also true of most of the other crops, by the maintenance of a high 
real exchange rate. 
The impact of this last factor was also reflected in the boom in fruit production, an activity that 
is closely related to the external market. Strong growth continued to be seen in 1986 both in the 
output of all the main fruit crops and in the land areas devoted to them (see table 6). 
Production increases were also seen in 1986 in all livestock items except for mutton. Particu-
larly large rises were achieved in the output of eggs and pork, which marked up record production 
volumes. The increases observed in the production of milk, beef and poultry meat were not great 
enough, however, to make up for the sharp decreases of previous years, and these items therefore 
failed to regain the levels they had reached early in the decade (see table 7). 
Finally, following four years of steady growth, the rate of expansion in the area covered by 
forests slowed markedly. To a large extent, this was a result of the fact that the National Forestry 
Corporation did not carry out any additional planting in 1986 (see table 8). 
ii) Fisheries. The output of this sector, which is also closely linked to external markets, rose 
10%. Combined with the strong growth seen in this sector during the preceding years, this brought 
its production level to almost double what it had been in 1980. As regards fishing activities as such, 
the catches of fish and shellfish for use in industry showed particularly striking increases (17% and 
14%, respectively). Fishery production for industrial purposes also achieved a notable growth rate 
(17%) owing to another large increase in the production of fish meal, a sharp jump in the output of 
tinned fish and the partial recovery observed in that of frozen fish (see table 9). 
iii) Mining. The output of the mining sector rose by 1.4%, which was the lowest growth rate 
recorded in the past three years. Copper production was up by 3 %, but the value of copper exports fell 
slightly, due to the drop in copper prices on international markets. The extraction of iron ore, coal and 
gold also showed increases (8%, 16% and 8%, respectively). In contrast, there was a marked 
slackening in the production of iron pellets (-14%), petroleum (-7%) and molybdenum (-11%), all 
of whose international prices declined (see table 10). 
iv) Manufacturing. In contrast to the virtual stagnation of manufacturing in 1985, in 1986 the 
industrial product grew at so rapid a rate (8%) that it surpassed its pre-crisis levels by a slight margin. 
The recovery of the manufacturing sector was also evident in industrial sales, which expanded by 
nearly 7% (see table 11). 
The jump in the production of consumer durables was particularly sharp (42%), but its level 
was still 30% lower than it had been in 1980. The sectors producing mass consumption goods and 
capital goods showed notable increases as well (10% and 14%, respectively). Nevertheless, the latter 
has still not completely recovered from the slump it suffered during the crisis years. In 1986 the 
output of intermediate goods also rose and, within this category, those products intended for use in 
forestry and agriculture once again exhibited particularly strong growth. On the other hand, the 
production of transport equipment continued to follow an erratic trend, with a 7% drop which 
brought it down to less than half of its 1980 level. 
v) Construction. The increase of slightly over 1 % in the construction product constituted a 
continuation of the pronounced fluctuations displayed by this sector over the past 10 years. Construe -
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tion was one of the leading activities during the economic expansion of 1977-1981, suffered an 
enormous contraction during the 1982 crisis, and was one of the driving forces behind the recovery in 
1984 and 1985; however, in 1986 it surrendered this leadership position the tradeable-goods sectors. 
The main factor in this loss of dynamism was the decrease in housing construction. This 
subsector, which had received a strong boost the year before from government subsidies aimed at 
mitigating the effects of the March 1985 earthquake, was hurt in 1986 by the conclusion of the 
emergency programmes carried out by the government for this purpose. Non-residential construc-
tion, on the other hand, expanded for the third consecutive year, but it was still far below its 
1980-1981 levels (see table 12). 
d) Employment trends 
The employment situation, which had seriously deteriorated during the 1982-1983 crisis, 
continued to improve in 1986. Thus, the nationwide unemployment rate-; which had reached record 
highs of around 22% during the crisis, fell to below 14% in 1986 according to surveys conducted by 
the Department of Economics of the University of Chile. This trend was also reflected in the figures 
compiled by the National Statistical Institute, which indicated that the average level of unemploy-
ment in the country was 10.5% in 1986 and that the rate moved a steadily downward throughout the 
course of the year (see table 13). 
Unemployment was higher in urban zones than in rural areas —although the difference 
between the two rates narrowed considerably— and, as in 1985, was substantially lower in the south 
than in the central and northern parts of the country. Among the main urban centres, Valparaiso had 
the highest unemployment rate (13.5%). However, it is also the city which has recorded the most 
rapid decline in unemployment. 
Unemployment decreased in all the sectors of the economy (two percentage points in industry, 
almost three points in construction and one and one-half in commerce) but the decline was 
particularly sharp in services. Unemployment continued to be much greater among manual workers 
(16%) than among non-manual workers (9%). In both cases, however, unemployment amounted to 
just slightly over half of the exceptionally high levels recorded during the period 1982-1983 (see 
table 14). 
As during the two preceding years, the fall in unemployment was accompanied by a decline in 
the relative importance of the government's emergency job programmes as a means of absorbing 
manpower. Indeed, the Minimum Employment Programme (PEM), which had provided jobs for the 
equivalent of 8.6% of the labour force in 1982, accounted for less than 2% of the labour force in 1986. 
Similarly, the percentage of the labour force employed in the Job Programme for Heads of Household 
(POJH), in which higher wages are paid and more productive employment is provided than in the PEM, 
fell to 3.3% in comparison to somewhat over 6% in 1983 (see table 15 and figure 3). 
As a consequence of these changes, "self-sustaining" employment —i.e., excluding persons 
enrolled in the government's emergency employment plans— climbed 16%. Since this rate was 
much higher than the growth rate of economic activity as a whole, the average productivity of the 
employed labour force decreased substantially. 
3. The external sector 
a) External trade 
i) Exports of goods. Thanks to another considerable increase in the real effective exchange rate 
and to measures designed to offset the implicit tax on exports represented by tariffs, external sales of 
merchandise rose by more than 10%. This increase was chiefly due to the further substantial 
expansion in the volume exported and, to a lesser extent, to the rise in unit value, which went up by 
2.5% after five years of uninterrupted decreases (see table 16). 
The greater value of exports was wholly accounted for by non-copper exports, since external 
sales of copper dipped 2 % as a result of the drop in its international price (see table 17). The value of 
copper exports thus continued to fluctuate sharply (increases of over 11% in 1983 and 1985 and 
decreases of 14.5% in 1984 and of 2% in 1986). The fastest-growing items among the other 
traditional exports were paper, wood pulp, paperboard and related products (30%), fish meal (13%) 
and nitrates and iodine (9%), all of which benefitted from higher international prices (see table 18). 
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Figure 3 
CHILE: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES 
(As percentages of total labour force) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Statistical Institute. 
aJob Programme foi Heads of Household. ^Minimum Employment Programme. 
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In the category of non-traditional exports —whose growth rate (24%) was eight times higher 
than that of traditional exports— external sales of agricultural and marine products increased nearly 
33%, while exports of manufactures climbed almost 23%. Among the latter, external sales of 
foodstuffs and beverages soared by 51% while wood exports jumped 21% thanks to the almost 12% 
expansion in their volume and a rise of around 8% in the international price. 
ii) Imports of goods. After dropping steeply in three of the last four years, the physical volume 
of imports expanded 15%, which was nearly three times as fast as the growth rate of the product and 
twice that of the volume of exports. However, owing to the notable decline in the prices of imported 
products (especially petroleum), the value of external purchases rose only 5% (see table 16). 
The import items that showed appreciable growth were capital goods, non-food consumer 
goods and intermediate industrial products, which rose 13%, 16% and 23%, respectively, and thus 
continued their recovery from the dramatic downturns observed in these categories during the period 
1982-1983. In contrast, and primarily as a result of the rapid expansion seen in crop-farming output, 
food imports fell sharply for the second year in a row, to less than one-third of their 1982 level. At the 
same time, the value of external purchases of fuels and lubricants dropped by 24% as a consequence of 
the sharp slide in international oil prices (see table 20). 
iii) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. Following marked decreases in 
four out of the last five years, the terms of trade made a partial recovery in 1986. This improvement 
was mainly attributable to the significant drop in the average cost of imports and, to a much lesser 
degree, to the increase in the unit value of exports. As a result of this and of the strong growth seen in 
the volume of exports, the purchasing power of exports jumped by more than 20% to the highest 
level achieved so far this decade (see table 16). 
b) The current account position and capital movements 
Thanks to the improvement in the terms of trade, the trade surplus grew from somewhat less 
than US$550 million to US$750 million. By virtue of this increase in the trade surplus and a slight 
decline in net payments of profits and interest, the deficit on current account was reduced to US$1.135 
billion, which was US$200 million less than it had been the year before (see table 21). The country's 
current account position was thus even stronger than the target level that had been agreed upon at the 
beginning of the year in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, when a deficit on current 
account of US$1.3 billion had been projected. This was made possible by the reduction in the nominal 
international interest rate, the increase in the trade surplus (which was greater than expected) and 
the decline in interest payments brought about through the retiming of the repayment period from 
90 to 180 days (which is estimated to have represented a savings of about US$140 million). 
The net inflow of capital was the source of financing for over 70% of the deficit on current 
account even though this inflow was US$350 million less than in 1985 and US$1.35 billion less than 
in 1984. The net flow of loans fell once again despite the fact that during 1986 the country had at its 
disposition the US$250 million corresponding to the second tranche of the structural adjustment 
credit granted by the World Bank. In contrast, foreign investment rose sharply. The whole of this 
increase was attributable, however, to the trading of external debt paper in accordance with chapter 
XIX of the Exchange Control Law, as may be seen by the fact that, whereas direct investment dropped 
by US$5 million, portfolio investment soared by US$210 million to a total of slightly more than 
US$260 million. 
As a consequence of the reduction of external financing, there was a substantial increase —from 
US$700 million to US$1.06 billion— in the transfer of resources out of the country (i.e., the 
difference between payments of interest and profits and the net inflow of capital). In addition, the 
proportion of interest paid out of the trade balance rose from 28% to almost 39%. 
c) The external debt 
The policy of financing part of the deficit on current account by resorting to further borrowing 
was continued in 1986. At the same time, transactions involving external debt notes (which may be 
used to pay domestic debts or to buy assets within the country) were stepped up in an effort to lessen 
the impact of external financing on the overall debt level. 
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The total external debt therefore rose only slightly, from US$20.4 billion to US$20.7 billion 
(see table 22). The nominal medium- and long-term debt was augmented by the flow of fresh credit 
(somewhat over US$800 million) and by exchange adjustments stemming from the drop in the 
international quotation for the dollar which added another US$220 million, approximately. These 
increases were, however, offset in large part by regular amortization payments and by the decrease in 
the debt brought about through debt capitalization operations. 
As a result of the fact that the debt increased very little while exports soared, the debt/exports 
coefficient declined, thereby putting a stop to the steep and uninterrupted ascent of this indicator over 
the preceding six years. Furthermore, the proportion of exports represented by the service on the 
debt fell for the third year running. 
The debt renegotiation agreement which had been reached the year before remained in forcé. 
This arrangement provided for the restructuring of somewhat more than US$59 billion in amortiza-
tion payments corresponding to the 1985-1987 triennium and the rescheduling of these payments 
over 12 years with a six-year grace period. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Inflation was down in 1986. The December-December variation in the consumer price index 
was slightly over 17%, compared to 26% in 1985, and the increase in the wholesale price index 
slowed from 30% to 18% (see table 23). 
Factors making a significant contribution to the slackening of inflation included the decrease of 
more than 40% in oil prices and the considerable drop in real domestic interest rates. Another factor 
was that the inflationary effects of the adjustments in exchange rate parities decreed in February and 
July 1985 had already been transferred to the prices of imported products by early 1986, as illustrated 
by the profile of the monthly and 12-month variations in wholesale prices. Hence, within the 
framework of the government's policy of making "mini-devaluations" in the peso, the factors 
working to hold back inflation tended to result in a stabilization of the 12-month variations in 
consumer and wholesale prices at levels below 20% during the second half of 1986 (see figures 4 
and 5). As a result, in 1986 the rate of inflation was lower than it had been at any time during the past 
two decades with the sole exception of the year 1981 (when the consumer price index increased less 
than 10% and the wholesale price index dipped by nearly 4%). 
b) Wages 
Real average wages rose by almost 2%, which marked a break in the downward trend followed 
by wages ever since 1982 (see table 24). The relatively small size of this increase in comparison to the 
growth of the product (about 6%) was in part a reflection of the decision taken by the economic 
authorities to place priority on raising employment. 
The trends in real wages varied substantially from one sector of the economy to another. Thus, 
largely as a consequence of the government's fiscal policy of curbing public-sector current expendi-
ture, wages fell 3% in the sector of community and social services (which includes the government). 
On the other hand, they rose 3% in manufacturing and 5% in construction, thereby halting the sharp 
and steady decrease observed in real wages in these two sectors during the five preceding years (see 
table 24). 
The cumulative 12-month variations in the real wages paid in the production sectors of the 
economy (see figures 6 and 7) reinforced the reversal seen in the trend of wages and salaries 
negotiated in the marketplace. This turnabout contrasted with the situation in respect of the 
minimum wage and of the various subsidies provided under government employment plans, since 
the minimum wage dropped 3% in real terms in 1986 and the purchasing power of the monthly 
subsidies received by the various categories of workers employed in emergency job programmes was 
down 4% (see table 25). This latter decrease constituted an inherent part of the government's policy 
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5. Monetary, fiscal and financial policy 
The authorities' macroeconomic scheme was aimed at co-ordinating the objectives of the structural 
adjustment programme (i.e., increasing saving and investment and reconverting the production 
structure in line with the rapid growth of tradeable-goods production activities) with a stabilization 
programme capable of taking advantage of the situation created by the combination of a more 
comfortable balance-of-payments position with the subsidence of inflationary expectations. In 
addition, the steps taken by the authorities to normalize the financial system resulted in the virtual 
completion of this process in 1986. 
The macroeconomic programme incorporated the policy objectives and performance standards 
set forth in the extended facility arrangement for US$6,675 billion signed with the International 
Monetary Fund in August 1985. As mentioned earlier, all these objectives were achieved in 1986. 
Indeed, the country's international reserves surpassed the target figure, while the Central Bank's net 
holdings of domestic assets, the non-financial public-sector deficit and the cumulative short- and 
long-term debt of the public sector were all below the respective ceilings which had been established 
(see table 26). Moreover, the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments was lower than 
the projected figure, the growth of the product was greater than expected and inflation was within the 
projected range of 15%-20% per year. 
Figure 5 
CHILE: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN WHOLESALE PRICES 
(Percentages) 




CHILE: TWELVE-MONTH VARIATIONS IN REAL WAGES 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Statistical Institute. 
a) Monetary policy and interest rates 
The country's achievement of a trade surplus which exceeded the original projections by around 
US$250 million and the easing of cost-push inflationary factors provided the basis for an aggressively 
expansionary monetary policy. The money supply of the private sector (M,), the money supply of the 
public sector (PS) and the sum of the former and term deposits (M2) increased between December 
1985 and December 1986 by 44%, 66% and 24%, respectively. In real terms, these rates were 
equivalent to 2 3 % , 4 1 % and 5% (see table 27). 
The authorities applied a flexible monetary policy directed towards raising the real levels of 
liquidity in the economy while, at the same time, preventing such an increase from exerting pressure 
on the balance of payments or jeopardizing the reserve position agreed upon as part of the 
International Monetary Fund programme. The fiscal policy, however, continued to follow a stringent 
line aimed at increasing saving in the public sector and reducing its demand for credit. The 
combination of these two policies was successful in bringing about a substantial decrease in the cost of 
money. Real interest rates on readjustable loan and deposit operations —which are freely determined 
by the market—declined steadily throughout the year (see table 28). In fact, during the second half of 
the year the interest rate on deposits stood below 4% per annum and the rate on loans was below 7%; 
these were the lowest levels recorded since the decontrol of interest rates in 1975. As a consequence of 
the easing of inflationary expectations, real interest rates on short-term non-readjustable loan and 
deposit operations followed a similar course. This seemed to indicate that the abnormally high 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Statistical Institute. 
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b) Fiscal policy, saving and investment 
As part of the authorities' structural adjustment policy, the public sector was assigned a major 
role in raising the coefficients of saving and investment. Indeed, public-sector investment did rise 
—from 7% to 7.7% of the gross domestic product— and thus made a major contribution to the 
increase in gross fixed capital formation. 
The domestic saving effort required to bring about this rise in investment had to be substan-
tially greater than would otherwise have been necessary owing to the slackening of external saving. 
Whereas the latter fell by the equivalent of nearly one percentage point of the product, the proportion 
of the product represented by national saving climbed from 6.8% to 8.7%. Public saving, for its part, 
rose from 3.8% of the gross domestic product in 1985 to 4.4% in 1986 (see table 29). 
The fiscal adjustment was thus marked by an increase in capital accumulation by the public 
sector; this was made possible by stricter tax controls, the improved management of public enter-
prises and the decrease in current government expenditure, which dropped from 30% to 27% of the 
product. At the same time, the overall public-sector deficit was lowered from 2.7% to 2.2% of the 
gross domestic product. 
c) The normalization and evolution of the financial system 
The steps taken by the authorities in an effort to normalize the situation in the financial system 
laid the groundwork for the main events occurring in this sector in 1986. These measures concerned 
the following principal aspects: 
i) Recapitalization of the financial system. This was accomplished by means of: the sale, under 
the system referred to as "people's capitalism", of shares in the Banco de Chile and Banco de 
Santiago, the two largest private banks in the country; the recapitalization and sale of other 
banks that had been placed in receivership; the establishment of incentives for capitalization 
involving portfolio sales under the provisions of Law 18519; and the input of capital by some 
banks on their own initiative. The recapitalization of the Banco de Chile and Banco de Santiago 
was based on a heavily-subsidized programme under which the emergency loans furnished by 
the Central Bank were converted into shares which could be purchased with a mere 5% down 
payment. The sale of these shares was then further encouraged by the granting of substantial 
tax incentives and the immediate payment of preferential dividends to purchasers. 
The recapitalization of the financial system and the additional Central Bank portfolio sales 
made it possible to restore the solvency of the private national banking system and to improve 
the capital position of the financial system as a whole. Between December 1985 and December 
1986 the real increases in the capital and reserves of the banking system and in the loans sold to 
the Central Bank amounted to 26% and 14%, respectively (see table 30). These additional 
portfolio sales helped eliminate the shortfall in bad debt reserves. Thus, whereas 10 financial 
institutions had insufficient contingency reserves as of late 1985, in December 1986 all such 
institutions had brought their reserves up to the requisite levels. 
ii) The promulgation in November of substantive amendments to the General Banking Law. 
The main such amendment established the principle of the sharing of risk by shareholders and 
depositors should problems of solvency arise. To this end, the Superintendency of Banks was to 
issue periodic reports to the public concerning the risk entailed in the various assets and the 
actual capital position of banks and financial associations. Another amendment provided for 
the withdrawal, within a maximum period of two years, of the State guarantee on deposits, with 
the exception of small demand and term deposits. It was further provided that, should problems 
of solvency arise in the future, the shareholders in financial institutions would be called upon to 
replenish these institutions' capital and that, in certain cases, depositors could lose their money. 
In addition, the granting of related credits was to be strictly regulated in order to limit credit 
risks. 
iii) The virtual completion of the debt renegotiation process set in motion by the economic 
authorities. By the end of the year over half of the total amount of the commitments of 
small-scale debtors eligible for renegotiation on a case-by-case basis had been restructured. 
The financial system (banks and financial institutions) was also reduced in size during 1986. 
This was evidenced by the fact that, despite the expansion of economic activity, the issue of loans, 
circulating assets and outstanding liabilities all fell slightly in real terms (see table 30). The figures 
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are not changed to any significant degree by the inclusion of the loans held by the Central Bank (i.e., 
the product of portfolio sales). When this is done, the level of total lending turns out to have remained 
virtually unchanged in real terms. At the same time, surpluses declined moderately in real terms as a 
consequence of the competitive spreads with which the banks operated (see the interest rates on 
loans and deposits in table 28). 
The trend in credit balances reflected the decrease which occurred in the production sectors' 
high levels of indebtedness in 1986. In fact, the expansion of economic activity made it possible for 
business enterprises to recoup working capital in a highly competitive credit market that maintained 
its liquidity. Nevertheless, as the year neared its end, the question remained as to whether or not some 
banks would be able to generate sufficient reserves to enable them, in accordance with the pro-
gramme that had been laid out, to gradually buy back the enormous volume of poor-quality portfolio 




CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986° 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 





Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
General government income 
General government expenditure 
Public sector deficit/gross 
domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international 
reserves'7 
General external debt (gross) 


















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 'Excluding variations in reserves due to revaluation of gold. 
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Table 2 
CHILE: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Indexes (1980=100) Percentage breakdown Growth rates 
1984 1985 1986" 1980 1986° 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 





90.6 90.9 97.2 127.1 118.7 
96.4 98.8 104.1 100.0 100.0 
69.2 62.0 71.8 27.1 18.7 
90.6 90.9 97.2 127.1 118.7 
-2.9 7.0 0.3 6.9 
-0.5 6.0 2.4 5.4 
-13.8 12.2 -10.4 15.8 
87.1 84.1 89.1 104.1 
Gross domestic investment 61.2 57.2 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery 




















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Chile and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from IMF balance-of-
payments data expressed in dollars at current prices, which were converted into dollars at constant 1980 values using unit 
price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the purpose. 
Table 3 
CHILE: ORIGIN, COMPOSITION AND FINANCING 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
Gross domestic investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 
Changes in stocks 
Gross domestic saving 
Net income from factor 
services^ 
Terms-of-trade effect 






































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Chile. 
°At market prices, in constant 1980 dollars, at the parity exchange rate. 
unrequited private transfers. 




CHILE: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 








Electricity, gas and water 
























































































































insurance, real estate and 
business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
87.4 88.8 93.7 16.3 
88.4 89.4 93.9 17.2 
104.2 103.5 106.0 7.4 
97.0 99.3 101.5 16.7 
96.3 96.8 94.8 5.1 





















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Cental Bank of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes the livestock and forestry sectors. 
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Table 5 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the National Statistical Institute (INE) of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. ^Millions of pesos at 1974 prices. 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of hectares. 




CHILE: INDICATORS OF FRUIT-GROWING ACTIVITY 
Growth rates 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 









































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural Planning Office (ODEPA). 
"Preliminary figures. 'Thousands of tons. 'Thousands of hectares. 
Table 7 
CHILE: LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION 
























































































Source: Beef, pork and mutton: National Statistical Institute (INE); other livestock items: Agricultural Planning Office 
(ODEPA). 



































































CHILE: AREA AFFORESTED 
(Thousands of hectares) 
1975 1977 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
82.6 93.2 52.0 72.3 93.2 68.6 76.3 
44.1 44.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 - 21.8 
38.5 48.6 51.6 72.1 93.1 68.6 54.5 
93.6 96.3 66.5 
40.3 24.2 
53.3 72.1 66.5 
Source: National Forestry Corporation (CONAF). 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 9 


















































































































































































Source: Ministry of the Economy, Development and Reconstruction - National Fisheries Service. 
"Preliminary figures. 
finished products. 
Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of tons of 
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Table 10 

































































































































































Source: Copper: Chilean Copper Commission and State Department of Mines; iron: National Statistical Institute; coal: 
National Coal Corporation; nitrate, iodine and sodium sulphate: Chilean Chemical Corporation; petroleum: 
National Petroleum Corporation; molibdenum: State Department of Mines and National Statistical Institute; gold 
and Silver: National Statistical Institute. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of gross tons. 
'Tons. thousands of cubic metres. 'Kilogrammes fine. 
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Table 11 













Forestry and agriculture 
Packaging and accessories 
Energy, fuels and lubricants 

































































































































































Source: Industrial product: National PlanningOffice (ODEPLAN); industrial output: National Statistical Institute (INE) and 
Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA); industrial sales: Sociedad de Fomento Fabril. 




CHILE: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
Construction product 
Building materials 
Deliveries of cement 
for the domestic marlcetc 
Deliveries of round 
bars for construction 
Index of real sales of 
intermediate goods for 
construction ( 1 9 8 0 = 100) 
Building 














1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1984 
366 381 443 449 
80.1 95.7 97.0 
1985 1986" 
4.2 16.2 1.3 
29.6 32.9 33.5 33.8 11.1 1.8 0.8 
45.6 65.6 66.9 85.2 43.9 2.0 27.4 

































































Source; Construction product: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the National Planning Office; building materials: 
Chilean Chamber of Construction; building: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of dollars at 1970 prices. 'Millions of sacks. Thousands of 
tons. 'Thousands of m2. Building starts in 80 administrative districts. "Permits approved. 
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Table 13 
CHILE: RATES OF PARTICIPATION A N D UNEMPLOYMENT, BY REGIONS 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
1985 1986° 




Nationwide 47.8 48.4 48.6 48.6 48.6 48.9 ... 48.3 ... 48.8 ... 48.3 
Greater Santiago 51.7 52.2 52.5 52.3 52.5 52.4 50.9 52.1 53.6 53.6 51.1 52.8 52.4 
Unemployment ratec 
Nationwide 21.1 22.3 18.8 16.3 13.9 16.0 ... 16.6 ... 13.9 ... 13.9 
Urban 22.7 23.8 20.3 17.5 14.6 17.6 ... 17.3 ... 14.7 ... 14.4 
Rural 14.5 15.4 12.5 11.5 11.1 9.5 ... 13.4 ... 10.5 ... 11.7 
Greater Santiago 22.1 22.2 19.3 16.3 13.5 18.0 16.2 17.4 138 14.5 15.4 13.5 10.6 
Unemployment rate 
Nationwide 19.6 16.7 15.4 12.9 10.5 130 12.9 13.6 11.9 11.8 11.0 10.5 8.8 
Northern zone 
(Regions I to IV) 18.4 16.7 14.0 12.1 10.4 11.3 12.6 12.6 11.7 12.6 11.8 9.2 7.9 
Central zone 
(Regions V to Vll)e 19.4 19.1 16.1 11.7 10.0 11.6 11.9 12.8 10.6 10.2 10.6 9-9 9.1 
Southern zone 
(Regions VIII to XII) 14.3 13.5 10.5 7.7 7.1 8.2 7.1 7.3 8.1 7.2 7.8 7.6 5.9 
Greater Santiago 21.9 
Greater Valparaiso 
Greater Concepción 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Labor force, as a percentage of the population aged 14 or over. 'According to the 
Department of Economics of the University of Chile, on the basis of surveys carried out for Greater Santiago in March and 
September of each year. J According to the National Statitiscal Institute: 1981, October-December; 1982, October-
November; 1983, average May-July, July-September and October-December; 1984, 1985 and 1986, quarterly 







































CHILE: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN GREATER SANTIAGO 
(Percentages) 
Total rate of unem-
ployment according to: 
Department of Economics 
of the University of Chile 
National Statistical 
Institute 
Rate of unemployment 
among the established 
labour force" 
(i.e., excluding persons 






Government and financial 
services 
Personal and household 
services 



























































































































































































Source: Department of Economics of the University of Chile and National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"According to data supplied by the Department of Economics of the University of Chile. 
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Table 15 













































Number of persons employed. , as a 
percentage of the labour force 
Nation-
wide 



















ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Nations 




































il Statistical Institute (1NE). 





































due to the lack of complete information on the 
labour force nationwide prior to the second half of 1983. For 1982, figures correspond to the period October-November. 
Figures for 1985 are an ECLAC estimate because of the lack of comparable figures due to changes in the INE survey 
methodology. T h e Minimum Employment Programme was set up in March 1975. Consequently, the figures for that 
year are an average based on the period March-December. Preliminary figures. 'This programme was set up in 
October 1982. Consequently, the figures for that year are an average based on the last quarter. 
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Table 16 









Terms of trade, FOB/CIF 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 17 





























































































































CHILE: VALUE AND BRAKDOWN OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 




Nitrates and iodine 
Fishmeal 






































































































































































































































































CHILE: EXCHANGE RATES 





























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Central Bank of Chile and the International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics. 
Note: A: For deflation, the domestic products sub-index of the wholesale price index was used. 
B: For deflation, the consumer price index prepared by J. Yánez was used for the years 1970-1973, the consumer price 
index prepared by R. Cortázar and J. Marshall was used for the years 1974-1978, and the INE consumer price index 
was used from 1979 onwards. 
"These indexes correspond to the average of the real peso exchange rate indexes (main official) vis-à-vis the currencies of 
Chile's main trading partners, weighted by the relative importance of the exports to or imports from those countries, as 
appropriate. From 1970 to 1980, these weightings correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979, while from 1981 on, 
they correspond to the average for the period 1982-1985. For further details on the methodology and sources used, see the 












Fuels and lubricants 
Raw materials 
Spare parts and interme-


























































































































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 21 
CHILE: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 




































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 
assets and liabilities. Equals the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 22 
CHILE: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
CHILE 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Balances 
I. Total external debt 
(II + III + IV)tc 
II. Medium- and long-term 
external debt 
State-guaranteed public and 
Millions of dollars 
15 591 17 159 18 037 19 659 20 403 20 716 




Lines of credit for importation 
of capital goods 
Financial credits 
III. Short-term external debtc 
Public sector 
Private sector 
IV. Debt with IMF 
V. Net international reserves 
VI. Net total external debt 






Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Net total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing/exports of goods 
and services 




























































































































Source: Central Bank of Chile, Deuda externa de Chile, 1986, Boletín Mensual, November 1987. 
'Preliminary figures. Amounts disbursed and pending payment at 31 December of each year. r Excluding short-
term credits for external trade operations of the non-financial private sector. Credits entering under articles 14,15 
and 16 of the International Exchange Law and credits under Decree-Law 600. 'The drop is due to the conversion of 
short-term debt to medium- and long-term debt. Corresponds to the international assets of the Central Bank, less 
liabilities with the International Monetary Fund. Gold is valued at market prices and swaps at their "net" value. "The 
servicing is lower because of the renegotiation of the external debt. * Before the renegotiation of the external debt, 
amortization payments came to US$2 063 million in 1983, US$1 666 million in 1984, US$2 393 million in 1985, and 
US$2 675 million in 1986. ' Interest paid, less interest received, according to the balance-of-payments current account. 
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Table 23 












Index of building costs 










Index of building costs 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 

















































































































































































































Source: National Statistical Institute; Chilean Chambers of Construction; José Yáñez, "Una corrección del índice de precios al 
consumidor, 1971-1977", in Comentarios sobre la situación económica, Departament of Economics of the University 
of Chile; and René Cortázar and Jorge Marshall, "Índice de precios al consumidor en Chile: 1970-1978", Estudios 
CIEPLAN, No 4, November 1980. 









Electricity, gas and 
water 







Electricity, gas and 
water 











































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Statistical Institute and the Chilean Chamber of Construction. 
"Deflated on the basis of the consumer price index given in table 23. From 1975 to 1978: average for January, April, July and 
October. Subsequently, average for 12 months. Applicable to private sector manual and non-manual workers not 
subject to special arrangements. '1975-1983: wages in middle-level building activities. 1984-1986: average wages. 
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Table 25 
CHILE: MINIMUM WAGE AND ALLOWANCES PAID IN 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Minimum monthly wage 
Nominal 
Realc 2 195 2 592 2 511 2 515 2 914 2 933 2 362 2 019 1915 1838 









































Monthly allowance paid 




Monthly allowance paid 
in job Programme for 








Nominal* 15 000 15 000 16 000 16 000 
Realc 5 456 4 634 3 782 3 629 
Senior Staff 
Nominal1" 30 000 30 000 31 000 31 000 
Realc 10 911 9 269 7 328 7 033 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the National Statistical Institute. 
"Preliminary figures. *Pesos. 'Pesos of December 1978, on the basis of the corrected consumer price index 
shown in table 23. 
Table 26 
CHILE: FULFILMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND PROGRAMME TARGETS 
_, . . . . . Target Actual figures Objectives and criteria , 
' (December 1986) (December 1986) 
Net international reserves" 1 130 1 239 
Net domestic assets of Central Bank" 730 713 
Deficit of non-financial public sector c 59 53 
Short-term indebtedness of non-financial 
public sector and Banco del Estado 990 901 
External debt incurred and guaranteed by 
public sector" 
1-10 years 500 102 
1- 5 years 200 33 
Rescheduling 170 105 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Thousands of dollars. Billions of pesos. f As of end of September. 
298 
Table 27 
CHILE: MONETARY INDICATORS 
Money issue (E) 
Total money supply 
Private sector (M,) 
Public sector (PS) 
Terms deposits (TD)* 
From 30 to 89 days 
From 90 to 365 days 
Readjustable 
Non-readjustable 
Over one year 
Private money + 
term deposits 
(M2 = M, + TD) 







































































































































636.4 924.4 1 315.1 1 506.9 22.5 45.3 42.3 14.6 
4 838.1 3 825.0 2 703.2 2 578.8 -24.8 -21.0 -29.3 -4.6 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, Síntesis Monetaria. 
"Preliminary figures. 
deposits for less than 30 days. 
Includes bonds of the Department of Savings and Investments (DAI). 
Millions of dollars 
' Includes other 
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Table 28 



























































































Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Annual rates projected on the basis of quarterly data. Calculated on the basis of the nominal rates published by the 
Central Bank, the corrected consumer price index given in table 23, and the consumer price index of the National Statistical 
Institute (period 1979-1982). 
Table 29 
CHILE: PUBLIC SECTOR INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
(Percentages of gross domestic product) 
1984 1985 1986 
A. General government 
1. Current income 
2. Current expenditure 
3. Current surplus (1-2) 
B. State enterprises 
4. Operating surplus 
5. Net transfers to general government 
6. Current surplus (4-5) 
C. Public sector 
7. Current surplus (3+6) 
8. Net capital income 
9. Gross capital formation (9a+9b) 
9a General government 
9b State enterprises 
10. Capital surplus (8-9) 




































Source: Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Chile. 
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Table 30 
CHILE: EVOLUTION OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM" 
CHILE 
(Year-end balances in billions of pesos) 
Assets 
1. Loans in national currency 
2. Loans in foreign currency 
3. Total loans (1 + 2) 
4. Financial investments 
5. Circulating assets 
Liabilities 
6. Deposits and other funds attracted 
7. Loans obtained in the country 
8. Loans obtained outside the country 
9. Outstanding liabilities 
10. Contingency funds 
11. Capital and reserves 
Balances 
12. Surplus before taxes 
13. Surplus after taxes 
14. Net balance 
Suspense accounts 
15. Loans sold to Central Bank 






















































Source: Office of the Superintendent of Banks and Financial institutions. 





1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1986, despite serious problems Ecuador registered an increase in economic activity for the third 
consecutive year. The gross domestic product increased once again, and although the inflation rate 
accelerated slightly, real minimum wages improved. The worst difficulties arose from the slump in 
the price of petroleum, which heightened the balance-of-payments current account imbalance and 
created a major fiscal distortion. 
The 3% expansion in the product, coupled with the improvement of the two previous years, 
brought the cumulative increase for the three-year period to 12%. The crisis of the period 1982-1983 
was thus overcome and the trend observed in the economy as a whole up to the beginning of the 
decade was resumed. On the other hand, the per capita product virtually stagnated and thus did not 
fully recover from the loss suffered during the crisis years (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The growth in the product was due primarily to the good results registered in agricultural 
activity, which expanded by almost 8%, and the considerable increase (5%) in mining and petroleum 
production. 
The growth of domestic demand in 1986 (1.5%) was similar to that of the previous year and 
was likewise attributable basically to the increase in fixed capital investment. Nevertheless, it was still 
not possible to recover from the decline of over 30% accumulated during the 1983-1984 biennium, 
and the investment coefficient was one of the lowest in the current decade (14.5%). 
Total consumption, for its part, registered a slight upturn (1.7%). This was attributable solely 
to the fact that the growth rate of family consumption doubled, thus giving an increase of over 13% in 
the last three years. Government consumption in contrast, shrank for the fourth consecutive year, 
resulting in an accumulated decrease of approximately 15%. 
The twelve-month variation in the consumer price index rose from 24% to 27%. This 
reactivation of inflation, which speeded up in the second half of the year, was due to the increases in 
interest and exchange rates, as well as the higher rates charged for certain public services. The 
inflationary pressures were moderated, however, by the good yields in the agricultural sector and the 
strict control exercised by the government over the monetary variables. 
The nominal money supply (M,) increased by 20%, but in real terms it declined because the 
accumulated increase in prices during the year was higher. This demonstrated the government's 
determination to contain price increases and reflected a contraction in the domestic credit supply. 
With regard to wages, the real minimum wage registered a significant improvement (4%), 
which compares favourably with the virtual stagnation of the previous biennium but constitutes a 
very modest increase in the light of the deterioration of close to 35% recorded during the 1981-1983 
triennium. 
As already noted the most serious problem which beset the economy was the steep decline in 
petroleum prices. Because of the glut on the international market and the price war unleashed 
between the OPEC member countries and the non-OPEC producers, the average quotation for Ecuado-
rian petroleum plunged to US$12.50 per barrel, with the lowest level (US$8.50) being recorded in 
July, in contrast with the selling price of US$25.80 per barrel registered in 1985. The upshot was that 
total petroleum and petroleum product exports —which the previous year had generated 60% of 
total sales of goods and services and a similar percentage of government revenue— fell by almost half 
(from US$1 930 million to less than US$990 million). 
This plunge, added to the slump in some other exports, had an adverse impact on the trade 
balance. Thus, the total exports of goods and services fell considerably (-22%), whereas imports 
declined by only 1%. As a result, the trade surplus declined by almost US$700 million, and since the 
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Figure 1 
ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross national incomea 
Gross domestic product3 
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Figure 1 (conclusion) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
^Annual growth rate. b Annual average rate for the whole country. Official estimates. 
Percentage variation from December to December. ¿Billions of dollars. Percentages. 
net payments of profits and interest verged on US$960 million, the current account deficit increased 
more than sixfold, coming close to US$690 million. For their part the terms of trade in goods and 
services fell yet again, as had happened systematically during the present decade, except for 1984. 
This year, however, the decline was of unprecedented magnitude (-27%). For its part, the capital 
account showed a surplus of almost US$640 million. This was largely due to the fresh credits that 
Ecuador received from sources such as the United States government, its creditors and a number of 
multilateral agencies. 
As a result of the above, the country suffered a US$50 million loss of reserves, bringing the net 
external assets of the Central Bank at the end of the year to around US$150 million, which was 
equivalent to slightly more than one month of imports. 
The progressive shortage of foreign exchange had an impact on, inter alia, the exchange rate. 
Thus, the sucre/dollar ratio in January had already risen to 14% on the intervention market, where 
the dollar was sold for 110 sucres by the Central Bank. The sucre continued to depreciate, and in 
December the issuing agency quoted the dollar at 147 sucres. On the free market, the exchange rate 
fluctuated in the course of the year, especially during the first half, but in December it was only 15% 
more than at the same time the year before and was similar to the rate being quoted on the 
intervention market. Because of the devaluation of the sucre, the real effective exchange rate rose and 
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this acted as an incentive to exports, especially non-traditional ones, while it increased the cost of 
imports. 
The drop in petroleum prices also had a negative impact on the fiscal accounts, to such an extent 
that current State income fell by 1.5% after having risen by 65% and 90% in 1984 and 1985. The 
growth rate of total expenditure, for its part, slackened because although its expansion was considera-
ble (31%), it had been much greater in previous years. 
As a result of these trends, the deficit/total expenditure ratio stood at around 16%, whereas in 
the previous year there had been a surplus (6.5%). Likewise, the deficit/gross domestic product ratio 
was 2%, compared with a similar surplus the year before. 
In order to curb price increases, the government sought to control monetary expansion. 
Consequently, although the amount issued increased by 37%, the money supply increased by only 
20% (that is to say a good deal less than inflation) because of the raising of the reserve requirement 
rate. Furthermore, in order to reduce the foreign exchange demand on the free market, the authorities 
completely freed interest rates. 
There were two clearly distinguishable stages in the economic policy. During the first stage, 
which lasted until July, the government tried to adapt the evolution of economic activity to the 
situation created by the decline in the price of petroleum. Thus, in addition to raising the exchange 
rate, it established a foreign exchange insurance commission and prior deposits for imports. It also 
increased the price of some public services and the rates of some taxes and carried out a tariff reform 
which not only reduced the existing dispersion of tariff rates but also rationalized the duties charged 
on different types of imports. 
As the decline in oil prices persisted during the first half of the year, in August the government 
radically changed the direction of the country's economic policy. With respect to exchange rates, the 
public sector foreign exchange market was made completely independent of the private sector, 
market. Whereas in the former the foreign exchange requirements would be met from petroleum 
export incomes, in the latter the foreign exchange for financing private sector imports would come 
from the sector's own exports. The dollar rate on the intervention market was also raised, bringing it 
closer to that of the free market dollar. At the same time, an effort was made to ensure that the public 
sector, and particularly the State petroleum company, was not adversely affected by the wide disparity 
existing between the two exchange rates. 
To prevent the creation of these two foreign exchange markets from triggering off speculation 
against the sucre, the government allowed the interest rates on bank loans and deposits to float freely. 
In this way, it was hoped to encourage saving in national currency and at the same time to relieve the 
pressure on the available foreign exchange. However, this did not mean eliminating the lines of credit 
that were rediscounted by the Central Bank at preferential interest rates. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The total supply of goods and services increased by slightly more than 2%, bringing down the 
growth rate for the second consecutive year. Whereas the gross domestic product grew by 3%, the 
volume of imports fell by an equal percentage because of the gradual increase in the real effective 
exchange rate and the poor performance of domestic demand, which grew by around 1.5%: a rate 
similar to that recorded in 1985 and much lower than the 6% achieved in 1984. As a result of this, the 
accumulated increase over the last three years was not sufficient to compensate for the decline of over 
12% suffered in 1983 (see table 2). 
In 1986 there was an upturn in both consumption and gross fixed investment. The latter, which 
had begun to recover in 1985, increased by 3%, but as its level continued to be much lower than before 
the crisis, the investment coefficient (14.5%) was still one of the lowest since 1980. 
The 1.5% expansion of total consumption was the net result of the opposite trends observed in 
government and family expenditure. In the first case, the decline of close to 1% represented the 
fourth year of negative evolution, making an accumulated decrease of the order of 15% during that 
period. For its part, private consumption went up by 2%, which was a higher rate than that of 1985 
but much lower than that recorded in 1984 (10%). 
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Lastly, the growth rate of the volume of exports slowed down considerably, failing to reach even 
one-third of the rate observed in the two previous years. This was attributable to the marked decline 
in petroleum sales, as a result of the dramatic slump in the international price, although on the other 
hand the increase in the real effective exchange rate was an incentive to non-traditional exports. 
b) Evolution of tbe main sectors 
The slackening of overall economic activity was due to the drop in the growth rates of the 
goods-producing sectors and "other services" (see table 3). The increase in the former (3.5%) was 
based on the performance of agriculture, mining and the petroleum industry; in contrast, manufactur-
ing and construction experienced a decline. In almost all cases, the activities falling under the heading 
of "other services" expanded only modestly, at rates lower than those of 1985. On the other hand, 
basic services grew by 7.5%, which was considerably faster than the year before. 
i) The agricultural sector. Agricultural production increased satisfactorily (8%) for the third 
consecutive year, thus more than compensating for the heavy losses caused by the climatic disasters at 
the beginning of the decade (see table 3). 
The growth rate of agricultural production was double that of 1985. This was attributable to the 
fact that the majority of crops —especially those destined for the domestic market— registered 
significant increases, making it possible to reduce imports of food and inputs for industry (see 
table 4). 
Among agricultural exports, banana production continued its upward trend. Thus, after the 
record expansion of 17% recorded in 1985, output increased by a further 7% as a result, inter alia, of 
good climatic conditions. The overall increase during the period 1984-1986 more than made up for 
the severe losses (-18%) suffered during the period 1982-1983. However, major problems continued 
to plague this crop and the shortcomings in the irrigation, drainage, transport and shipment systems 
persisted, with a result that after having improved by more than 10% in 1984 yields once again fell, 
this time by 3.7%. 
The decline in coffee production (-2.5 %) came after the boom of the previous two years, when 
an increase of almost 45% was recorded. The area under cultivation remained constant and the yield 
declined slightly; furthermore, outbreaks of rust and coffee-bean borer attacks affected some growing 
areas. 
Cocoa, another of the main export products, also turned in a poorer harvest (-14.5 %), due both 
to the smaller area under cultivation and the lower yield (-6.5%). As in the other cases, the small size 
of the majority of holdings prevented farmers from modernizing their crops through the use of more 
advanced techniques. 
Among the products destined for the domestic market, cotton and barley gave outstanding 
results. Cotton production rose by 95%, which, when added to the even greater increases during the 
previous two-year period, raised output to almost 10 times that observed in 1983. In addition to the 
expansion of the area cultivated, there was a notable improvement in yields (100% in 1984, 39% in 
1985 and 44% in 1986). 
The barley harvest also increased substantially (52%), while soya, rice and wheat production 
grew by around 27%. The growth of soya output, plus the upswing during the previous two years, 
meant that it was almost six times the volume of the 1983 harvest. For its part, the rice harvest amply 
compensated for the decline observed during the previous crop year. Wheat production, for its part, 
although it improved substantially, was well below that achieved at the beginning of the decade. 
In short, the excellent yields obtained by the agricultural sector were due to the favourable 
climatic conditions and the special attention given to the sector by the government through the 
expansion or opening of special lines of credit for rice, maize, cotton, soya, palm and sugar cane 
cultivation. In addition, during the year the Banco Nacional de Productos Agropecuarios and 
Almacopio S.A. was set up to facilitate the marketing of products and to prevent abuses by 
middlemen. 
ii) Fisheries. As a result of the tariff and credit assistance given to the sector by the government, 
the product of the fisheries sector improved for the third consecutive year, although even so the 
growth rate (10%) was only half of the extraordinarily high rate achieved during the 1984-1985 
biennium (see table 5). 
307 
As a result of the improvement in the supply of bait, the excellent climatic conditions and the 
better exploitation of the resource through the establishment of a closed season, the shrimp catch 
improved by 7%. Although this improvement was not enough to compensate for the losses of the 
previous year, the upward trend observed during the early years of the decade was resumed. On the 
other hand, as in 1985, there was a smaller tuna fish catch because of the restrictions deriving from 
the biological cycle of the tuna. 
Exports performed exceptionally well during the year. Shrimp sales increased by (32%), far 
outweighing the accumulated decline (-9%) of the previous two years. There was an even greater 
increase in exports of frozen fish, which expanded by around 90%, thus quadrupling the 1983 
volume. In contrast, fish meal sales fell by slightly more than 11% in 1986, although their total 
amount was double that recorded in 1984 and 7.5 times greater than that of 1983. 
iii) The petroleum industry. The radical changes that occurred on the international petroleum 
market during the year left their mark on this sector, which in 1985 had generated about 60% of the 
value of exports of goods and services as well as of total State income. 
The growth rate of crude.petroleum production —which had averaged 10% per year during the 
three previous years— slackened to 4% (see table 6). This increase derived from the expansion of the 
daily output, which came to some 293 000 barrels, as against 260 000 the year before. 
This increment was due to the incorporation of new wells and the reconditioning of existing 
ones in the CEPE-ORIENTE field and to the rise in daily output in the CEPE-CITY field. On the other 
hand, production fell in the oilfields of the CEPE-TEXACO consortium because, inter alia, of a decline in 
the yield of the wells being exploited. 
For its part, the volume of crude petroleum exports grew by only 1%, compared with a 15% 
increase in 1985. This marked decline, which led to a drop of some US$900 million in income from 
crude petroleum exports, was the result of a glut on the world petroleum market and to the price war 
unleashed among the exporting countries. 
The macroeconomic forecasts for 1986 had been made on the basis of a crude oil price equal to 
that obtained the previous year (US$25.85 per barrel). Even as early as January, however, the 
quotation fell below US$20, and the slide continued during most of the year, reaching a minimum of 
US$8.54 in July. 
In order to cope with this steady decline, a series of changes were made in the system of fixing 
crude oil prices. Thus, in February the practice of linking 25 % of the price of Ecuadorian petroleum to 
the value of the official OPEC type of petroleum and the remaining 75 % to the price of Alaskan North 
Slope oil was abandoned. The new formula was now pegged to the price of the Alaskan North Slope 
variety, less US$1.34 for freight and transport. In April, a third form of calculation was inserted in 
some sales contracts, namely, the delivery of crude to refining companies for marketing after 
processing. Under this system, CEPE obtained the value of sales of the resulting output, less an agreed 
rate for refining, the incentive being that under this procedure ("netback") the sales price of 
petroleum products declined less than that of crude petroleum. 
From August onwards, the situation on the international market began to stabilize and in 
December the price of Ecuadorian crude reached US$13.64. All in all, the average price per barrel of 
the oil exported in 1986 was US$12.69, that is to say, 51% less than in 1985 (see figure 2). 
The volume of refined products exported rose spectacularly (38%), amply offsetting the 
decline of over 20% registered the previous year. This was attributable partly to the increase in 
output (2%) as well as to smaller domestic demand for electrical energy. For their part, imports of 
petroleum products shrank by almost 30% to half the 1983 total. Lastly, domestic consumption of 
petroleum products, which had completely stagnated in 1985, recovered by 3% because the price of 
these products was maintained during the year and there was an upswing in industrial activity. 
The government redoubled its efforts to boost foreign investment in the sector, which had been 
virtually paralysed in previous years.1 Thus, in January an exploration contract was signed with a 
'Whereas in 1971 there were 36 companies exploring some 10 million hectares, in 1981 only five of these remained, 
exploring around 600 thousand hectares and in 1982 only, Texaco and City Investing are still operating. The government 
which took office at the end of 1984 tried to reverse this situation, and the first step taken was the application in September 
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consortium comprising Conoco, Diamond, Shamrock, Nomeco and Overseas Petroleum Investment 
Company, providing for the investment of USS44 million in the exploration of some 200 000 
hectares. In order to pave the way for the signing of such agreements, the restrictions which 
prevented a company from entering into more than one exploration or exploitation contract were 
lifted. Preliminary steps were also taken for the signing of other contracts, covering 800 000 hectares 
and involving rather more than US$100 million, with a number of consortia formed by Tenneco, 
Pectén Clyde, Unocal, Fred Parks Inc., Petro-Canada, Braspetro, Elf-Aquitaine, Yacimientos Petrol-
íferos Fiscales Argentinos and Hispanoil. For its part, the State oil company (CEPE) will prospect in 
another area of 600 000 hectares. It is expected that the total area explored will thus be in the region 
of 3 million hectares. 
iv) Manufacturing. The product of this sector recovered by 1%, after the 5% decline accumu-
lated over the previous three years (see table 7). This slight recovery took place despite the 
persistence of unfavourable factors and the emergence of new ones which could influence its 
development in the medium term. 
The performance of the various branches of manufacturing activity was affected by the policy of 
making the economy more flexible, which entailed the reduction of tariffs, the freeing of interest 
rates and the raising of the exchange rate. The performance of industry was also affected by the 
establishment at the beginning of the year of advance deposits of 100% of the value of imports and of 
a foreign exchange risk commission. 
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The production of foodstuffs increased by 1%, but this rate was not enough to offset the 3% 
decline in 1985 and another even greater one in 1983, with the result that the accumulated overall 
decline during the last four years came to 6%. Production of beverages and tobacco went down for the 
second consecutive year, this time by 3%, and this decline, coming on top of the negative performance 
observed since 1983, resulted in an accumulated drop of 16%. The other industrial activities, except 
clothing, registered increases of between 1 % and 5 %, but some of these advances were not enough to 
compensate for the losses suffered in previous years. 
v) Construction. This was the sector of activity which experienced the most severe contraction 
in 1986 (-5%), bringing the accumulated decline in the last four years to nearly 13%. Among the 
factors behind this decline were the higher interest rates (with the attendant increase in the financial 
costs of companies); the cutbacks made in public investment programmes because of the loss of 
income suffered by the State, and, to a lesser extent, the increase in the price of certain inputs. The 
decline in activity in the sector was reflected in growing unemployment, since construction is one of 
the most labour-intensive sectors. 
vi) Mining. There was once again modest growth in the mining product, similar to that of the 
previous year (1%). In keeping with the strategy of increasing the openness of the economy and 
promoting exports, private investment (both national and foreign) continued to be encouraged, 
mainly through the removal of all taxes and duties on imports of capital goods and a 50% reduction in 
taxes on profits. 
In addition, some 300 exploration contracts were signed, most of them with Ecuadorian 
companies, in order to promote the development of the country's vast and varied mineral resources 
(gold.silver, copper, iron, zinc, uranium, molybdenum, etc.). The extraction of gold, one of the pillars 
of mining policy, yielded satisfactory results and the Central Bank began to purchase gold in order to 
prevent its illegal exportation. 
3. The external sector 
a) Merchandise trade 
Income from exports of goods suffered a decline of close to 24%, because the drastic deteriora-
tion in the unit value (-26%) could not be cancelled out by the increase of almost 3% in volume. The 
value of imports of goods also went down (-5%), but in this case the unit value hardly changed 
whereas the volume dropped by 5% (see table 8). 
Mainly as a result of the sharp downturn in the price of petroleum, the terms of trade in goods 
declined by 26%, bringing the overall decrease to 35% in the last two years. Since the increase in the 
volume of exports did not offset the deterioration of the terms of trade, the purchasing power of 
exports of goods plunged by 24% to one of the lowest levels ever recorded. 
i) Exports of goods. The decline in exports was due to the drop in sales of both commodities and 
manufactured goods. The slump in the former (-27%), which account for some 85% of total exports, 
was due basically to the performance of petroleum sales (see table 9). 
The volume of crude exported rose slightly (1%) to the record level of 71 million barrels. 
However, the proceeds from this item dropped by half to only 40% of total export income. 
Once the conditions on the international cocoa market returned to normal, exports of this 
product reached a slightly higher level than at the beginning of the decade. Because of the deteriora-
tion of the unit value (-5.5 %) and the much greater decline in the volume (-45%), income from cocoa 
sales plunged by 50%, compared with the increase of almost 600% recorded during the previous two 
years. 
The remaining export commodities evolved positively. Thus, sales of coffee —the second most 
important export product— rose by more than 55%, thus marking five years of growth and reaching 
a level three times that of 1981. This vigorous growth was attributable to the considerable increase 
(31%) in the volume sold, accompanied by a major increment in unit value (19-5%). 
310 
ECUADOR 
The income earned from shrimp sales, for its part, came to account for one-eighth of total 
export receipts. This extraordinary increase (over 80%) in these receipts derived mainly from the 
substantial expansion of volume, although the unit value also increased (19%). 
Lastly, banana sales also expanded (20%). Thanks to this improvement and to that registered 
in 1985, which was three times greater, this item became one of the major exports. 
The decline observed in exports of manufactures (-9%) affected virtually all its components. 
Thus, despite the fact that the volume of exports of petroleum products went up by some 40%, their 
value deteriorated by more than 30%. In turn, receipts from processed cocoa products and from 
fisheries products declined by 3% and 25 %, respectively, in the first case because the fall in unit value 
was greater than the increase in volume, and in the second because the volume sold plunged by 30%. 
To sum up, in 1986 there was vigorous growth in products which until recently had been of little 
importance in total external sales (see table 10). Among the reasons for this was the fact that the 
increase in the real effective exchange rate helped to make exports of these products more competi-
tive on international markets. 
ii) Imports of goods. Purchases of goods abroad increased at less than half of the rate recorded 
the previous year, and their level continued to be lower than that recorded at the beginning of the 
decade (see table 11). 
The only imports which showed any growth (29%) were those of capital goods, which 
expanded for the third year in a row (65% in all), so that they surpassed the level reached at the 
beginning of the decade. The greatest increase was in imports of transport equipment (55%), 
bringing the total increment to almost 100% during 1984 and 1985. Purchases of equipment for 
industry, for their part, which had already expanded more than 28% during the previous biennium, 
again saw vigorous growth (20%). Lastly, purchases of machinery for agriculture, after registering a 
partial recovery in 1984 and soaring by over 100% in 1985 increased by 7% in 1986. 
In contrast, there was a decline in imports of consumer goods, raw materials and intermediate 
goods. The 2% slide in the first-named came on top of the decline of the three previous years and was 
due entirely to the slump of close to 9% in purchases of durable goods, for purchases of non-durable 
consumer goods increased by 9% to their highest value since 1982. 
Imports of raw materials and intermediate goods for their part, fell by 12%, thus cancelling out 
the recovery observed during 1984 and 1985. The only item in which there was growth was 
construction materials (28%), but this increase, together with the 21% rise registered between 1984 
and 1985, still failed to offset completely the great drop of 60% recorded in 1983. The downturn in 
purchases of raw materials for industry (-6%) was the most significant, as these materials account for 
40% of the total value of imports. 
Finally, major changes were made in import policy during the year. 
Among the most important measures taken between January and July was the adoption of a 
new tariff system. In order to boost the functioning of the economy and enhance the competitiveness 
of Ecuadorian products, the authorities reduced the tariff spread by eliminating the unnecessary 
protection afforded some goods, while increasing the protection of others. Thus, the tariff on raw 
materials and essential products not produced in the country (Schedule la) was reduced from 0-50% 
to 0-20%, whereas the tariff on goods competing with national products (Schedule lb) was raised 
from 0-60% to 20-90%. For their part, import duties on luxury items (Schedule II) and on 
pharmaceutical products and the raw materials for producing them (Schedule I, special) were reduced 
from 60-200% to 55-80% and from 0-20% to 0-10%, respectively. 
Soon afterwards, with a view to increasing public sector income and reducing excessive 
liquidity, an advance deposit of 100% of the value of imports was introduced and an exchange risk 
commission was established ranging in value from 25% to 30%, depending on whether the products 
in question were included in tariff Schedule la or lb and on the payment period agreed with the 
supplier. Imports of some vehicles up to a certain engine capacity were also authorized. 
The exchange and trade policies were modified during the second part of the year. Thus, under 
the exchange regulations adopted in August, whereby the foreign transactions of the private sector 
were completely divorced from those of the public sector, two separate foreign exchange markets 
were created. At the same time, the exchange risk commission and the prior deposit on imports were 
eliminated, but authorization from the Central Bank was still required for all imports. 
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b) The current account deficit and its financing 
The deficit on current account rose considerably, going from US$110 million in 1985 to around 
US$690 million, which reflected the downward course of both the trade balance and the factor 
services account (see table 12). 
The trade surplus went down by US$690 million as a result of the trends in trade in goods and, 
to a lesser extent, transactions of real services. Exports of goods fell much more than imports, so that 
the merchandise trade surplus was a little over US$550 million instead of the US$1.1 billion around 
which it had fluctuated in 1984-1985. For its part, the traditional imbalance in the trade in real 
services grew by US$100 million because of the 9% fall in export receipts and the 11.5% increase in 
payments made under this heading. 
During the year, Ecuador's net payments for factor services came to some US$960 million. 
Although this amount represents a decline of US$115 million compared with 1985, it was equivalent 
to almost 40% of exports of goods and services. Net interest payments alone came to US$675 million, 
which represents 27% of total exports of goods and services and 70% of total petroleum exports. 
The capital account, for its part, registered a surplus of some US$630 million: an amount 4.5 
times greater than that of 1985 and attributable inter alia to the virtual doubling of official transfers 
and a 16% increase in direct investment, partly due to the more favourable treatment recently 
accorded foreign investment. The main cause, however, was the fact that US$760 million in 
long-term loans were granted to the government. 
As a result of the transactions mentioned above and the figure of some US$200 million 
registered by the "errors and omissions" item, the loss of foreign exchange to the country was in 
excess of US$50 million. The net reserves of the Central Bank fell to US$145 million, in sharp 
contrast with the almost US$860 which it held in 1980. 
c) The external debt 
The total outstanding external debt came to US$8 160 million, which represented an annual 
increase of US$720 million: the greatest since 1981. The total amount paid out for debt servicing was 
some US$1 000 million, of which US$300 million constituted payments of principal: 30% more than 
the previous year. The remaining US$700 million were disbursed under the head of interest 
payments, which decreased by some 10% (see table 13). 
The total external debt was easily three times the total value of exports of goods and services, 
and the relevant coefficient therefore reached its highest level since the beginning of the decade. 
As a result of the increase in amortization payments and the decline in external sales, the 
debt/exports of goods and services ratio went up from around 30% in 1985 to almost 40%. On the 
other hand, as a result of the decline in international interest rates, the ratio of interest payments to 
exports of goods and services changed only slightly, standing at 27%. 
As debt servicing remained virtually unchanged and the new loans received increased by 
US$270 million to over US$2 billion, the ratio of these two variables fell for the second consecutive 
year, this time from 56% to 49%. 
On the other hand, as the external debt continued to be serviced during the year and yet at the 
same time it was necessary to reduce the balance-of-payments disequilibrium caused by the slump in 
exports, the government was faced with the need to secure additional financial resources. Conse-
quently, in May it obtained credit from the United States government in the amount of US$150 
million to compensate for the drop in the price of petroleum. At the same time, the World Bank 
granted a loan for a further US$145 million. 
The government also signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund which 
enabled it to obtain a stand-by credit for around US$75 million as well as another credit of some 
US$40 million to compensate for the decline in the price of crude. The Andean Reserve Fund, for its 
part, granted Ecuador resources in the amount of US$170 million over a period of four years. Lastly, 
the country received a further US$200 million from a sindicated loan granted by its main creditors at 
1.5% over LIBOR or 1% over the prime rate. The granting of these loans led to the view in various 
circles that Ecuador had been one of the first beneficiaries of the Baker Plan. 
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Before the end of the year, the government adopted an initial external debt capitalization plan 
along the lines of those applied in other countries of the region, so that creditors could convert their 
credits into equity. However, the plan was quickly abandoned and replaced by another which came 
into effect at the beginning of 1987. 
d) Exchange and foreign trade policy 
With a view to promoting exports, especially non-traditional ones, and to discouraging imports 
by, inter alia, eliminating under-invoicing or over-invoicing, the official and intervention foreign 
exchange markets had been unified at the end of the previous year. The official exchange rate rose by 
around 42%, and all public and private transactions relating to exports and imports, debt servicing, 
credit disbursements, capital repatriation and remittance of profits abroad had to be carried out on the 
intervention market. 
During the first half of 1986, the main principles of the policy established the previous 
November were followed on the whole. The official exchange rate for buyers was maintained at 95 
sucres per dollar. In January, however, the intervention market rate was raised yet again, this time by 
14%, so that the sucre/dollar ratio rose to 108.5 for buyers and 110 for sellers. The purpose of this 
measure was not only to promote exports and restrict imports but also —what was much more, 
important at that time— to reduce the imbalance that the drop in the international price of 
petroleum would create in the public sector accounts and in the balance of payments. 
During the year, the price of petroleum continued to slide and it became increasingly difficult to 
service the external debt and at the same time import the most essential items. 
Furthermore, the price of the dollar on the parallel market was gradually increasing. Specula-
tion against the sucre forced the dollar value up by around 30% between January and July, creating 
signs of instability on the exchange market. 
In view of this situation, in August the authorities modified the exchange rate policy by creating 
two transaction areas. The first —consisting of the intervention market of the Central Bank— would 
deal only with the public sector's foreign trade operations. In other words, that market sold foreign 
exchange only for government imports, servicing of the public external debt and other services 
essential to the State. The foreign exchange on this market would come from petroleum exports and 
from the disbursement of the external loans secured by the government. At the same time, as a result 
of an increase of some 35%, the sucre/dollar ratio was fixed at 146 and 147 sucres for buyers and 
sellers respectively. The government also decided to allow the currency to float, in order to keep the 
exchange rate in line with the free market rate. 
In the second market, made up of the private banks and the exchange houses, only purchases 
and sales of foreign exchange for the private sector were transacted. The value of the United States 
dollar was left to be determined by the free interaction of supply and demand, and exporters were 
obliged to convert the foreign assets proceeding from their operations into sucres. As from July there 
was a reversal of the upward trend observed in this area, and this became more marked with the 
application of the new exchange policy. Consequently, in December 1986 the value of the dollar was 
only 15% more than at the same time in 1985. 
The object of creating these two areas was fundamentally to make the market in public sector 
assets independent of that of the private sector, thus placing the State in a better position to pay for its 
own imports and service the external debt. For its part, the permission given to the private sector to 
liquidate its foreign exchange at the parallel market exchange rate increased the profitability of 
exports, although importers, on the other hand, had to face an initial increase in the price of their 
purchases abroad expressed in sucres. 
The exchange reform did not modify the designated official exchange rate, the value of which 
remained unchanged throughout the year at 95 sucres per dollar. However, this rate is used purely for 
accounting purposes by the Central Bank. 
Finally, because of the increases in the nominal exchange rate already indicated and the modest 
rate of price increases, the average variations in the real effective exchange rate indexes for exports 
and imports were 2% and 12%, respectively. This contrasted with the upward trend of export prices 
and the lowering of import prices observed in 1985 (see table 14). 
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4. Prices and wages 
a) Trends in prices 
The variation between annual averages of the consumer price index was 23%, compared with 
28% the previous year, due fundamentally to the slowing down of the increases in food prices (31 % 
to 23%), thanks to the excellent crop yields, especially in respect of products intended for the 
domestic market. However, the year closed with a 12-month variation which, at 27% was higher than 
that observed for December 1984-December 1985. 
The prices of foodstuffs and beverages increased by a similar percentage to that of the overall 
index. On the other hand, in December the prices of housing services showed a 12-month variation 
which was almost double that of 1985, while clothing increased by 34.5% compared with 24.5% one 
year before. 
During the first half of the year there was a definite downward trend in the consumer price 
index, especially from February onwards (see figure 3). The prices of foodstuffs followed a similar 
course and even fell in absolute terms in May and June. The general index began to rise again in 
August, and this tendency was especially marked during the period from August to October, but 
subsequently it slowed down (see table 15 and figure 3). 
Generally speaking, it is likely that the price increases were connected with some of
 sthe 
measures adopted during the year. Thus, the increases during the early months of the year were 
probably influenced by the devaluations at the end of 1985 and injanuary 1986, plus the creation of 
the exchange risk commission and the introduction of the prior deposit for imports. The increases in 
the charges made for certain public services (domestic air transport, electricity, water and telephone 
installations) must also have contributed to this. 
The resurgence of inflation in August and subsequent months, for its part, is traceable to the 
freeing of interest rates and the transfer of all private imports to the intervention market. To some 
extent, however, this effect must have been offset by the tariff reductions adopted during the year. 
b) Wages 
The minimum living wage (8 500 sucres per month), which had been in effect since the 
beginning of 1985, was raised to 10 000 sucres injanuary and to 12 000 as from August. Its annual 
average was therefore slightly more than 10 800 sucres, which represented a nominal increase of 
30% and an increase of 7.5% in real terms. Even so, it failed to offset the sharp falls suffered in the 
previous four years, which taken together came to around 33% (see table 16). 
The minimum wages of the other wage-earners, measured in constant values, also improved. 
The greatest increases were registered by craft workers (10.5%), wage-earners in the Sierra region 
(13%) and workers in small-scale industry (15%). The real minimum wages of agricultural workers 
in the coastal and Oriente regions and of domestic servants also rose but by smaller amounts (5.5% 
and 8%, respectively). In none of these cases did the rises make up for the sharp decline in real wages 
during the previous years. 
If the premiums and bonuses also received are taken into account, the average minimum living 
wage came to somewhat more than 17 000 sucres per month. In nominal terms, this represented an 
increase of almost 28%, but in constant-value currency it amounted in fact to only 4%, so that there 
was no real recovery from the losses accumulated in-previous years. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
a) Monetary developments 
As in the previous year, the monetary policy sought to prevent the existing liquidity from 
increasing inflation, to maintain the restrictions on the public sector's access to credit from the 
Central Bank, to reduce the private banking system's dependence on the issuing agency. 
Thus, the growth rate of the money supply in the strictest sense of the term (M, ) slackened once 
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30%, the expanded money supply (M2) increased somewhat more than 25%. The monetary base, for 
its part, grew by 37% (see table 17). 
Among the main changes in the factors of expansion of the money supply was the decline in 
foreign assets monetized by the Central Bank, this phenomenon being due to the loss of income 
suffered by the government on account of the slump in petroleum prices. Moreover, the growth rate 
of domestic credit slackened to 17% after having risen to 49% and 42% in 1984 and 1985, 
respectively. This performance was attributable to a further contraction in the amount of funds 
received by the public sector and to the smaller supply of credit granted to the private sector. 
For the third consecutive year, the net credit received by the central government showed a 
negative balance. The resources procured by the rest of the public sector followed a relatively similar 
course. Conversely, the credit received by other agents increased ( 16%), although at a lower rate than 
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inl985(25%).A similar situation occurred with the private financing entities, which increased their 
financial resources by only 12%, compared with annual average expansion of 190% during the 
two-year period 1983-1984. 
The slackening in the rate of nominal variation of the main monetary aggregates and in price 
increases meant that in real terms the amount of money was only just enough to meet the needs of the 
economy. This was evident to some extent in the performance of interest rates. At the end of the year, 
the effective interest rate on credit operations on the whole was 26%, or three percentage points 
higher than in 1985; for their part, the rates paid by banks on savings and time deposits increased 
from 20-22% to 21-27% in 1986. Notwithstanding these increases, interest rates continued to be 
negative in real terms (see table 18). 
The measures adopted in this area sought to consolidate the reforms introduced the previous 
year. Thus, in January the establishment of readjustable interest rates for loan and deposit operations 
of the financial system with a minimum term of two years was approved and the minimum value of 
accumulation policies was reduced to 750 000 sucres.2 The most radical measure was taken in August, 
when in order to stimulate saving in national currency and to reduce the financial system's depend-
ence on the Central Bank, all interest rates were completely freed. The object of this decision was to 
permit the market to determine the price of money and to offer private savers other options besides 
the US dollar. 
The freeing of interest rates occurred at the same time as the division of the foreign exchange 
market into two areas. As was originally hoped, the rise in the dollar quotation on the parallel market 
slackened while the average value of nominal interest rates paid annually on the accumulation 
policies increased. In any event, the credits to the private sector that were rediscounted in the Central 
Bank at preferential interest rates continued in effect. 
During the year, the minimum reserve rate was changed several times, in order to regulate the 
surplus liquidity and the corresponding pressure on the foreign exchange market. At the end of 1986, 
the reserve rate for demand deposits in private banks was set at 27%, two percentage points above 
the rate for December the year before. 
Lastly, alongside the other decisions aimed at further liberalizing the monetary system without 
interfering with the Central Bank's supervisory duty, special rediscount lines were created in some 
cases and expanded in others, particularly in order to give support to the agricultural sector. 
b) Government income and expenditure 
The public sector budget had for long been based on petroleum income, which in 1985 
accounted for 60% of net revenue (see table 19). The sudden decline in the price of crude therefore 
drastically affected the public income and expenditure programmes and made the management of the 
fiscal variables one of the most conflictive aspects of economic policy. 
The net current income of the State fell by almost 2% in nominal terms, after the 90% increase 
recorded in 1985 and the 65% rise registered in 1984, and as a proportion of the domestic product it 
dropped from 17% to 14%. In turn, the income from petroleum took a spectacular downward turn 
(-35%), after a period of continued rapid growth. The decline affected with equal force both the tax 
and non-tax income from petroleum. However, it was traditionally the latter which constituted the 
largest source of income, and despite such a sharp fall they continued to represent more than 95% of 
total earnings from crude. 
'Through the creation in March 1985 of a new kind of financial asset known as special accumulation policies, sold in 
minimum amounts of one million sucres and yielding readjustable interest rates, the government sought to channel the 
resources negotiated in the non-banking market to the banking system. Besides encouraging saving, this enabled greater 
control to be exercised over the monetary variables and at the same time made it more difficult to divert the resources in 
question towards the parallel external assets market. 
These policies sold well on the capital market, and at the end of 1985 the funds obtained by the banks represented 
approximately a quarter of the money supply. The majority of these funds were, however, placed on short-term deposit ( less 
than nine months) and the annual yield —which declined during the year— fluctuated in nominal terms between 249? for 
three to four-month policies and 21% for policies of over one year. 
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These losses were partly offset by the performance of non-petroleum income and, to a much 
lesser extent, by the developments in capital income. The former expanded by around 55% in 
nominal terms (equivalent to approximately half this in real terms). Thanks to this increase, its share 
in net current income climbed from 40% in 1985 to nearly 65%. 
The greatest increases were recorded in income from direct and indirect taxation. The changes 
made in the income tax scale were reflected in the 47% increment recorded in revenue from direct 
taxation, while the upsurge of 77% in indirect taxes was attributable to the increase in the sales tax. 
Revenue from taxes on foreign trade, however, grew less than the previous year (39%). 
The corrections made during the year in order to bring expenditure into line with income 
meant that the former grew by only 3% in real terms and increased only slightly as a percentage of the 
product. A similar trend was observed in current and capital disbursements. The former increased by 
about 20%, as against 53% one year before, while the latter rose by about 40%, whereas in 1985 they 
had expanded by 55%. As a percentage of the product, current expenditure increased more than 
capital outlays. 
The overall result was that the State budget turned in a deficit of some 38 billion sucres, in 
contrast with the surplus of close to 12 billion sucres registered in 1985. There was thus a resurgence 
of the trend towards an imbalance which had appeared in 1981 and had only been interrupted during 




ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Population (thousands of inhabitans) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Per capita gross national income 
Unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real minimum wage 
Money (M,) ' 
Net current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
of government 




















































































































Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
18.9 1.6 -7.7 -1.7 9.5 11.7 -22.3 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 
Total external debt 
















816 1 012 
-1 027 -1 215 
657 875 
-381 -328 










"Provisional figures. ''Including various allowances and bonuses. ' From December 
































ECUADOR: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D DEMAND" 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 














Exports of goods and 
services 
















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"These series are calculated on the basis of official figures, re-weighted with the structure at current 1980 prices. Consequently, 
the results obtained do not necessarily coincide with those published by the countries in their calculations at constant prices. 
Likewise, the figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from IMF balance-of-payments figures 
in current dollars, converted to constant 1980 values using unit value indexes calculated by ECLAC for the 
purpose. Preliminary figures. 
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Table 3 
ECUADOR: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY" 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture 





Electricity, gas and water 





insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 




Less: imputed charges 
for banking services 



























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"These series are calculated on the basis of official figures, re-weighted with the structure at current 1980 prices. Consequently, 
the results obtained do not necessarily coincide with those published by the countries in their calculations at constant 


















































































































































































































































































































































ECUADOR: INDICATORS OF FISHERY PRODUCTION 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1.984 










Millions of sucres at 1975 prices 
1 949 2 340 2 832 3 115 
























































Source: CONADE, Department of Fisheries, and Central Bank of Ecuador. 
" Preliminary figures. Includes fishing and hunting. 
Table 6 





Production of petroleum 
products 
Exports of petroleum 
products 
Imports of petroleum 
products 




















































































ECUADOR: GROSS MANUFACTURING PRODUCT 
Manufacturing 
Food 
Beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 
leather goods 
Wood and wood products 
Paper and printed matter 
Chemical and rubber 
products 
Basic metal and non-
metallic products 
Machinery, equipment 
and transport material 
Other manufactures 



























































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Excludes oil refining. 
Table 8 
ECUADOR: MAIN INDICATORS OF FOREIGN TRADE 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods 
Purchasing power of exports 
of goods and services 
Indexes of volume 
Exports of goods 
Imports of goods 




































































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes fish meal and other products. 
Table 10 






















































































Source: Centra) Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of barrels. 
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Table 11 





































































































































































ECUADOR: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 






















































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. 'includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 
assets and liabilities. JEquals the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign), plus counterpart items. 
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Table 13 
ECUADOR: EXTERNAL DEBT 
ECUADOR 
A. Total externa] debt'' 








































1982 1983 1984 
Millions of dollars 














































































1982 1983 1984 1985 



































































Total external debt/ 
exports of goods 
and services 
Service/exports of 
goods and services' 
Net interest payments/ 































Source: ÉCLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Preliminary figures. End-of-year balances, excluding debt owed to the International Monetary Fund. 'From 
November 1982, the refinancing of the external debt owed to foreign banks was assumed as debt by the Central Bank From 
June 1983, the refinancing of the external debt owed to the Paris Club became part of the government external 
debt. The figures for disbursements include the amounts refinanced during the respective years. 'Service does 
not include the amounts refinanced. Refers to total net interest payments as given in the balance of payments. 
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Table 14 







































Nominal exchange rate" 
































Indexes of real 



































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information from the Central Bank of Ecuador, Información Estadística and the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics. 
'Refers to the average of the buyer's and seller's rate in the case of the official market and the seller's rate in the case of the 
Central Bank free rate and the free market proper. Corresponds to the average index of the real exchange rate for the 
currencies of Ecuador's, main trading partners, weighted by the relative importance of exports or imports, as appropriate, to 
or from these countries. From 1970 to 1980, these weightings correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979, and from 
1981, to the average for the period 1982-1985. The exchange rate used in Ecuador was as follows: up to 1983 the official 
quotation was used; in 1984, an average of the official and the Central Bank free rates was used, and from 1985 onwards the 
Central bank free rate. See the Technical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981 for the methodology and 
sources used. 
Table 15 
ECUADOR: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX" 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Variation from December to December 
Consumer price index 
Food 










Variation between annual averages 
13.0 16.0 16.3 48.4 













Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Up to 1980, corresponds to the consumer price index for Quito. As from 1981, corresponds to the national consumer price 




ECUADOR: EVOLUTION OF MINIMUM MONTHLY WAGES 
























Sucres at current p 


























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 
"Annual averages. The nominal wages were deflated by the national urban consumer price index. 
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Table 17 







Money plus quasi-money (M2) 
Determinants of M2 
Factors of expansion 
Net international assets 
Domestic credit 
Central Government (net) 




Net unclassified assets 
Others 
Factors of contraction 
Medium and long-term 
external liabilities 






















































































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 
Table 18 
ECUADOR: SHORT-TERM BANK INTEREST RATES" 








































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Ecuador. 




ECUADOR: GENERAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
A. Total net income ( 1 + 6 ) 
1. Net current income 
2. Gross current income 
( 3 + 4 + 5) 











6. Capital income 
B. Total expenditure ( 1 + 2 ) 
1. Current expenditure 




2. Capital expenditure 
Deficit/Surplus (A - B) 
Ratios (percentages) 
Net current income/GDP 
Total expenditure/GDPc 

































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Ecuador. 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The weak economic recovery made by El Salvador during the preceding two years slowed down even 
further in 1986, with the gross domestic product increasing by less than 1%. This led to a greater 
decline in employment and income in many sectors and to the persistence of a marked underutiliza-
tion of installed capacity. The emergence of temporary difficulties with respect to the domestic supply 
of some goods also intensified inflationary pressures. Furthermore, the country continued to suffer 
from huge deficits in its balance of payments and public finances (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The armed conflict, which dragged on for the seventh consecutive year, continued to take its toll 
in the form of the destruction of physical capital and basic infrastructure, production losses and a 
reduction in usable farmland, the obstruction and irregularity of support services, the disarticulation 
of some productive activities, the discouragement of private investment and the diversion of financial 
resources to the conflict, with the concomitant adverse impact of such a situation on the bulk of 
productive activities. In the political arena, the growing polarization caused by the conflict further 
hampered any attempt by the different groups in the country to reach agreement as to a concerted 
course of national action. In the social sphere, the displacement of vast numbers of people within the 
country continued, and there was an increasing exodus of skilled manpower. 
The government attempted to deal with this highly complex crisis, in which both structural and 
cyclical factors are at work, through the application of the Economic Stabilization and Reactivation 
Plan which it introduced at the start of the year. The aim of this plan, in addition to seeking a means of 
financial adjustment, was to boost production and exports. To these ends, the measures provided for 
under the plan included: the devaluation of the colón, a fiscal reform consisting of an increase in the 
selective tax on consumption and wealth, the adoption of a policy of monetary restraint, increases in 
interest rates, the raising of transport charges and fuel prices, and wage adjustments for year-round 
agricultural workers and both manual and non-manual workers in industry and urban services. The 
plan also provided for the facilitation of credit to the private sector, but in real terms the level of such 
credit proved to be less than in 1985. 
Because of the growing polarization created by the armed conflict and the ensuing difficulties in 
respect of the mounting of any concerted social effort, only some of the measures included in the plan 
could be executed. The measures that were implemented, together with a number of positive factors 
deriving from the external sector, helped to maintain a moderate growth rate during the first nine 
months of the year which was much the same as that of the previous biennium. Growth was 
interrupted early in October, however, by the devastating earthquake which struck the city of San 
Salvador, where the bulk of the population and of the country's productive activities are located. ' This 
natural disaster was largely responsible for the sharp decline in output which resulted in a very low 
economic growth rate for the year as a whole. 
The problems created by the conflict continued to have a serious effect on the exportable supply 
of farm products. Unlike what had occurred in previous years, there was a marked improvement in 
the terms of trade, primarily as a consequence of the increase in coffee prices and the drop in oil 
prices. Nevertheless, the total volume of merchandise exports contracted by 17%, largely because of 
the decline in sales to the countries of the Central American Common Market. 
Once again, external donations (which were augmented by the international assistance given in 
the aftermath of the earthquake) constituted the main source of support for the overall functioning of 
'See ECLAC, 1986 San Salvador earthquake: damage, repercussions and assistance re¡7»ire¡¿(LC/MEX/L.}9/Rev.l), 
21 November 1986. 
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Figure 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Gross national income11 
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Figure 1 (concluded) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basts of official figures. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^Percentage variation from December to December. cMillions of 
dollars. ^Percentages. 
the economy. This provided the economy with some degree of liquidity in respect of external 
transactions and raised public-sector revenues. In terms of aggregate demand, the greater flow of 
donations from abroad made it possible to increase public consumption and investment; in turn, 
remittances from residents abroad helped to boost private consumption. These factors notwith-
standing, the per capita level of this variable remained below that of 1963-
In addition, unilateral external assistance also made it possible to meet overdue short-term 
commitments. As a result, the overall level of the external debt fell and its structure in terms of 
repayment periods and interest rates improved. 
The shrinkage of the volume of exports and a growing demand for machinery and equipment 
helped to generate the largest trade deficit in the last six years. Aside from the capital goods required 
for reconstruction work, from the very outset of the year the public sector began to step up its external 
purchases of transport and construction equipment for use in, among other things, repairing some 
public works, building rural access routes to the main zone of armed clashes and rehabilitating sites 
for settlement by displaced persons. 
The growth previously observed in the output of all sectors of the economy began to level off 
(except for construction) and, in some cases as in agriculture, even declined. Adverse weather 
conditions —strong winds at the beginning of the year and a prolonged mid-year drought— were 
partly to blame for the contraction of agriculture, as was the fact that the conflict spread to a larger 
area. Industrial production, for its part, slackened as a result of the lack of incentives in both domestic 
and external markets, difficulties in obtaining inputs and the irregular provision of support services. 
In the course of the year some temporary problems arose because certain goods were in short 
supply on the domestic market. This, coupled with the increases in the prices of imports caused by the 
devaluation, heightened inflationary pressures. These pressures eased towards the end of the year, 
however, thanks to the donations in kind that were received and the restoration of the distribution 
network, which made it possible to put a stop to the supply shortages and dislocation of the 
commercial system. Nonetheless, the average increase in prices far exceeded that of the preceding 
year. 
The continued uprooting of the population from the war zones aggravated the unemployment 
problem. The agricultural sector's diminished capacity to absorb manpower and the damage caused by 
the earthquake in urban areas raised the level of unemployment, especially in the capital. It had been 
hoped that the reconstruction work would provide jobs for some of the unemployed, but the 
execution of such projects went more slowly than expected due to institutional difficulties and to the 
country's limited operational capacity for mobilizing external assistance. 
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The central government had greater financial resources at its command owing to the excep-
tionally high level of income from coffee sales and of external donations and thus was able to increase 
total expenditure significantly. Furthermore, the deficit was partly covered by the sale of securities 
both through the banking system and directly to the public, without there being a need (as there had 
been during the previous two years) to rely on credit from the Central Bank. The rise in expenditure 
was, to a large extent, accounted for by the very high level of service payments on the domestic and 
external debts and by the increase in current transfer payments, with the result that the deficit was 
80% larger than that of 1985. 
As has already been stated, the Economic Stabilization and Reactivation Plan was only partially 
implemented. The magnitude of the devaluation of the colón (from 2.5 to 5 colones to the United 
States dollar on the official market) sparked off controversy, since exporters of manufactures, who 
had been carrying out transactions using the exchange rate for the dollar on the parallel market, 
thought that it was not large enough, while on the other hand, it appears to have resulted in an 
excessive increase in the costs borne by manufacturers producing for the domestic market. In 
addition, the wealth tax provided for under the plan was never applied because of the opposition that 
this measure aroused, while the imposition of new excise taxes and the raising of charges and service 
rates heightened inflationary pressures. Furthermore, the wage readjustments failed to offset the 
decline in the incomes of the various sectors of the labour force, thus prolonging a situation which 
dates back almost to the beginning of the decade. Although the private sector had greater access to 
credit, it made use of this opportunity to only a limited degree owing to the country's domestic 
instability and to a climate of uncertainty on the external market with the result that investment 
levels remained very low. Lastly, the moderate improvement in international liquidity was partly 
siphoned off for the purchase of war matériel or the repair of equipment damaged during military 
operations, with total purchases abroad exceeding the levels of previous years. Consequently, because 
the plan was applied only in part, in some cases it had relatively little effect while in others it actually 
exacerbated the imbalances it sought to correct. 
To sum up, during 1986 both the economic difficulties which the country has been experiencing 
since the beginning of the decade and the tensions associated with the armed conflict grew worse. 
These problems were compounded by the adverse effects of natural phenomena which seriously hurt 
agricultural production and, in particular, by the damage caused later in the year by the earthquake in 
El Salvador's capital city. Yet another factor was the private sector's reserved attitude towards the 
Economic Stabilization and Reactivation Programme. It is likely that the armed conflict and the 
prevailing uncertainty as to when it would end continued to influence the decisions of economic 
agents. Thus, they failed to take full advantage of the more favourable external economic 
environment, which led, inter alia, to an improvement in the terms of trade, a decline in interest rates 
and a steady and growing flow of remittances and donations from abroad. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
After having remained stagnant the year before, total supply increased by almost 3%, chiefly 
due to the considerable growth (9%) observed in the volume of imports (see table 2). 
The slowness and uncertainty of the recovery of economic activity was reflected in the fact that 
the level of the product was nine percentage points lower than it had been in 1980 even though it 
increased for the fourth consecutive year. The escalation of the war —which has led to a growing 
disarticulation of the productive sectors of the economy, the destruction of fixed capital, the 
dampening of investment and the diversion of resources to military operations— was one of the main 
factors responsible for this unsatisfactory result. 
Moreover, the violent earthquake that devastated the city of San Salvador in October inflicted 
heavy losses in terms of lives, capital and production. Preliminary estimates indicated that the gross 




The above factors were compounded by the poor weather conditions that severely hurt 
agriculture, the country's main production activity. At the beginning of the crop year, strong winds 
damaged the coffee blossoms and in mid-year a protracted drought caused the yields of other crops to 
plummet. 
Finally, the meagre results of the adjustment and economic reactivation plan constituted yet 
another negative factor, especially since the armed conflict continued to absorb a huge amount of 
resources and no effective agreement could be reached with the entrepreneurial sector. 
The volume of imports of goods and services grew by almost 10% and served as the main source 
of momentum for the moderate increase in total supply. This expansion primarily stemmed from the 
reconstruction work undertaken following the earthquake, which called for an exceedingly large 
volume of inputs and equipment. Even so, external purchases were only slightly higher than during 
the two preceding years due to foreign exchange constraints and the ban on imports of some luxury 
items. 
The trend in overall demand was just the opposite of that of supply, since, although domestic 
demand picked up (6%), real exports contracted substantially (-8%). The fastest-growing variable 
was investment in fixed capital (7%). This reflected the upturn observed in public investment, after 
five years of unrelenting decreases, thanks to the increase in the demand for equipment and materials 
for use in the reconstruction and repair of basic infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, to the 
heightened demand for transport equipment to replace the machinery damaged as a result of the 
fighting. Private investment also grew (nearly 8%) but more slowly than during the preceding two 
years. 
Lastly, the recovery in gross investment was mainly attributable to the accumulation of coffee 
stocks which occurred as a consequence of the fact that the sharp drop in international coffee prices 
from September onward brought exports of this product to a halt during the final months of the year. 
Despite this upturn, however, capital formation has fallen off considerably during the years of 
the armed struggle. The investment coefficient declined by seven points during the period 1978-1986, 
and the present coefficient (just 14%) may prove insufficient to keep domestic production moving 
forward and to maintain external competitiveness. 
Both private and public consumption grew by 4%. In addition to the greater requirements of 
the government as it strove to repair the damage caused by the earthquake, there is reason to believe 
that both the number of troops and their supply needs also increased. As a result of the continued 
expansion of consumption by this sector, its coefficient in respect of the gross domestic product 
(19%) was almost twice what it had been in 1975 (11%), while the share of the government budget 
devoted to defence and public security expenditures continued to mount. 
The increase in private consumption (4%) was somewhat faster than the growth rate of the 
population, but in per capita terms it was nonetheless fairly similar to the level recorded during the 
preceding biennium, which was the lowest in the last quarter of a century. If this fact is considered in 
conjunction with the rise in unemployment and underemployment, the conclusion is that the living 
conditions of vast sectors of the population deteriorated significantly. The above-mentioned increase 
in consumption was largely based on remittances from Salvadorans abroad. These remittances 
augmented the purchasing power of certain strata of the population after the devaluation, but it may 
reasonably be assumed that other sectors —particularly the informal sector, which grew in size as a 
consequence of the earthquake— did not play a part in this upturn in consumption. 
The steep decline in exports was accounted for by the inelasticity of crop-farming production, a 
number of weaknesses in external marketing activities, and the irregular rains which prevented 
farmers from taking advantage of such favourable factors as the substantial rise seen in the 
international price of coffee before its downward slide during the final quarter of the year. 
b) The main sectors of production 
The gross domestic product showed virtually no increase (see table 3), mainly because of the 
decline in crop-farming output and the repercussions of the earthquake in San Salvador. The 
earthquake caused property losses and disrupted some services, thus generally slowing down their 
expansion. Nevertheless, the work of reconstructing and repairing the damaged infrastructure 
during the last two months of 1986 did generate some growth. 
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i) Agriculture. The downward trend observed in agriculture during the last few years persisted, 
largely because this sector has been one of those most seriously affected by the fighting in the country 
(see table 4). Other factors included bad weather conditions, higher production costs —stemming 
from the increase in the price of the foreign exchange needed to purchase inputs from abroad and the 
requirement that they be paid for in advance— and the financial constraints arising out of delays in 
the granting of credits, as well as the extension of the conflict zone and the intensification of the 
fighting in the eastern part of the country (where staple grains and cotton are produced), which 
heightened the exodus of agricultural workers and the abandonment of crops. 
Among the exportable products, coffee output suffered a significant decline (-7%) because 
heavy winds in March damaged the blossoms of the coffee plants and because; less care was given to 
upkeep and to the applications of fertilizers and fungicides, all of which continued to result in a lower 
yield. The administrative and financial problems which have been affecting the marketing of coffee 
ever since the beginning of the decade also grew worse in 1986. Consequently, the incentives 
represented by the higher price brought by coffee on the international market —40% more than the 
average price in recent years— and the devaluation of the colón5 were partially undermined by a 
number of factors: firstly, a 15% surtax was levied on coffee exports when the price rose above 
US$140 per quintal; secondly the cost, in terms of the local currency, of fertilizers and pesticides 
doubled; and finally, a portion of the payment made to producers for their exports was received on a 
delayed basis. 
Cotton production plummeted by 35%, which brought the cumulative drop over a three-year 
period to more than 75 %. Once again, the area under cultivation decreased, and the yield slumped as a 
result of the drought in the middle of the year. The decline of this crop was also associated with the 
extension of the conflict zone and with problems relating to the profitability of cotton. 
The area under sugar cane cultivation expanded and production increased by 6% even though 
the yield was lower in the eastern part of the country due to the drought. This crop is in an uncertain 
position because of the progressive reductions in the United States import quota, which dropped 
from an annual average of 73 000 tons in 1983 and 1984 to 50 000 tons in 1985 and 1986 and is to be 
reduced to 26 000 tons in 1987. However, the entry into operation of a processing plant for cane-
based alcohol fuel and, to a lesser extent, a better domestic market price constitute production 
incentives. 
The prolonged drought in mid-year did damage to more than 50% of the land area planted with 
crops for domestic consumption. The maize and rice harvests were nearly 12% and 23% smaller, 
respectively, but the sorghum harvest partially recovered from its decline of the preceding year. Only 
bean production increased significantly, due to the fact that a larger area was sown with this crop and 
that the drought affected only one-seventh of the planted area. The poor showing made by 
crop-farming activity resulted in a 7% drop in the domestic supply of grains, which rendered the 
staple food supply of the population even more precarious. 
The decrease in crop-farming production was partially offset by the good performance turned 
in by stock-raising activity (3%). The fact that the volume of meat production was quite similar to 
that of 1980 represented a significant recovery from the sharp and sustained decreases seen in 
previous years. The main factor in this upturn was the promotion of poultry raising, which was once 
again the fastest-growing activity in the subsector. 
The number of pigs slaughtered declined by more than 12% as a consequence of the 
cysticercosis which has been attacking these animals during the past three years. In contrast, as a 
result of the increase in the cattle herd, cattle slaughtering recovered (5%) from its drop of the 
preceding year and milk production showed some growth. Because of the fighting, the cattle herd has 
had to be transferred to the western part of the country, where there is less pastureland. This has 
made it necessary to stable the cattle and to use more sophisticated reproduction techniques; as a 
result, a higher productivity rate is now beginning to be observed. 
The third stage of the agrarian reform effort was completed in 1986, bringing the total area 
involved in this process to some 340 000 hectares. Nevertheless, the land now being worked which is 
'Because of the devaluation, coffee producers' export earnings rose only 18%. This was due to the fact that, by official 




covered by the reform was reduced by almost 50 000 hectares in the space of one year because some of 
the beneficiaries of this programme abandoned farms located in the conflict zone and because the 
government took back land for various reasons. Due to its importance in the production of basic 
grains, the reformed sector played an important role in the farming production system. 
ii) Manufacturing. Production in this sector expanded for the fourth consecutive year, although 
more slowly (2%) than in 1985 (see table 5). Difficulties in obtaining supplies of various inputs 
contributed to this slowdown: in the case of imports, the main factors were the higher cost of foreign 
exchange and the unwieldiness of the regional market; with respect to domestic products, the 
problem was the drop in crop-farming production. Finally, other negative factors were the 
irregularity in the provision of electrical energy and transport services and the above-mentioned 
slackening of both domestic and regional demand. 
The performance of the various sectors was uneven; only the food industry grew significantly 
(almost 5%) and for the third consecutive year, as a result of which this industry finally regained the 
level of production volumes that it had reached early in the decade. Since this subsector generates 
65 % of the aggregate value of manufactures, its dynamism compensated for the stagnation or decline 
observed in the others. In the days following the earthquake, industrial activity started on a steep 
downward slide which was only halted when a regular supply of electricity was gradually restored. 
The potential of the industrial and construction sectors is being hurt by the emigration of 
skilled human resources. Furthermore, the weakening of the accumulation process in the private 
sector has also contributed to the decapitalization of some manufacturing subsectors. Both of these 
elements are holding back the reactivation of industry. 
iii) Construction. Along with government services, construction was one of the most dynamic 
sector in the economy, since it grew by close to 4%. Nonetheless, the level of construction remained 
below that of 1980. 
The public sector attempted to fuel the growth which this activity has achieved since 1985 
thanks to the building of low-cost housing by carrying forward the repair of roads and other 
infrastructure damaged as a result of military operations. 
External emergency financial aid received after the earthquake (a total of US$50 million) 
provided support for the sector in the form of loans for housing reconstruction and repair and credits 
to small enterprises.4 In addition, a total of 18% of the donated funds were used to build temporary 
shelters and provisional housing.5 
Consequently, the impetus given to construction activity came mainly from the private sector, 
autonomous institutions and co-operatives, in the form of the building of urban housing begun the 
year before. In addition, following the earthquake the work of restoring dwellings in marginal urban 
areas was stepped up, as were resettlement projects in rural areas for persons displaced by the armed 
conflict. 
iv) Services. On the whole, the growth of services slowed as a result of the war, the decline in the 
total supply of goods, and the disruption of distribution channels caused by the earthquake. Thus, 
basic services grew by only 2% and the others by just 1%. 
The generation of electrical energy was affected by reservoir supply problems (due to the long 
summer drought) and by the drop in the output of the Ahuachapán geothermal plant. Electricity 
generation therefore increased by only 3%, while consumption is calculated to have fallen —by nearly 
2% in the case of industry— because of interruptions in supply (see table 6). 
The earthquake also had a strong impact on non-basic services and on the informal sector of the 
economy because it destroyed or severely damaged the infrastructure used by these activities. San 
Salvador's established businesses and financial and administrative services were also concentrated in 
the area of the city most affected by the earthquake. In addition, many of the dwellings that were 
damaged were being used as workshops and retail stores. In any event, even during the first half of the 
4The earthquake resulted in the destruction of 23 000 dwellings and seriously damaged 30 000 other buildings in the 
area of San Salvador, which was the most severely affected zone. See World Bank, Resumen de las conclusiones de la misión del 
Banco Mundial sobre el terremoto de San Salvador y la estrategia de reconstrucción, San Salvador, 25 October 1986, and 
ECLAC, 1986 San Saltador earthquake .... op. cit. 
'In 1987, the reconstruction work, which was still in its initial stages, was expected to involve bilateral external 
financing in the amount of USJ234 million; this financing was to be made available subject to the submission of formal project 
proposals. 
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year the commercial sector was already experiencing supply difficulties, which partly accounts for the 
fact that it remained stagnant for the second year in a row. The banks and, to a lesser extent, the 
government service quickly recovered from the disaster and resumed their operations. The 
emergency work that had to be carried out as a result of the earthquake thus helped to make 
government services one of the fastest-growing sectors of the economy (4%). 
c) Employment 
Open unemployment and underemployment continued to be two of the most serious 
manifestations of the crisis afflicting the country. Although official 1986 figures were not available, a 
series of factors indicate that the employment situation deteriorated considerably. Foremost among 
these were the forced removal of the population from the conflict zone, the decline observed in the 
capacity to absorb agricultural manpower and the destruction by the earthquake of the sources of 
employment of a large number of urban workers. 
Unemployment in rural areas spread as the fighting in the eastern and central zones of the 
country took in a larger area than before, thereby augmenting the exodus of peasants from these areas 
and making their resettlement more difficult. According to official sources, from the start of the 
conflict up to the end of 1986, more than 600 000 persons had been displaced from their places of 
origin, with many workers emigrating out of the country, especially to the United States. Poor 
harvests and the decline in the number of jobs provided by crop upkeep and preparation activities 
have further aggravated the problem of unemployment in agriculture. 
In urban areas the dynamism of some activities, such as construction and the food and wood 
industries, provided more jobs, but not in sufficient numbers to offset the adverse effect on 
employment in net terms (the number of jobs fell by 38 000) of the earthquake and the slowdown in 
other sectors. In the area of government administration employment remained stagnant because of 
the prevailing budgetary constraints. Towards the end of the year, however, US$4 million from the 
earthquake emergency fund was used to contract labour for clearing rubble 
3. The external sector 
a) General trends 
The improvement of the terms of trade, which was chiefly due to the increase in coffee prices 
and the reduction in the prices of hydrocarbons, and the moderate decline seen in interest rates 
created a more favourable climate for the external sector (see table 7). Nevertheless, the drop in the 
output of exportable products and the difficulties encountered in finding external markets for certain 
articles caused the volume of foreign sales to plummet. The purchasing power of exports of goods was 
consequently lower than it had been in 1980. Furthermore, as imports increased, the trade deficit 
reached the highest level recorded so far in the 1980s. Nevertheless, as a result of a greater income 
from private transfer payments, the country's enormous deficit on current account was reduced 
slightly. Finally, despite sizeable donations from official sources, net capital inflows were 
substantially lower and international reserves were drawn down by US$15 million (see table 8). 
b) Merchandise trade 
i) Exports. After two years of decreases, the value of exports made a recovery (7%) thanks to 
the growth shown by traditional products (12%). By contrast, the value of sales of manufactures 
decreased by 55% and the remaining export items remained stagnant. On average, the unit value of 
traditional goods increased by 38%, while the exported volume of these products —coffee, cotton, 
sugar and shrimp— slumped by 19% in overall terms (see table 9). 
Only coffee sales, as a result of the extraordinary increase in the price of this product on the 
external market, lent some dynamism to export earnings. As from the end of 1985, following this 
rise, the quotas allocated by the International Coffee Organization were thrown open and, in 
consequence, the supply on the traditional market gradually increased. Then, by around the second 
half of 1986, difficulties began to be encountered in placing this product on the market as its 
international price fell without there being a reassignment of quotas, pushing the sales volume down 
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by 17%. Because of the higher prices (the annual average was approximately US$183 per quintal), 
however, the value of coffee exports nonetheless represented almost 73% of total sales. 
Cotton exports dropped substantially due to the combined effect of a steep decline in the 
volume of sales (one-fifth of that of 1985) and a further downturn in the average price on the 
international market, which in two years showed a cumulative decrease of 57%. 
The quota for sugar exports assigned to El Salvador by the United States was cut from 75 000 to 
50 000 short tons, and the total volume of sales therefore went down as well. This product has ceased 
to be competitive in external markets despite the increase in the average effective price, which 
continued to be exceedingly low (US$11.80 per quintal) in comparison to its production costs.6 For its 
part, shrimp —whose price has remained virtually unchanged over the past three years— was sold at 
a price 25% lower than the quotation on the international market. Nevertheless, because of the 
substantial increase in the volume exported (37%), the value of shrimp exports increased. 
Taken as a whole, the remaining exports (mainly textile, leather and chemical manufactures) 
declined. As has already been indicated, the high content of imported inputs (between 20% and 50%) 
in the manufactures exported by El Salvador and the resurgence of domestic inflation reduced the 
competitiveness of these products on the Central American Common Market, particularly as regards 
trade with Guatemala. 
Although the export promotion policy —which is one of the core elements of the national 
reactivation programme— has yet to produce results, institutional efforts continued to be made to 
strengthen it. Such initiatives included the application of the Central American tariff, the introduc-
tion of fiscal incentives for exports of manufactures —e.g., a 10-year tax exemption and tax discount 
certificates— and the creation of an agency whose purpose is to centralize and simplify administra-
tive procedures with respect to exports (CENTREX). 
ii) Imports. External purchases increased by 4% in nominal terms, thus recovering from the 
decline recorded in 1985, although in real terms this represented a return to the 1984 level, which was 
itself 27% lower than the level reached before the outbreak of the armed conflict. The greater 
availability of foreign exchange, due in large measure to the donations received by the country, made 
it possible to increase purchases both from Central America and from the rest of the world, since a 
number of payment problems, particularly with trading partners in the region, were thus resolved 
(see table 10). 
External purchases of consumer goods again slumped (-6%), this time owing to the ban on the 
importation of luxury articles, with the result that imports of durable goods decreased by one-third. 
Purchases of non-durable goods followed a downward trend until the last quarter of the year, when 
food imports had to be increased in order to alleviate the supply problems caused by the earthquake. 
As the shortage of foreign exchange was mitigated by the reduction in the country's oil bill, it 
became possible to increase imports of intermediate goods for agriculture, particularly fertilizers, 
pesticides and fungicides. Repair and reconstruction work undertaken following the earthquake also 
boosted the importation of materials (46%), and purchases of intermediate goods consequently rose 
by more than 6%. 
Imports of certain capital goods (mainly office equipment and equipment to replace the stocks 
destroyed by the earthquake) increased once again, although at a slower rate than that of the 
preceding year. A larger number of motor vehicles (12%) was imported due to the need to replace 
those vehicles destroyed in the fighting and by acts of sabotage,7 thus helping to maintain the growth 
of this import item, although the rate of increase was lower than in previous years. The purchase of 
construction equipment also helped to push up total imports during the last quarter of the year. 
Exchange controls and the marked underutilization of production capacity in agriculture and manu-
facturing were both factors in the contraction of the demand for equipment for use in these activities. 
iii) Terms of trade and the purchasing power of merchandise exports. The terms of trade for 
merchandise improved by 28%, owing in large measure to the extraordinary increase in the price of 
coffee. Nevertheless, this upturn failed to offset the whole of the cumulative decline recorded during 
the decade. Moreover, the favourable trend in the average price of exports was accompanied by a 
6In Malawi, the country which has the lowest costs on the market, the production costs of raw sugar cane amounted to 
US$8.70 per quintal. (GEPLACEA. Bulletin No. 1, vol. IV, January 1987.) 
'A loan was placed on imports of all motor vehicles except for work vehicles. 
341 
further decrease in the volume of sales (-12%) due to the drop in the exportable supply of a number of 
items and the slump in external demand for others. Consequently, these higher prices were ultimately 
reflected in no more than a slight recovery in the purchasing power of exports, which in any event 
was far less than it had been in 1980 (see table 7). 
c) The trade and current account balances 
The trade deficit (-US$271 million) was the highest of the decade and stemmed from both the 
persistent merchandise trade imbalance and the growth of the deficit in the real services account. 
Trade with the Central American Common Market was responsible for more than 60% of the 
imbalance in merchandise trade (-US$212 million). Although there has been a deficit in trade with 
Central America since 1980, during the last three years it has grown worse because the value of 
exports to the subregion has been halved, whereas imports have, on average, held steady at their 1984 
level. The loss of competitiveness of Salvadoran manufactures caused by the overvaluation of the 
colón appears to have added to the contraction in such exports, which has been further compounded 
by the problems in respect of reciprocal payments being experienced by the severely weakened 
Common Market. 
d) The current account position and its financing 
The deficit on current account was reduced thanks to the remittances —whose recorded amount 
was equivalent to 20% of merchandise export earnings— sent by Salvadorans abroad and to the 
reinsurance payments covering the losses and damage caused by the earthquake which were received 
in the country towards the end of the year. This improvement may prove to be only temporary, 
however, since the danger exists that unrequited private transfer payments,8 which was the main 
factor working against the deterioration of the trade account, may show a decrease in the future. 
The net inflow of capital decreased by almost US$90 million, due largely to the outflow of 
US$69 million in the form of overdue interest payments and to the lower level of long-term capital 
inflows. 
Official donations have constituted an increasingly important component of capital inflows; in 
1986, receipts under this heading amounted to 45% more than the deficit on current account and to 
60% more than the net balance on capital account. These donations have thus been, to a great extent, 
what has sustained the country's relative solvency vts-à-vis the exterior. The large sum of official 
donations received (US$251 million)9 by the country enabled it to meet its external commitments and 
to ease short-term pressures without having to resort to external commercial financing. 
According to official estimates, the net result of the capital operations (including net assistance 
from AID) figuring in the balance of payments was an increase equivalent to US$75 million in gross 
reserves. However, the actual inflow of capital totalled only US$158 million, while the deficit on 
current account amounted to US$ 173 million and a decline equivalent to US$ 15 million was recorded 
in international reserves. The difference between these two sets of figures accounted for by the fact 
that the monetary authorities revalued the country's gold holdings during the course of the year.10 
e) Exchange policy 
In 1986 the colón was devalued from 2.50 to 5 per dollar in an effort to restore the competitive-
ness of Salvadoran products on the Central American Common Market and to encourage the export 
sector. By making this and other complementary changes in the exchange system, the Central 
"The entry into force in the United States of what is known as the Simpson-Rodino Act beginning in September 1987 
and the United States government's refusal to grant exceptions in this connection mean that more than one million 
Salvadorans who are thought to have settled in that country are threatened with deportation. 
'This total includes US$51 million in emergency aid received from the Agency for International Development (AID) of 
the United States government after the earthquake. 
'"This revaluation was not included in the balance of payments because IMF accounting procedures dictate that such 
revaluations should only be taken into account if there has actually been a sale of gold. The revaluation amounted to US$90 
million inasmuch as the recorded value of the gold reserves had remained unchanged since 1978. See IMF, Balance of Payments 
Manual, fourth edition, Washington, D.C., 1977. 
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Reserve Bank of El Salvador regained a greater measure of control over transactions on the parallel 
market, particularly in respect of incoming transfer payments. 
These steps were taken in response to the fact that since the second half of 1985 inflation had 
been increasing at double the historical rate, with the result that the bulk of exports and nearly 60% of 
imports had been shifted to the non-official exchange market, where the average exchange rate was 
4.5 colones to the dollar. 
The devaluation was long overdue, since as early as 1981 serious imbalances had begun to 
appear in the trade and current accounts of the balance of payments, and capital flight had been 
mounting. The stimulus provided by the devaluation for the traditional agricultural export sector is 
thought to have been slight, however, since all such transactions were being carried out on the parallel 
market. Thus, the gross benefit derived by export agriculture from the devaluation came to approxi-
mately 18% in real terms. The effect of the duplication of the cost of the inputs which were previously 
traded on the official market would have to be subtracted from this figure. Similarly, the impact on 
exports of manufactures was smaller than the devaluation because the increase in the cost, in local 
currency, of imported materials would also have to be subtracted. Consequently, on average, the 
positive effect of the devaluation on total exports was counteracted by the impact of imports on 
domestic prices, which amounted to 14%. However, the conversion to a single exchange rate did 
make it possible to recover a sizeable portion of transfer payments since it resulted in the disappear-
ance of the parallel market. 
f) External indebtedness 
' The total external debt was reduced by US$69 million, mainly through the efforts made by the 
authorities to restructure the debt owed to external creditors by using medium-term lines of credit to 
bring about a significant decrease in the Central Bank's commitments and to consolidate external 
liabilities (see table 11). Furthermore, the private sector amortized US$28 million of its long-term 
debt, whereas its short-term debt rose by US$14 million. This latter increase was possible because 
new lines of credit were made available as a result of the favourable situation with respect to the 
country's main export item. Be this as it may, the level of the external debt, when measured as a 
percentage of the country's exports of goods and services (235%) remained high. 
The drive to relieve the pressure deriving from the external debt load of the government and 
the long-term debt burden of the private sector gave rise to a considerable increase in amortization 
payments, thus bringing the sum total of the debt service to US$427 million, i.e., nearly 48% of the 
country's exports of goods and services. As the international banks restricted the flow of short-term 
loans to the government sector and maintained disbursements at almost the same level as in 1985 
(US$260 million), a high percentage of these service payments were covered with funds provided by 
donations. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
The average consumer price index recorded a 32% increase (see table 12). The inflationary 
trend which had begun the previous year and then continued on into 1986 was compounded by the 
devaluation of the colón, the shortage of products for the domestic market and speculative trading. 
When a single-tiered exchange rate of five colones to the dollar was officially decreed at the end of 
January, the prices of a large number of the products in the basic shopping basket began to rise. In the 
case of those imports which were still being traded on the official market (petroleum and petroleum 
products, medicines, staple foods and some production inputs), the devaluation resulted in a 100% 
price increase in terms of the local currency. In the case of those that had been shifted to the parallel 
market since mid-1985, the impact was 18% according to official estimates. 
In order to hold down the rise in the prices of certain products in the shopping basket of 
mass-consumption goods, the government instituted a subsidy for fuel used in public transport 
—which was financed by a surtax on gasoline for private consumption— and placed price controls on 
essential goods. These measures were counteracted, however, by the decline in the supply of grains 
and of some manufactures (textiles and leather products) and the increases observed after the 
October earthquake in low-income housing rents, which had formerly been frozen. 
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The situation was aggravated by speculation in essential products, especially poultry and sugar. 
Whereas in October and November the general price index showed a slight decrease (probably as a 
result of the receipt of donations in kind after the earthquake), in December prices began to increase 
once again. 
In an attempt to lessen inflationary pressures, the government directed its monetary policy 
towards controlling the expansion of the means of payments, which had exerted pressure on the 
supply of goods and services in previous years. 
b) Wages 
The wage policy was aimed at halting the loss of purchasing power by certain sectors of the 
work force. To this end, the government decreed an across-the-board adjustment in the minimum 
daily wage (54% for men and 74% for women) as well as differentiated wage increases for 
Figure 2 
EL SALVADOR: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
344 
EL SALVADOR 
year-round agricultural jobs (55%) and urban occupations (15%). This measure proved to be no 
more than a temporary palliative, however, since although the increase in the minimum wage and in 
those earned by year-round rural workers exceeded the average rate of inflation for the year (27 % and 
14%, respectively), it was not enough to offset the cumulative drop in the real wage, which on 
average was 40% lower than that of 1980 (see table 13). 
The government had, since the beginning of the decade, followed a policy of wage freezes on 
account of the financial constraints entailed by military spending in connection with the armed 
conflict. It was not until 1984 that urban workers —mainly those in the public sector— had through 
the mobilization of the labour force and mass strikes, won some wage adjustments (which, during the 
past two years, have amounted to 14% less than the growth of consumer prices). The wage level of 
this group was thus the lowest of the last six years and represented a 55 % loss of purchasing power 
compared with 1980. 
Rural wages continued to decline even more rapidly: coffee-pickers and workers in coffee 
processing plants and in cotton and sugar mills suffered an accumulated wage decrease of 62 % during 
the period 1980-1986. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The monetary policy was aimed at restraining the expansion of the means of payment, 
establishing a more realistic external exchange rate, giving priority to financial support for the 
productive sector, restoring control over external transactions to the central authority and restricting 
credit to the public sector. In order to achieve these objectives, early in the year three measures were 
implemented: the devaluation of the colón, the strengthening of exchange controls and the framing 
of a legal definition of exchange-related offenses. Beginning in April, when it was ascertained that 
there was an excess of liquidity in the intermediation system, the minimum reserve requirement was 
raised for a period of four months and the borrowing and lending rates of the system were increased. 
These measures failed to check the inflationary process, however, which continued for reasons 
unrelated to monetary policy. 
The increase in official transfer payments, which was to some extent linked to the reconstruc-
tion of the city of San Salvador, and remittances of foreign exchange by residents abroad tended to add 
to the liquidity of the system. Nonetheless, other elements of the authorities' monetary policy, 
particularly that relating to credit for the public sector, helped to control the expansion of the money 
supply, which on average grew more slowly (21%) than prices (see table 14). 
The banking system recorded an increase in net international reserves, partly because of the 
revaluation of monetary gold holdings (despite the drop in long-term loans) and the steady 
expansion of credit to the private sector. Consequently, early in the year the monetary base showed an 
increase which had to be regulated, and this was done by raising the minimum reserve requirement 
from 20% to 25% during the period 1 April to 31 July. However, the credit multiplier nonetheless 
grew slightly because the minimum reserve requirement for commercial and mortgage banks were 
relaxed considerably in subsequent months." In addition, the public displayed less of a preference for 
the more liquid means of payment. Indeed, quasi-money expanded substantially (36%), despite the 
negative yields in real terms of medium-term accounts, since interest rates only rose from 15% to 
17%. Among the factors of absorption, long-term external loans declined due to the financial relief 
afforded by the greater inflow of donations from abroad. 
The driving force behind the monetary expansion was the 22% increase in credit to the private 
sector, in line with the authorities' policy of reactivating production. The provision of funds, taken 
out of external resources, for low-interest loans continued to be subject to the condition that they be 
used to promote agricultural production, exports or housing construction and repair. Credits were 
also granted at preferential rates as part of the policy of refinancing the overdue debts of the export 
crop-farming sector and of the industrial activities which had imported machinery and equipment for 
use in their operations. 
"The coefficient of commercial bank reserves in respect of total deposits gradually declined from 0.24 injuly to 0.14 in 
December. 
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The credit supplied by the Central Bank to public institutions expanded (4%) less than during 
the preceding year. Meanwhile, the amount of credit furnished to the central government dropped by 
10%, as a result of which it decided to sell bond to the public. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The government's fiscal imbalance grew worse in 1986 due to the greater outlays made in 
connection with the armed conflict, the extraordinary expenditures required after the earthquake and 
the servicing of the public debt. This occurred despite the fact that the tax burden climbed from 12% 
to 13% and that tax receipts increased by an unusually large amount, thereby generating a current 
savings of 105 million colones, which was far more than the year before (see table 15). 
Among the means used to finance the huge fiscal deficit, which almost doubled, external funds 
continued to feature prominently. The chief source of such funds was donations from AID, which were 
used to cover more than 80% of this deficit. With respect to domestic financing, although there was a 
decline in Central Bank lending in keeping with the aims of the government s monetary policy, the 
sale of securities on the open market increased markedly. 
The substantial rise (48%) in current income was attributable, inter alia, to the imposition of a 
temporary tax on windfall earnings from coffee sales—which brought in 635 million colones of extra 
income— and the additional tax revenues from imports deriving from the devaluation of the colón. 
At the same time, reforms made in the law governing the selective tax on consumption and on sales 
augmented the receipts from domestic transactions. 
Furthermore, the stricter supervision of taxpayers —especially those providing services on an 
independent basis— generated a 34% increase in income-tax revenues. Non-tax income also rose 
once again as further adjustments were made in the prices of goods and services provided by the 
government. 
Inasmuch as it had foreseen that the public deficit was going to be larger as a result of 
expenditures relating to the armed conflict, in October the government submitted a fiscal reform bill 
(the National Defence Taxation Act) providing for a tax on wealth. This bill was challenged as being 
inconstitutional by various entrepreneurial and political groups in the Legislative Assembly and was 
subsequently disallowed on legal grounds. The government was thus prevented from receiving the 
estimated 120 million colones which it had hoped to collect by this means. 
Although the administration of public services was theoretically subject to strict spending 
guidelines, current outlays increased by 43%, mainly because of expenditures on wages and on the 
purchase of goods and services. The defered adjustment of civil servants' wages and, presumably, the 
recruitment of new personnel for defence-related work and, to a lesser extent, of public-health staff 
after the earthquake12 helped to raise spending under this heading by 29%. 
The increase in interest payments (66% more than in 1985) and in transfer payments, which 
practically doubled, also contributed to the growth of expenditure. The interest on the public debt 
rose sharply as well, primarily as a consequence of the sale of securities paying attractive interest rates 
and of the effect in terms of local currency of exchange modifications. Furthermore, the granting of 
larger subsidies to public enterprises (3-5 times more than in 1985) and to the private sector 
prompted a considerable expansion of current transfer payments. 
Capital expenditure increased at an even faster rate (more than double) than current spending 
(94%), due to the amortization of both the domestic and external debts and to the transfer payments 
made to public financial institutions, particularly those providing support for crop-farming 
production and construction. Public investment, for its part, showed an exceptionally steep upturn 
(62%) in relation to the level which has generally prevailed since the conflict began. Before the 
earthquake struck, the expansion seen in public works primarily corresponded to the construction 
and repair of communication channels,15 while during the last quarter of the year, the repairs made to 
12According to official figures, current expenditure on defence and public security increased by 35% while current 
outlays in the health sector rose by 42%. In the functional allocation of central government expenditure, defence is the largest 
item and absorbs 45% of the total, whereas education and health account for 21 % and 11 %, respectively. (Ministry of Finance, 
Gasto corriente del Gobierno Central, 1986.) 
"During the first half of the year, road works amounting toa total of 243 million colones were begun. These included 
the repair of highways and bridges providing access to the conflict zone and the construction of rural roads. 
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installations and to the for supply network for basic services that had been damaged by the earthquake 
helped to raise the figure for direct investment expenditure. 
As noted earlier, it proved possible to finance the public deficit —which was equivalent to 6% 
of the gross domestic product, as against 5% the year before— on soft terms, thanks to the external 
transfer payments and, to a lesser extent, the net long-term external credit which the country 
received. 
To sum up, despite the favourable effects of the temporary upturn in coffee prices, the 
introduction of tax changes and the continued external financial support provided on soft terms to 
the government, a deterioration was seen in fiscal variables as a result of the inordinate expenses 
incurred by the government in financing its military operations and meeting the needs created by the 
earthquake. Nonetheless, the trend in these variables had less of a direct impact on inflationary 
pressures. 
Table 1 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
1980 1981 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
Gross domestic product at market prices 100.0 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross domestic income 
Unemployment rate c 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expendi 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports 
(goods and services) 
Current value of imports 
(goods and services) 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net internacional reserves 





















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
percentage of the economically active population. 
Salvador. 
Percentages. 'Refers to the number of openly unemployed and underemployed persons, as a 
Real minimum wages of workers in industry and services in San 
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Table 2 
EL SALVADOR: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross deomestic investment 









Exports of goods and 
services 


























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from IMF balance-of-
payments data expressed in dollars at current prices, which were then converted to constant 1980 values using unit-value 




EL SALVADOR: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
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Ownership of dwellings 

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador 
"Preliminary figures. 'includes the livestock sector, forestry and fisheries. 
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Table 4 
EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1980 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 11984 1985 1986" 
Index of agricultural 
production (1978 = 100) 104.6 87.7 8 6 . / 82.56 -5.6 2.0 -1.1* -4.96 
Crop farming 107.4 89.4 86.76 78.56 -5.0 0.7 -3.0* -9.56 
Livestock raising 88.3 77.7 80.86 83.26 -9.6 12.0 4.06 3.06 
Production of main crops' 
For export 
Coffee 186 147 147 136 -11.5 -3.4 -0.3 -7.1 
Cotton 61 31 25 16 1.8 -22.8 -20.7 -35.3 
Sugarcane 2 564 3 402 3 455 3 655 27.1 12.8 1.6 5.8 
For domestic consumption 
Maize 521 520 488 432 7.0 19.0 -6.1 -11.5 
Beans 39 48 34 48 10.5 15.4 -29.5 43.7 
Milled rice 39 39 42 32 22.1 46.5 8.8 -22.9 
Sorghum 138 139 131 133 -0.8 14.1 -5.6 1.4 
Stock-raising indicators 
Number of animals 
slaughtered 
Cattle'' 185 148 141 148 -1.3 0.7 -4.6 4.9 
Pigs' 126 140 140 123 9.2 -9.7 - -12.5 
Poultry' 14 21 27 29 18.7 10.5 28.6 7.4 
Other products 
Milk' 331 275 311 330 -22.1 32.2 13.1 6.1 
Egg/ 818 854 659 700 0.6 0.6 -22.8 6.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Estimated on the basis of variations in value added at constant prices. "Thousands of 




EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of value added 
(1980 = 100) 
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 
leather products 
Textiles 
Clothing, footwear and 
other leather products 
Wood and paper 
Wood and wood manufactures 
Paper and paper products 
Chemicals and petroleum 
and rubber products 
Chemicals 
Petroleum and rubber products 
Non-metallic mineral products 
Machinery and metal products 
Metal products 












































































































































Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 
Consumption of electricity 
by industry 482 484 499 489e -0.4 0.4 3.1 -2.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of kWh. 'Estimated on the basis of the variation in the period January-October, 
according to the records of CAESS, which distributes nearly 65% of the electricity consumed by industry in the country. 
Table 6 
EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF ELECTRICITY 

































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Department of Energy and Mining Resources. 
"Preliminary figures estimated on the basis of the annual variation in the gross amount of electricity generated according to 
the records of the Lempa River Hydropower Executive Commission (CEL). 
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Table 7 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 




























































































EL SALVADOR: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
EL SALVADOR 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance of current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 















































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. This entry includes net loans 




EL SALVADOR: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
Central America 
Rest of world 











Cotton yars and thread 
Clothing 
Other 











































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Estimated on the basis of the period January-August. 
Table 10 
EL SALVADOR: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Central America 




Raw materials and 
intermediate products 














































































































































































EL SALVADOR: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986a 
Total external debt 
Balances 
By institutional sectors 
Public 
Central Reserve Bank of 
£1 Salvador 
Central government and 
autonomous institutions 
Private 
By repayment periods 








Central Reserve Bank of 
El Salvador 






Total external debt/exports of 
goods and services 
Servicing/exports of goods 
and services 
Interests payments/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing/disbursements 







































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador in respea of the public external 
debt and by the Ministry of Planning in respect of the private external debt. 
'Preliminary figures. * Year-end balances of disbursed debt. 
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Table 12 
EL SALVADOR: DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food 
Wholesale price index 
Imported products 
Domestic products 
Consumer price index 
Food 

















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Variation from July to July. Variation from January to July. 
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Table 13 
EL SALVADOR: WAGES 
EL SALVADOR 











Other activities in 
San Salvador 
Industry and services 
Commerce 











Other activities in 
San Salvador 
Industry and services 
Commerce 
Indexes 
(December 1978 = 

















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Calculated on the basis of the average annual wage. Deflacted on the basis of the consumer price index. 
Table 14 




Money plus quasi-money (M2) 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
Central government (net) 
Public institutions 








































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes cash plus deposits made by commercial and mortgage banks in the Central Reserve 




EL SALVADOR: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenues 
2. Current expenditure 
Remunerations 
Purchase of goods and 
services 
Interest payments 
Transfer and other payments 
3. Current savings ( 1 - 2 ) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization 
Other capital expenditure* 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit ( 1 - 5 ) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing (net) 
Central Bank 

































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes capital transfer, net loans granted and net : shares acqu ¡red. Includes net [ sales of 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The severe depression which has been affecting the Guatemalan economy for the past six years 
continued during 1986. The economic situation has been characterized by a steady fall in the per 
capita domestic product, intense inflationary tensions, balance- of-payments disequilibria, a deterio-
ration of public finances and worsening employment conditions. Thus, the real gross domestic 
product remained at its low level of the preceding year (6% less than in 1980), which in per capita 
terms was equivalent to a 20% drop. This was coupled with a steep decline (-13%) in imports of 
goods and services as a result of the severe adjustment being undergone by the economy, which 
contributed to a contraction in total supply for the second year in a row (see table 1 and figure 1). 
Most of the variables of total demand showed signs of a decline or of virtual stagnation as part 
of a reciprocal chain reaction that accentuated the depressive trends. Private investment in fixed 
capital showed a slight upswing, but even so it was 30% lower than in 1980. 
Given the existence of a considerable amount of idle capacity, mainly in industry, the chief 
obstacle to reactivating production and promoting new investment projects was the loss of dynamism 
of both domestic and regional demand. The continued decrease in the real incomes of large segments 
of the population led to an additional deterioration in per capita private consumption, which sank to a 
level last observed 15 years ago. Overseas sales of new products were not sufficient to activate the 
productive apparatus or to encourage investment. 
Furthermore, the deterioration of public finances prevented the State from continuing to 
stimulate productive activities, inasmuch as, despite the fact that there was again a budget deficit, it 
was not possible for government spending to perform the compensatory role it had played in the 
past. Even so, the systematic downward trend in public investment reversed itself (with a rise of 3%, 
following a cumulative drop of more than 60% during the preceding three-year period), and the 
increase in general government consumption was substantially greater than the decrease observed 
during the preceding period. 
Finally, the unsatisfactory performance of exports of goods and services reflected the existence 
of adverse conditions for some products on the international market, as well as the productive sector's 
feeble response to the difficulties experienced in adapting supply and shortcomings in the area of 
marketing. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to what had occurred in previous years, foreign trade showed some 
favourable signs which allowed the sector to function more smoothly, even though this did not 
modify its recessive trends to any appreciable extent. The oil bill was lower due to the decrease in the 
international price of hydrocarbons and to a diminished need for oil imports as the Chixoy hydro-
electric plant went into full operation. International coffee prices rose significantly, offsetting the 
unfavourable effects of the continuous downturn in the prices of other agricultural export products. 
Consequently, the terms of trade improved substantially (29%). 
However, the foreign debt continued to absorb a high percentage of the available foreign 
exchange, and the marked decline in net loans persisted. Along with this, there was an even greater 
weakening of demand by the Central American Common Market as a result of the crisis of recent 
years. 
At the domestic level, the considerable rise in the variation between the annual averages of the 
consumer price index (37%), the surge in unemployment and the steep drop-off in real wages 
adversely influenced productive activity. Moreover, even though the government launched a reorgan-
ization programme designed to give its economic policy greater continuity and coherence and to 
clarify the "rules of the game", during a good part of the period the business sector maintained the 
"wait and see" attitude that has characterized it for years now. In addition, some productive activities 
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Figure 1 
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aAnnual growth rate. b Average annual rate nationwide. Official estimates. Percentage 
variation from December to December. dftünjons °^ dollars. ePercentages. 
encountered problems in obtaining supplies of imported inputs. Furthermore, the slackening of 
investment seems to have had structural effects on some segments of the productive apparatus; this is 
especially disturbing because the implications of such a development would extend beyond the 
current economic scenario. For example, cotton production activities were reduced to a minimum, 
and among the country's exportable goods no other product of similar value materialized. Some 
industries have gone for several years now without renewing machinery and equipment, and some 
chains of production have been weakened or have become disarticulated. 
The recommencement of the democratization process with the rise to power of a new civilian 
government in mid-January and the improvement of some aspects of foreign trade generated an 
optimistic outlook. Some of this government's initial economic measures were a liberalization of 
prices aimed at spurring production and ensuring the supply of mass consumer goods, restrictions on 
budget performance (at least for the central government) and a prudent monetary policy. Neverthe-
less, the incongruity or lack of continuity of the economic strategy that had been applied during the 
preceding period created distortions in the productive and financial system which sharpened the 
adverse effects of the overall economic crisis.1 
'See ECLAC, Notas para el Estudio Económico de America Latina y el Caribe 198Í, Guatemala (LC/MEX/L.29), 
13 June 1986. 
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The authorities then designed the Short-Term Economic and Social Reorganization Plan, 
which took effect in July and was to be applied for at least one year. The dual purpose of this plan was 
to ease inflationary pressures and to help raise the level of employment. The measures provided for 
by the plan included a lowering of the fiscal deficit, the limitation of the money supply and a reduction 
of pressures on the exchange rate through, among other steps, the establishment of a regulated 
exchange rate of 2.50 quetzales to the dollar for most external trade transactions; the creation of an 
extra tax on exports; the application of a special tax on international telephone services; an increase 
in other public service rates and charges, especially for water and power; the granting of some 
subsidies; the implementation of a programme designed to create 40 000 jobs; and a curbing of credit 
to the public sector. 
Although the six months during which this plan had been applied at the time of writing is not a 
sufficient basis for an evaluation, it should be noted that by the end of the year the exchange rate on 
the parallel market had dropped to only slightly above the controlled rate, which led to the virtual 
disappearance of that market. In addition, the fall in production was arrested; in the opinion of the 
authorities, this decline would have amounted to around -2% had the plan not been applied. The 
deficit on the current account of the balance of payments was nearly eliminated, and the growth of 
monetary variables tapered off. In contrast, however, the fiscal deficit rose once again, inflation 
accelerated sharply, although late in the year its rate was slowing down; unemployment escalated and 
real wages shrank. 
Some short-term indicators suggest that in the last quarter there were signs of a stabilization 
and some improvement in the macroeconomic situation. Private investment reacted timidly, but was 
stimulated by the dynamism of the inbond assembly (maquiladora) industry, and there was thus some 
intimation of a change in the downward trend of production. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Economic activity did not come out of the depression in which it has been enveloped since 1982. 
The gross domestic product remained stagnant, despite the determined efforts undertaken without 
delay by the new government. Specifically, its economic policy sought to stimulate supply by 
loosening restrictions on the prices of a considerable number of goods which according to the 
entrepreneurial sector, involved high production costs. A more realistic exchange rate was also 
applied, which undoubtedly benefitted export activities, and the government did succeed in reducing 
the pressure exerted by the public sector on domestic credit thereby encouraging the allotment of 
credit to the private sector. In addition, it maintained a cautious attitude regarding wages in order to 
hold back inflation. 
Because of the adjustment measures applied to the productive system, imports of goods and 
services slid once again, thus heightening the strain on the productive apparatus. As a result, the 
import coefficient, which in 1985 was around 25% (a level that could be considered normal), slipped 
to 15%. As a consequence of the stagnation of the product and the decline in external purchases, 
overall supply decreased for the second consecutive year, this time by approximately 1 % (see table 2). 
On the demand side, almost all the variables continued to show negative signs, as they also had 
during the four preceding years. Gross domestic investment, which the year before had plummeted 
16%, dipped by slightly more than 1%, partially due to the persistence of a significant degree of 
unused productive capacity. The obsolescence and deterioration of installed capital, as well as the 
literal decapitalization of some sectors or segments thereof, may have limited the capacity of the 
productive complex to react to the appearance of more favourable circumstances. Due to the fact that 
it has been at a virtual standstill for the last three years, private fixed investment was even 30% lower 
than it had been in 1980. In its turn, the rise (3%) in public investment was insignificant in 
comparison to its steep decrease of the preceding years. As a consequence of financial setbacks 
suffered by the sector and the efforts being made to lower the fiscal deficit —as part of the adjustment 
policy that had been adopted— the accumulation of fixed capital was 40% less than in 1980, and thus 
constituted yet another factor in the contraction of the productive system. 
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Private consumption expanded slightly more than 2%, but waned again in per capita terms. 
This decrease, when added to those of the past six years, brought this variable down to a level lower 
than that of 1972. The middle and lower income strata have had to alter their consumption patterns 
and thus to find new ways of surviving on the-~fringes of the formal economy. At the same time, 
critical poverty has sharpened and the critically poor population has increased. 
General government consumption rose more than enough to offset its 1985 decrease, princi-
pally as a result of the fact that social services (education and health) were restored to their former 
levels. Nonetheless, partial indicators suggest that the provision of some of these services continued 
to decline since they were probably the first expenditures to be cut in the past in an attempt to balance 
the fiscal budget. 
The exportation of goods and services was the component of overall demand that showed the 
greatest contraction (-17%) in 1986. This was partly attributable to the losses sustained by some 
productive sectors, to the uncertainty still prevailing among some entrepreneurial groups, and to the 
constraints stemming from agricultural cycles. 
b) Trends in tbe main sectors 
The product of the main sectors generally remained stagnant, with only some activities of little 
significance showing increases, such as mining, construction, energy and finance (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. This activity, which continues to be the most important in the economy, has 
remained virtually stagnant since the beginning of the decade (see table 4). Structural problems were 
compounded by difficulties associated with the present economic situation, which included weak 
external demand, price instability, rising production costs and, in some cases, financial constraints. 
Consequently, despite a conjunctural improvement in international coffee prices and exchange rate 
advantages, it proved impossible to boost the volume of foreign sales of exportable agricultural 
products. 
Coffee, the main export crop, enjoyed a temporary incentive in the form of an international 
price hike of over 40%, as well as being benefitted, as were all exportable goods, by the government's 
exchange rate policy. Nevertheless, the increase in production (around 2%) was insufficient to offset 
the preceding year's contraction. This rise does, however, appear to foreshadow a more sustained 
recovery, to which the easing of some social conflicts relating to coffee production is also likely to 
contribute. 
The amount of land sown with cotton decreased to a little more than one-half its former figure, 
with the consequent drop in the harvest amounting to approximately 36%, chiefly because of a sharp 
slump in the international price. Other factors in this poor performance included technological 
limitations, increases in the prices of imported inputs and insufficient credit. 
The sugar cane harvest rose almost 3%, triggered by a domestic price hike of slightly more than 
30%. Given the unfavourable outlook on the international market and the existence of a large 
amount of idle processing capacity, for several years now the experts have been studying the 
possibility of producing a sugar-based alcohol fuel, which would also make it possible to save foreign 
exchange that would otherwise be expended on energy imports. However, the fall in the interna-
tional price of oil may reduce the justification for this project. 
Basic grain harvests rose considerably (5 % in the case of maize and beans) due to the increase in 
the area of land under cultivation and generally favourable weather conditions. Nonetheless, it was 
still necessary to import grain to supply the domestic market, which signalled a dwindling capacity to 
maintain a satisfactory margin of food security. 
ii) Mining and hydrocarbons. Although this sector's contribution continued to be scant, the 
dynamism it exhibited in 1986 (29%) helped to compensate for decreases in other sectors (see 
table 5). Once again, a decisive factor in the sector's performance was oil production, which is 
gradually —although on a somewhat unstable basis— becoming one of the country's principal 
non-traditional export products. A boost in the output of oil wells, drilling activities yielded 1.9 
million barrels as compared to 0.9 million the year before. 
Furthermore, the outlook for oil-production activity improved. The legal modifications intro-
duced in 19852 permitted the signing of five new contracts for the prospecting and exploitation of an 
area of 275 000 hectares. 
2ECLAC, Notas para el Estudio Econômico .... op. cit. 
365 
iii) Manufacturing. The value added of the sector continued to be virtually stagnant, making the 
absolute level much lower than that of 1980; this is an indication of a discouraging structural change, 
as is the decline in the industrialization coefficient. In fact, this is one of the activities that has been 
most affected by the crisis. The loss of dynamism marking both Central American and domestic 
demand is a disincentive for the entrepreneurial sector. The increase in the cost of imported inputs 
and the difficulties encountered in obtaining the foreign exchange necessary to purchase such 
supplies have also become serious obstacles to a rise in production (see table 3). 
Partial indicators suggest that the food and textile subsectors showed a slight recovery, while 
clothing, chemicals and metals and metal machinery underwent a further contraction (see table 6). 
Apparently, during the latter part of the year manufacturing rallied to some extent. In the 
business opinion survey covering the first six months of the year, almost one-third of the enterprises 
reported that they were using less than 50% of their installed capacity and thai: their output had been 
lower than during the same period of the preceding year. In the survey, corresponding to the final six 
months of the year, however, only 15% of the entrepreneurs questioned said that there had been a 
decrease in output, and the percentage of businesses utilizing less than 50% of their installed capacity 
also declined (see table 7). Finally, it should be mentioned that there was also an upturn in the inbond 
assembly (maquiladora) industry, which has been receiving special support. 
iv) Construction. After four years of steady and substantial downturns, construction saw a slight 
recovery (3%). This was based on the performance of private construction, which, for the second 
consecutive year, expanded enough to effect a turnaround in the overall trend of the sector and 
reflected a certain change in attitude on the part of savers in the entrepreneurial sector. The surface 
area covered by building permits in the capital city rose 18%, and the cement production index 
climbed 8%, although its absolute level was only 3% higher than in 1980 (see table 8). 
c) Employment 
According to official estimates, open unemployment continued to rise, reaching 14.5% of the 
labour force. This reflects the difficulties which the productive apparatus is having in creating the 
additional jobs called for by the rapid rate of population growth. The figure for equivalent unemploy-
ment (30%), which shows the high level of underemployment, was an even more disturbing 
indicator (see table 9)- Although direct estimates in this regard were not available, some indicators 
suggest that the situation is even more critical in the metropolitan area, where marginalization and 
the informal sector have expanded. 
The deterioration of labour conditions was demonstrated by the fact that only 28 000 of the 
70 000 people who joined the economically active population during the year were covered by the 
social security system (see table 10). 
3. The external sector 
Although the conditions prevailing in the external sector had conflicting effects, overall they were 
favourable for the first time in the 1980s. However, the precarious position of the economy persisted, 
above all with regard to international liquidity. The positive factors included the significant increase 
in the unit value of exports (20%), along with a drop in the unit value of imports (8%), which 
resulted in a substantial improvement (29%) in the terms of trade. In addition, as the macroeconomic 
situation grew better and exchange rate advantages stimulated the export sector, an upturn was seen 
in non-traditional sales. On the other hand, the sector did not succeed in taking advantage oí the boost 
in the prices of some traditional goods, sales to the Central American Common Market continued to 
taper off, and the debt servicing burden grew, while difficulties in obtaining net financing were also 
encountered. 
a) Merchandise trade 
The value of merchandise exports waned slightly (-0.2%), following their contraction in 1985. 
The decline was not greater only because of the upswing in their unit value, since their volume fell 
sharply (-17%), after having been at a standstill during the preceding two years (see table 11). 
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Coffee sales expanded by 11%, owing to an international price hike of over 40%, which was 
partly offset by the drop in the volume exported (-27%), despite a slight increase in production. The 
benefits derived from the exchange rate adjustments made in the last quarter of 1985 boosted forward 
sales, and it was thus not possible to take advantage of the favourable market for coffee that prevailed 
during 1986 (see table 12). 
Particularly adverse conditions in international markets caused a further downturn in the value 
of cotton sales. Due to the slide in output, the exported volume declined 20%, and this was 
compounded by a 40% contraction in the unit price. In contrast, despite a price slump, sugar exports 
rose by around 11%; this was primarily attributable to sales to countries other than the United States, 
since the quota for that market was lowered as a result of the protectionist measures adopted in order 
to favour corn syrup. Banana exports also rose (by nearly 4%), thanks to the increase in their volume, 
since the price remained virtually unchanged. 
External meat sales dropped off drastically, thus following the pronounced downward trend 
observed during the preceding five years. Production problems and what was possibly a deterioration 
of the cattle herd were compounded by a ban on meat exports during the month of April which was 
applied in an effort to ensure a supply for the domestic market and to keep domestic prices from 
rising further. 
Oil exports doubled owing to the greater volume sold. Although the contribution of this 
product to total exports continued to be moderate (US$25 million), its dynamic performance in 1986 
and the efforts that have been made to stimulate national production would appear to presage the 
appearance of a new driving force for the external sector. 
After a downturn (-6%) in 1985, the category of "other" non-traditional products, which is 
made up of a variety of chiefly industrial goods, showed a slight rally (2%), which to some extent 
reflects the moderate reactivation of production that occurred during the final quarter. With the help 
of exchange-rate modifications and other incentives, a new sector of small-scale exporters seems to be 
beginning to take shape which could eventually make significant contributions to production and to 
the generation of foreign exchange. 
Finally, exports to the Central American Common Market fell by 4%, in line with the trend that 
began in 1980. Some of the factors contributing to this decrease were the defensive measures being 
implemented by the other countries of the subregion in an attempt to correct their balance-of-
payments disequilibria; the fact that it was impossible for the Guatemalan authorities to increase the 
credits they granted to their trading partners because of their shortage of foreign exchange; and the 
low level of Central American demand in general. In any event, the small volume of intra-regional 
trade is a phenomenon affecting all the countries of the area and reflects the present crisis in 
economic integration, which, during the two preceding decades, had proved its capacity for 
generating reciprocal productive incentives. 
The value of merchandise imports declined again (-15%), for a cumulative decrease of over 
22% in the two-year period; this was attributable to the constraints stemming from the shortage of 
foreign exchange and the adjustment being made in the productive apparatus. Yet another factor was 
a slight descent in the average price index, which was largely a result of the deterioration of the price 
of hydrocarbons, as well as the reduced need for this product due to the opening of the Chixoy 
hydroelectric plant. 
Almost all the various categories of imports showed a decrease. The marked contraction 
(-26%) in consumer goods —including a good part of the purchases from Central America— was 
particularly notable. This phenomenon was associated with the weakness of private consumption and 
the rationing made necessary by the shortage of foreign exchange (see table 13). 
Capital goods imports fell off again (-8%), after a slight rally during the preceding two-year 
period. The drop in external purchases of goods for investment during a number of the last seven 
years has been so great that their share in total imports slid from 23% in 1975 to 18% in 1980, and to 
only 14% in 1986. This trend indicates that some sectors or segments thereof have been undergoing 
what is virtually a decapitalization process, which compromises the productive apparatus' future 
response capacity. 
In their turn, imports of intermediate goods also slipped (-2%), as a direct consequence of the 
stagnation of productive activity; another factor, however, was the decline —in terms of both volume 
and price— in the oil bill, although this was partially offset by a recovery in the purchases of goods for 
construction in the last quarter of the year. 
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Imports of goods underwent a more pronounced contraction than did exports of goods. The 
merchandise trade balance thus showed a surplus of almost US$140 million (15% of imports), in 
contrast to the customary deficit in this respect (see table 14). 
b) Services trade and factor payments 
The traditional trade deficit in real services was down sharply because of the more moderate 
level of payments, especially for transport and insurance and tourism services, and a slight rally in the 
external sales of the latter. Thus, for the first time in the last 10 years, the economy showed a surplus 
(US$78 million) in its trade balance, which reflected the adjustment efforts undertaken during the 
year. 
On the other hand, the deficit in factor services continued to grow, mainly as a consequence of 
interest payments on the short-term foreign debt, which, along with amortization payments, has 
gradually become one of the chief obstacles to the structuring of an economic recovery plan. Hence, 
despite the advances made with respect to real services in an effort to restore the external sector's 
capacity to contribute to economic growth, the current account of the balance of payments once again 
showed a deficit (US$-32 million), although it was the lowest of the last 15 years. 
c) The deficit and its financing 
Net external financing amounted to US$55 million, which was equivalent to one-seventh of the 
annual average for the preceding two-year period. Owing to the small size of the deficit on current 
account, gross international reserves grew moderately (US$23 million). However, it has not been 
possible to make up for the losses of the 1979-1982 period, so net reserves remained negative. 
The net balance of capital flows was particularly low in comparison to prior years, reflecting the 
problems that the financial area of the external sector is posing for domestic economic policy. Since 
1985 the amount of private short-term foreign debt which has been falling due has begun to lead to 
major increases in amortization payments. In addition, net credits diminished, as the crisis in 
international financing persisted. 
During 1986 some changes were seen in capital movements. Even though total gross inflows in 
this connection were similar to those of the preceding year, the net balance represented only a tiny 
fraction of that of 1985 due to the noticeable rise in debits. The Banco de Guatemala continued to use 
short-term financing (more than US$130 million), but the volume of its amortization payments was 
US$78 million higher; it also cut its medium- and long-term borrowing by US$26 million. 
d) Exchange policy 
One of the key objectives of the Economic and Social Reorganization Plan was to restore to 
monetary authorities part of the control that they had traditionally exercised over exchange rate 
policy. The idea was to eliminate the multiplicity of exchange rates, which was skewing productive 
activity and promoting the development of speculative activities that were destabilizing the country's 
currency. 
Accordingly, three well-defined markets were established. The official market maintained the 
official parity of one quetzal to the United States dollar; this rate was used only for official operations 
relating to the payment of the existing public debt. In what may be referred to as the regulated 
market, a parity of 2.50 quetzales to the United States dollar was established. This rate was to be 
guaranteed by the Banco de Guatemala for a series of commercial operations, which at the beginning 
of the second half of the year involved 615 products and by the end of the period, 1 000. Finally, the 
banking market, on which all the remaining external transactions were carried out, had a buying rate 
of 2.78 quetzales in January, reached its highest point in August (2.98) and closed in December very 
close to the rate of the regulated market (see tables 15 and 16). 
The favourable trend in reserves, above all during the fourth quarter, made it possible for the 
demand for foreign exchange to be met fairly promptly, which eased the uncertainty that had 
prevailed as regards the exchange market. Thanks to this and to the moderateness of the expansion of 
the means of payment during the final months of the year, a sustained revaluation of the quetzal on 
the banking market and the disappearance of the unofficial market were achieved. This is undoubt-
edly the area in which the reorganization plan has been most successful. However, the existence of 
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three different currency markets, one of which —the official— did not involve operations that 
contributed to the supply of foreign exchange, caused the Central Bank to once again register 
exchange losses, which led it to undertake primary currency issues. 
e) The external debt 
The external debt has begun to figure as one of the chief obstacles to a reactivation policy; this is 
due less to its volume than to its structure, since almost half of the debt is made up of short-term 
liabilities. 
In 1986, the total foreign debt approached US$2.65 billion, which put Guatemala —in terms of 
the ratio of its debt to exports and the product— among the Latin American countries having a 
mid-range level of indebtedness. Aside from some temporary arrears involving small amounts, which 
were reprogrammed on a case-by-case basis, Guatemala is one of the countries which usually meets 
the servicing of its foreign debt. However, this has had recessionary effects on its economy which 
have been more severe than those suffered by other countries in a more difficult position with respect 
to external indebtedness. 
Since 1983 foreign debt servicing has absorbed more than one-fourth of the country's goods and 
services exports, and in 1986 this coefficient reached 34%. The situation is all the more serious in 
view of the fact that its debt service payments were 77% greater than its use of foreign loans, which 
reflects the country's problems in gaining access to fresh capital. Although this situation is largely due 
to the tightening of the international credit market referred to earlier, it is also attributable in part to 
the public sector's difficulties in proposing projects that are acceptable to international lending 
agencies —which loan funds on better terms— and even its operational and financial shortcomings 
as regards the use of loans that have already been obtained (see table 17). 
4. Prices and wages 
The consumer price index witnessed an unprecedented average increase (37%). This translated into 
a deterioration in the real income of most of the population and generated a series of distortions in 
the price system that will require a realignment among the different microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic variables and among productive agents (see table 18 and figure 2). 
Although this acceleration of the inflationary process could be attributed to exchange measures, 
which supposedly affected production costs in the local currency, in reality the bulk of the country's 
productive activities were already operating on the basis of higher and more unstable exchange rates. 
Consequently, a considerable part of the inflation was due to the substantial expansion of the money 
supply observed in 1985, to the liberalization of prices that was implemented with a view to spurring 
the production of higher-cost goods, and to what might be described as a speculative attitude on the 
part of producers and consumers. This was coupled with a hike in some public service rates and prices 
which was aimed at restoring the financial standing of business enterprises and lessening the burden 
they represented for the State's weakened public finances. 
Consequently, the economy was subject to inflationary pressures which only began to subside 
during the third quarter, when the relative slowdown of price rises combined with other indicators to 
form a more stable macroeconomic picture. 
Wage policy continued to hold to the cautious strategy that has been followed since the start of 
the crisis. In the first quarter the government granted a moderate wage adjustment to civil servants 
and encouraged the private sector to give raises in accordance with the financial situation of each 
enterprise. Although no official data were available in this connection, it is known that some 
enterprises, especially those that renegotiated collective contracts, granted wage increases; however, 
due to the sharp jump in the general price level, the real income of wage earners is thought to have 
deteriorated again in 1986; in combination with the rise in unemployment, this meant that the 
income of the labour sector dropped considerably. Thus, for example, social security statistics3 
5
 The data concerning persons covered by social security generally correspond to the more organized productive sectors, 
in which labour possesses greater negotiating power. 
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indicate that in nominal terms average wages and salaries rose by 12%. This represents an 18% 
decline in wages in real terms, which, together with the decrease registered during the preceding 
two-year period, is equivalent to an approximate loss of 36%. The same data also indicate that over 
the last four years, the wage bill has shrunk by approximately 30% in real terms (see table 19). 
This is probably one of the areas to which economic policy-makers will have to devote greater 
attention in the future, both because a continued deterioration in real wages would run counter to the 
expectations being generated by the new political process and because, among other elements, the 
strengthening of domestic demand could become an important factor for economic reactivation. 
Figure 2 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
The new government's fiscal budget —approved in December of the preceding year— called 
for a moderate boost in current income (13%) but a pronounced increase in spending (44%), with 
operating expenditures going up by 21%, investment spending rising by 83%, and expenditures 
relating to the amortization of the debt more than doubling. Hence, a fiscal deficit of 733 million 
quetzales was predicted, which would have been more than twice that of 1985. In the final analysis, 
then, the budget was an expansionary one, which, inter alia, provided for constitutionally mandated 
fiscal contributions to the local governments and some decentralized institutions, a wage hike for civil 
servants and some subsidies. 
During the year, however, two important events caused income to increase more than had been 
expected. Firstly, towards the end of 1985 import duties and the value added tax on the sum in local 
currency represented by external purchases began to be applied on the basis of the actual exchange 
rate at which the corresponding transactions had been made.4 Secondly, with the implementation of 
the Short-Term Economic and Social Reorganization Plan, several measures went into effect which 
produced greater revenues for the public treasury. These provisions included the imposition of a 
temporary and decreasing tax, effective for a period of 18 months, on windfall profits from exports, 
which at the outset was equivalent to an average rate of 30%; an increase in international telephone 
service rates designed to bring them into line with the new regulated exchange rate, and an increase in 
the rates for other public services, particularly water and electricity. 
On the other hand, the budgeted expenditures also rose, as a result of the readjustment 
(50 quetzales per month) of the wages of civil servants; the granting of some subsidies, especially for 
public transportation, school lunches, medicines and fertilizers; the allocation of a fund of approxi-
mately 100 million quetzales for the implementation of an emergency programme aimed at creating 
40 000 new jobs; and the creation of the Ministry of Culture and Sports and the Ministry of Urban and 
Rural Development. 
As compared to 1985, all the fiscal variables escalated due to the above-mentioned modifica-
tions and inflation. Thus, current income climbed 69%, particularly because taxes on foreign trade 
tripled; however, the new taxes on exports were a temporary and decreasing levy, which meant that 
in the near future the revenue they provided would dwindle (see table 20). 
Current expenditure went up (64%) less than income, producing a current-account savings 
which, while greater than that recorded in 1985 (95 million quetzales), was still quite moderate as 
compared to other fiscal variables. 
Although capital spending doubled, direct investment by the government climbed only 39%, 
which in real terms was equivalent to no more than a slight increase. Public debt payments more than 
tripled, which reflected the fact that the accumulation of financial imbalances was beginning to pose 
problems for the country's economic management, even though the amortization of the foreign debt 
continued to be made at the official exchange rate. As a result, the fiscal deficit (619 million quetzales) 
nearly doubled. 
In sum, during 1986 the imbalance in public finances intensified, with the deficit reaching a 
level equal to 4% of the product (2.8% in 1985), notwithstanding the fact that the above-mentioned 
temporary tax modifications boosted the tax burden from 6% to 7 % and that public investment grew 
only moderately. This was due in large part to the growing public debt load. 
b) Monetary policy 
After an inordinate increase in liquidity in 1985 —when the Central Bank had to monetize 
considerable exchange losses— an effort was made during 1986 to regain control over this variable by 
means of a restrained and cautious monetary policy both as regards the expansion of credit, especially 
for the public sector, and the reduction of exchange losses. The application of a more orderly, realistic 
exchange policy contributed to the achievement of the latter goal. The end result was deflationary, in 
4
 Previously these taxes had been levied on the value of such operations as calculated according to the official exchange 
rate (one quetzal to the dollar). 
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line with the overall adjustment scheme, since almost all the monetary variables grew at slower rates 
than the general price increase; thus, the productive system tightened up, and the velocity of 
circulation therefore rose from 8.4 in 1985 to 10.5 in 1986 (see table 21). 
During the second half of the year a series of steps were taken in an effort to limit the excess 
liquidity in the economy and stabilize the exchange rate. The most outstanding measures were the 
exchange rate reorganization discussed earlier; a two-point hike in the interest rate ceilings on 
banking system lending and deposit operations, which was aimed at encouraging saving; the 
approval of a line of credit at preferential rates for certain activities that were considered to be of high 
priority;5 a gradual increase in bank reserve requirements, during a period of three months, on 
monetary deposits (2% monthly) and savings deposits (1% monthly) which brought the new rates 
up to 4 1 % and 13%, respectively; the authorization of the Banco de Guatemala to increase its 
open-market operations; and the transfer of funds from the social security institute (IGSS), as well as 
deposits and investments in the banking system, to investments in public bonds. Finally, the services 
of an international firm6 were contracted to supervise foreign trade operations and to reduce capital 
flight and tax evasion effected through the over-invoicing of imports and the under-invoicing of 
exports. 
The means of payment (M2) expanded by 19%, but due to a reduced liquidity preference on the 
part of the public —probably owing to an improvement in the outlook as regards the exchange rate— 
quasi-money rose by 22%, and hence the money supply (M^ increased by only 13%. Its expansion 
was thus quite limited as compared to the preceding year and the trend of the price level. 
Domestic factors were the predominate force behind the monetary expansion, while external 
factors once again had a contractionary effect. Domestic credit was curtailed by almost 8%, as the 
requirements of the public sector were reduced, and net credit therefore shrank by 28% in relation to 
the particularly high level of the year before. Financing for the private sector, for its part, climbed at a 
moderate rate (around 9%); this was apparently due more to factors relating to demand than to any 
resource constraints in the banking system, which was building up a wide margin of liquidity. 
Consequently, Central Bank accounts were the principal source of monetary expansion, that, even 
though exchange losses fell off appreciably, they continued to be monetized, due to the existence of 
different foreign exchange markets. Among these, demand was the only force in the official market, 
since all incoming foreign exchange was sold on either the controlled market or the banking market. 
'Housing and the cultivation of basic grains, soybeans and cotton. 
6
 La Société Générale de Surveillance, S.A. (SGS). 
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Table 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
GUATEMALA 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total government 
expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international 
reserves 
Total external debt 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 



















































































































19.4 -16.4 -11.6 -8.3 4.8 


























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Percentages. 
Table 2 
GUATEMALA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 









Exports of good and 
services 



































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 




















































































































taken from IMF balance-of-
payments figures in current dollars, which were then converted into constant 1980 values by means of unit value indexes 




GUATEMALA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 







Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 





















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes the livestock sector, forestry and fishing. 
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Table 4 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Indexes of agricul-
tural product ion 
(1975 = 100) 
Crop farming 
Stock raising 
































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of 
"Preliminary figures. 











































































1958 prices. 'Thousands i 







































































Thousands of bunches. 
; of dozens. 
Table 5 
GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Mining product ion 
index 












Value added index 





























































GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Manufacturing pro-
duction index 







































































(thousands of kWh) 515 006 362 118 370 228 401273 447 392 -20.3 -6.3 2.2 8.4 11.5 
Employment (number 
of persons) 83 066 77 842 69 506 78 205 78 251 0.2 5.4 -10.7 12.5 0.1 




GUATEMALA: RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF ENTREPRENEURS CONCERNING 
INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1986 
(Percentages) 
Branch of activity 
Manufacturing 
Food processing 
Beverages and tobacco 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel and leather 
goods 
Wood and furniture 
Paper, printing and 
publishing 
Rubber and plastics 
Chemicals 
Glass and non-metallic 
minerals 
Basic metals industries 
Manufacture of metal products 
Other industries 
Branch of activity 
Manufacturing 
Food processing 
Beverages and tobacco 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel and leather 
goods 
Wood and furniture 
Paper, printing and 
publishing 
Rubber and plastics 
Chemicals 
Glass and non-metallic 
minerals 
Basic metals industries 
Manufacture of metal products 
Other industries 
Production volume 













































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Banco de Guatemala. 




GUATEMALA: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
Area constructed 

























1983 1984 1985 
-0.9 4.1 7.6 




228.4 183.3 157.7 216.7 234.3 -9-6 -10.8 -14.0 37.4 8.1 
27 738 17 817 13 041 14 077 15 702 14.7 -33.8 -26.8 7.9 11.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Refers to private building permits issued in the capital city. 
by Social Security, 
c
 Number of people covered 
Table 9 
















1981 1982 1983 









































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
over). 'Includes underemployment. 
Economically active population as a percentage of the working-age population (15 years and 
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Table 10 
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Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 
























































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 13 













































































































































































GUATEMALA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 


























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 




































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Base 1980 = 100. 
Table 16 
GUATEMALA. TREND IN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF THE 












































GUATEMALA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 














Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing/exports of goods 
and services 
Net interest payments/exports 


















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 






































































































GUATEMALA: DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Foodstuffs 




Consumer price index 
Foodstuffs 

































































































GUATEMALA: WAGES AND SALARIES 
GUATEMALA 








































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information supplied by the Guatemalan Social Security Institute concerning the number of 




GUATEMALA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
2. Current expenditure 
3. Current savings ( 1 - 2 ) 




5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit 
(or surplus) ( 1 - 5 ) 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 








Money plus quasi-money 
(M2) 
Domestic credit 

































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
'Preliminary figures. 
banks. 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 19861 the Haitian economy was virtually stagnant. Indeed, the per capita gross domestic product 
fell by slightly over 1 %, which, coupled with the declines of the five preceding years, amounted to a 
contraction of 14% during the 1980s. This deterioration was even more serious in view of the fact 
that Haiti is one of the countries least able to meet the basic needs of its population (see table 1 and 
figure 1). 
This was a situation unlike that of previous years. In analysing its causes, various non-economic 
events must be taken into account, including the social disturbances which preceded the change of 
government midway through the fiscal year (February 1986). These factors had an adverse impact on 
production activities even though greater international co-operation began to be made available in 
support of the new administration. 
When the new government took office, it had to divide its attention between the long-standing 
structural problems affecting the country and its short-term financial difficulties which external 
co-operation and grants have usually succeeded in mitigating. 
As a rule, systematic efforts had not been made in the past to develop and replenish natural 
resources subject to deterioration or to strengthen the country's production sectors on a sustained 
basis. Consequently, the country had to resort to mounting food imports while its crop-farming 
exports continued to fall and the disarticulation of its production apparatus became ever more 
apparent. Moreover, unemployment increased, real wages fell and the living standards of the bulk of 
the population deteriorated. Steady progress was made, on the other hand, in developing the inbond 
assembly industry, and part of the roadway infrastructure was modernized as a first step towards 
laying the foundations for the integration of the country and thus preventing excessive centralization 
in the capital. 
The economic crisis and the ever more serious fiscal problems it brought in its wake, had led the 
previous administration to request international financial co-operation and the support of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the urging of the Fund, the authorities in question had 
attempted to apply an adjustment policy during the early part of the fiscal year (October 1985). Given 
the low levels of income and the high unemployment and underemployment rates in the country, 
however, a policy of this type naturally encountered opposition from the various agents in the society, 
and this increasingly restricted the government's manoeuvring room. 
Growing social dissatisfaction with the previous régime created severe tension within the 
society from mid-1985 onward, and this affected economic activity in both the countryside and the 
city.thus leading, inter alia, to the closure of some industries (especially inbond assembly enterprises) 
and to the increased emigration of human resources. 
As the country's balance-of-payments problems were worsening, at the same time, it found 
itself in a difficult situation with respect to foreign liquidity. As a result, early in the year petroleum 
imports had to be interrupted for a short period, and the country was therefore unable to reap the 
benefits of the low oil prices being charged at that time. 
It was in these circumstances that a new transitional government took office in February 1986 
for a period of two years. This government received some technical and financial assistance from the 
international community and there were indications that it could expect to obtain financing for future 
development projects as well. 
'The statistical and qualitative data used in this chapter cover the period October 1985-September 1986, which 
corresponds to the fiscal rather than the calendar year. 
389 
Figure 1 
HAITI: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^Percentage variation from September to September. cMilIions of 
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Despite the change in administration, political and social tensions persisted because of the 
difficulty of reducing, at least in the short term, the wide gap which exists in respect of the satisfaction 
of basic needs. Nevertheless, the government did take a number of steps immediately, the chief one 
being to lower the prices of some basic grains. It also adopted some other economic policy measures 
having short-term effects which were aimed at putting public finances on a sounder footing (i.e., the 
elimination of unwarranted budget items), reducing the size of the public sector (especially in regard 
to public enterprises), applying a strict monetary policy and liberalizing foreign trade (i.e., the 
termination of the import monopoly). Furthermore, at the social level, emphasis was placed on 
improving health and education by increasing public expenditure in this area on an exceptional basis. 
The government's long-term priorities included a reactivation policy based on agriculture and 
on labour-intensive light industries whose main purpose was to alleviate poverty and boost the 
production of essential goods. 
Thus, in 1986 two key policy objectives played a decisive role in the evolution of the economy: 
the reduction of the fiscal deficit and the lowering of the external deficit. In fact, public finances did 
improve appreciably, largely as a result of the inclusion of incomes which had not previously been 
considered as such, but also because some investment expenditures were forgone. Consequently, the 
public deficit, which represented almost 8% of the gross domestic product in 1985, dropped to 5%. 
Simultaneously, at the external level, for the first time following 12 years of declines, the country's 
international monetary reserves showed an increase —of US$30 million. This was attributable not 
only to a greater inflow of grants and to arrangements for fresh financing, but also to the substantial 
reduction made in the deficit on current account as a result of the sharper contraction of imports than 
of exports, which was mainly due to the temporary closure of many assembly plants. 
The country's reduced import capacity and the low level of public expenditure adversely 
affected its production apparatus, especially in industry, construction and commerce, sectors which 
account for almost 40% of the gross domestic product and which together declined by 11%. On the 
other hand, owing to favourable weather conditions, agriculture expanded by over 2%, thus compen-
sating for this contraction to a large extent. 
As a result of the easing of the pressure on the Central Bank to finance the public deficit and the 
reduction of the prices of some basic grains, other essential goods and fuels, consumer prices fell 
virtually without interruption from January onward, declining by more than 11% during the year. 
Private per capita consumption again contracted slightly and the real income of wage-earners, 
whose wages were not readjusted, was once again eroded. (Haiti's wage policy is one of offering 
attractive conditions in this field in an attempt to encourage the establishment of inbond assembly 
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plants.) The extreme poverty of a large part of the population and the country s widespread shortages 
of resources became more marked during the first part of the year, and the new government 
attempted to deal with this situation by taking a number of steps, many of which could only bear fruit 
in the long term. Haiti's financial difficulties limit its chances of applying a more aggressive 
reactivation policy in the immediate future, unless the country receive a greater flow of external 
co-operation. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
In 1986 total supply declined considerably, following three years of weak growth. This 
downturn was caused by the sharp drop in imports of goods and services (18%), since the gross 
domestic product remained virtually at a standstill. In the final months of 1985, the country found 
itself in a difficult external liquidity position because of the slump in its exports, and this made it 
necessary for the new government to follow a highly selective policy as regards imports. Further-
more, purchases from Europe and Japan also fell because the prices of goods ifrom both these sources 
increased (see table 2). 
External demand fell by 25 %, primarily because of the slowdown in the assembly industry. This 
sector, which accounts for one-third of Haiti's exports of goods and whose external sales thus 
surpassed even those of coffee, was profoundly affected by the tensions of a non-economic character 
that were felt during the year. Tourism was down by almost 10% for similar reasons. 
Domestic demand slackened slightly as a net result of the differing trends observed in this area. 
A decline was seen in investment, which in previous years had been the moving force behind the 
economy, primarily on account of the execution of road works. In contrast, consumption increased, 
although more slowly than the rate of population growth. Capital formation decreased due to the 
combined effect of the government's austerity policy in respect of its capital expenditures and the 
reluctance of private, national and foreign economic agents to invest in the country because of the 
tensions referred to above. Private consumption, for its part, rose slightly thanks to the existence of a 
larger supply of crop-farming products than in 1985 to meet a demand for foodstuffs which has 
usually gone unsatisfied in the past. The government's consumption expenditure also showed a slight 
upturn after three years of declines, although in per capita terms it remained virtually stable. 
b) The main sectors of production 
Economic activity, as has already been stated, followed a generally uneven trend during the 
fiscal year. Early in the year, the worsening situation as regards the country's financial imbalances 
hampered production. At the same time, social and political tensions in Haiti deepened, culminating 
in a change of government four months into the fiscal year. The subsequent reorientation of 
economic policy, combined with the provision of international co-operation, boosted the country's 
economic activity. 
Indicators concerning the trends in the various sectors during the two periods in question were 
unavailable, but according to official information, the virtual stagnation of the economy as a whole in 
1986 was the result of two opposing trends in respect of goods and of services, whereby the 
goods-producing sectors of the economy, with the exception of agriculture saw their level of activity 
decline, while the services sectors, except for commerce, offset this slowdown. The growth of various 
services sectors in conjunction with a downturn in commerce is a somewhat puzzling phenomenon, 
since logic would seem to dictate that the latter should have expanded more or less on a par with the 
output of farm products for domestic consumption (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. The rate of growth in this sector was somewhat faster than in 1985, with its 
aggregate value increasing by 2% in constant terms. This slight upturn was observed both in 
production intended for sale abroad and in virtually all the categories of output destined for domestic 
consumption and was also in keeping with some indicators of livestock activity. These results should 
be viewed in relative terms, however, given the small production volumes involved (see table 4). 
The financial difficulties and a number of organizational problems which have existed for some 
years grew worse in 1986 because of the conflicts mentioned previously. This limited the possibilities 
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of applying a pragmatic policy of credit or other incentives for crop-farming production. Neverthe-
less, a good rainfall pattern and normal weather conditions compensated for the above obstacles. 
With respect to exportable crops, coffee production —which is the most important item— 
improved slightly, but coffee exports nonetheless fell sharply due to the disruption of work during the 
processing stage owing to social disturbances and a breakdown in the production-processing-external 
marketing chain, which considerably reduced the possibility of capitalizing on the improved interna-
tional market conditions. 
The situation was somewhat similar in respect of cocoa production; despite the expansion of 
output (11%), exports declined in terms of both current value and volume. This might, however, be a 
reflection of unrecorded external sales. 
The output of some farm products for domestic consumption increased thanks primarily to 
favourable weather conditions, thereby more than making up for the damage done in this sector as a 
consequence of the social disturbances previously mentioned.2 This was a highly positive outcome in 
view of the fact that, traditionally, supply has been less than that needed to maintain adequate 
nutritional levels. The crops showing an upturn were maize (5%), rice (4%) and bananas (3%), 
which are basic items in the daily diet of the population. On the other hand, sorghum output fell. 
Furthermore, despite difficult economic circumstances, livestock activity increased by 7%, 
owing mainly to the policy of restocking the pig herd after its virtual extinction some years previously 
as a result of the extermination campaign that was mounted to fight outbreaks of swine fever. Some 
fairly large-scale initiatives were also undertaken in the area of poultry-raising which is one of the 
subsectors where growth can most easily be promoted. As regards cattle production, on the other 
hand, a number of extremely disquieting distorsions of various kinds hindered the policy of expand-
ing this activity. 
ii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing output continued to decline. As a result, the share of this 
sector in the gross domestic product —which had increased in the early 1980s— was the same as it 
had been in the mid-1970s, before the "take-off" of the inbond assembly industries. Although a 
slower pace of activity was observed in all branches of industry, official data indicate that the largest 
decreases were those seen in two of the main articles produced by this sector: sugar and edible oils. 
This was due to the fact that even though the Darbonne sugar mill and the National Oil Seeds 
Company (both of which were part of the public sector and suffered from serious financial imbalan-
ces) were converted into worker-run co-operatives, they did not manage to raise their level of 
profitability and had to be closed down (see table 5). 
The value added generated by the assembly industries fell by almost 15%. This decline was 
recorded in almost all branches of the sector, except for exports of radio receivers and accessories, 
travel itmes, handbags and handicrafts. The strikes held in late 1985 and early 1986 contributed to the 
decline of activity in the assembly plants, as did the greater protectionism practiced by their major 
export market, which had a direct impact on the sector. The closure of many plants due to the political 
unrest in the country was another very important factor in the slowdown of the assembly plants, 
although towards the end of the period most of them resumed their operations. 
iii) Construction. After the exceptional boom of 1985, construction slumped, although its value 
added nonetheless remained higher than that of 1984. The unfavourable investment climate directly 
affected this branch of activity, especially in the metropolitan area, as evidenced by the very small 
number of construction permits requested and approved for this area. This was reflected in a decrease 
in cement production. No major infrastructure works were undertaken during the year; indeed the 
only projects carried out, especially in the provinces, were some enlargements of drainage and 
irrigation systems and some road repairs. 
iv) The electrical sector. Electricity generation continued to grow at a similar rate to that of 
previous years (close to 4%), thanks to an expansion programme aimed at meeting the huge 
unsatisfied demand, especially in residential consumption. This latter category of consumption grew 
at a satisfactory rate as a result of the increased supply. Industrial consumption, on the other hand, 
declined (-8%) in line with the performance of that sector. The closure of the Darbonne mill partly 
accounts for the decline in electrical energy consumption in the sugar industry. At the same time, the 
•'The agricultural infrastructure and the storehouse and garage in Damien were destroyed; there was looting of food 
warehouses and experimental development centres; and there were reports of a considerable amount of theft of livestock. 
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decline in activity in the construction sector led to lower electricity consumption in the cement 
industry. The falling-off in production in the assembly industries was also reflected in the decrease in 
the industrial consumption of electrical energy (see table 6). 
c) Employment trends 
No recent official figures were available on unemployment. There are, however, indications 
that both open unemployment and underemployment increased, because of the unfavourable eco-
nomic situation and the weakening of the productive apparatus. The closure of the industrial firms 
mentioned above undoubtedly produced greater unemployment in those regions where they were 
located. Furthermore, every year the labour market is swollen by hordes of jpeople who cannot be 
absorbed in productive activities. In view of the growing unemployment, the new government 
decided to promote highly labour-intensive programmes. As might be expected, however, only a 
fraction of these show positive results because of the short time they have Iseen in existence. 
3. The external sector 
a) General features 
The external sector closely mirrors the critical economic situation of the country. Trade 
volumes —both imports and exports— plunged dramatically. However, for the first time in 12 years, 
the balance of payments showed an overall surplus and the total movement of reserves increased, 
with the result that the government decided to make a more drastic adjustment than in the past. This 
took the form, inter alia, of a restriction on foreign purchases which will be maintained until the 
external imbalance is adjusted (see table 10 below). The target set was to double the amount of 
reserves between February 1986 and September 1987. This policy of the new government is intended, 
according to statements made in official circles, to reactivate the economy and to ensure the 
building-up of the reserves required for the smooth functioning of the external sector, along with a 
measure of growth in domestic production. However, it is likely that such a rigorous adjustment 
policy will not enable the desired reactivation to be secured in the short term unless, inter alia, 
external co-operation is substantially increased. 
b) Trade in goods 
The evolution of trade in goods followed a different trend from that observed of the four 
previous years, since there was a decline in the current values and volume of exports as well as a 
reduction in external purchases. The drop in the volume of exports made it extremely difficult to 
procure foreign exchange (see table 7). 
Overall exports of the main agricultural products increased slightly in current values, primarily 
on account of the rise in international coffee prices, which outweighed the decline in the export 
volumes of coffee and of some less important agricultural export items. It should be highlighted that 
in the case of coffee, exports declined in spite of certain fiscal incentives offered.3 Furthermore, 
foreign sales of goods manufactured in the free zone have already outstripped coffee sales and have 
thus become the main export item and chief foreign exchange earner. The decline in activity in the 
agricultural sector was due to domestic tensions and to the unfavourable external climate, especially 
the growing protectionism practiced by the United States (see table 8). 
Imports of goods fell markedly (13%) in current values, both as a whole and by groups. Overall, 
this was the result of a deliberate policy aimed at restoring balance-of-payments equilibrium because 
of the shortage of foreign exchange. With respect to hydrocarbon imports, these declined because of 
the drop in the international price of petroleum and the cessation of foreign purchases for several 
weeks —at the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986— because of difficulties caused by short-term 
indebtedness and lack of foreign exchange (see table 9). 
'A reduction of 15% in the export tax on coffee beans was granted. 
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c) Services trade and factor payments 
Trade in real services declined sharply, as did the number of tourists. In the case of the latter, 
this decline was due first and foremost to extra-economic tensions which directly affected the tourist 
sector. Expenditure by Haitian tourists abroad also declined, but to a lesser extent. A 75 gourde tax 
was charged for the pass required to travel to the Dominican Republic by land, in order to discourage 
the outflow of foreign exchange by this route. Finally, freight and insurance payments to foreign 
companies also went down considerably (33%) because of a drop in the volumes of goods traded. 
The trade deficit came to US$181 million: a figure only slightly higher than that of 1980, and 
19% less than in the previous year. Factor service payments also decreased, whilst capital transfers 
from Haitian emigrants recovered to their 1980 level (see table 10). 
d) The current account position and its financing 
The current account deficit was reduced by approximately 25 % to a level close to that of 1980 
(US$140 million). This negative balance was more than covered with external financial resources, 
the inflow of which increased more than in the past, perhaps in an attempt to alleviate to a certain 
extent the precarious financial situation prevailing when the new government took office. The 
improvement in the current account situation reflected the government's determination to adjust its 
external accounts, the equilibrium of which is considered in official circles as a pre-requisite for 
restoring the international community's confidence and obtaining more solid credit support on more 
favourable terms. Furthermore, within the framework of the policy aimed at putting the govern-
ment's finances on a sounder basis, it was considered necessary to rebuild the international monetary 
reserves and draw more heavily on external than internal financing to cover the public deficit. 
The amount of official grants (US$100 million) surpassed even that received in 1985. The 
procurement of loans from abroad also increased considerably, and it is difficult to determine what 
proportion of the soft loans contain elements of free aid. On the other hand, direct foreign 
investment remained at the low volumes of the previous biennium, discouraged by the uncertainty 
and fear generated by the socio-political events. 
To sum up, the overall balance-of-payments situation was positive (by US$26 million) for the 
first time in the last 12 years, thus permitting an upturn in the international reserves, which had 
shrunk almost to nothing (see table 10). 
e) External indebtedness 
As a result of the foregoing, the total external debt rose by US$100 million to US$700 million. 
Some of this increase was attributable to the rescheduling of credits, which was necessary because the 
country was unable to meet its external commitments in full. Also partly responsible for this increase 
were the exchange-rate modifications affecting the debt expressed in European currency and in yens. 
Consequently, although a part of this debt was concessionary, unlike what had occurred in the past, 
the debt has now become a relatively serious problem, as its servicing absorbs increasing proportions 
of export income. It is worth repeating that although the amount paid in debt servicing fell in 1986, 
this was simply due to the inability to make the scheduled service payments (see table 11). 
4. Prices and wages 
After climbing quite rapidly in 1985, consumer prices went down steadily as from January 1986 and 
the total accumulated decline was more than 11 % for the year (see table 12 and figure 2). This change 
in trend was attributable to the abrupt fall in international petroleum prices —which made it possible 
to reduce the domestic prices of diesel oil, gasoline and kerosene—, the lower fiscal imbalance and the 
reduction in the price of basic consumer goods such as flour, sugar and evaporated milk. 
Nevertheless, however, as the annual average variation in consumer prices was still positive 
because of the delayed effect of the high inflation registered the previous year, and as nominal wages 
were not readjusted, their purchasing power fell by rather more than 3% (see table 13). 
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5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
a) Monetary policy 
During 1986, there was an increase in the money supply and in factors of absorption in general, 
while domestic credit contracted. 
Although the monetary base decreased in real terms with the decline in the reserves of the 
commercial banks, the amount of money in circulation registered quite a large nominal increase 
(16%). The greater demand deposits in the banking system (20%), the issue of paper money (13%) 
and coins (6%) all contributed to this (see table 14). 
Quasi-money, for its part, grew by 9% because of the 18% increase in savings deposits even 
though interest rates were not sufficiently advantageous. On the other hand, despite the improved 
rates, term deposits continued their downward trend (-13%) because of the reluctance of the banks to 
accept them. As a result, the excessive liquidity of the banking system continued, as in the previous 
year. Hence, ironically, although the level of interest rates was increased in order to make them 
competitive with those abroad —especially in the United States— and so prevent the outflow of 
resources, depositors were forced to deposit in savings accounts abroad because i:hey were unable to do 
so at home. 
Figure 2 
HAITI: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
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The 2% contraction in domestic credit was one of the root causes of this situation. The 
restrictive credit policy which was applied coincided with a weak demand for loans on account of the 
decline in investment. The loans granted to the public sector dropped slightly, for although the 
central government received 4% more financing than in 1985, the resources channelled to public 
enterprises fell drastically (-46%) because some of these companies closed down, while others 
obtained their resources from abroad. The credit absorbed by the private sector declined by more than 
4%. By branch of activity, credit to the electrical sector went down most, followed to a lesser degree by 
transport and communications. 
Even though the exchange rate was undervalued because domestic inflation rates were higher 
than those abroad, the pressures on the gourde eased appreciably. At the beginning of 1986, the dollar 
was quoted on the parallel market at 20% above the official value, but by the end of the year the gap 
had fallen to less than 10% because of the improvements in the balance-of-payments situation and 
the replenishment of the international monetary reserves. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The policy aimed at putting the public finances on a sounder basis, which had been started by 
the previous government, was continued according to the guidelines agreed with the international 
financial community. After the change of government, greater efforts were made to present more 
accurate fiscal accounts and reduce the public deficit, and significant progress was made in both areas.4 
Thus, as a percentage of the gross domestic product, the fiscal deficit was reduced from almost 8% in 
1985 to 5% in 1986 (see table 15). 
As a result, government income increased more than expenditure (25% as compared with 
10%). However, the greater dynamism of income was due to the inclusion of items not previously 
considered, not only of budgetary income but also, and especially, of extrabudgetary resources, as part 
of the above-mentioned effort to present more accurate public financial statistics. Indeed, income 
from direct, indirect and foreign trade taxes grew only slightly, owing both to the scant domestic 
economic activity and the contraction in external trade flows. Furthermore, the 15% decline in the 
income from coffee exports and the reduction in import duties on several products were also factors 
in this poor performance, as were the difficulties in collecting the taxes stemming from the climate of 
social unrest. 
Current budgetary expenditure remained virtually unchanged in real terms (7% nominal 
growth). The real wages paid by the public administration were eroded by the deterioration in the 
purchasing power of wages. Other government consumption expenditure increased slightly in real 
terms, but because of scarcity of resources and budgetary austerity, public investment was severely 
curtailed (-13%) although the larger flow of donations mitigated the decline. 
There was less reliance on domestic sources for financing the fiscal deficit of 550 million 
gourde, because a deliberate policy to alleviate the pressures on the Central Bank was pursued. 
Consequently the deficit was financed primarily by donations from abroad, especially official loans. 
4The fact that in 1986 income or expenditure not previously considered has now been included means that there is 




HAITI: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
1980 
Indexes (1980 
Gross domestic product at market prices 100.0 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Consumer prices 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government' 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product0 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 

































































































































Millions of dollars 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international 
reserves 











































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Refers to the minimum paid by industrial enterprises. 




HAITI: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
HAITI 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 




Exports of goods and 
services 
Indexes 





















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. *The figures on exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments 
data expressed in dollars at current prices, which were converted to constant 1980 values using price indexes calculated by 
ECLAC for the purpose. 
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Table 3 
HAITI: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 


























































































































insurance, real estate and 
business services 
Ownership of dwellings 


















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes livestock, forestry and fishing. 
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Table 4 
HAITI: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
HAITI 










































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development. 
"Preliminary figures. Million dozea 
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Table 5 
HAITI: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIONS 








Metal product and machinery 
Miscellaneous 







(millions of bottles) 
Beer (millions of bottles) 
Cigarettes 
(millions of units) 
Shoes (thousands of pairs) 
Soap 
Detergent (tons) 
Assential oils (tons) 
Cement 
Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 
Commercial and industrial 
electricity consumption 
(millions of kWh) 
Sugar industry 
Cement industry 
1980 1984 1985 











































































































































































































Commercial and industrial 
Residential 
Street lighting 





























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. 
consumption. 
The difference between generation and consumption is due to losses and unregistered 
Table 7 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 



































































































Goods manufactured in 









































































































































































Oils and fats 
Chemicals 
Manufactured articles 




































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
"Preliminary figures. Including manufactures of textiles, leather, rubber, wood, paper and metallic and non-metallic 
mineral products. 'Including articles of clothing, footwer, travel goods, furniture, professional instruments and sanitary 
and electro-domestic articles. Including non-edible raw materials. 
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Table 10 
HAITI: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 





























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, June 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official figures. 
"Preliminary figures, subject to revision. Including other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and 




HAITI: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS" 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Millions of dollars 
Table 12 












External public debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing/exports of goods 
and services 
Net interest payments/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing/disbursements 



































supplied by the Bank of the Republic of Hait 





































Consumer price index 
Food 
Consumer price index 
Food 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Variation from December to December 
16.4 4.9 11.2 
12.8 
Variation between annual averages 



















HAITI: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALARIES 







1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Gourdes 
11.4 13.0 13.2 
Indexes (1980= 100) 
103.6 118.2 120.0 
93.5 99.3 91.5 
Growth rates 
3.6 14.1 1.5 
















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Haitian Statistical Institute. 
"Preliminary figures. Refers to the minimum daily wage paid in industrial enterprises. 
price index. 
' Deflated by the consumer 
Table 14 




Money plus quasi-money (M2) 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
Central government (net) 
Public institutions 




 2/monetary base 
Velocity of circulation 
GDP/M, 
End-September balances 
































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Bank of the Republic of Haiti. 
'Preliminary figures. Excluding interbank operations. 
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Table 15 
HAITI. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On external trade 
Miscellaneous 
Extrabudgetary income 
2. Current expenditure 
Budgetary expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Other expenditure 
Extrabudgetary expenditure 
3. Current saving (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2+4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (1-5) 























































































































































































































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The international crisis has been having a severe impact on the Honduran economy for several years 
now. Despite the economic policy applied and relatively broad external financing, there has been no 
success in adjusting the economy, much less reactivating it. On the contrary, to a certain degree, this 
policy —chiefly oriented toward softening financial imbalances— has been partially responsible for a 
slow down in productive activity and investment in some branches, heightening unemployment. The 
degree of well-being of the population has deteriorated severely during the past five years, and 
poverty and the concentration of income have increased. The fiscal deficit has been considerable and 
difficult to master, since it is due, on the one hand, to the growing cost of debt servicing, defense and 
public security, and, on the other, to the difficulties exprienced by the public sector in a period of 
stupendous unemployment, in reducing its spending on remunerations, which constitute a substan-
tial share of public expenditure. Moreover, in spite of the restrictions imposed by the trade and 
exchange rate policies, the external gap has been wide. 
In 1986, the economy continued to grow at the slow rate of the preceding two-year period. The 
gross domestic product rose by slightly less than 2%, and the per capita product dropped for the 
seventh year in a row, making it 14% lower than in 1979 (see table 1 and figure 1). Although the 
inflation continued to be low (4.4%), real wages again deteriorated, accruing a loss of around 20% in 
the last four years. The fiscal deficit and current account deficit of the balance of payments decreased, 
but their share in the gross domestic product remained substantial (7.3% in both cases). 
Some externa] factors had a positive impact on economic development. In the first place, the 
rise in international coffee prices and in the exportable supply of grain increased the value of goods 
exports significantly (12%). This increase was also due to the increased value of the sale of shrimp, 
lobsters and meat. However, the volume of goods exports dropped by 3%, mainly because of 
decreases in sales of bananas, minerals and wood. In the second place, co-operation continued to be 
received from the Goverment of the United States in the form both of transfers and subsidized 
credits, and that co-operation represented 55% of the balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account. On the other hand, the fall in international oil prices made it possible to effect a sizeable 
savings of foreign exchange, which was greatly enhanced by the substitution of oil derivatives by 
hydroelectric energy. Thus, the terms of trade improved significantly (18%), which increased the 
purchasing power of exports. Finally, the decline in international interest rates reduced debt servicing 
with international banks to a certain extent and lowered the costs of new external financing, which 
encouraged the private sector recourse to it, above all for pre-export activities. 
All these factors contributed to an increase in both liquidity and the volume of goods and 
services imports (5%), particularly consumer items and capital goods for agriculture and transport. 
Thus, it was possible to meet the increased private and public consumer demand, part of which was 
due to the higher earnings of coffee growers and to the readjustment of the remunerations of 
government employees. 
The deterioration of productive capacity lessened the possibilities to expanding the exportable 
supply of goods and services, which declined by 3 %. This drop reduced the positive effects of the high 
prices obtained by some of the main export products. The slow growth of overall production was also 
caused by steep production costs and in particular by high real domestic interest rates (over 13%) and 
the continuance of certain restrictions on external purchases, especially in the industrial sector and 
some trade activities. In spite of the production incentives granted through tax subsidies, the policies 




HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Gross domestic product3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
aAnnual growth rate. beverage annual iate nationwide. 
to December. ^Millions of dollars. Percentages. 
cPercentage variation from December 
The output of the sector producing goods was completely stagnant. In the agricultural sector, 
the increases in the production of coffee, rice, African palm and livestock were neutralized by the 
persistent deterioration of the international prices of various commodities, while decreased invest-
ment had a damaging effect on the production of bananas, cotton and sugar cane. The impact of these 
factors was compounded by the after-effects of the drought, a decline in State credit support and the 
high prices of chemicals used in agriculture, all of which affected the cultivation of basic grains, in 
particular. Manufacturing contracted slightly, owing to the continued decline of sales to the rest of 
Central America and limited domestic demand, which slowed a further decrease because of tough 
competition with imported products. Behind these trends was the overvaluation of the exchange rate 
vis-a-vis other Central American currencies. The forestry industry suffered a downturn owing to the 
scant supply of raw materials, institutional problems and a policy aimed at the privatization of mixed 
enterprises and the external marketing of wood, which had previously been handled by the Forestry 
Development Corporation of Honduras (COHDEFOR). Construction and mining experienced sharp 
reversals. Thus, the modest growth shown by the product was attributable to the growth recorded in 
services, mainly electricity, governmental services, financial services and trade. 
Fixed capital formation also slid considerably (-11%), owing to the 25% drop in public 
investment. This was offset only partially by the growth of private investment (8%). 
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The external sector continued to show an important current account deficit, although this was 
nearly 16% lower than 1985. The imbalance persisted because although the trade account improved 
considerably, interest payments on the debt and remittances of profits increased. As in prior years, 
the current account deficit was financed by means of a large flow of resources from the United States. 
However, the net inflow of capital fell abruptly (-48%), impeding the adjustment and recovery 
programme and raising its costs. 
External debt servicing continued to absorb a considerable share of domestic savings and export 
revenue (48%). The servicing of the debt was 12% higher than disbursements. In net financial terms, 
this means that the country's commitments were paid by resorting to external indebtedness, it being 
necessary also to sacrifice part of the country's own resources. 
The long process of renegotiating the debt continued although it proved impossible to reach 
any kind of agreement with the creditor banks. Consequently, the renegotiation of overdue accounts 
(almost US$200 million) —the equivalent of 7.4% of the total external debt—, was pursued. 
Negotiations were also begun with the International Monetary Fund in an effort to obtain stand-by 
credit. The main subjects of those negotiations were the reduction of the fiscal deficit and the 
exchange-rate policy. However, the points of disagreement, especially in matters of fiscal policy, 
prevented a new agreement. 
The fiscal policy was, in fact, contractive, and central government finances evolved differently 
than predicted. Current expenditure showed more growth (10%) than income (8%), thus increasing 
the deficit. Despite the 7% reduction in capital expenditure, the overall net deficit continued to be 
high (7 % of GDP). On the other hand, debt servicing amounted to the equivalent of 67 % of the fiscal 
deficit. In other words, more than two-thirds of the new debt was used to service the public debt. 
The consumer price index rose slightly. This was because the world inflation rate was moderate, 
the exchange rate remained the same, petroleum prices were reduced and there was a heavy flow of 
unregistered goods imports from other countries in Central America. 
The government's economic policy was influenced by the favourable expectations which 
prevailed at the beginning of the year (a rise in coffee prices, a cutback in oil prices and lower 
international interest rates). Within this framework, the subsidies granted to different areas of the 
private sector continued to grow, central government spending climbed in order to satisfy the wage 
demands of some groups of public employees, the interest payments rate on the debt mounted and 
defense and public security allocations rose sharply. Therefore, in the face of a smaller flow of 
financing from the exterior, the central government needed more domestic credit, and this need had 
to be met by reducing the net credit available to the rest of the public sector. 
The policy of a fixed exchange rate was continued. This negatively affected sales to the rest of 
Central America and favoured imports and unregistered imports, in particular, despite the fact that a 
parallel exchange rate for use in commercial transactions with this area continued to operate. During 
the year the non-bank exchange rate averaged around 2.30 lempiras per dollar, as compared to 2 
lempiras on the official market. The government kept the volume of imports under control although 
it made the restrictions adopted in 1984 more flexible. 
The monetary authorities tried to limit the credit granted by the banking system to the public 
sector with the objective of favouring the allocation of resources to the private sector and rediscount 
and financing lines for specific purposes were expanded. The banking system accumulated an excess 
of liquidity due to the fact that the private sector's demand for credit was relatively low. 
Within the framework of the short-term and structural measures agreed upon with the 
International Development Association (IDA), the policy of privatization was pursued by selling off 
State assets and increasing the private sector's participation in activities previously reserved for the 
public sector (e.g., the external marketing of wood). In addition, the new tariffs continued to be 
negotiated with the business sector, exports were promoted under the protection of laws enacted the 
preceding year and an attempt was made to stimulate private investment through tax changes. 
In the social sector, 1986 was characterized by the intensification of certain phenomena. For 
instance, in addition to the labour problems experienced in the mining sector and in some public-
sector institutions, some of the tensions unrelated to the economic situation experienced in the 
Central American countries were heightened. This made it harder for the government to handle the 
serious financial, economic and social problems that were accumulating and gave rise to unfavourable 
expectations with regard to private activity. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The growth rate of total supply (2.8%) was nearly twice as high as in 1985 (see table 2). This 
was attributable primarily to the increase of over 5% in the volume of imports of goods and services, 
which can be accounted for by the decline in the prices of imports, the greater availability of foreign 
currency and the relaxation of administrative controls in the foreign exchange market and on 
external purchases. Nevertheless, the import coefficient was five percentage points lower than in 
1980, which suggests that external restrictions continued to be a stumbling block for the recovery of 
the economy. 
Among the components of total demand, exports of goods and services dropped by 3%, 
primarily because of the drop in the exportable production of bananas, sugar, metals and tobacco and 
the continuing decline in the country's Central American market. 
On the other hand, domestic demand expanded by close to 5%, chiefly as a result of the 
dynamism shown by total consumption. The expectations of singificant growth in tax revenue 
prompted the expansion of public consumption in response to demands made on and commitments 
entered into with government officials, mainly with regard to health and education. Not only was a 
general wage increase granted to central government employees, but special raises were also given to 
teachers and doctors, and new posts in education and transport were created. Another important 
factor in the rise in public consumption was the mounting expenditure on defense and security, which 
reduced the possibilities for extending the coverage and improving the quality of the productive and 
social services. As for private consumption, it rose by 8.5% owing to the higher earnings of coffee 
growers and the slight increase in the number of wage earners. 
Conversely, the gross domestic formation of fixed capital plummeted by nearly 11%, owing to 
the severe financial constraints on public enterprises, the weakening of executive capacity found 
when a new administration takes office, an insufficient number of new projects and limitations on 
counterpart governmental funds. Nevertheless, perhaps the greatest obstacle to public investment 
continued to be the growing burden represented by foreign debt servicing, which amounted to the 
equivalent of 120% of national savings. 
Private investment continued to recover from the fall experienced at the beginning of the 
decade, when stocks of raw materials and consumer goods had been replenished and equipment 
changed in a process that was favoured by increases in exports and in the availability of credits for 
industry. Fixed private capital formation rose, primarily in such activities as construction; the food, 
footwear, clothing and wood derivatives industries, and the breeding of shrimps for export. As for the 
sharp increase in inventories, it reflected the replenishment of stocks of imported goods, which more 
than offset the depletion of stocks of export commodities (chiefly wood and coffee). 
Nonetheless, several factors continued to affect private investment. Among them, the follow-
ing should be singled out: the expectations of a low external and domestic demand for some products, 
high financial costs and the uncertainty associated with regional tensions. This situation was 
compounded by an exchange rate policy which deprived producers of exportable goods of incentives. 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The growth rate of the product was bolstered by the growth of services, particularly govern-
ment and financial services, while goods production remained stagnant, ostensibly owing to the 
persistence of the systematic slump in construction (see table 3). It would seem that the economic 
policy and especially the fiscal and credit inducements provided in it did not succeed in improving the 
expectations of entrepreneurs, while the exchange rate policy continued to erode the competitiveness 
of products geared toward the Central American market and blocked the possibilities for traditional 
exports. 
i) Agriculture. The agricultural gross domestic product rose by a scant 1.6% so that per capita 
food production was again reduced (see table 4). This was attributable to adverse weather conditions, 
which especially affected the production of bananas, cotton, sugar cane and basic grains; the continued 
decline in international prices of meat, tobacco, cotton, and wood; difficulties in obtaining long-term 
financing and the rise in the price of fertilizers and other chemical inputs used in agriculture. 
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Consequently, exportable production contracted despite the sharp increase in the coffee harvest. The 
production of grains for basic domestic consumption also fell off. 
With the purpose of stimulating agricultural activity, the government broadened its fiscal 
support policy, principally through subsidies (to meat and cotton) and in some cases through tax 
reductions (coffee and bananas). Moreover, the interest rate applied to the special funds for 
agricultural development and the marketing of agricultural products dropped. However, their credit 
support of the sector sank substantially, to the point that the credit coverage of the National 
Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA), which is in a critical financial situation, dropped from 
10% to 7%. Those most affected were medium- and small-scale farmers and the beneficiaries of the 
agrarian reform. On the other hand, financing from the rest of the banking system rose by 12 % to the 
benefit primarily of producers of bananas, coffee, tobacco and sugar cane. Private credit thus offset the 
cutback in State credit to a certain degree. 
The agricultural sector was also affected by a delayed rainy season, which began almost one 
month later than usual, and then by irregular rainfall. The greatest damage was suffered in the 
southern region of the country, which is one of its most densely populated areas and has the worst 
indexes of extreme poverty and malnutrition. Here nearly 90% of the crops were lost, affecting some 
58 000 families. 
After two years during which bananas had recovered, their production fell, mainly as a 
consequence of the intense drought, and this caused the share of Honduran exports in the growing 
world trade in bananas to shrink. The enterprises involved in the production and export of bananas 
consider that the devaluations of the exchange rate in competitor countries and the subsidies and tax 
advantages they provide are incessantly eroding Honduran competitiveness, a process that the tax 
exemption policy of the last six years has not been able to offset.1 
The upward trend of international coffee prices in the last four years and the technification of 
grain farming contributed to a 9% rise in grain poduction. Furthermore, the policy promoted by the 
Coffee Institute of Honduras (IHCAFE) of diversifying crops in low-productivity coffee areas, which 
stimulates cocoa and cardamon production, in particular, remained in force. However, important 
problems still existed. Despite more effective controls, coffee rust continued to affect 73% and coffee 
berry beetle, 29% of the 122 500 hectares cultivated; debt and delay continued to characterize 
producers' co-operatives, which impeded their access to credit; and in the eastern part of the country, 
the war and the presence of foreign armed groups caused losses amounting to around US$50 million 
(15% of exports). 
The level of sugar cane production was only slightly higher than that of 1980 because the 
surface sown was reduced. This reflected the reduction in the import quota of the United States,2 low 
sugar prices on the world market (lower than production costs) and the contraction of bank financing. 
Then too, the crop continued to be affected by the financial problems in the sugar industry, where 
three out of seven companies are experiencing great losses on a continuous basis. 
Since 1979, the area in which cotton is harvested has been declining and in 1986 cotton 
production experienced another drop, amounting to 48% of that which occurred in 1980. The main 
cause for this trend is the persistent downturn of prices to the producer due to the sustained drop in 
international prices, which was compounded in 1986 by higher input costs, the reduction of the 
financing granted to cotton producers and the effects of the drought. In these circumstances, 
production fell by 28%. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the government has given high priority to basic grain 
production. Credit incentives, guaranteed prices, marketing services and technical assistance —along 
with relatively favourable rainfall— contributed to the rise in the domestic grain supply, the surface 
harvested and the yield having increased. However, in the past two years, this situation has changed. 
BANADESA financing was lower, which chiefly affected peasants working in co-operatives; the 
financial constraints on the Agricultural Marketing Institute of Honduras (1HMA) reduced its purchas-
1
 According to the estimates of the main producer-exporter firm, the share of Honduran exports in the world market 
decreased from 219? in 1973 to 169? in 1986, while Panama, Costa Rica and Guatemala maintained their share and that of 
Colombia rose from 5.49? to 18.39?. The FOB costs of Honduras were 15 % higher than those of Panama, whose costs ranked 
second highest in a sample of major producers; and 92 % higher than those of Nicaragua. These differences are lessened by the 
smaller transport costs of the Honduran product. 
2The quota assigned to Honduras for 1986 was 35% lower than in 1984, and for 1987, it could be 64% lower. 
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ing capacity and ultimately, the possibilities for maintaining guaranteed prices, technical assistance 
and mechanization services; also the rainfall was unfavourable. Thus, in 1986 the production of both 
maize and beans sank, and it was necessary to resort to maize imports to meet the domestic demand. 
In the case of rice, which is cultivated in areas under irrigation, ample credit support from private 
banks made it possible to obtain a rise in the harvest (19%), but the volumes attained three years 
before were just barely recovered. 
The enlargement of the area under cultivation of the African palm made it possible to increase 
production by 6%. However, this crop still raises problems, since the oil production costs of the 
co-operatives were nearly twice the international price. This would seem to be due to defects in the 
methods used in gathering and transporting the fruit and to organizational problems caused by 
friction between those exploiting the crop and the State. 
Several public and private institutions are making efforts to consolidate and develop non-
traditional exports, which was reflected in increases in the production of some of them, mainly 
cardamon and melons. 
In spite of the financial support the National Agrarian Institute received from the Central 
Government, activities relating to the allocation and auctioning of land under the agrarian reform 
slumped, because of serious labour-related unrest within that body. In addition, the agrarian policy 
was still not very explicit; it produced uncertainty among peasants and agricultural entrepreneurs and 
discouraged investment. Mobilized efforts to press demands for new land' lacked intensity because 
Decree-Law 33 penalized moves of this kind and the major peasant organizations concentrated their 
efforts on obtaining State support for production. 
Producer organizations benefiting from the agrarian reform continued to consolidate their 
accomplishments in the area of productivity and, primarily, in crop diversification. Nevertheless, 
there are still problems like high levels of payments in arrears, limited access to credit and a high 
incidence of defection by their members. 
ii) Manufacturing. Industrial production recovered partially from its fall of the previous year, 
owing to the larger volume of credit granted to the sector and to other promotional policies. The 
effects of these policies were, however, neutralized appreciably by certain negative factors. Thus, 
depite the increased flexibility of exchange rate controls, the timely acquisition of foreign exchange 
for the purchase of raw materials continued to be difficult; the loss of competitiveness of Honduran 
products curtailed the industry's participation in the Central American market and provided a 
stimulus for contraband from neighbouring countries, to the detriment of certain industrial goods 
produced domestically; trade with some Central American countries was interrupted, provoking a 
shortage of some raw materials and, in certain cases a decline in exports; and finally, an atmosphere of 
uncertainty in terms of investment prevailed. 
In spite of these adverse factors, productive activity rallied in the second half of the year and 
investments in some manufacturing branches rose (see table 5). This improvement was partially 
attributable to measures adopted by the State, especially in certain industries associated with the 
National Investment Corporation, such as the measure aimed at the recovery of private enterprises 
carried out in the main by the Foundation for Research and Entrepreneurial Development (FIDE). 
Activities engaged in food production expanded under the impetus of greater domestic demand. 
The meat industry boosted its income as the result of a government subsidy; nevertheless, production 
dropped because of the continued decline of the international price, the smaller export quota, and 
sales of cattle on the hoof to other Central American countries; consequently, the level of idle installed 
capacity continued to be very high. 
Sugar refining picked up; nonetheless, problems related to external demand, mounting opera-
tion costs and the heavy financial burden persisted because of the large short-term debts entered into 
by some refineries. 
In the lumber and wood derivatives sector, the sawn wood industry diminished due to a sharp 
dive in the international price, insufficient supplies of raw materials resulting from the depletion of 
the forests in some areas and the decapitalization that the industry has been undergoing. However, in 
the furniture and other wood processing branches some firms were reactivated thanks to the 
diversification of their market and production. 
'According to official estimates, the number of families without land comes to more than 150 000 families (21% of the 
economically active agricultural population). SeeSECPLAN, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo del Sector Agropecuario, 1987/ 990. 
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The textile, garment, paper and cardboard and chemicals industries were affected by competi-
tion with unregistered imports coming from the rest of Central America as a result of the overevalua-
tion of the lempira vis-à-vis other currencies and despite less rigid exchange rate controls. The 
manufacture of paper and cardboard articles was also affected by foreign exchange restrictions and 
the downturn in banana exports, which had an impact on the production of cardboard boxes. In the 
chemical industries, interruptions of trade with other Central American countries limited imports of 
raw materials, which production and sales adversely affected. 
iii) Construction. During 1986, the government formulated a national housing policy, under 
which the Housing Fund (FOVI) was expanded by 30 million lempiras and foreign loans were 
contracted by over US$25 million. These initiatives generated an atmosphere conducive to the 
construction of housing by private enterprise (see table 6). Regardless of the dynamism experienced 
by building and by residential building in particular, reduced public investment caused the sector's 
activity to fall by 8%. 
iv) Mining. Mining production again contracted owing to the persistent deterioration of the 
international price of metals. This caused serious labour problems at the Mochito mine, whose 
activities were paralyzed twice. 
v) Basic services. Basic services grew by slightly more than 2%, mainly because of the sustained 
increase in electric power production. In fact, the operation of the "El Cajón" hydroelectric plant 
permitted the substitution of all electricity imports (see table 7). On the other hand, the underutiliza-
tion of the average production capacity of 2 billion kWh was very high (30%), showing the need to 
expand the distribution system. The low volume of domestic demand and, in some cases, the limited 
distribution capacity impeded the generation of more hydroelectric power despite the expansion of 
sales to Central America. For this reason, the National Electric Energy Corporation suffered serious 
financial problems. 
The favourable growth of transport (2%) was due to the increase in urban and interurban 
passenger movement, and in sea freight, which offset the drop in land and air freight as a result of the 
stagnation of goods production and the rise of air transport costs. 
vi) Other services. Other services, which represented almost 40% of the total GDP, constituted 
the most dynamic sector of the economy, showing a growth rate of 4%. Thus, stimulated by increased 
demand, commerce improved after several years of deterioration and stagnation. Financial activities 
escalated as a consequence of the attractive returns achieved, while governmental services rose 
significantly (7%) because of larger defense and public security allocations and some increase in 
central government employee openings. 
c) Evolution of employment and unemployment 
Even in major growth years, a structural feature of the Honduran economy has been a labour 
absorption capacity which fails to match the increase in the labour force, which expands at an annual 
rate of 3.7%. This has resulted in increasingly higher rates of open unemployment and underemploy-
ment, above all in the forestry and services sectors. The rate of open unemployment rose to 12% in 
urban areas; underemployment increased, especially in the rural sector as a result of the drought, 
whose effects were very severe in the southern part of the country (see table 8). 
The government continued to apply the National Employment Programme, which includes 
labour-intensive projects. It also created over 3 000 permanent jobs for people under temporary 
contract. 
When problems related to unemployment are considered in conjunction with those due to the 
persistent decline in income, it may be assumed that the degree of poverty has risen and that general 
well-being has seriously degenerated. 
3. The external sector 
The growth shown by the external sector was not as unfavourable as that recorded in 1985, primarily 
because of price changes in the principal foreign trade commodities. Consequently, the coefficient of 




The unit value of exports rose considerably (17%), while that of imports slid (-3%), with the 
result that the terms of trade showed an improvement of nearly 20% (see table 9). The sharp 
increase in the value of exports of goods and services (13%) allowed the trade deficit to drop by 44% 
in a situation in which external purchases showed little dynamism. Factor servicing continued to 
climb, however, and was solely responsible for 70% of the negative balance on current account (see 
table 10). 
An important feature of the performance of the external sector was the marked reduction in the 
net inflow of capital. Thus, despite the smaller deficit on current account and the increase in 
unrequited official transfer payments, there was a slight loss of international reserves. 
In sum, regardless of the improvement of some external conditions (coffee, bananas and 
petroleum prices), exports were unable to give a forward thrust to the economy. The deterioration of 
the productive capacity in respect of exportable goods made it impossible to respond quickly to such 
changes as those described above and to take advantage of the favourable conditions in the interna-
tional economy. Moreover, the positive effects of the improvement in the purchasing power of 
exports were eroded by burdensome payments of interest to the exterior. 
a) Merchandise trade 
i) Exports. The value of exports of goods rose by 13%, owing to the behaviour of international 
prices, while their volume fell, with part of that reduction being covered by existing stocks of coffee, 
wood and meat (see table 9). 
Despite the government's export promotion policy, particularly as regards the subsidies 
granted for some items, the exportable supply declined. This was due to the decreased competitive-
ness of Honduran products intended for the Central American market (mainly meat and industrial 
goods) and the adverse conditions affecting the demand for some other goods (minerals, sugar and 
cotton). Non-traditional exports grew, although only slightly, owing to the fact that a sharp increase 
in wood manufactures offset the downturn in the other items in this category (see table 11). The 
efforts made by the Honduran Forestry Development Corporation to promote the industrialization 
of forestry activities were a factor in this regard. 
External banana sales dropped as a result of the contraction of the exportable supply (see 
table 12). The factors contributing to this reduction in supply included the problems mentioned 
above, the temporary dip in consumption and the low prices which prevailed in European and North 
American markets during the major part of the year. 
Coffee was the main export item thanks to a rise in international coffee prices and the 
significant increase in the volume exported, which was made possible by the high level of stocks on 
hand. As a result, the value of external sales rose by 74%. Due to the fact that better prices were 
expected, exporters paid high domestic prices to producers and held back sales; the subsequent fall of 
international coffee prices thus created problems for exporters, in response to which the government 
decided to decrease the export tax by 20 lempiras per 46-kilogram sack. There were uncontrolled sales 
to Guatemala. 
The value of lumber exports sank by nearly 3% as a consequence of a lower international price, 
even though the volume rose slightly owing primarily to a reduction in inventories. The depletion of 
forestry resources in the most accessible areas, the sector's institutional problems, its heavy financial 
burden, the depreciation of its physical capital and the gradual dissolution of mixed-capital lumber 
companies resulted in a cumulative reduction of 27% in the exportable supply during the three-year 
period from 1983 to 1985. Acting through the Honduran Forestry Development Corporation, the 
State therefore undertook a review of its existing policies, especially those relating to the external 
marketing of lumber. As a result, the private sector was given a greater role in this process, and by the 
end of the year a proposal for a new forestry policy was under study. 
Both the value and the volume of meat exports climbed considerably (16% and 14%, respec-
tively). Nonetheless, the exported volume was still 66% less than in 1980. One factor contributing to 
its contraction during the period 1981-1985 was the stagnation of international prices, which led 
meat packing firms to pay lower prices to producers, thereby discouraging production and spurring 
unregistered sales of livestock to neighbouring countries. Thus, the utilization of the installed 
capacity of the meat export industry was still low in 1986. In line with the fiscal subsidy policy, the 
government granted $0.12 lempira per pound of livestock. 
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As a result of the 16% increase in the value of shrimp and lobster exports, the share of total 
exports represented by these items —although small— doubled between 1980 and 1986, putting 
them in third place in external sales, after coffee and bananas. On the other hand, the value of mineral 
exports fell 55 % due to the drop in their volume, which, in turn, was a consequence of the progressive 
deterioration of world market prices during the 1980s. Finally, bank credits for exporters rose 57%. 
ii) Imports. According to preliminary estimates, external purchases rose 3%; most of this 
increase occurred during the second half of the year as a result of greater domestic demand, 
particularly for consumer goods. 
Thanks to the inflow of foreign exchange occasioned by burgeoning coffee sales and to the 
decrease in the country's petroleum bill, additional resources were available. These resources were 
used to expand the country's external purchases of consumer goods (12%) in order to satisfy the 
mounting demand and to replenish inventories. Capital goods imports (especially for transport and 
agriculture) also grew, above all due to the needs of the private sector. Nevertheless, the share of total 
imports accounted for by capital goods was still much lower than it had been in 1980 (see table 13). 
The value of purchases of raw materials and intermediate goods dipped 5% due to the drop in 
the price of petroleum and the substitution of electricity for this energy source, as a result of which the 
oil bill was lowered by 30%. 
The overvaluation of the lempira with respect to other Central American currencies spurred 
the entry (in some cases, unrecorded) of merchandise from neighbouring countries. Imports and 
exchange rate controls tended to be more liberal, as is illustrated by the fact that the partial operation 
of a parallel market was permitted. On the other hand, the credit made available by the banking 
system for purchases abroad increased only 5%. 
iii) Subregional trade. The country's trade with the rest of Central America declined once again 
in respect to both imports and exports, with the latter dropping to just 28% of the 1980 volume. 
Honduras' trade deficit with the area was consequently reduced by 60%. 
Trade relations with Guatemala were interrupted several times. Injune, Guatemala announced 
its withdrawal from the Central American Clearinghouse and demanded that payment for its exports 
be made in dollars. In response to this decision, the Government of Honduras suspended trade 
transactions, with that country, some of which were then diverted to Mexico. The above situation as 
regards Honduran trade relations with Guatemala had the effect of reducing its trade deficit with that 
country by 30%. 
Trade with Nicaragua also decreased, chiefly as a result of payment problems and reduced 
energy sales. The level of debt corresponding to the accumulated deficits with this country thus 
reached 57 million Central American pesos. In May, the two governments signed a mutual assistance 
agreement whose object was to regularize the commerce between their countries by means of 
countertrade operations totalling US$10 million, A mechanism was established for the repayment of 
the debt over a 10-year period, with a three-year grace period, at an interest rate of 7.5%, and an 
arrangement was reached with regard to fishing by Honduran boats in Nicaraguan territorial waters. 
In addition, Honduras agreed to continue to export electrical energy. 
The existing tariff system, which can be said to be of a protectionist character that discourages 
exports, remained in force, while efforts were made within the country to define a new tariff régime. 
This process has been slower than in the rest of Central America due to the fact that 28% of 
Honduran tax revenues come from import duties (in the other Central American countries this 
proportion ranges between 8% and 13%). 
iv) The terms of trade. The significant improvement in the terms of trade (20%) was mainly 
due to the increase in the price of coffee and the drop in petroleum prices. However, with the 
exception of bananas, shrimp and lobster, the prices of the country's main export products declined. 
Thus, for most of Honduras' exportable goods, external market conditions continued to be 
unfavourable. 
The improvement in the terms of trade nonetheless more than offset the reduction in the 
volume of exports, thereby significantly increasing their purchasing power. 
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b) Services trade and factor payments 
Overseas sales of real services were stimulated by electricity exports, especially to Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua, following the agreement reached with the latter country. For their part, imports of 
services grew slightly, in line with the expansion of purchases of goods (see table 10). 
Factor services showed a rise of 14%, since, although the international interest rate fell, the 
level of interest payments made internationally climbed as the debt became concentrated in the hands 
of multilateral and bilateral creditors. 
Additionally, returns on direct foreign investments went up by 30%. Thus, factor servicing 
once again absorbed the significant inflow of unrequited official transfer payments and continued to 
be the main element contributing to the maladjustment of the balance-of-payments current account. 
c) The current account position and its financing 
As a result of the trends outlined above, the deficit on the current account of the balance of 
payments fell to US$270 million. A considerable portion of this amount was covered by unrequited 
official transfer payments. 
The main aspect to be noted in the behaviour of the variables of the capital account was the 
drastic decline in net receipts of external credits. Long-term capital inflows plunged 56% to their 
lowest level in the last 10 years. This decline was caused by the decrease in public investments and, 
consequently, by the reduced disbursement of external funds. In fact, in so far as its relations with 
some financial agencies were concerned, the country became a net exporter of capital. Thus, net 
capital inflows to the official sector slumped 50%. Loans to the banking sector also dropped sharply 
(-65%) as a result of a cutback in the disbursement of regular credits contracted among the Central 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Indeed, in the case of the latter 
institution, the net flow was negative. In contrast, loans to the private sector surged due to the 
increased external credit support made available for coffee pre-export activities. 
Funds from the Agency for International Development continued their upward trend, whereas 
the net utilization of compensatory credits was negative due to the decrease in the disbursements 
made by the Venezuelan Investment Fund and the Banco de México. Furthermore, International 
Monetary Fund resources have not been used since 1974 owing to Honduras' failure to reach an 
agreement with that agency; as a result, the country's activity in this regard has been limited to 
making amortization payments. 
The capital account balance was slightly less than the current account deficit and a small loss of 
reserves took place. Despite optimistic expectations at the beginning of the year, in the end the 
overall performance of the external sector was poor and was largely based on the inflow of bilateral 
resources made available within the framework of external financial co-operation, whose continua-
tion in the future would appear to be uncertain (see table 10). 
d) External indebtedness 
The country's total debt reached US$2.93 billion, which was almost three times the value of its 
exports of goods and services and equivalent to nearly 80% of the gross domestic product. The 
external debt continued to be concentrated in medium- and long-term credits with official lending 
agencies (75%) and in the public-sector portfolio (see table 14).4 
For the second time in the present decade, the service on Honduras' foreign debt exceeded 
disbursements and reached 48% of the earnings from goods and services exports. One factor of 
significance in this regard was the expiration of the grace period of a number of credits, chiefly those 
related to the "El Cajón" project. 
External debt servicing thus hindered private and public capital formation. The decreased flow 
of financing has diminished the prospects of completing large-scale projects (pulp and paper) and 
has limited the possibilities of taking advantage of others (distribution network for the use of 
4
 At the end of 1986, the public debt balance (90% of the total debt) was made up of the following components: 53% 
with official multilateral lending agencies; 22% with official bilateral agencies, mainly of the United States. The remainder was 
composed of commercial bank credits (17%) and supplier credits (18%). See Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 
Memoria 1986, Tegucigalpa, February 1987. 
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hydroelectric capacity) as well as making it more difficult to pay off the credits used to finance these 
investments. The mounting burden of the debt has thus been compounded by the impossibility of 
taking full advantage of previous loans. 
In addition, amortization and interest payments put strong pressure on public finances, 
restricting the resources available for providing social and productive services. This has been 
exacerbated in recent years by the growing use of external resources for defense and public security-
related expenditures. 
The new government recommenced the renegotiation of its external debt with the private 
international banking system, with which it was on the point of reaching an agreement in July. 
Honduras proposed the renegotiation of 100% of its debt, a 16-year repayment period, a three-year 
grace period, and the application of the London interbank rate without surcharges. The Banking 
Committee proposed the renegotiation of 90% of the total debt, the immediate payment of the 
remaining 10%, a 14-year repayment period, to include three years grace, and the use of the LIBOR 
rate with a spread of 1.75 %. However, the parties were not able to reach an agreement. Consequently, 
by the end of 1986 the country was US$243 million in arrears in its debt servicing payments, of which 
US$226 million corresponded to arrears in amortization payments. 
Preliminary talks were undertaken with the International Monetary Fund, in 1986 with the 
goal of establishing the basis for a possible stand-by credit arrangement. The main issues were the 
reduction of the fiscal deficit and exchange rate policy options. However, the differences between the 
parties' positions, above all with respect to the first topic, continued to block the signing of a new 
stand-by credit agreement. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
During the last three years, domestic prices have risen relatively moderately. This could well be 
primarily a reflection of world inflation and of the maintenance of the lempira's exchange rate. In 
1986, the variation between annual averages of the consumer price index (4.4%) was somewhat 
higher and the December-to-December increase (3.2%) was less than in 1985 (see table 15). 
These subtle changes were the net result of various conflicting phenomena. On the one hand, 
international petroleum prices and the unit value of merchandise imports declined, which had a 
positive effect on the prices of manufactures. Nevertheless, the impact of the drop in petroleum 
prices was less than what it would otherwise have been because the government maintained the 
consumer prices of petroleum derivatives at their existing levels and modified only those of bunker 
fuel and kerosene, which benefitted certain branches of industry and some urban households. On the 
other hand, the increase in liquidity and especially the problems that affected the production of basic 
grains pushed up the prices of farm products and foodstuffs. These higher prices increased the 
income of agricultural producers, who in the past had received lower prices relative to those of urban 
productive activities. Both rents and the prices of beverages and tobacco climbed more than the 
overall price level (7% and 12%, respectively). 
b) Wages 
The purchasing power of minimum wages dropped for the fourth consecutive year in 1986, for 
a cumulative loss during the last four years of around 20% (see table 16). 
Early in the year, labour unions engaged in talks with the government concerning a review of 
the official minimum wage, which has been frozen since June 1981. However, no agreement was 
reached in this regard, due to the slow expansion of productive activity and mounting unemployment. 
Additionally, the low levels of productivity existing in various branches of production resulted in 
wages that were inadequate for satisfying minimum needs. 
Given these circumstances, labour tensions escalated. Thus, in a number of institutions within 
the public sector conflicts arose over layoffs or wage demands. The problems experienced within the 
National Agrarian Institute were particularly severe and affected both workers and the peasant 
sector. In mining, activities were also suspended, and this had major repercussions on employment 
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and production, despite the fact that the government granted a subsidy of 5 million lempiras to the 
workers at the Mochito mine. 
Nonetheless, wages did rise in certain activities. According to a survey carried out in Teguci-
galpa between July 1985 and July 1986 the manufacturing wage index climbed by slightly less than 
6%, while the wage index rose by 8% in commerce and by 6% in financial institutions; the increase 
was somewhat less than 2% in construction, and less than 1% in transport services. Within the 
central government structure, special raises were granted to teachers and doctors, as well as to 
dayworkers in the transport communications and public works sectors. The wage bill also grew as a 
result of the increase in the number of jobs in the public sector. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
In 1986 serious fiscal problems persisted. Although the tax burden grew slightly and the 
coefficient of the global deficit with respect to the GDP dropped somewhat less than two points, the 
latter remained high (7.3%). Moreover, inasmuch as current spending increased more than current 
income, the maladjustment in the central government's current account grew more acute, and it was 
necessary to engage in greater domestic borrowing in order to finance this deficit (see table 17). 
For the third year running, current income expanded considerably, although at a slower rate 
(8%) than in 1984 and 1985. This was mainly due to the changes observed in tax revenues (see 
table 18). Tax receipts from coffee exports rose substantially (thereby more than offsetting the 
reduction in receipts from exports of bananas and other products), and fiscal revenues increased 
significantly as a consequence of the differential between international oil prices and the prices of 
petroleum products within the country. On the other hand, income tax revenues rose only 4%, 
despite the wage adjustments granted to government employees and the creation of new jobs in the 
public sector, as well as the introduction of measures to improve tax administration. 
In fact, if the revenues corresponding to the differential between international and domestic oil 
prices are excluded, it becomes apparent that indirect tax receipts stagnated, as they climbed only 
slightly in certain categories and fell in others. Thus, the general sales tax increased less than private 
consumption, in opposition to the historical trend and despite the preventive auditing plans that 
began to be applied during the year. The income from indirect taxes also declined as a consequence of 
the tax deductions granted in the form of Export Promotion Certificates as an incentive for private 
export activity. 
Revenues from import duties diminished 5% due to the lower receipts from the duty on fuels 
and lubricants5 and to a certain amount of tax evasion, despite the progress made in monitoring 
valuations under the new auditing plan. 
As a result of both the decline in the export volumes of various products (bananas and minerals) 
and the elimination of the export tax on non-traditional products —as provided for by the Export 
Promotion Act— the tax receipts from exports were lower than in 1985 for all items except coffee. 
The taxes collected on coffee exports rose significantly (38%), despite the partial deferment of their 
payment.6 
One feature of the country's fiscal policy in recent years which became more noticeable in 1986 
has been the modification and adjustment of the tax structure without any prior assessment of the 
possible costs and benefits of these changes as regards production activity, income distribution and 
public finances. On the one hand, the intensity of the external disturbances and in general, of the crisis 
that the country has been undergoing has prompted the introduction of partial reforms to the tax 
structure with a view to raising government revenues and improving its financial situation. On the 
other hand, through its economic policy, the government has attempted to reactivate production and 
'This is accounted for by the following factors: i) tax revenues from oil imports in 1985 included 25.2 million lempiras 
of receipts corresponding to 1984; and ii) the oil bill was lower owing to reduced oil prices and the smaller volume imported. 
6
 By means of Decree No. 90-86 of 23 July 1986, a deferment was granted for the payment of coffee export taxes owed 
prior to the decree's entry into force. In addition, a discount of 20 lempiras per 46-kg sack was granted; this discount was 
deductible from the export tax and applied to the exports of the 1985/1986 and 1986/1987 harvests. 
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exports by granting various tax exemptions and subsidies to private enterprises which have had a 
deleterious effect on public finances. 
Current spending continued to expand for the fourth year in a row, this time by 10%. This was 
attributable to the fact that both government wages and the number of government jobs rose, interest 
payments on the domestic and external debts climbed, and subsidies rose, principally due to transfers 
to the National Agrarian Intitute and to meat exporters. 
In its efforts to curtail spending, the government has encountered obstacles due to its lack of 
manoeuvring room. In fact, a significant cutback in government spending would only be possible at 
the expense of greater unemployment and/or a reduction in its debt servicing payments. For 
example, in 1986, 63% of total government spending corresponded to the payment of wages and to 
amortization and interest payments on the total debt. 
Capital expenditure dropped around 7% as a result of the negative trend in real investment and 
of the lower level of transfers and loans to decentralized institutions, despite the rise in amortization 
payments. This is accounted for by the completion of the "El Cajón" hydroelectric project (and the 
consequent decrease in transfers and credits to the National Electricity Company), the lack of major 
projects with approved financing, and the relatively scant ability to execute projects inherent to a new 
government. Furthermore, the share of total capital expenditure represented by debt amortization 
payments continued to climb, reaching a level of 55%, which seriously lessens the possibility of 
expanding spending on the accumulation of fixed capital. 
Despite the decrease in capital spending, the considerable increase in the deficit on current 
account contributed to a large net global deficit. In addition, the smaller inflow of external resources 
made it necessary to significantly modify the composition of its financing. The burden of providing 
this financing therefore had to be borne by domestic credit, which limited the amount of domestic 
financial resources available to the private sector and drastically reduced the amount of credit at the 
disposal of the rest of the public sector. 
In terms of its end uses, expenditure continued to be directed largely (44%) toward debt 
servicing and outlays for defence and public security. Consequently, since 1980 there has been a 
decrease in the share of spending allocated to public health and welfare, labour and social security, 
communications, public works and transport, and the promotion of agricultural production and the 
conservation of natural resources (see table 19). 
b) Monetary policy 
Given the favourable external outlook at the beginning of the year, the government's monetary 
policy was geared toward maintaining the exchange rate and diminishing the external imbalance, and 
thereby preventing the increase in income from abroad, which mainly stemmed from the improve-
ment in coffee sales, from putting pressure on the money supply. By means of positive interest rates, 
an attempt was also made to discourage capital flight, curb inflationary pressures, and provide more 
resources to the private sector, especially to exporters and to producers of raw materials and of 
essential goods for the population. 
In order to achieve these goals, the credit supplied by the Central Bank to the public sector was 
increased moderately, interest rates on loans were maintained at positive levels in real terms, and the 
rediscount rates for production in general and for the domestic and external marketing of agricultural 
products were lowered by two percentage points. In addition, exchange and import controls were 
retained and an attempt was made to make them more operative. 
However, the foreign exchange earnings generated by increased exports and the expansion of 
domestic credit spurred a rise in liquidity. Thus, the amount of money in the economy grew by around 
9% and quasi-money climbed even more sharply (14%), outstripping the increase in the nominal 
product. 
The growth rate of net domestic credit to the public sector was, in contrast, lower than the rate 
of inflation. This was due to the fact that the sharp jump in the central government's demand for 
credit (16%) was to a great degree offset by the more sluggish demand for credit of the rest of the 
public sector. In fact, deposits by decentralized public institutions exceeded loan requests (see 
table 20). 
Domestic credit to the private sector rose substantially (8%), but by less than during the 
preceding year, owing to the fact that the difference existing between domestic and external real 
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interest rates encouraged borrowers to turn to external credit sources. In addition, the private sector 
made greater use of rediscounts and special credit programmes whose finance costs for producers 
were lower. 
The rise in savings and time deposits (due to greater liquidity), in combination with the slower 
growth rate of the demand for loans, made it possible to use bond sales to finance a larger fiscal deficit. 
Of the credit granted to the private sector, 36% was devoted to financing trade, principally 
coffee exports; consumer loans also rose significantly (23%). As a consequence of the sluggish 
activity of the manufacturing industry, new loans to this sector climbed 50% less than they had the 
preceding year. 
An important element of the government's monetary policy during 1986 was the maintenance 
of steep real interest rates, even though international rates diminished. This meant that finance costs 
for productive enterprises were high —since many businesses did not have access to financing from 
private international banks— and discouraged investment. Indeed the cost of credit came to repres-
ent as much as 30% of total costs in some industries, and the difference between the interest rates on 
loans and deposits fluctuated between five and nine points; this was a reflection of the national 
banking system's inefficiency and/or of a very high profit margin that was maintained at the cost of a 
lower level of productivity as regards the output of real goods and services (see table 21). 
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Table 1 
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 




Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
M 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 

























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 'Total medium- and long-term external debt. 
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Table 2 
HONDURAS: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
HONDURAS 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 









Exports of goods and 
services 




















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from the IMF balance-of-
payments data expressed in dollars at current prices, which were converted intoconstant 1980 values using unit value indexes 
calculated by ECLAC for that purpose. 
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Table 3 
HONDURAS: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 














insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 




HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Indexes of agricultural 

































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. Estimated on the basis of the value added. 'Thousands of tons. 
































































































































162 169 166 147 -7.3 6.5 4.6 -2.1 -11.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
Preliminary figures. Millions of tons. 
of tons. Millions of packs of 20. 
litres. 'Millions of kWh. 
'Thousands of square metres. 
"Millions of boxes of $0. 
Millions of yards. 




HONDURAS: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Total 
Residential 
Production of some 
building materials 
Cement' 
















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Refers to applications for private urban building permits in theCentralDistrict,San PedroSula 
and La Ceiba; covers the period from 1 October of the preceding year to 30 September of the year in question. May differ from 





























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the National Electrical Energy Corporation of Honduras (ENEE) 
and the Central Bank of Honduras. 
Note: Electrical energy supply and demand refers only to the ENEE system. 
"Preliminary figures. Net production = gross production - power station consumption. 'Refers to large 
enterprises in various sectors of economic activity (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.). 
systems and free consumption. 'Refers to transmission and distribution losses. 
Refers to sales to other 
Table 8 
H O N D U R A S : ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION A N D UNEMPLOYMENT 
Total population 
(thousands of inhabitants) 
Economically active population 
Thousands of persons 
Index 
Open urban unemployment 













































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Department of Planning, Co-ordination and the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. On the basis of preliminary information taken from the September 1986 urban labour force 
survey. 'Includes open unemployment and underemployment. 
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Table 9 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing 
Volume of < 
Volume of i 
power of exports 
sxports 
imports 



























































































H O N D U R A S : BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
H O N D U R A S 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services* 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance d 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1984: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook,Jxine 1987; 1985-1986: ECLAC, on the basis 
of official figures. 
° Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. Includes net loans granted and other 
assets and liabilities. ''is equal to the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 11 













































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 12 



































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras and the Department of Planning, Co-
ordination and the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of board feet. 'Thousands of troy ounces. 
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Table 13 






Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 
Fuels and lubricants 
Materials for agriculture 








































































































































0.2 0.5 41.7 -23.5 135.9 4.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 'These figures differ from the balance-of-payments figures because they refer to CIF values and 
do not include adjustments for undervaluation. 
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Table 14 
HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
















Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Debt service/exports of 
goods and services 
Net interests/exports of 































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Includes only medium- and long-term debt. Preliminary figures. cEnd-of-year balances of debt 
disbursed. ''includes adjustment for exchange rate. 'Includes only the total long-term debt and the short-term 
private sector debt. Includes amortization payments on short-term debt. Corresponds to the actual interest paid, 
excluding interest accrued but not paid; hence the difference between these figures and the corresponding item of the balance 




H O N D U R A S : DOMESTIC PRICES 
HONDURAS 
Consumer price index 
Food 






Consumer price index 
Food 




























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
° Refers to the variation between the final quarter of the year and the same period of the preceding year. 
variation between the third quarter of the year and the same period of the preceding year. 
Refers to the 
Table 16 
HONDURAS: WAGES AND SALARIES 
Official minimum wages" 
Nominal 
Crop-farming and stock-raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Handicrafts 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Real 
Crop-farming and stock-raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Handicrafts 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Official minimum wages" 
Nominal 
Crop-farming and stock-raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Handicrafts 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
Real 
Crop-farming and stock-raising 
Manufacturing and mining 
Handicrafts 
Construction 
Commerce and services 
1980 1981 




















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"The minimum wages correspond to the annual averages for the Central District and San Pedro Sula. After May 1974, 




HONDURAS: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Purchase of non-personal 
goods and services 
Interest 
Transfers 
3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Debt amortization payments 
External 
Domestic 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure 
6. Fiscal deficit (or surplus) 
(1-5) 




Current savings/capital expenditure 
















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Office of the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. Corresponds to real, not rounded, figures. 'Include income attributable to the oil price 
differential. Capital inflows representing a limited amount of income have been deducted from this item. 'The 
gross indicator takes into account expenditures on debt amortization; the net indicator does not. 
Table 18 






Production, consumption and 
sales taxes 
Beer 
General sales tax 









Transfers from the 
public sector 
Other income 















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Office of the Budget. 




HONDURAS: INDICATORS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 





Office of the President of 
the Republic 
Ministry of the Interior 
and Justice 
Foreing Relations 
Defence and Public Security 
Economy and Commerce 
Treasury and Public Credit 
Attorney General of the 
Republic 
Public Education 
Public Health and Social Welfare 
Culture and Tourism 
Labour and Social Security 



















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Correspond to absolute figures. c Excludes the amortization of financial bonds. 
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Table 20 
HONDURAS: MONETARY BALANCE AND INDICATORS 
Money (M,) 
Currency outside banks 
Demand deposits 
Factors of expansion 
Gross international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To public sector (net) 
Central government 
Public institutions 
To private sector 
Factors of absorption 
Quasi-money (savings and 
time deposits) 
Bonds 










Velocity of circulation GDP/M; 
End-year balance in 










































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. The monetary base is not included in the balance. 'Average up to 
September. ''Refers to the September variation as compared to the same month of the preceding year. ' Annual 
averages. 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Honduras. 
"Averages. Obtained by subtracting the growth rate of the consumer price index. 

MEXICO 
1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
After a brief and limited upswing, the Mexican economy suffered a marked decline in 1986, due 
mainly to two factors. Firstly, from the second half of 1985 there was an intensification of the policy 
aimed at reducing the external and fiscal deficits and curbing inflation. However, it was not possible 
to achieve these objectives on account of the sudden drop, early that year, in the world price of 
petroleum: a product which had assumed great importance in the development of the country since 
the end of the previous decade. The shortfall of US$8.5 billion in exports of hydrocarbons and the 
need to pay a similar amount in interest on the foreign debt created severe problems in meeting 
external payments. Secondly, the public finances —which are heavily dependent on earnings from 
petroleum exports— deteriorated substantially and the effect of this decline was soon felt in all 
economic activities, thus deepening the recession. 
This critical situation required the urgent assistance of the international financial community. 
The external public and private debt, amounting to almost US$80 billion, was successfully renego-
tiated under new arrangements and the country was able to maintain its debt service payments. 
However, the additional external credits that had been agreed upon were not received and the plan to 
achieve a moderate a reactivation of the economy had to be postponed. 
In these circumstances the evolution of the principal macroeconomic variables was unfavoura-
ble. The gross domestic product fell by 3.8% resulting in a 6% drop in the per capita product (see 
table 1). The latter indicator thus declined to its 1978 level, wiping out the progress that had been 
made during the 1978-1981 "petroleum boom". The slowdown in economic activity was widespread. 
While industrial activities suffered the greatest decline, the primary and services sectors were also 
affected. Consequently, it was not possible to productively absorb the labour force which is entering 
into the labour market and which is growing at an annual rate of 3.2%. While it is difficult to make a 
precise determination on the basis of available employment indicators, the latter do suggest some 
increase in unemployment, as a result of lay-offs in the manufacturing and the construction sectors, 
and a considerable increase in underemployment. 
The depression in the international petroleum market led to a sharp turnaround in the external 
sector, and a deficit of more than US$1.4 billion was registered on the current account, following 
three years of surplus. The 40% increase in exports of non-petroleum products was insufficient to 
make up for the shortfall in sales of hydrocarbons. The value of total exports of goods thus fell by 
26%, which limited the capacity to import. The authorities sought to promote exports and discourage 
imports by a substantial devaluation of the peso against the dollar, even though this accentuated 
inflationary pressures and reduced the incomes of broad sectors of the population. Partly as a result of 
this and partly owing to the decline in economic activity, purchases of goods from abroad fell by 13%. 
Even so, the surplus on the trade balance for goods and the larger surplus earned on the trade balance 
for services were insufficient to cover external factor payments. 
The foreign exchange market remained calm despite the worsening balance-of-payments 
situation on current account. The inflows of capital made it possible to increase the international 
reserves by almost US$1 billion from the low levels to which they had fallen at the end of 1985. In 
contrast with previous years, there was a surplus of US$2.2 billion on capital account, due to the 
increase in direct foreign investment and, particularly, to the repatriation of the deposits of Mexicans 
abroad. The limited availability of domestic credits for the private business sector forced the 
repatriation of a part of these resources, which were used to maintain the level of working capital 
rather than to finance new investments. In these circumstances, private capital formation was unable 
to maintain the dynamism of the previous biennium and declined by 9%. 
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One of the objectives of fiscal policy was to reduce by half the public sector deficit, which had 
amounted to 10% of gross domestic product in 1985. The sharp drop in earnings of Mexican 
Petroleum (PEMEX) and, consequently, in the taxes paid by this enterprise, together with the 
monetary effects of devaluation on the payment of interest on the external debt, made the achieve-
ment of this target impossible. Moreover, the cost of servicing the domestic debt increased considera-
bly on account of higher domestic interest rates. Interest payments on the total debt increased by 27% 
in real terms, equivalent to 17% of gross domestic product. Overall, the fiscal deficit represented 
more than 16% of gross domestic product despite a rigorous policy of austerity in public spending; 
government spending increased by barely 1% and public investment continued its downward trend, 
declining this time by 16%. However, if the fiscal deficit were adjusted for the inflation resulting 
from the increase in interest payments on the domestic debt, the final result would be a "primary" 
surplus of over 2% of the gross domestic product. 
In keeping with the policy of rationalization of government finances and reduction of the size of 
the public sector, the sale or liquidation of State-owned enterprises continued, which, with a few 
exceptions, were able to significantly reduce their deficits through frequent adjustments of prices and 
tariffs. 
In the absence of external resources, the public deficit was financed mainly from domestic 
sources. Largely on account of this, the banking system severely restricted private credit. While the 
mining and energy sectors and some services still benefitted from increased financing, the same was 
not true for other activities, particularly agriculture and construction. 
In fact, there were significant increases only in the credit extended to the government and to 
State-owned companies while credit to the other financial sectors was reduced, in some cases by 
substantial margins. There was therefore a decline in real terms in both monetary variables and the 
amount of private domestic resources attracted. Consequently, the decline in deposits attracted by the 
banking system continued; a trend which, with the exception of 1984, had been present during the 
last five years, despite the attractive interest rates offered by the banks. In contrast, stock exchanges 
took on a more important role as a parallel banking system and as agents for the sale of government 
securities to private enterprises. In addition, the rate of return in the limited equity-investment 
market increased more than two-fold in real terms, even though one-third of the companies 
registered on the stock exchange incurred losses. This climate of speculation contrasted with the 
decline in productive activity. 
As already mentioned, the unfavourable external situation made it necessary to accelerate the 
rate of devaluation of the peso in order to rapidly generate trade advantages, This was accompanied 
by a marked reduction in the difference between the two existing exchange rates. The "controlled" 
rate —applicable to 80% of foreign transactions— increased by an average of 138%, almost equal to 
the rate of increase of the "free" dollar which went up by 106%. 
The accelerated rate of devaluation —a key aspect of the short-term policy— had a consequen-
tial effect on inflation. The average annual variation in consumer prices increased sharply from 58% 
in 1985 to 86% in 1986 and the variation from December to December rose even more rapidly (from 
64% to 106%) (see figure 1). Active interest rates increased owing to the movements in the rates of 
exchange and inflation. Interest rates also influenced inflation, by way of prices, in a spiral of inert 
pressures. Moreover, prices and tariffs for goods and public services increased faster than the average 
rate of inflation, which they also fuelled, thus completing a cycle of expectations that favoured the 
continuation of the generalized increase in prices. 
In contrast with the previous biennium, the rate of increase in prices for rural produce was less 
than the average inflation rate, thus weakening a form of support for one of the least developed 
sectors of the economy. Nominal wages in both urban and rural areas also increased by less than the 
general level of prices, although they were readjusted more frequently than in previous years. 
Minimum wage earners were, moreover, faced with the cost of a "basket" of essential items, which 
increased faster than the average rate of inflation. During the year the minimum wage suffered a real 
decline of 11%, which meant that its purchasing power was 45% less than the historical maximum 
recorded in 1976 and was equivalent to the level achieved 23 years previously. 
This decline, together with problems of unemployment, caused the share of salaries in the gross 
domestic product to drop to 26%, in comparison with the 40% which it represented before the crisis 
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mid-1970s. Thus, on account of inflation, the domestic impact of the recession was unequally 
distributed to the detriment of the labour factor. In contrast, capital was favoured largely due to the 
high returns on savings and, in general, to the climate of speculation. 
In summary, the adverse external situation brought about by the slump in the petroleum 
market —which accounts for more than 6% of gross domestic product— had a severe impact on the 
economy. This impact was felt most strongly in the goods sector, on account of the decline in 
production in most branches, and in the social sector, since the standards of living of the disadvan-
taged sectors of the population declined even further. In contrast, despite the accelerated devaluation 
of the currency, financial circuits and the currency exchange market suffered little disruption. 
Moreover, with support from abroad, servicing of the external debt continued. However, the 
resulting decline in investments led to a drop in economic activity and to a deterioration in the 
prospects for future growth. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
In 1986 the main macroeconomic variables suffered a decline which, though widespread, was 
less severe than that experienced during the 1983 recession, the worst in the last half century. The 
expansion of the economy in 1984 and during the first half of 1985 had been accompanied by an 
increase in the external and fiscal deficits, which the government attempted to control by intensifying 
its austerity measures, reducing public expenditure and gradually restricting credit. The year 1986 
thus began in unfavourable circumstances, which soon worsened with the collapse of the petroleum 
market. 
Despite this, the volume of exports was one of the few variables which recorded some growth 
(6%). The reduced volume of petrol sold abroad was more than offset by the increase in the volume of 
exports of other products and services. This expansion was achieved thanks to the undervaluation of 
the peso as well as to the greater volumes of exportable surpluses available as a result of the 
contraction of domestic consumption. However, the sharp drop in the prices of petroleum drastically 
reduced the country's capacity to import, which led to a decline in economic activity, imports fell by 
12%; gross domestic product by almost 4% and total supply by 4.5% (see table 2). 
With respect to total demand, there were significant declines in all variables, with the exception 
of exports. Gross investment fell by 14%, to levels similar to those recorded 10 years previously. In 
contrast with the previous biennium, during which private investment had recovered fairly rapidly, 
in 1986 it declined by 9%. The unavailability of credit and the weakening of the domestic market were 
the main causes for this decline, although high interest rates and the reduction of some tax incentives 
were also contributory factors. Despite official efforts to halt its decline, public investment dropped 
even more sharply (-16%) and amounted to less than the 1975 total. 
Following a slight increase in the previous biennium, consumption again fell by more than 4%, 
even though government consumption was slightly higher than the level of the previous year. On the 
contrary, private consumption declined by 5.5%, largely on account of the new drop in real wages. 
Private per capita consumption was thus 16% lower than the historical maximum achieved in 1981, 
the high point of the "petroleum boom". 
b) Evolution of the main sectors 
The 3.8% decline in gross domestic product reflected a rather widespread deterioration. The 
goods-producing sectors were most affected, declining by more than 5%. The sharp drop in industrial 
activities, owing to the unavailability of investment and credit and the limited domestic market, was 
compounded by a poor year for agriculture. The output of basic services declined by only 1 %, due to 
the fact that the moderate growth in the electricity, gas and water sectors offset the effects of the 
decline in the transport and communications sectors. The other services suffered a decline of almost 
3%, largely as a result of the drop in commercial activity, which accounts for a large part of total 
services (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. During 1986, agricultural production declined by 2% in comparison with the 
previous year, in which the agricultural sector had had a relatively good performance. The 5% decline 
in crop farming was mainly responsible for this poor performance, since livestock raising activities 
expanded by 3% (see table 4). 
The unfavourable pattern of rainfall was among the factors most responsible for the reduced 
size of the harvests. Prolonged droughts in the northeast of the country, late rains and, subsequently, 
excessive rainfall in some producing areas, particularly affected yields of maize and sorghum. The 
total harvested areas decreased by more than half a million hectares owing to the lack of water. 
Moreover, the support price policy acted as a disincentive to production since, with the exception of 
beans, increases in these prices were lower than the rate of inflation. Also, the level of credit disbursed 
fell by 12% in comparison with 1985. In contrast, adequate supplies of inputs were available: there 
was an increase in the production of improved seeds as well as in the total area fertilized. 
Consequently, while production of maize and sorghum fell by 16% and 26% respectively, 
production of beans went up by 20%. Wheat was a special case since the surplus of a million tons 
accumulated during the previous cycle made it possible to implement restrictive measures to 
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discourage production. Oilseed production fell by 21% while safflower production increased only on 
account of the higher yields per hectare. Cotton production continued to decline as a reflection of the 
unfavourable international prices prevailing since 1984. On the other hand, the projected production 
targets for vegetables were not met; export prices for some crops fell, while the crops also suffered 
from the effects of a tropical storm which affected the northeast, the most important producing 
region. 
In the cattle farming subsector, the slaughter of cows and sheep increased for the second 
consecutive year (by 16% and 9%, respectively); pork production again dropped (-16%), while 
poultry production maintained its upward trend, although the increase was a good deal less (5%) 
than the previous year (12%). Much of the increase in beef production, which expanded by 68% 
(although total stock declined slightly) went for export. The reduction in the slaughter of pigs was 
due to the increased cost of inputs, which made this activity less profitable. 
The fisheries subsector continued to receive official support in the marketing of its production. 
At the same time, fish consumption was promoted through price control measures for popular 
species. However, only limited measures to maintain the fleet were undertaken. The total volume of 
the catch increased by 8%, although this was not reflected in the total value since it included species of 
widely different prices. Although there was a rapid rise in the catch of anchoveta and tuna, the catch of 
shrimp and sardines declined. 
In the forestry subsector, the volume of production decreased both with respect to lumber and 
non-lumber products. In the first case, there was a slump in the market, with the exception of the 
demand for sleepers; in the case of non-lumber goods production was adversely affected by the lack of 
credit support and competition from cheaper substitutes. 
ii) Mining. In recent years, mining production —with the exception of petroleum— has been 
somewhat sluggish or even declined. In 1986 it fell by 3%, partly on account of long-standing 
problems but also owing to a sharp drop in the industrial consumption of mineral products. There 
was also a sharp slump in external demand during the first months, although towards the end of the 
year demand picked up, leading to an increase in prices. The production of minerals for the iron and 
steel industry —coke and iron ore— was the most severely affected, but production of some 
non-ferrous industrial metals, such as lead and copper, also declined considerably (see table 5). In 
recent years, production of iron ore has been affected by problems in the iron and steel industry, 
which have even led to the closure of plants. The slump in domestic demand for this product resulted 
in large surpluses for exports. In contrast, the extraction of precious metals increased, largely owing 
to the incentive provided by the increase in international prices. Lastly, the exploitation of quarries 
and the extraction of sand, gravel and clay declined by 8%, owing to a contraction of demand resulting 
from the sharp drop in the construction sector. 
iii) Petroleum. The gradual deterioration of the international hydrocarbon market, which had 
been taking place in previous years, worsened in early 1986. As a result, the volume of petroleum 
exported fell by 10% and its prices by 55%. Domestic consumption also declined slightly on account 
of the slowdown in economic activity (see table 6). This situation was made worse by the financial 
problems of PEMEX, which were reflected in fewer investments and in a cutback in operations. 
Activity in the industry as a whole declined by 5%, on account both of the extraction of smaller 
volumes of petroleum and gas and the drop in the output of refined products. The exhaustion of the 
surpluses of exportable gas also had a negative impact. Prospecting activity also declined during the 
year, and only a few new deposits were discovered in the Tabasco-Chiapas area and in the Campeche 
Sound. Although the rate of extraction was reduced, it surpassed the 1985 level, bringing the proven 
hydrocarbon reserves down to 70 billion barrels. 
iv) Manufacturing. Following two years of growth, manufacturing activity declined by nearly 
5 %. This decline was mainly due to the drop in investment, the weakness of domestic demand and the 
sharp contraction of credit. 
As a result of the drop in investment, the trend in the sectors producing capital goods —which 
had been markedly upward during 1984 and 1985— was downward throughout the year, during 
which an average decline of 13% was recorded. 
The production of consumer durables followed asimilar pattern, declining by more than 11%. 
This was partly due to the slump in the automobile industry (-28%), which had far-reaching 
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consequences for many of the other sectors and was attributable to the fact that the industry no longer 
enjoyed the fiscal provisions that had artificially encouraged the purchase of vehicles by companies 
during the previous biennium. Credit restrictions and insufficiently high private demand also made 
domestic sales fall in contrast with the unusually high rate of growth shown by exports. The 
production of electro-domestic appliances also declined, though to a lesser extent. 
The production of non-durable consumer goods (mainly foodstuffs, beverages, clothing and 
footwear) declined by 1%, primarily because of weak demand (see table 7). Overall, the output of 
manufactured consumer goods fell by 3%-
As for intermediate goods, their production declined by 5%. The most notable decreases were 
observed in the manufacture of inputs based on wood, paper, chemical products, plastics and 
non-metallic minerals. In contrast, the basic petrochemicals industry expanded considerably follow-
ing extensions to and the opening of sulphur, polyethylene and tetrame plants, among others. 
The manufacturing industry was also affected by the measures to liberalize trade and abolish the 
system of prior permits, which were adopted in part to facilitate the entry of Mexico into GATT. 
Nonetheless, the sharp devaluation of the peso had a compensatory effect and provided greater real 
protection. The liberalization of trade, while gradual, still led to major disruptions in certain branches 
or companies facing an adverse economic and financial situation and represented an obstacle to their 
reconversion. Private agents also came up against credit restrictions when attempting to introduce 
technological changes. In contrast, transnational corporations with branches in the country expanded 
their operations, both in re-exports and in supplying the domestic market. A part of the foreign 
investment consisted of the purchase of shares in payment of the foreign debt. As part of the trend 
towards greater internationalization of the production of certain goods, the subcontracting industry 
located primarily along the northern border continued to expand rapidly. 
v) Construction. The construction industry suffered the worst decline of all the sectors of the 
economy (see tables 3 and 8). This decline had already begun in the second half of 1985, in spite of the 
demolition and reconstruction projects which had to be carried out following the earthquakes and 
accelerated during 1986. The contraction of credit added to the problem caused by the drop in public 
investments over the preceding four years and by the substantial decline in private investments in 
1986. Consequently, only a few public works were continued, among them the Mexico City under-
ground railway and a number of provincial airports. 
In contrast with previous years, private construction was hampered not only by a drop in 
investment, but also by the contraction of credit for low-income housing, which lost its priority rating 
owing to a more rigorous implementation of the policy of reducing all forms of subsidies. Residential 
construction and irrigation and transport works were the hardest hit. The decline was, however, less 
significant in the case of projects in the energy sector (electricity and petroleum) and civil non-
residential construction. 
vi) Basic services. The growth of the basic services group declined by only 1% because the 
electricity, gas and water sector expanded by almost 5%, a percentage which nevertheless repres-
ented a decline in the historical growth rate of the sector, which had been over 7% per annum. 
Hydroelectricity generation fell by about 24% on account of insufficient supplies of water in the 
dams resulting from the lower level of rainfall in 1985. This made it necessary to have greater 
recourse to thermoelectricity whose production increased by 17% to represent 78% of the total. The 
total production of electricity increased by almost 5% and domestic consumption by only 3%, owing 
to weak industrial demand. Energy exports grew more than tenfold on account of the increase in the 
production of the géothermie plants on the northern border. 
The transport, storage and communications sector showed a decline of 2 %. Transport alone fell 
by 5%. Both the number of passengers and the volume of freight transported by rail declined 
significantly. The number of air passengers also declined (-10%). In contrast, the maritime transport 
industry maintained some dynamism. Highway and urban road transportation and the underground 
railway in Mexico City expanded at moderate rates by comparison with communications, which grew 
by 7%. After long distance telephone service, which had been suspended on account of the earth-
quakes in September 1985, had been reestablished, national calls increased by 9% and international 
calls by an even greater percentage. 
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vii) Other services. Other services on the whole fell by about 3%, largely as a result of the poor 
performance of commercial activity, which declined by almost 6%, the reduced purchasing power of 
the population and the increased cost and scarcity of credit. The deterioration in the restaurant and 
hotel industry was less significant (-3%) since the number of tourists entering the country showed 
some improvement. Financial services also declined (-1%) since the degree of financial intermedia-
tion by the banking system was less than it had been. On the other hand rentals of dwellings increased 
by just under 2%. In the community, social and personal services sector, there were increases only in 
professional and educational services (particularly the latter which expanded by almost 4%), while 
other areas, including medical and recreational services and public administration, declined. 
c) Employment 
The drop in investments, the poor agricultural year, the major downturns in the industrial and 
construction sectors and the relative reduction in the size of the public sector have combined to create 
conditions in which enough new jobs cannot be created, particularly when account is taken of the high 
annual rate of increase of the economically active population (3.2%). 
There is no official estimate of open unemployment at the national level.1 Surveys are confined 
to the urban areas (the 16 largest cities), in which the rate of open unemployment (4.3%) seem to 
reflect a slight improvement over the previous year. However, other indicators point to a significant 
deterioration of the employment situation in the formal sector. For example, in the manufacturing 
industry employment fell by almost 4% and the number of man-hours worked decreased by more 
than 5%. In the construction industry employment fell by 38% during the first three quarters of the 
year. On the other hand, employment in subcontracting plants producing goods for export increased 
by 17% in confirmation of its very rapid expansion over the preceding three years (see table 9). 
The number of members of the Mexican Social Security Institute remained virtually the same. 
This was due to an increase of almost 3% in the membership of permanent workers —a rate lower 
than the growth rate for the economically active population— and to a 10% decline in the 
membership of casual workers, a group largely composed of construction workers. 
3. The external sector 
a) General features 
The influence of the external sector on the economy was particularly adverse. Already in 1985 a 
deterioration had been observed in the balance of payments partly as a result of increased imports 
brought about by the upswing in economic activity, following the rigorous adjustment to which the 
latter had been previously subjected. This situation, to which the heavy burden of servicing the 
foreign debt had also contributed was compounded in 1986 by the effects of the slump in the 
international petroleum market. As a result of this slump, the value of exports of crude fell by almost 
US$8.5 billion, an amount equivalent to more than 6% of the gross domestic product and slightly 
higher than the interest payments on the debt. 
This loss in earnings called for a tremendous effort to adjust the trade and financial variables. 
The export of non-petroleum products was promoted and imports curbed through a policy of 
accelerated devaluation. In the financial sphere, an appeal was made to the international community 
for help in renegotiating a huge credit package, which enabled the country to continue to meet its 
external debt servicing obligations. Within the framework of these negotiations, commercial banks 
were asked for additional loans amounting to US$7.7 billion during the 1986-1987 biennium, none of 
which were received in 1986, however. 
'The only available estimate is not an official one and comes from an international firm of consultants which uses a 
macroeconomic model for Mexico, according to which the rate of open unemployment rose from close to 9'7c in the period 
1983-1985 to nearly 12% in 1986. 
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Despite the lack of external resources and the current account deficit of more than US$1.4 
billion, there were no sudden fluctuations in the exchange rate. This relative stability was due to the 
large inflow of foreign exchange mainly from the repatriation of capital motivated by the strict 
domestic credit policy and to the increase in direct foreign investment. Thus in the last months of the 
year, international monetary reserves recovered after having dropped to extremely low levels. At the 
end of the year, they stood at approximately US$6.8 billion, an amount equivalent to the value of 
seven months of imports. 
b) The current account 
The main external trade variables contracted in 1986. The drastic decline in the price of 
petroleum (-55%) and the decrease in the volume of crude petroleum sold abroad (-10%) were only 
partially offset by the increase in prices in the international market for some traditional goods and by 
the favourable response of non-petroleum exports to tax, institutional and, particularly, exchange-
rate incentives.2 The value of total exports thus fell by 26%, a decline wholly attributable to the 
marked reduction (-27%) in unit value since the volume exported increased by 1 %. As a result of the 
sharp drop in the price of exports, the terms of trade deteriorated by almost 26% in 1986. This 
deterioration —the fifth in the last six years— caused the corresponding index to fall by 36% in 
comparison with 1980 (see table 10). 
The higher value put on foreign currency increased the cost of imports, which, following a 
partial recovery in the preceding biennium, fell by 15%. This drop, which was due mainly to a 
contraction in their physical volume, occurred although the external trade of the country had been 
made more liberal as a result of its entry into GATT in September.3 
The total value of exports rose to US$ 16 billion. Sales of hydrocarbons accounted for less than 
40% of these earnings in contrast with a share of almost 70% in previous years. On the other hand, 
exports of non-petroleum products showed considerable dynamism, increasing by 40% (see 
table 11). This increase was mainly due to the exchange-rate and export-promotion policies, the 
facilities granted for the temporary importation of goods to be re-exported and the exportable 
surpluses achieved through increased production or as a result of the contraction in domestic 
consumption. Increases due to this last phenomenon included those in exports of beef cattle (up by 
42%), cars and trucks (up by 290%) and iron and steel products (up by 85%). With respect to coffee, 
tomatoes and silver, the higher value of external sales was due rather to the much more favourable 
prices obtained abroad. In general, exports of non-traditional products grew faster than exports of 
traditional products (44% as against 33%). 
As for imports they dropped to just under US$11.5 billion. Particularly severe was the drop in 
imports by the public sector, which shrank by 24% on account of substantial reduction in government 
expenditure and especially in public investment. The drop in private investment also affected private 
sector imports, which fell by 8% (see table 12). Imports of consumer goods declined more markedly 
(-22%) than imports of intermediate goods (-15%) and capital goods (-6%), on account of sluggish 
demand or adequate domestic supply. The decline in imports of intermediate goods was due in part to 
the contraction of the manufacturing industry, the larger domestic supply of agricultural raw 
materials owing to the good 1985 crop cycle and, to the general decline in economic activity. 
As a result of these changes, the surplus on merchandise trade was only US$4.6 billion, 45% 
less than the 1985 figure. Conversely, the favourable balance of trade in real services increased 
significantly, rising from US$500 million in 1985 to almost US$1.1 billion in 1986 (see table 13). 
This increase was due to a contraction of imports, since sales of services abroad increased by less than 
3%. In fact, although assembly-type services expanded, their value increased by very little in 
comparison with the 1985 level of US$1.3 billion. This stagnation was largely due to thecompara-
'The main export promotion measures adopted during the year include the introduction of a domestic letter of credit, 
the establishment of temporary import facilities, the reimbursement of the value-added tax and the granting of incentives for 
marketing firms. 
'During 1986 progress continued tobe made towards the elimination of the license required prior to importation with 
the exemption of another 190 items from this requirement. This brought the total number of items exempted to 7 542, or 92<Jf 
of the items subject to tariff, representing 69% of the total value of imports. 
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lively lower cost in dollar terms of domestic inputs and to the negligible increase in foreign currency 
earned from tourism, even though the number of visitors rose by 10% (to 4.6 million) and the 
average length of stay increased. On the other hand, the relative increase in the cost of external 
services discouraged Mexicans from travelling and purchasing abroad. The corresponding positive 
balance thus increased by 36%, rising to US$870 million; other services, such as transport, freight 
and insurance, declined partly as a result of the weakening of trade relations with the exterior. 
In contrast with the preceding three years, the positive balance of trade in goods and services 
(approximately US$5.7 billion) was not large enough to cover factor payments (US$7.5 billion), even 
though they decreased by 15%. This reduction was due to the drop in interest rates on the 
international markets and to the improved terms obtained in renegotiating the debt. Even so, close to 
US$8.4 billion was paid out under this heading (see table 13). 
c) The capital account 
The capital account produced a favourable balance of over US$2.2 billion, which more than 
made up for the deficit on the current account, thereby making it possible to recover some 
international monetary reserves. The inflow of capital was partly due to an increase in direct foreign 
investment, which rose to US$900 million, of which US$360 million corresponded to the conversion 
of public external debt into capital. 
There was a higher level of net inflows of short-term capital. These resources were channelled 
both to development banks and to the public sector. In addition, almost US$1.6 billion entered the 
country as a result of the repatriation of capital by the private sector. As pointed out above, the 
unavailability of domestic credit forced a number of entrepreneurs to repatriate their savings abroad 
to be used as working capital. The high returns on certain securities, particularly listed securities, also 
proved attractive in this regard. 
d) The external debt 
The sharp drop in the prices of petroleum made it necessary to reformulate the strategy of 
servicing the external debt. The Mexican position in the prolonged negotiations with the interna-
tional financial community was to make debt servicing compatible with the real possibilities of the 
economy in order to ensure that adjustment did not preclude growth. This position was clearly 
outlined in the Programme of Recovery and Growth (PAC), which was announced in the second half of 
the year for implementation over the next two years. 
Eighty billion dollars of the total external debt of more than US$100 billion was renegotiated. 
The agreements reached concern international financial organizations, the governments of the 
industrialized countries and private foreign banks. 
First support from the International Monetary Fund was obtained in an amount of US$1.7 
billion, with quarterly disbursements scheduled over an 18-month period. The agreement with the 
Fund contained novel features which promote growth and structural change in the economy. These 
include the change in the criterion used in evaluating fiscal performance in terms of the "primary" 
balance (which is obtained by subtracting the inflationary component of the interest payments made 
on the domestic debt from the "financial deficit") and the possibility of the Fund's lending US$720 
million if the price of Mexican petroleum were to fall below US$9 per barrel, US$500 million if the 
economy performed poorly during the first quarter of 1987 and an additional US$1.2 billion should 
there be an extraordinary decline in the external earnings of the public sector. 
The agreement with the Fund was tied to the agreement with the World Bank, which envisaged 
loans worth US$2.3 billion for the 1986-1987 biennium and included the signing of a letter of intent 
centered on the structural changes made in the economy. At the same time, renegotiation and support 
agreements were reached with the Bank for International Settlements, the Paris Club and Japan in 
respect of amounts totalling some US$5.3 billion. 
The negotiations held with international private banks presented greater difficulties, not so 
much with respect to the maturity dates for interest and amortization payments corresponding to the 
contracted debt, but rather with regard to new financing. As already mentioned, new funds could not 
be obtained in 1986 since a financial agreement involving numerous creditor banks required the 
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approval of a very large percentage of them before the private banks could disburse the new credits 
agreed upon, which amounted to US$6 billion, that is to say an additional US$1.7 billion of a 
contingent nature.4 
The renegotiation made it possible to extend the payback period of US$43.7 billion of the debt 
contracted by the government with private banks and to reduce the corresponding interest rate. Thus, 
the periods of fourteen years with a one-year grace period agreed upon previously were extended to 
twenty years, with a seven-year grace period, while the margin above the LIBOR rate fell from 1.125% 
to 0.8125%. The rate of interest applicable to loans contracted in 1983 and 1984 also fell, first because 
of the drop in the margin above the LIBOR rate from 1.5% to 0.8125% and secondly because of the 
replacement of the United States preferential rate by the LIBOR rate. The maturity dates were, 
however, not changed. With regard to the private external debt, on the other hand, longer repayment 
periods were negotiated for the US$11.7 million in the Trust Fund to Cover Exchange Risks 
(FICORCA), the term of maturity being extended from eight to twenty years and the grace period from 
four to seven years. Finally, a commitment was obtained to maintain a minimum of US$5.2 billion in 
inter-bank lines. 
The additional financing that entered the country increased the external debt by US$2.7 billion. 
Of this amount, some US$1.4 billion corresponded to the net flow of resources to the public sector. As 
for the banks, their debt increased by US$700 million, while the private sector debt fell by US$2 
billion. The remainder of the increase corresponded to exchange rate adjustments on account of the 
revaluation of the debt expressed in European and Japanese currencies (see table 14). 
Some US$400 million of the amortization payments made were effected through the sale of 
assets of enterprises with debts. This procedure represented another innovation, particularly as 
regards the creation of facilities by which international financial corporations can intervene in this 
type of operation. These corporations showed a preference for the purchase of assets in the 
automobile, metal-products and hotel industries. 
As a consequence of the increase in the debt and, above all, of the pronounced drop in the value 
of exports, the indicators of indebtedness deteriorated significantly. The ratio of debt to exports thus 
reached the unprecedented level of 4.6 and, in spite of the drecrease in interest payments, their ratio 
to exports also increased. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Efforts to bring inflation down from an annual rate of about 60% in 1985 to one of 45% or 50% 
in 1986 began to prove unsuccessful early in the year when the petroleum market collapsed. The 
increased rapidity with which devaluations were effected constituted an inflationary factor of the first 
magnitude. In addition to its direct effects on the cost of imports, it made it necessary to increase the 
nominal interest rates to a level that would be competitive with prevailing external rates. This in turn 
augmented the financial costs of enterprises. In practice, moreover, many prices were "indexed" to 
the exchange rate. A vicious circle was thus set in motion since greater inflation, apart from putting 
new pressures on the exchange rate, caused interest rates to rise. As a result, the rate of increase in the 
national consumer price index rose steadily, reaching the unprecedented level of 106% in the month 
of December. As a result the variation between annual averages in respect of consumer prices rose 
from 58% in 1985 to 86% in 1986 (see table 15 and figure 2). 
The reduction or removal of numerous subsidies and the active revision of the prices and rates 
of goods and public services were among the factors that caused the price of controlled articles to 
increase more (94%) than those of articles that were not controlled (82%). In particular, the prices of 
certain basic food items (such as bread and tortillas) and of transport increased faster than the rate of 
4The credits which could not be disbursed in 1986 and which, it is estimated, will enter the country in 1987 will be 
subject to a surcharge of 0.8125 % above the LIBOR rate. It is expected that the first US$5 billion w ill be granted for a period of 
12 years with a five-year grace period and the remaining US$1 billion for a period of 15 years with a seven-year grace period. 
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inflation (92%), which pushed up the cost of the family "food basket" of wage-earners in the 
lower-income groups.5 Nonetheless, the overall increase in the price of foodstuffs, both controlled 
and non-controlled was in keeping with the average rate of inflation. This was mainly due to the fact 
that the costs of various agricultural products increased more slowly. In fact, in the producer price 
index (whose rate of increase has been consistently lower than that of the consumer price index), the 
guarantee prices paid to farmers recorded the slowest rate of increase (74%). In contrast, raw 
materials, have the greatest responsibility for the increase in the general index, partly because some 
of them were imported. 
The effects of these inertial factors on the inflation were compounded by those of the 
above-mentioned modifications to the exchange rate and increases in interest rates, which not only 
accelerated the rate of inflation but also promoted inflationary expectations. 
Figure 2 
MEXICO: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
'The average price of bread increased almost threefold and that of tortilla by 110%, both increases being much higher 
than the average rate of inflation. Even so, as from May, the subsidy on tortilla was granted on a highly selective basis, through 




The wage policy continued to reflect the limitations imposed by the targets of the adjustment 
programme. Two other factors also affected this policy negatively, one of them being the moderation 
of wage demands by trade unions in the light of the prospects of a worsening of the unemployment 
situation and the other, higher inflation. Even so, the authorities attempted to partially correct the 
deterioration in the purchasing power of wages by menas of a third revision, which took place in 
October and came on top of the two half-yearly adjustments granted in previous years. Despite this, 
the purchasing power of the minimum wage fell again, this time by almost 11 % (see table 16). This 
loss followed those experienced in previous years so that in real terms the accumulated deterioration 
of the minimum wage amounted to 45 % in terms of the historical maximum reached in 1976 and the 
purchasing power of the wage was equivalent to that recorded in 1963. 
Moreover, in January two of the four geographical minimum-wage zones were merged in 
keeping with efforts to unify the minimum wage nationally. This meant that those in the zone with 
the lowest minimum wages received a higher than average increase with the result that their real 
wage deteriorated much less (-2%) than average. On the other hand, during the year the remaining 
zones lost more than 12% of their purchasing power. 
The daily wage for agricultural workers followed a similar pattern, and real incomes in rural 
areas also declined, partly as a result of the inadequate increase in the support prices paid for 
agricultural products. However, this did not cause food prices to rise more slowly and hence did not 
make that the nutrition levels of the urban groups deteriorated further. Lastly, workers with access to 
supplementary benefits of various kinds (most of whom may be found in the middle-income strata) 
tended to rely more on those benefits than in the past, in consequence of the drop in their wages. 
On account both of the further deterioration of wages and the inadequate supply of jobs, the 
share of the gross domestic product represented by labour factor payments dropped to 26%, as 
compared to almost 40% prior to the crisis of 1982. The cost of the squeeze in national wages was 
thus unequally distributed within the society, to the detriment of wage-earners. In contrast, those 
receiving income from capital were in a relatively favourable position owing, among other things, to 
the high real interest rates they earned on their savings. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policies 
a) Monetary policy 
The drop in petroleum prices had immediate effects on the financial sector. On the one hand, 
the accelerated rate of devaluation of the currency helped to push up domestic interest rates. On the 
other hand, while credit was generally available, the greater financial needs of the public sector, 
brought about by the decline in its income, reduced the amount of credit available for financing other 
sectors of the economy. These two factors together made it necessary to maintain restrictions on 
private credit, and this, in turn, contributed to the contraction of the economy. 
With regard to the exchange rate, apart from achieving a substantial increase in the effective 
exchange rate, the authorities had by the end of the year almost succeeded in unifying the two 
exchange rates in force, the gap between which had been very wide in the past. Thus the exchange 
rate for the "controlled" dollar (used in 80% of external transactions) increased by an average of 
141%, while the exchange rate of the "free" dollar climbed by 106%, both increases being much 
higher than the average rate of inflation (see table 17). 
As a result of the restrictive monetary policy applied by the authorities, the main financial 
variables underwent substantial real contractions. Hence, between December 1985 and December 
1986, the monetary base expanded by 48%, and money by 68%, both of these figures being much 
lower than the rise of 106% shown by the consumer price index during this period (see table 18). 
Nonetheless, as table 19 illustrates, although interest rates on savings deposits were attractive, the 
procurement of deposits by the banking system was weak, with the result that the trend began some 
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years previously towards a decline in the financial intermediation.6 This decline was to a large extent, 
due to the contraction in economic activity and to the increased dynamism of stockbroking firms, 
most of which are privately owned. These firms act as a parallel banking system, accepting deposits 
and undertaking financing operations, and participate in the sale of common stock, as well as 
government-issued fixed-income securities, such as Treasury Certificates (CETES) (which have 
expanded spectacularly) and the new dollar-denominated promissory notes (PAGAFES) issued by the 
Treasury of Mexico. The yield from these securities, with which the public sector finances its deficit 
domestically, was in general higher than the yield from banking instruments. In contrast with the 
depressive tone of the economy, the stock market offered large profits. In fact, the share index rose by 
more than 250% in real terms, in a highly speculative environment. 
Inadequate external financing again forced the public sector to seek financing from domestic 
sources. The financing granted to it by the banking system expanded by 11% in real terms,7 a rate 
sufficiently high to give the overall picture with regard to domestic credit to the economy a slightly 
positive tone. However, this diverted away resources from the private sector which had been 
suffering the effects of a severe contraction of credit since late 1985 and experienced a drop in loans of 
15% in real terms in 1986. The productive sectors that were most affected were construction, 
agriculture and commerce. On the other hand support to mining, including the petroleum industry; 
electricity and services increased (see table 20). 
b) Fiscal policy 
Public spending was once again regulated by a strict policy of austerity. The termination of the 
extended service agreement with the International Monetary Fund corresponding to the preceding 
three years did not mark the end of the commitments entered into with this organization. Actually, 
the earthquakes of September 1985 had increased the Treasury's difficulties, and at the end of the 
year, it had been necessary to seek credit from the Fund while a new extended fund facility was being 
established. 
Prior to the petroleum crisis, when the budget was being prepared, it was felt that the financial 
deficit of the public sector should be brought down from the equivalent of 10% of the gross domestic 
product it had represented in 1985 to less than 5% in 1986; on the assumption that this target could 
be reached by levying higher taxes and conducting an active review of public prices and rates, and by 
putting stricter limits on current expenditure. Thus, for the purpose of obtaining additional funds to 
repair the damage caused by the earthquake in 1985, taxes on medium and high incomes were 
increased and taxes on new cars and on gasoline were raised substantially. 
The drop in petroleum prices profoundly altered the public finance picture, not only because the 
earnings of PEMEX were reduced but also because of the taxes which this decentralized agency ceased 
paying to the federal government. Moreover, the accelerated rate of devaluation of the peso, the 
higher interest rates and the price increases caused serious dyssymmetry in respect of public finances. 
Since the tax system had not been adequately adjusted for inflation and expenditure, particularly 
expenditure on interest payments on the domestic and external public debt increased, the financial 
deficit of the public sector represented somewhat more than 16% of the gross domestic product (see 
table 21). The greater part of this negative balance, which amounted to 12.7 billion pesos, was 
imputable to the federal government. While PEMEX no longer produced a surplus, the real deficit of 
the other State entities and enterprises, which are subject to budgetary control, was substantially 
reduced. On the other hand, the deficit of the official sector not subject to such control expanded 
considerably. 
The federal government deficit rose by 55% in real terms. This was due both to the contraction 
of income and to increases in interest payments on the debt, which represented 38% of total 
expenditure. In contrast, the remaining expenditure (current and investment spending) experienced 
a real decline of 6% (see table 22). 
'Savings deposits effected through banking instruments shrank by 9% in real terms. On the other hand, they remained 
stable if account is also taken of deposits of "other financial assets" (a category composed largely of government securities), 
which increased by 45/? in real terms. 
'Credit to the government grew by 13%, while credit to the semi-official sector increased by only 5%. 
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With regard to tax earnings, those from PEMEX experienced a real drop of 42%, while tax 
income from the rest of the economy declined by just under 2%. With regard to the latter, earnings 
from direct taxes, particularly those on the incomes of physical persons, showed greater rigidity, 
since, in spite of the higher rates, lower real wages and salaries and the fact that the tax system was 
ill-adopted to a climate of high inflation reduced their intake. If indirect tax earnings did not decline 
that was basically because higher taxes on gasoline and new cars provided a source of additional 
revenue. On the other hand, income from VAT declined significantly as a result of weak domestic 
demand. The effects of the increases in the exchange rate and the more widespread application of 
tariffs served to increase tax earnings from external trade, which rose by 18% in real terms. Finally, 
non-tax income declined slightly. 
As regards government expenditure, current disbursements (excluding interest payments) 
decreased by approximately 17% in real terms. This was due to the drop in real wages, the freeze on 
the hiring of government employees, austerity in purchasing and the reduction or suspension of 
numerous subsidies. On the other hand, interest payments were 40% higher than in 1985 in real 
terms as a result of the higher cost of domestic credit and the surtaxes on government securities. In 
addition, the higher rate of devaluation had an impact on the interest on the external debt, even 
though its nominal rates declined. As for capital expenditure, it fell by 19%, a drop which was 
compounded by those which had occurred over the previous four years. 
In the semi-official sector the policy of selling, dissolving, transforming or merging unprofita-
ble enterprises with a view to obtaining better financial results continued.8 In spite of the substantial 
contraction in transfers received from the government, this sector's deficit was reduced on account of 
the disproportionate increase in its prices and rates. Nevertheless, the increase in its income was 
insufficient since its sales declined because of weak domestic demand. Public entity expenditure, both 
operating and capital, was maintained at minimum levels. Only interest payments, the main anomaly 
in public finances, continued to increase, particularly interest payments by PEMEX. 
In short, 1986 saw the continuation of the tremendously tight budgetary situation caused 
largely, as in previous years, by the burden of interest payments on the debt and made substantially 
worse this time by the lower oil income. While this made it necessary to pursue greater rationality in 
public sector operations, it also called for a further reduction in the investment programme, with 
adverse effects on the economic situation and also on the rate of economic growth achievable in the 
medium term. 
"Of the 1 155 entities inexistence in 1982, 205 had been eliminated and 261 were in the process of liquidation, leaving 
some 700 in operation. 
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Table 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986° 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Rate of unemployment 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government expenditure 
Public sector financial deficit/GDP 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 



















































































































55.1 23.1 -9.4 3.9 10.9 -8.2 -20.5 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net factor payments 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in gross international 
reserves 
























































97 800 100 500 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Percentages. "Weighted average for the 16 largest cities. Up to 1983 only the metropolitan 
areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey were taken into consideration. Weighted average of general 
minimum wages, deflated by the national consumer price index for low-income groups. 
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Table 2 
MEXICO: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total suppply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 









Exports of goods and 
services 
Indexes 





























































































































































MEXICO: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC 



































































































Trade, restaurants and 
hotels 
Financial institutions, 
insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 




































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 




MEXICO: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 




Hunting and fishing 
































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of tons. 'Thousands of litres. Millions of units. 
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Table 5 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION" 
General indexes of mining 
production (1970 = 100) 
Precious metals 
Non-ferrous industrial metals 
Metals and minerals for the 
iron and steel industry 
Non-metallic minerals 











Metals and minerals for the 



























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget. 
"Does not include the quarrying 
excluded. Preliminary figures. 




, gravel and clay. Petroleum 













































MEXICO: INDICATORS OF PETROLEUM ACTIVITY 
Index of extraction of 
crude oil and natural 
gas (1970 = 100) 
Production of main items 
Petroleum6 









































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by Petróleos Mexicanos. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Millions of barrels. cMillions of cubic metres. 
Table 7 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
production (1970 = 100) 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles and clothing 
Wood 
Paper and printing 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metals 
Metal products and machinery 
Production of some 
important manufactures 
Beer 




Other indicators of manufacturing 
production 




























































































































28.7 37.3 40.1 40.1 3.1 8.6 7.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Programming and the Budget, and the Banco de México. 
"Preliminary figures. Billions of kWh. Does not include energy for pumping. 
Table 8 
MEXICO: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
1980 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Index of volume of constrution 
(1970 = 100) 
Production of the main inputs 




Seamless steel tubes 
Flat, smooth and worked glass 





























































Members of the Mexican 
Social Security Institute1 
Permanent 
Casual 
Employment in the 
manufacturing industry' 
Man-hours worked in the 
manufacturing industry' 
















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. Weighted average for the 16 principal cities. 'Index 1980 = 100. 
Table 10 









Terms of trade 
Puchasing power of exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 
Terms of trade 





























































































Main traditional exports 













Metal products, machinery 
and equipment 
Motor-vehicle parts 
Automobiles and trucks 
Chemical products 
Food and beveragesc 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
Iron and steel products 
Petrochemical products 
Rest 
































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
























Metal products, machinery 
and equipment 
Other unclassified goods 
Table 12 
MEXICO: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 











































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de México. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 13 
MEXICO: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods, FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance'' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 



























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; April 1987; 1986: ECLAC.on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subjet to change. 'includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 




MEXICO: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 






Public external debt 
Balance outstanding 







Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Servicing/exports of goods 
and services 
Net interest payments/exports 




















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the Banco de México and the 




MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
1980 1981 1982 
Variation December to December 
Consumer price index" 
Food 
Goods subject to price control 
Goods not subject to price control 
Family food basket, minimum-
wage earners 
Wholesale price index 
Producer price index" 
Agricultural goodsc 
Goods produced by private enterprises 
Goods produced by public enterprises 
Raw materials 










Variation between annual 
Consumer price index" 
Food 
Goods subject to price control 
Goods not subject to price control 
Family food basket, minimum-
wage earners 
Wholesale price index 
Producer price index" 
Agricultural goodsc 
Goods produced by private enterprises 
Goods produced by public enterprises 
Raw materials 




















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de México. 
"National. 'in Mexico City. 'Guaranteed prices paid to farmers. 
'National, for low-income housing. 




MEXICO: EVOLUTION OF MINIMUM WAGES 



























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the National Commission on Minimum Wages and the Banco de México. 
° Refers to general minimum wages. Reflects the annual average of the wages paid in the different wage rones, weighted by the 
wage-earning population in each rone according to census data. The results were deflated by the national consumer price 
index for low-income strata. It was assumed that the presidential recommendation (non-binding) that minimum 
wages should be raised by 30% as from 18 February was followed by only 40% of the enterprises in the country and that the 
adjustment was gradually generalired before it became law on 1 November. 
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Table 17 





















































































































































Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of information provided by the Banco de México, and 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
"As from August 1982 a dual exchange rate was adopted, known first as the "preferential" and later as the "controlled" 
rate. This corresponds to the average for the real peso exchange rate indexes against the currencies of Mexico's main 
trading partners, weighted by the relative importance of exports or imports, as applicable, towards or from these countries. 
Between 1970 and 1980 these weightings correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979, and from 1981 to the average 
for the period 1982-1985. Preference has been given to wholesale prices in the calculations. For the methodology and sources 
used, see the technical appendix in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 'Calculated on the basis of the free 




MEXICO: MONETARY INDICATORS 
1. Monetary base 
2. Money (M,) 
Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
3. Quasi-money 
4. Total of money plus 
quasi-money (M2) 
5. Time deposits 
6. Bank savings instruments 
(4 + 5) 
7. Other financial assets' 
8. Total savings instruments 
(6 + 7) 
9. Domestic credit 
Claims on public sector 
Government 
Public institutions 
Claims on private sector 




M2/ monetary base 


































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de México. 
"Preliminary figures. Three months or more. 'CETES, bank certificates of acceptance, commercial documents, 
petrobonds, etc. held by non-banking sectors. Includes the Federal Government, the state and municipal governments 
and the Federal District Department. 
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Table 19 












































3-month promisory notes issued 
by banks and convertible 
to liquid assets at maturity 
Nominal* 












































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de México. 
"No real rates are given for the average cost of procuring deposits because of the impossibility of deflating that cost on an 
adequate time base and because it represent an average of interest rates for capital deposited for periods of varying 
lengths. 6Net rates expressed in annual terms. 'Yearly rates. In order to deflate these, national quarterly 















Services and other activities 
Commerce 
End-year balances 



























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Banco de México. 
"Includes public and private enterprises. Excludes financing from the Banco de México and from development 
funds. Preliminary figures. 
477 
Table 21 
MEXICO: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Total income 
Federal government 





























































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and by the Banco de México. 
"Preliminary figures. 'includes the telephone company, the collective transport system, the Federal District 
Department and, up to the end of 1983, Altos Hornos de México.S.A. 'Includes deficit of 479 billion pesos with sources 




MEXICO: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
1. Current income 
Income form PEMEX 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Interest payments 
Transfers 
Other current expenditure 
3. Saving on the current 
account (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Capital transfers 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Budget deficit (1-5) 
7. Account not under 
budgetary control 
8. Total deficit (6 + 7) 
Ratios (percentages) 
Savings on current account/ 
capital expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure 
Tax revenue (with 
(PEMEX)/GDP 





















































































































































































































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1986 Nicaragua's economy remained stagnant in nearly all sectors of production. The gross 
domestic product dropped slightly, to a level below that reached in 1982, and as a result the per capita 
product declined by nearly 4%, which brought it down to a point lower than that reached 30 years 
before (see table 1). 
Within this critical framework, the intensification of th armed conflict continued to hamper 
efforts to achieve economic objectives and to implement economic policy. This gave rise to a situation 
marked by major conjunctural disturbances, in which it was difficult to single out the economic causes 
from among the other factors at work and in which all the various elements fueled one another. 
Under such circumstances, it is not easy to analyse the current economic situation or to assess the 
economic policy that has been applied, especially in terms of the rationale underlying the standards 
applicable to economies free from this type of political conflict. 
In the first place, mention should be made of the severe bottlenecks existing in the supply of 
goods and services, particularly in the export sector, as a result of the fact that low international prices 
—except for coffee— were coupled with a relative price pattern which favoured production for 
domestic consumption. 
Secondly, the economic depression in the Central American countries continued to play a major 
role in generating an external imbalance in Nicaragua, as it further reduced the country's already very 
low level of trade with the subregion, in contrast to the great dynamism exhibited by the Common 
Market's demand in earlier periods. 
Thirdly, the shortage of convertible foreign exchange grew more acute. The substantial fall in 
export earnings, the discontinuation of many investments oriented towards import substitution, the 
demands of the war effort and the halting of credit flows from the Western countries all reduced the 
amount of financing available for priority purchases of goods and services abroad, and this was only 
partly offset by aid from a number of other countries. 
In addition, the lavish subsidization policy implemented ever since the early years of the 
present decade has not had the expected impact in terms of actual production performance, and has 
instead produced serious distortions in government finance and monetary policy. 
Finally, a large percentage of public expenditure had to be assigned to defence, and this became 
one of the main factors in the deterioration of the economy's capacity for adjustment and growth. 
In 1986 the above factors contributed, to varying degrees, to the country's traditional fiscal and 
balance-of-payments disequilibria, as well as speeding up the price spiral (see figure 1). Thus, an 
unprecedented situation of hyperinflation was created, in which the price level went up by over 
700%, giving rise to a number of misadjustments that were very difficult to control, both in the 
patterns of relative prices and wages and in the distribution and marketing of basic goods. 
In order to rectify this state of affairs, government authorities started to implement policies 
different from those applied in past years. As a result, although the fiscal deficit remained high, as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product it dropped from 23% in 1985 to 16% in 1986. This was 
partly due to an increase in non-tax income —mainly owing to adjustments in prices and rates in the 
public sector— and to the maintenance, despite the stagnation of the economy, of the prevailing tax 
level, thanks to an improvement in tax administration and control systems. Furthermore, total 
government expenditure was reduced, with priority being given to allocations for defence, health and 
education. Indeed, wages rose less than the price level, and investment was mainly oriented towards 
following up projects begun in previous years and towards undeferrable replacement and mainte-
nance programmes. In spite of negative interest rates on the domestic public debt and the absorption 
by the Central Bank of foreign exchange transfers, public expenditure nonetheless remained high. 
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Figure 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Gross domestic product3 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. 
aAnnual growth rate. bAnnual average rate for the whole country. cperCentage variation 
from December to December. ¿Millions of dollars. epercentages. 
In the external sector, both the trade balance and the current account continued to deteriorate 
despite a minimal level of external debt servicing and a sharp drop in international oil prices. Some of 
the factors exerting an adverse impact were the continuation of a pricing policy that was unfavourable 
to exports, the difficulties encountered in obtaining external financing in convertible currencies and a 
steady rise in the cost of foreign trade operations as a result of the fact that the country was forced to 
search for new and more distant markets. The latter was aggravated as the country began to feel the 
full effects of the trade blockade decreed by the United States in May 1985. 
Some of the measures adopted to correct the external imbalance contributed to the intensifica-
tion of the inflationary process. Most important among them were the rise in the official exchange 
rate from 28 to 70 córdobas per dollar, an increase in the support prices for basic products and the rate 
readjustment of some services, such as electricity and drinking water. In spite of these adjustments, 
the spread between prices in the controlled market —subject to official regulation— and the informal 
market continued to widen. 
The dualism prevailing in the domestic market gave rise to the coexistence of various price 
systems which tended to produce significant distortions in factor payments and to discourage truly 
productive activities in favour of speculative commercial intermediation. This situation exacerbated 
the shortage in the supply of agricultural and manufactured goods. 
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The slight increase in open unemployment in the city of Managua suggests that such distortions 
also existed in the labour market. The employment structure was also affected by military recruiting, 
the underutilization of productive capacity in combat zones and the destruction of harvests, facilities 
and infrastructure works. 
The intensification of inflationary pressures, the domestic supply shortage, the decrease in the 
purchasing power of wages and the proliferation of speculative activities all contributed to regressive 
changes in income distribution. This was one of the most serious problems faced by economy, because 
it reduced the effectiveness of government policies and hampered progress towards the primary goal 
of achieving greater social equality. 
In fact, in view of the drop in real wages resulting from hyperinflation, two adjustments were 
made in the so-called National Labour and Wage Scales System (SNOTS) during the year. However, 
these adjustments turned out to be 30% below the rise in the consumer price index in the Managua 
metropolitan area. The wage policy was supplemented by incentives for workers in enterprises 
within what is referred to as the People's Property Area. 
Measures aimed at easing inflationary pressures and putting public finances on a sound footing 
had contradictory effects, since at the same time an attempt was made to stabilize and protect the 
incomes of majority groups in the population. Thus, although the price increases for goods and 
services in the public sector helped to limit the fiscal deficit, they also curbed the purchasing power of 
most consumers. Conversely, the overvaluation of the córdoba and the existence of differential 
exchange rates mitigated certain inflationary pressures in the short run, but at the cost of raising 
subsidies, which had a destabilizing effect on public finances that will tend to aggravate inflation in 
the medium term. Finally, the policy of maintaining highly negative interest rates, which was applied 
for budgetary reasons and with a view to reducing production costs, also discouraged savings 
channelled through the banking system and prompted an increase in the liquid assets available for 
speculation in goods and foreign exchange markets. This heightened pressures on domestic prices 
and foreign exchange quotations and made it necessary to allocate credit resources on a purely 
administrative basis. 
There is no question but that many of these trade-offs and difficulties could have been resolved 
at a lower cost if it were not for the armed conflict in which the country is enveloped. Military 
expenditure absorbed a high percentage of the national budget and increasing volumes of human and 
material resources had to be allocated to defence, thereby impairing efforts to attain the goals of 
development and equitable distribution. Moreover, the destruction of infrastructure works and the 
abandonment of productive activities in combat zones aggravated the supply bottlenecks affecting 
certain goods and services. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
The recessive trend which begun in 1984 persisted in 1986. The gross domestic product 
—which had declined by over 5 % during the two preceding years— dropped slightly, leading to a fall 
of nearly 4% in the per capita product. On the other hand, in spite of financial difficulties and the 
partial trade blockade, the volume of imports of goods and services was maintained, thanks to the use 
of new credit lines and unrequited official transfer payments. Therefore, the total supply of goods and 
services remained at the same level reached the year before (see table 2). 
Domestic production continued to be affected by the constraints that have been experienced in 
recent years. These included the effects of the international crisis, some difficulties in implementing 
economic policy relating to the armed conflict and to the economic and trade blockade, and the 
limitations that these situations placed on the recovery capacity of the economy. In this setting, the 
responsiveness of private supply continued to decline, due either to the unfavourable expectations 
prevailing in the private sector or to the lack of real resources. In addition, the war has caused 
widespread and severe damage, thus making it necessary to allocate an increasing amount of human 
and material resources to defence activities. The conflict has also led to a gradual population shift 
towards the Pacific area as people seek safety, and, in the process, abandon productive activities in 
their home areas. 
Private consumption increased by 2%, following a steady decline in previous years. The main 
factors which allowed this slight upturn in demand to be met were an increase in agricultural 
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production for domestic consumption and the greater efficiency and coverage of the State system for 
the marketing of commodities at official prices, thereby expediting their distribution. Government 
consumption also rose in real terms, but at a substantially lower rate (4%) than the very high 
increases recorded in previous fiscal years. This was due to an employment freeze in the State sector, a 
reduction in the real wages of civil servants and the establishment of more selective criteria in regard 
to current expenditure, whereby priority was placed on disbursements for defence and basic social 
services. Nevertheless, general government consumption continued to account for a very large share 
of the gross domestic product (45%), largely because of the huge volume of resources assigned to 
defence. 
Gross fixed investment grew moderately. The very limited availability of foreign exchange 
forced the government to be more selective in its investment expenditure. This was essentially 
oriented towards projects already in progress and to replacement and maintenance outlays, thereby 
halting the modernization effort in some sectors, especially in agriculture. 
Exports, however, fell sharply once again (-27%), due to a decline in the production of some 
items (mainly cotton, coffee and meat), as well as to the trade boycott imposed by the United States 
government in May 1985. The sharp drop in the volume of coffee sales prevented the country from 
profiting from the substantial rise in the price of this product in the international market. 
b) The main sectors 
The slight variation in the overall gross domestic product was mainly due to the fact that the 
decline in agricultural production was neutralized by a slight upturn in almost all the other sectors 
(see table 3). 
i) The agricultural sector. The product of the agricultural sector shrank for the third year in a 
row, due both to a fall in agricultural production for export and to a sharp decline in the slaughtering 
of beef cattle. However, the production of basic grains for domestic consumption increased signifi-
cantly, thanks to the incentives provided for by the market liberalization policy (see table 4). 
The production of some export items was hurt by persistently low international prices and by 
the shortage of foreign exchange for the purchase of inputs. In fact, the output of ginned cotton 
—almost all of which was for export— went down by over 20% for the second year running. Due to 
changes in relative domestic prices and to a drop in quotations on the international market, the area 
under cultivation was reduced even further, with production thus being confined to the highest-yield 
zones. 
Coffee output also declined sharply (-12%) as a result of excessive rainfall in some areas and the 
escalation of the armed conflict in a number of what have traditionally been coffee-growing zones. 
The failure to maintain coffee plantations in recent years also had an adverse effect. 
In contrast, the production of basic grains showed a favourable trend, with record harvests of 
maize and sorghum, and very substantial ones of rice and beans. This achievement was partly due to 
the furtherance of the National Food Programme, which, among other measures, promoted the 
exploitation of high-yield irrigated land. Bean cultivation surpassed its production target thanks to 
substantial second harvests, which were encouraged, in part, by a free marketing policy for the crop 
that allowed producers to sell their harvests on the market. Maize production also increased 
considerably —after having decreased for two years in a row— due to the expansion of the area under 
cultivation. The market liberalization policy, the use of land previously assigned to cotton growing 
and good weather conditions helped to bring about this change. For the second year running sorghum 
production showed substantial growth (an average of 25%), in spite of decreased yields as a 
consequence of irregular rainfall. Thus, the adequate supply of balanced-food processing plants was 
ensured. 
The livestock sector continued to be marked by a decline in the cattle herd, which has been 
seriously affected since 1978 by illegal cattle exports and indiscriminate slaughtering. In addition, 
production was again hurt by poor weather conditions which damaged grazing lands, as well as by a 
lack of inputs and a shortage of investment. As a result, slaughtering dropped by 20%, although it is 
estimated that clandestine slaughtering increased by 24% due to the better prices paid outside official 
channels. The large number of cows slaughtered in previous years also had a negative effect. In view 
of this situation, strict measures relating to cattle breeding and conservation were enacted. In 
addition, official meat and milk prices were raised in order to promote livestock activity, but these 
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prices nevertheless continued to be lower than those paid on the speculative market. On the other 
hand, the modernization of this sector proceeded with the establishment of new high-technology 
enterprises. 
ii) Fisheries. Fishery output declined because most fishing activity was carried out in war-
ravaged areas as well as because the fleet was in bad condition and inputs were lacking (see table 5). In 
order to reverse this situation, new fishing boats were purchased and the prices at which the State 
enterprise purchased the catch for subsequent marketing abroad were raised. 
iii) Mining. The recovery of the mining sector was based on an increase in gold output —its 
major product— whose export was fostered by a rise in international market prices (see table 6). 
Besides the problems stemming from the armed conflict, the sector confronted technological 
difficulties (due to outdated equipment), financial problems (a lack of resources for replacement 
purposes) and labour shortage (a lack of skilled manpower resulting from the exodus of staff from 
enterprises which were nationalized and a shortage of unskilled manpower because of the risks 
involved in working in mining zones). However, through mutual assistance agreements with CMEA 
member countries and Sweden, some mining projects and geological surveys were undertaken which 
indicated the existence of great mining potential. Thus, the development of a mining complex for the 
extraction of lead and zinc concentrates was initiated in 1986. 
iv) Manufacturing. The volume of industrial production recovered slightly thanks to the greater 
dynamism exhibited by enterprises in the People's Property Area (see table 7). However, the 
difficulties experienced in previous years continued to curb industrial operations: the shortage of 
foreign exchange for importing raw materials; the impact of the armed conflict on production and the 
supply of basic inputs; the high personnel turnover occasioned by the requirements of the war effort; 
the shift of workers towards the informal sector; and the private sector's reluctance to invest in 
industry. 
Food, beverage and tobacco output declined for the second year running, due to difficulties 
relating to the supply of agricultural inputs and to an unfavourable price ratio. The latter factor 
prevented the increase in agricultural production for domestic consumption from being reflected in 
an adequate supply for the industrial sector. As for footwear and leather, production declined again, 
largely due to a drop in slaughtering, which was compounded by the fact that clandestine slaughtering 
involves a great waste of cattle byproducts such as leather. In order to make up for the shortage of this 
input, priority was given to the production of canvas shoes. The wood and furniture industry was 
another of the most seriously affected subsectors, since many of these enterprises, located in areas 
where sabotage was frequent, suffered problems associated with an inadequate supply of machinery 
and means of transport. In contrast, textile and clothing production made a recovery, after declining 
during the two preceding years, thanks to investments made as part of a rehabilitation programme 
under which foreign technical and financial co-operation was provided. The metals and metal 
machinery industry grew for the second year in a row, owing to an increase in the manufacturing of 
rods, wiredrawing products, storage tanks and agricultural equipment. 
In addition, progress continued to be made in the diversification of the manufacturing industry, 
as evidenced by the entry into operation of a plant for the production of cardboard boxes —which 
significantly increased output capacity and will make it possible to save foreign exchange and to 
support other industrial activities— and a physiological serum plant with enough capacity to meet 
domestic demand for several years. In order to support the Valle del Sébaco agroindustrial project, a 
sanitary metal container plant was also put into operation which will help to expand the processing of 
vegetables and other exportable agricultural products. 
v) Electricity. The net generation of electrical power grew by nearly 16% (see table 8). This 
increase did not correspond to an expansion of domestic demand, but was instead used in the place of 
energy purchases from neighbouring countries and as a means of offsetting the notable increase in 
transmission and supply losses. The substantial growth in energy generation by steam plants (41 %) 
and the somewhat less marked increase (11%) in generation by hydroelectric power plants made up 
for the decline in that of geothermal power plants, which were affected by the insufficient mainte-
nance of wells and pipelines. According to official data, the rise in the loss coefficient was mainly due 
to an intensification of acts of sabotage. Most of the work on the Asturias hydroelectric project was 
completed in 1986. These facilities will increase water catchment and will therefore make it possible 
to generate more power even without any expansion of installed capacity. 
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c) Employment and unemployment 
According to the available official figures, unemployment reached 22%, a rate somewhat 
higher than those of the two preceding years. This increase was wholly due to a rise in unemployment 
in non-agricultural activities (from 23% to 28%),' since in agriculture unemployment dropped 
sharply for the second year in a row (see table 9). The rise in unemployment in the former category 
reflected the special conditions existing in the Nicaraguan economy. Indeed, there was an increas-
ingly sharp division between the formal labour market —which operates on the basis of officially 
established wages— and informal commerce, in which speculative activities have become an impor-
tant factor. In the formal market, real wages deteriorated sharply over the preceding two years, giving 
rise —in spite of the high level of open unemployment— to a relative shortage of skilled manpower 
in enterprises within the People's Property Area. Thus, a growing percentage of the economically 
active population has been entering the informal sector, where these people perform activities 
—many of which are linked to the underground economy— that provide them with a higher real 
income. 
In contrast, in the agricultural sector unemployment rates decreased substantially due to an 
increase in activities directed towards the cultivation of products for domestic consumption (maize, 
rice, beans and sorghum). Even though the level of unemployment in this sector was still high, there 
was a serious manpower shortage in agricultural export activities as a consequence of the seasonal 
nature of crop farming and of the implementation of land reform measures which, by giving the 
peasants land, have reduced their mobility. Furthermore, the armed conflict has forced peasants to 
migrate to the Pacific zone, and thus to move away from the areas where agricultural export products 
are grown —except in the case of cotton, which is cultivated there— and has required an ongoing 
transfer of members of the work force from productive activities to defence. 
On the other hand, the total number of workers registered with the Nicaraguan Social Security 
and Welfare Institute (1NSSB1) increased by 8%, in keeping with the upward trend observed since 
1980. In that year, social security coverage (i.e., the workers covered by social security, as a percentage 
of the total number of employed workers) was 22%, whereas in 1986 it reached 37%. 
3. The external sector 
As in the two preceding years, in 1986 both the volume and value of exports dropped sharply. 
Imports, on the other hand, climbed slightly (see table 10). Nevertheless, the moratorium on debt 
payments and the donations and official transfer payments received from abroad resulted in an 
increase in international reserves. 
The economic boycott decreed by the United States in May 1985 spurred the diversification of 
export and import markets. However, the remoteness of these new markets raised the cost of 
insurance and freight and reduced the competitiveness of exports. 
The córdoba continued to be overvalued on the official exchange market, in spite of the 
adjustment made in February. However, a larger number of operations were based on the exchange 
rate in the parallel market, which was considerably higher than the official rate. 
a) Trade in real goods and services 
The growth in the trade deficit was exclusively due to a decline in the value of exports, since 
imports of goods and services decreased slightly. In turn, the sole cause of the decrease in the value of 
exports was the sharp fall in their volume (-26%), which was not entirely offset by a recovery of 
nearly 10% in their unit value. 
Among merchandise exports, coffee exports remained paramount, accounting for nearly half of 
the total value of external sales. Nonetheless, their value did decrease by nearly 8% because of a sharp 
contraction (-23%) in the exported volume (see tables 13 and 14). Thus, difficulties in harvesting the 
crop caused by the armed conflict and the diversion of most of the harvest to the domestic market, due 
'The actual figures may be higher, given the statistical under-reporting of persons employed in such activities as 
informal commerce, repair shops or miscellaneous services. The shift towards such activities of persons employed in the 
formal labour market, which is subject to SNOTS system, should also be taken into account. 
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to the high prices being paid there, made it impossible to take full advantage of the rise in the 
international price of coffee. 
Cotton exports fell to less than half their previous level, with the exportable supply decreasing 
as this crop became confined to the highest-yield areas. This was basically the outcome of an 
insufficient allocation of foreign exchange for the purchase of inputs, an unfavourable relationship 
between domestic and external prices and, to a lesser extent, of the shrinkage of the international 
cotton market. 
The value of meat exports also dropped by over 50%. The decrease in the cattle herd which 
occurred in the second half of the last decade —due to an excessive increase in consumption and cattle 
smuggling to Costa Rica and Honduras— continued to be a factor in this regard, and has been 
compounded in recent years by a price differential which has encouraged clandestine slaughtering for 
domestic consumption. 
Shellfish exports also fell off sharply (-46%), but an upswing in this item was expected in the 
short run as a result of the renewal and expansion of the fishing fleet provided for in a project 
financed by the Inter-American Development Bank. 
Imports (FOB) of goods went up slightly, especially as a consequence of purchases of basic 
consumer goods within the framework of a policy designed to give priority to the satisfaction of basic 
needs. There was also a further increase in the relative weight of imports from member nations of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which, together with other Western European 
countries became the main suppliers of fuels, industrial inputs and equipment. New commercial 
credits and barter operations were arranged with these countries. In contrast, in 1986 purchases from 
the United States ceased because of the trade embargo decreed by that nation. 
The downward trend in foreign trade with the rest of the Central American countries persisted. 
This trend began in 1982 as a consequence of payment problems which have affected the subregion as 
a whole (see tables 11 and 12). However, the country did take an active part in negotiations 
concerning the revival of the Central American Common Market. To this end, trade agreements were 
signed with Costa Rica and Honduras which included debt renegotiations. Nicaragua also partici-
pated in the design of new ways to finance mutual trade based on Central American Import 
Documents (DICA), which function as central bank securities and make it possible to avoid the use of 
foreign exchange. 
On another front, the search for new markets continued through co-investment schemes 
undertaken with foreign marketing firms. This was the means used to maintain the level of banana 
sales, particularly in Europe. 
b) The current account position and its financing 
In 1986 there was a slight increase in the deficit on current account which was primarily due to a 
sharp drop in the value of exports of goods and services. At the same time, payments for transport 
and insurance continued to account for a high percentage of CIF imports, since these purchases had to 
be made in ever more distant markets (see table 16). 
On the other hand, payments for factor services decreased by nearly one half in relation to 1985. 
The drop in interest payments was especially notable, thanks to their refinancing and, above all, to 
the extension of the moratorium. In addition, the payment of non-bank capital and of short-term 
bank capital was deferred, thus helping to increase international reserves. 
c) The external debt 
Once again, a large part of the service on the external debt could not be met due to the country's 
foreign exchange shortage. This situation, which has existed for several years now, made it difficult to 
obtain medium- and long-term external financing and new lines of credit in convertible currencies. 
However, new loans were obtained from some Western European countries and from CMEA 
members. Furthermore, the payment of US$200 million, which included part of the debt owed to 
other Central American countries, was renegotiated. This measure represented no more than a 




By the end of 1986, the total public external debt amounted to almost US$5.8 billion. A large 
percentage of the increase in this debt that was recorded during the year (US$837 million) was due to 
the rising amount of arrears (US$548 million). Therefore, the debt/export ratio continued to climb 
very rapidly, reaching the extraordinarily high level of nearly 20. However, owing to the moratorium, 
real debt servicing represented a very small fraction both of external sales and disbursements (see 
table 18). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Inflation reached record levels. Indeed, the average growth rate of consumer prices in the 
Managua metropolitan area jumped from 220% in 1985 to 680% in 1986, while the December-to-
December variation rose from 335% to nearly 750% (see table 19 and figure 2). Price increases were 
steeper in the first half of the year due, among other factors, to a greater shortage of basic products, 
variations in exchange parities and rises in wages. In addition, early in the year official prices were 
raised in order to bring them into line with real production costs and to discourage the speculative 
market. Beginning in August, however, inflation slowed down as a result of an increase in the 
production of goods for domestic consumption (mainly maize, beans and sorghum), as well as of 
some perishable products. 
It is estimated that inflation was higher in Managua than in other areas, chiefly because the 
supply of war zones was given priority and because of increasing price distortions. 
The autorities' anti-inflationary policy failed to counteract the consequences of the fact that 
total supply expanded very little, of the increasing allocation of resources to national defence, the 
acceleration of the upward trend in monetary issues and the steady increase in the velocity of the 
circulation of money. 
In 1986 an attempt was made to improve the distribution network by eliminating middlemen in 
order to lower costs, ensuring the financial stability of business enterprises and maintaining official 
prices. However, production problems gave rise to supply shortages, mainly of lard, meat and dairy 
products. The stocks of the State distribution enteprise were generally below the programmed levels, 
and in some cases this made it necessary to reduce the established consumption quotas. This further 
encouraged the speculative market, particularly in Managua, despite the enforcement of a strict 
Commercial Regulation and Consumer Defence Law. 
b) Wages 
The purchasing power of wages again deteriorated, but this time by considerably more than it 
had in the five preceding years. Although the nominal increase in average wages was higher than in 
1985, it was not large enough to offset the higher rate of inflation. Given these circumstances, the real 
average wage dropped by at least 30% (see table 21). 
The progressive intensification of the inflationary process has eroded the progress achieved 
through the establishment of the Labour and Wage Scales System (SNOTS), which since 1984 has 
governed the payment of wages in the formal sector of the economy and through which an attempt 
has been made to rationalize wages and make them more equitable. 
In 1986 wages were adjusted in January and March. The first increase —90%, on average— was 
granted primarily to more highly skilled personnel as part of a policy aimed at retaining technical and 
administrative staff in enterprises within the People's Property Area.2 The second one —of 50%— 
was of the same amount for all categories and its object was to protect wages from the inflationary 
effect of the devaluation of the córdoba in February. However, this increment in nominal wages was 
soon outstripped by subsequent price increases. 
Despite the exceedingly steep rate of inflation, wage indexing was not introduced. Instead, the 
authorities opted for a combination of wage hikes that were below the level of price increases and 
2
 In January the last of the 28 categories included in SNOTS (comprising the most highly skilled personnel) received a 
102% increase (in respect of wages in effect since May 1985) whereas the first category (the least skilled workers) was granted 
a wage hike of only 58%. 
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policies designed to ensure the supply of basic goods at official prices.3 However, this objective was 
not fully achieved because of problems in distribution systems. 
As from October, the coverage of what are referred to as "wage flexibilization mechanisms" 
(i.e., incentives equivalent to up to 50% of their wages for manual workers who exceed certain 
production targets) was expanded. In order to offset the smaller increases established in the wage 
scale for agricultural workers, they received bonuses of up to 40% if they exceeded the production 
goals for agricultural export crops. Administrators and technical personnel were given incentives 
based on their academic qualifications and, generally, in occupational categories job seniority was 
taken into account. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
The fiscal deficit decreased in terms of the percentage of the domestic product which it 
represented in 1986 by an even greater amount than the goal set at the beginning of the year. This was 
due both to a restrictive spending policy and to the government decision to apply a stricter income 
policy, as well as to the fact that certain items of expenditure were transferred out of the government 
budget. However, the fiscal deficit still amounted to almost 16% of the gross domestic product (see 
table 21). 
Within the inflationary environment of the economy, total expenditure increased at a slower 
rate than prices. As in previous years, a large share of resources was allocated, directly or indirectly, to 
security and defence (see table 22). 
The greatest reduction in real terms was in capital expenditure.4 The austerity policy that was 
followed was applied in response to a shortage of external resources which prevented new projects 
from being undertaken. Expenditure on infrastructure was restricted to projects already in progress. 
Current expenditure was very strictly controlled, both as regards the purchase of goods and 
services and wage matters. Thus, a decision was taken to freeze employment in the central govern-
ment, except for the recruitment of physicians, paramedics and elementary school teachers, and 
around 700 vacant posts were eliminated in the State sector, mainly in service or administrative 
activities. At the same time, the policy of gradually eliminating subsidies continued to be applied. 
Accordingly, the subsidies that had previously been granted for the production of basic grains 
remained suspended, and the only subsidies that continued to be paid were those for mass transit5 and 
railway transport. 
As regards income, the tax burden was maintained at its 1985 level, but only thanks to a 
comprehensive administrative effort on the part of fiscal authorities, since in a context of severe 
inflation, the effectiveness of collection systems is affected by the delay between the time when a tax 
obligation is incurred and the time when the corresponding tax is paid. Moreover, in an economic 
crisis collections usually tend to drop. Tax revenues increased, however, as a result of the fact that new 
taxpayers were added to the tax rolls thanks to monitoring and auditing procedures. Payments were 
also regularized in the country's most densely populated areas (Masaya, Granada, Managua, León and 
Chinandega) and real estate values were updated in both urban and rural areas, although the practice 
of setting tax valuations at a lower level than the commercial values persisted. 
One of the most important measures in the economic realignment carried out in 1986 was the 
regularization of the tax obligations of enterprises within the People's Property Area (APP). This 
resulted in an increase in the collection of income and real estate taxes. However, the central 
government drew up agreements with each APP enterprise on a case-by-case basis in order to prevent 
the payment of these taxes from reducing the firms' working capital. 
'The government made a special effort to ensure access to five basic goods —rice, foodoils, sugar, soap and salt— which 
were distributed by retail establishments through a system of rationing cards. 
4In real terms, the reduction appears to be greater if the nominal figures are adjusted on the basis of theconsumer price 
index for the Managua metropolitan area. If, however, the nominal figures are deflated on the basis of the gross domestic 
product, then the resulting drop is smaller. 
'Although urban transport fares were raised from 3 to 10 córdobas per trip, they remained below the average cost 
(25 córdobas). 
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Another factor that contributed to the increase in tax revenues was the rise in the selective 
excise taxes levied on non-essential consumer goods. Tax rates on bottled water, tobacco and beer 
were revised on three different occasions, and those levied on rum were modified four times. Taxes in 
the form of road vehicle permits and the stamp tax were raised by 100%. 
In order to allow low-income wage earners (those included in the first 19 categories of SNOTS) 
to remain exempt from income tax, it was necessary to raise the tax deductible. In addition, an income 
tax reform was enacted in October with a view to retaining the most highly qualified employees. 
Instead of a progressive tax system with rates of from 2% to 50%, a proportional system at a 6% rate 
was applied. Tax progressivity in respect of non-wage income was maintained. 
Corporate tax rates were increased towards the year's end, and this was expected to have an 
impact on 1987 tax revenues. 
With a view to raising import duties, another measure was enacted in April, whereby foreign 
purchases made by what are known as "hawkers" (buhoneros) using their own funds were hencefor-
ward valued at the parallel exchange rate, instead of the official one. On the other hand, officially 
registered importers were only required to value 40% of their operations at the parallel exchange 
rate. 
The prices of basic services were revised. Electricity rates were raised because operating costs 
increased when oil purchases had to be paid for at a higher exchange rate after the February 
devaluation. The rise in electricity rates eliminated the operating deficit of the electrical power 
company, which until then had found it necessary to resort to the use of central government funds. 
The State telecommunications enterprise (TELCOR) adjusted its rates, making it possible for this firm 
to transfer surplus income to the public treasury. Water and sewerage services required less support 
from the central government, except for cases of more or less sizeable investment expenditures. 
b) Monetary policy 
The monetary policy was somewhat less expansionary than in 1985. Measures adopted in the 
past two years to reorganize the economy's tax situation, together with the austerity policy relating to 
public expenditure, brought about a reduction in monetary variables in real terms (see table 24). 
However, exchange losses again distorted the government's financial policy and the rate at which 
money circulated increased considerably. 
Given the shortage of external resources and the inflexibility of expenditure on such items as 
defence, the central government continued to rely almost entirely on issues by the Central Bank for 
the financing of its deficit. However, the growth rates of the credit granted to the central government 
and, particularly, of the credit extended to local governments were lower than in 1985. In contrast, the 
share of the total credit volume accounted for by marketing firms climbed sharply due to the 
government's export promotion efforts. 
The multiplier of the monetary base, which relates to current account deposits and money 
outside banks, increased slightly; on the other hand, the multiplier which includes time deposits 
declined. 
Interest rates on loans and deposits went up during the year, but both remained highly negative 
in real terms. However, this policy, which was aimed at avoiding further price increases linked to 
rising costs, contributed to the decrease in real terms of the deposits attracted by banks. 
In February, the official exchange rate was raised from 28 to 70 córdobas to the dollar, and 
foreign trade operations became more closely linked to the authorized parallel exchange rate. The 
authorities maintained the policy of providing foreign exchange to supplement the support prices for 
the main agricultural export products, and this resulted in exchange losses. The support prices for 
each product were reviewed, and exporters were paid a share of the foreign exchange at the parallel 
exchange rate and the remainder at the official one. Seventy-five per cent of the returns from exports 
of non-traditional products were paid at the official exchange rate and the remaining 25% at the 
parallel exchange rate. It is estimated that the monetization of the exchange losses attributed to total 
external transactions represented about 7% of the gross domestic product, and this neutralized the 
steps taken to restrict the expansion of domestic credit. 
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The deficits occasioned by the use of differential exchange rates for foreign trade operations 
—in order to encourage exports and to make imports less costly in terms of the local currency— 
contributed to the over-monetization of the financial system. It was therefore necessary to increase 
the cash reserve requirement and deposits of non-financial institutions; in spite of this, however, 
efforts to curb the increase in liquidity were unsuccessful. 
6. The effects of some non-economic factors 
One of the major obstacles confronted by the Nicaraguan economy in recent years has been 
harassment by armed groups. This was compounded in 1986 by the losses sustained as a result of the 
United States trade embargo imposed in May 1985 and by the progressive weakening of external 
financial support. 
The most serious damage caused by the military conflict was the loss in human lives (35 000 up 
to 1986) and the forced shift of the civilian population away from war zones. Additional damage 
included the direct destruction of infrastructure and obstacles to production. However, government 
sources indicated that such losses have gradually decreased since 1984, thanks to improved defence 
operations. 
According to official estimates, direct damage to fixed assets and production amounted to over 
US$100 million and was equivalent to 42% of the country's exports of goods. This proportion is even 
greater if the indirect damage caused by the trade embargo and by the difficulties encountered in 
obtaining external credit are taken into account. In turn, the damage sustained during the period 
1980-1986 in terms of the destruction of accrued capital and the production losses arising from the 
abandonment of enterprises and crops in combat areas as well as from delays in project implementa-
tion caused by the armed conflict, has been estimated at approximately US$620 million. About 78% 
of this amount corresponded to production losses, and the remainder to the damage done to physical 
assets. The main sectors affected were agriculture, forestry and construction (see table 24). 
In addition, official sources have estimated that in 1980-1986 the country failed to receive 
around US$350 million in credits that would otherwise have been forthcoming for the financing of 
projects, most of which were oriented towards the private sector. The difficulties involved in 
obtaining already technically approved credits from multilateral agencies have also been increasing. 
In fact, such loans, which have low interest rates and are mostly earmarked for infrastructure works, 
have practically been suspended during the past two years, whereas in 1979 they represented 78% of 
total external financing. 
The indirect damage also included the impact of trade barriers, which began to be erected in 
1983 with the reduction in the United States sugar quota and which intensified in 1984 when it was 
frozen altogether. The mining of exports in that year also impaired shipping. In addition, in May 
1985 a trade embargo was imposed whose full effects were felt in 1986 in the form of serious 
problems and delays in the supply of essential inputs. 
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Table 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
Decern ber-Decem ber 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries' 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 
Disbursed public external debt 




































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 
Nicaraguan Social Security and Welfare Institui 
'Total average monthly wage received by workers registered with the 
e. ''Short, medium- and long-term debt. 
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Table 2 
NICARAGUA: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
NICARAGUA 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery 




Exports of goods and 
services 
Indexes 








































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Planning. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were obtained from IMF balance-of-
payments data expressed in current dollars which were then converted into constant 1980 values by using unit value indexes 
calculated by ECLAC for the purpose. 
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Table 3 
NICARAGUA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 







Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 

























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Planning. 




NICARAGUA. INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Production indexes 



















Indicators of livestock 
production 









































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures supplied by the Ministry of Planning and the Budget. 












































' Millions of dozens. 
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Table 5 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF FISHERY PRODUCTION 
Production indexes 






1980 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
57.8 33.0 32.3 36.1 32.6 
16 300 23 800 23 000 22 000 22 295 
5 811 2 000 2 100 2 286 2 008 

















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Planning and the Budget. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of pounds. 
Table 6 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Production indexes 
(1970 = 100) 
Production of some 
major minerals 









































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Planning and the Budget and the National Institute of 





NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Production indexes (1980 = 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles and clothing 
Footwear and leather 
Wood and furniture 





Machinery and transport equipment 
Miscellaneous 
Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 
Electricity consumption by 
industry 
Employment^ 
Steel production for construction" 
Cement product ion 




















































































¡try of Planning and the Budget. 






















































NICARAGUA: SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF 






















Ratio of losses/ 
total supply 
Consumption of fuel oil 
as an input for economic 
activity' 

























of figures < 
Estimated ( 
transmission and distribution losses. 
















































































































Institute and the Ministry 
jn the basis of the input/gross generation ratio of 
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Source: ECLAC, ün che basis üf figures provided by che Miniscry üf Planning and che Budgec. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes forescry, livescock and fisheries. 
Table 10 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 


















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Central Bank of Nicaragua 
"Preliminary figures. 'Central American Common Market. 'Latin American Integration Association. 









































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 13 
NICARAGUA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
Central America 






























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of quintals. 'Thousands of pounds. 
boxes. 'Thousands of tons. 
Thousands of 42-pound 
Table 15 
NICARAGUA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Central America 




Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 




















































































































































NICARAGUA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 
























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other 
assets and liabilities. Equal to the total variation in reserves (opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 17 
NICARAGUA: EXCHANGE RATES 
Nominal ex- Exchange Consumer Nicaragua/ Index of real 1980 parity 
change rate" rate price United adjusted exchange rate 
(córdobas index index State exchange rate (córdobas 
per dollar) (1980=100) (1980=100) price (1980=100) per dollar) 
II '«J r a t ' ° 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Nicaragua. 




NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Ratios' 
Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Debt servicing/exports 
of goods and services 
Net interest payment// 




Public external debt 





















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. 4End-year balances. cRefers to long-term debt. Amortization payments on the long-
term debt. 'All ratios refer to the public external debt. Correspond to the net balance-of-payments figure. 
Table 19 
NICARAGUA: CONSUMER PRICES IN THE M A N A G U A 
METROPOLITAN AREA 
Consumer price index 
By item of expenditure 




By origin of products 
National 
Imported 
Consumer price index 
By item of expenditure 




By origin of product 
National 
Imported 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
December-December variation 
-2.9 23-2 22.2 32.9 50.2 
Variation between annual averages 

























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Planning and the Budget. 




1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Average monthly wage, total' 
Received, nominal 
Real, at 1980 prices'' 
Real, at 1980 prices' 
Average monthly wage, total' 
Received, nominal 
Real, at 1980 prices'' 
Real, at 1980 prices' 
Average monthly wage, total' 
Received, nominal 
Real, at 1980 prices'' 








2 641 2 927 
2 132 1 893 
2 364 2 245 












































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Ministry of Planning and the Budget. 
"Refers to the total average monthly wage received by workers registered with the Nicaraguan Social Security and Welfare 
Institute. In 1985 (February, March and May) and in 1986 (January and March) there were variations in the nominal 
wages. Preliminary figures. 'Excluding incentives. Deflated on the basis of the consumer price index 




NICARAGUA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 










On consumption and production 
Other 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 





3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 




5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (1-5) 








Current savings/capital expenditure 


































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
"Preliminary figures. On the basis of absolute values. 
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Table 22 
NICARAGUA: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, BY MAIN AREAS 
Total 
Social sector 
Education and culture 
Health and social welfare 
Housing 
Infrastructure and production 
Primary activities 
Manufacturing 
Construction and transport 
Energy 




Defence and security 
Other 































































































































Currency outside banks 








Other financial liabilities (net) 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
Central Government 
Local government and 
official agencies' 
State marketing firms 
People's Property Area 
To the private sector 
Gross international reserves 
M ^ monetary base 
M2/monetary base 


























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Nicaragua, the Ministry of Planning and the Budget, 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. 'including devaluations in 1985 (from 10 to 28 córdobas per dollar) and in 1986 (from 28 to 70). 
'Excluding State marketing firms. 
sums of the end-of-year balances. 
In the absence of monthly data, annual averages were estimated by averaging the 
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Table 24 
NICARAGUA: PROPERTY DAMAGE AND PRODUCTION LOSSES 
(Millions of dollars) 
Total 
Property damage 
By economic activity 
Agriculture 






By economic activity 
Agriculture 















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"This total does not include around US$500 million which, according to preliminary estimates, were lost due to the trade 
embargo and external credit restrictions. 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
During 1986, Panama's gross domestic product underwent an expansion of almost 3.0%, which rate, 
even though lower than that of 1985, was higher than that of demographic growth for the second 
consecutive year. Despite the fact that the country's economic activity showed signs of slowing down, 
the great imbalances within its public finances and external sector were attenuated thanks to stimuli 
coming mostly from abroad, and having great repercussions on an open economy such as Panama's 
(see table 1 and figure 1). 
During the year, the Panama Canal, the Colón Free Zone and the international financial centre 
all experienced very positive development in their operations, which helped to improve domestic 
activity. On the one hand, the favourable economic situation of the centre countries gave rise to an 
increase in world trade, which, among the other positive effects it had, was largely responsible for the 
increase shown in the utilization of the services of the Panama Canal. On the other hand, since a large 
number of Latin American countries faced less adverse conditions than in previous years, an increase 
was registered in the operations of the Colón Free Zone, which depends to a great extent precisely on 
trade with those countries. 
Both these factors combined with a general feeling of optimism to promote a notable expansion 
in the operations of both the international financial centre established in the country and the national 
banking system; in particular, very considerable increases were noted in export and import credit. 
At the same time, terms of trade in goods and services were very favourable for the third 
consecutive year. In 1985 this was due to the convergence of various trends, including, on the one 
hand, the drop in oil prices and, to a lesser extent, the decline in the prices of other imported goods, 
and on the other the rise in the prices of exported goods, especially coffee, and the increase in some of 
the rates charged for services of great importance to the Panamanian economy, such as those relating 
to the oil pipeline. 
Finally, the difficult external debt situation of the public sector experienced moderate relief. 
Firstly, the lowering of the interest rates in the international markets partially eased the pressure 
exerted by the servicing of the external debt. Secondly, during the latter part of the year, financial 
support was received both from the World Bank and from private commercial sources, the economic 
effects of which will be fully realized in 1987. 
Despite the decline in interest rates, there was an increase both in the remittance of profits by 
resident foreign companies and in the payment of interest on the external debt. Thus the ratio of 
servicing to disbursements rose. On the other hand, as a result of the devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 
there was a rise in the value of credits in currencies other than the dollar. This was of the greatest 
significance in the case of the yen, given that commercial and financial ties withjapan have increased 
in the present decade. 
The above-mentioned factors, most of which were positive in nature, were offset by other 
factors which had a negative impact, although in general they were of lesser importance. First, 
although the drop in prices of hydrocarbons was favourable up to a certain point, it gave rise to a 
decrease in the amount of oil transported by the trans-Isthmian pipeline since the United States 
supplied its East Coast market with oil from the Middle East instead of using its Alaska reserves. 
In addition, the gradual return of the Canal, as provided for in the Torrijos-Carter treaties, 
meant that Panama had to finance some of the expenditure on maintenance (an item previously the 
responsibility of the United States), whose cost, according to official sources, has increased due to the 
deterioration of part of the infrastructure. This has had repercussions on the public coffers and has 
diminished the favourable effects of the process of the return of the Canal. Nevertheless, as the return 
process continues, the benefits which will accrue to the country will grow, despite the increased 
expenditure referred to. 
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Figure 1 






'X \ * 
r \ \ \ \ \ \ \% ^*. 
X ^ 
• 1 1 1 
domestic product3 *• A 
» l"\ 
»* / ' A / « / / \i 
'/V /' 
'/ \ / ' J \ II 1 \ 1 ' 1 \ 11 1 \ 11 1 x\l 1 1 » V ' 
• » ' 
\ / /A / 
x
 ' Gross national income3 




N ' ^^^^ 
\ / 
i i i 














1974 1978 1982 1986 
514 
PANAMA 
Figure 1 (concluded) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
aAnnual growth rate. bAnnual average national urban rate. cPercentage variation from 
December to December. ^Billions °^ dollars. 
Another occurrence with a negative effect in 1985 was the intense drought, followed by 
irregular rainfall, which affected the production of such important crops as sugar cane and certain 
grains, including rice and maize. On the other hand, the remaining economic sectors showed an 
upward trend. 
Certain tensions, in many cases non-economic in nature, began to arise towards the end of 1986. 
If these continue, they may erode the functioning of the international financial centre and may also 
have a harmful effect on economic activity in the more general meaning of the term. 
Against a rather positive international backdrop, the authorities continued to apply an eco-
nomic policy congruent with the adjustment programme agreed upon with the International 
Monetary Fund. This policy was accompanied by measures aimed at economic openness (elimination 
of agricultural subsidies, establishment of a new tariffs structure and attempts to lower the level of 
protection) and by labour and industrial legislation favourable to the business sector. 
The structural adjustment programme provided for incentives for both industrial production 
and agriculture. With regard to the latter, measures have been in effect since 1983 aimed at 
eliminating the restrictions on external sales of meat and coffee, which had been established to keep 
their prices from rising on the national markets, and at ending the price controls on certain food 
products. Import quotas on some agricultural products were also eliminated. 
With regard to industry, production incentive laws and certain modifications in the labour code 
were enacted in 1986. Also, the substitution of the quota system by tariffs was given more general 
application, in order to provide added protection for industry. Construction incentives were provided 
by lowering nominal interest rates, offering tax exemptions for new buildings, and applying prime 
interest rates to mortgage loans. This gave a boost to private sector housing construction, with the 
result that the total value of building permits granted increased considerably. 
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Within the framework of this policy, the government budgeted public spending more austerely 
than in the preceding year; current spending was reduced, although investment was increased in 
order to reestablish some equilibrium. 
It should be noted that open unemployment fell below its 1985 level, although it remained 
higher than the levels usual in the past. The growth rate of the labour force was lower than that of 
previous years, which may have been partially due to an increase in informal activities. All these 
factors helped to reduce the pressure on formal work sources. 
In summary, the 1986 economic results gave evidences of being essentially satisfactory, within a 
favourable international context which had definite positive effects on an economy as open to the 
exterior as that of Panama. The basic result was a moderate growth of economic activity, as well as of 
fixed investment and accumulation of stocks. At the same time, financial imbalances were relieved 
and domestic prices remained stable. In this favourable climate, it was possible to apply the 
adjustment programme without major tensions, although these could return if the positive factors 
experienced throughout the year were to suffer a reversal. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
According to the estimates available, the total supply of goods and services increased by 6% (a 
rate similar to that attained the previous year), thanks mainly to favourable international 
circumstances. 
On the supply side, the gross domestic product grew more slowly than in 1985, barely exceeding 
population growth, due to a weakening in the performance of those activities which had been 
primarily responsible for the impetus behind overall economic activity. These activities included 
agricultural production for domestic consumption (which was affected by various phenomena that 
will be considered further on), the generation of hydroelectric power, and the transport sector, whose 
performance was weakened by a decline in the volume of oil conveyed through the pipeline. As for 
foreign purchases, they rose to a higher level than that attained in 1985, mainly as a result of an 
increase in the transactions related to the free zones. This increase again had a great impact 
domestically, although it did not reach the high levels attained early in the 1980s. 
On the demand side, exports of goods and services rose more slowly than in 1985, as a result of 
the above-mentioned recovery of the free zone prompted by the dynamism shown by sales to other 
Latin American countries. 
Noteworthy within domestic demand were, on the one hand, the change in the trend of 
investment, which had undergone a sustained decline and, on the other hand, the fact that it was 
possible to maintain the growth trend in private consumption, although this increased at a much 
slower rate. 
In investments, two outstanding developments took place. First, the trend in gross fixed capital 
formation was reversed, so that it grew after several years of decline, owing in particular to an 
increase in public sector investment (attributable in part to new flows of external capital), and second, 
there was an upturn in private sector construction, owing to the policy aimed at promoting building 
activity through the granting of mortgage loans on favourable terms. Moreover, thanks to the 
improved prospects associated with the upturn in foreign trade, merchandise stocks increased, 
especially in the Colón Free Zone. 
Private consumption continued to follow the upward trend observed in recent years, although 
its growth rate fell to 4%, in contrast with the impressive average annual growth rate of 7% 
registered in the period 1981-1985 (see table 2). This drop is explained in part by the contraction in 
agricultural activity (particularly in basic grains and sugar cane) which appears to have caused a 
reduction in the income of rural workers. Also, it is estimated that the consumption pattern of the 
high-income groups has changed, especially as regards durables, with more resources being chan-
nelled into saving. 
Government consumption continued to rise (2%), although more slowly than the economy as a 
whole (see table 2). This rise was related to an increase in remunerations and to the reduction of 
purchases of non-personal goods and services due to a policy of restraint on current expenditure 
associated with the commitments assumed with international finance agencies and as part of the 
stabilization policy in effect since 1984. 
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b) Evolution of the main sectors 
i) Agriculture. After three years of sustained growth, the agricultural sector declined by almost 
2%, reflecting differing trends within its main components (see table 3). Thus, in contrast with the 
marked deterioration shown by the majority of crops, livestock performed favourably, and fisheries 
even more so. The share of the latter in value added was only slight, but it achieved some prominence 
in export activity. Agricultural output declined by nearly 5%, thus turning in its least favourable 
performance since 1982. Climatic factors contributed to this, as did the labour problems which arose 
once again in the banana subsector, both of which meant that this crop continued to perform at below 
its potential. 
Sugar cane production also declined due to the contraction, once again, of the area cultivated in 
response to a decrease in quotas within the North American preferential market and to the continued 
low world prices (see table 4). 
Among traditional export products, only in the case of coffee was there an increase in 
production, but it was not possible to take advantage of the improved conditions in the international 
market because no policies aimed at improving, applying higher technology and expanding planta-
tions have been implemented in the 1980s. 
The severe droughts which occurred at the beginning of the agricultural cycle affected the first 
sowing of most of the crops intended for domestic consumption, and the floods which occurred 
subsequently reduced the harvest from the second sowing, especially in the Azuero region. This had 
an impact on the overall production of grains, particularly rice and maize. In addition to the climatic 
factors referred to, agriculture suffered the effects of the economic adjustment programme imple-
mented by the government, which liberalized imports of basic foodstuffs and began to eliminate 
subsidies. For this reason, although the food price index showed a greater increase than consumer 
prices on average, producer prices of certain goods, especially rice and beans, fell. 
Although there was a slight increase in the credits available for agriculture, these remained 
below the level of those granted during the period 1982-1984. The credits allocated to the cultivation 
of rice and sugar cane decreased, but loans for stock-raising increased. 
The increase registered in the livestock subsector was due primarily to the production of pigs 
and poultry, which was stimulated by the liberalization of the relative prices of these products in the 
domestic market and by the deterioration of beef production, the slaughter of beef cattle having 
undergone a gradual decline. 
The fishery subsector experienced a significant recovery for the second consecutive year, being 
spurred, although only temporarily, by the external market and especially by the demand for shrimp 
and shellfish in the United States. The increase in the credits obtained by this subsector was notable, 
although even so the volume of loans obtained in 1981 and 1984 was not equalled (see table 5). 
On the other hand, the contribution of industrial-scale fishery to the sector's added value 
declined, owing to the decrease in export prices of fishmeal brought about in part by the substitution 
of soy flour for this on the world market. This was compounded by a decline in the catch attributable 
to changes in ocean currents and to ecological deterioration in coastal areas (see table 5). 
ii) Manufacturing. After the stagnation registered in 1984, the value added by manufacturing 
increased by 2% for the second consecutive year, thus only returning to the volume of production, 
already attained in 1980 (see table 6). In this respect it should be noted that the loss of dynamism 
experienced by this sector so far in the present decade has been reflected in a noticeable drop in the 
coefficient of industrialization, which has fallen from 11% in 1975 to less than 9% in the year under 
review. 
As regards specific industrial branches, attention should be drawn first to the increases 
registered in the manufacture of clothing, footwear and leather goods and, second, to the decline in 
the manufacture of chemicals and petroleum products.The dynamism shown by the first-named 
items was a first reflection of the recently-adopted policy measures, including among others the 
application of incentives for industrial production, amendments to the labour code1 and the gradual 
introduction of new tariffs from mid-1985. These measures also contributed to a slight increase in 
investment in various export-oriented activities. 
'See ECLAC, Notas para el estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe 198): Panamá (LC/L.390/Add. 17), 
January 1987. 
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The dynamism shown by the construction sector, for its part, also stimulated the basic metals 
branch and the production of other inputs used in construction. 
Furthermore, the marked drop in international oil prices has brought about geographic changes 
in refining and marketing activities, and this appears to have been responsible for a decrease in the 
utilization of oil refining facilities in Panama, which had been on the increase. 
The new legislation on industrial promotion is part of the structural adjustment programme 
agreed to with financial institutions in the second renegotiation of the external debt. The strategy 
behind it was primarily aimed at boosting export activities, expanding subcontracting in the Colón 
Free Zone, and achieving greater competitiveness on the basis of the comparative advantages which 
the country possesses.2 The need to keep prices competitive was responsible for the stagnation of 
wages, since in Panama labour is traditionally paid more than in neighbouring countries. 
Noteworthy among the promotion mechanisms adopted were, firstly, the extension to small 
industry of the benefits enjoyed by the rest of the industrial sector in respect of the allocation of 
credits, and, secondly, the maintenance of a register of firms eligible for special fiscal treatment in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Even so, credits granted to manufacturing decreased for the fifth 
consecutive year, bringing their share in total domestic loans granted by the banking system down to 
little more than 7%. 
iii) Construction. Following a marked decline in the preceding three years, construction, which 
at times has been one of the driving forces behind overall activity, showed some dynamism. Value 
added increased by almost 5%, although the level attained was nearly 40% lower than in 1982' (see 
table 7). The increase was the result of an incentive policy based on credit instruments —prime 
interest rates were applied to loans granted for the construction of dwellings, the number of which 
increased substantially. Another positive factor was the decline in the prices of building materials. 
The private sector responded favourably to such incentives, concentrating on the construction 
of housing for middle-income families and non-residential buildings, although the latter were not 
connected with the operations of the international finance centre, as in previous years. The amount of 
luxury building, which had been substantial in the period 1978-1981 and was part of the process of 
modernization of the main cities, especially the capital, seemed to have begun to decline. 
Direct public investment barely increased since the effect produced by the execution of major 
projects, such as the oil pipeline, on which work concluded in 1984, and other energy-related projects 
which were completed in 1985, had already slackened off substantially. Prefeasibility studies were 
conducted to identify a number of important projects on which work could begin towards the end of 
the present decade or the beginning of the next. In this respect, special mention may be made of the 
studies on container terminals in Balboa and Colón, a "dry" canal (rail or road) between these cities 
and the integral development of the zones gradually being handed back as provided for in the 
Torrijos-Carter treaties. Projects in the longer term include studies on alternatives to the present 
Canal, currently under negotiation by a tripartite commission comprising the United States, Japan 
and Panama. 
iv) Electricity. This sector grew by close to 7% thanks to the continuing boost in hydroelectric 
power production (see table 8). Since 1984, when the La Fortuna hydroelectric power stations began 
to operate, a significant structural change has taken place in this sector. Thus, while in 1980 46% of 
the power produced came from thermal sources, in 1986 their share fell to 19%. The dynamism 
shown by this sector would have been still greater had it not been for the drought during the first 
months of the year, which affected reservoir levels. 
v) Transport and storage. The product generated by transport, storage and communications 
increased by almost 2%, compared with 6% in 1985 (see table 9). This was due to the stagnation in 
the land transport of freight following the decrease in the flow of farm commodities. A case in point 
was the drop in the volumes of sugar produced. 
Furthermore, the trans-Isthmian oil pipeline and other services relating to water transporta-
tion decreased by 12.5 % as a result of the decision by the United States (the main user) to conserve its 
2The government has associated this competitiveness with the training and skills of the Panamanian labour force, the 
strategic location of the country within the world transport network and its access to financial resources through the 
international financial centre. See Plan de lincamientos, objetivos y acciones para el desarrollo de Panamá, 29January 1986. 
'In the period 1982-1986 only 3 230 new jobs were created directly in the sector. The Panamanian Chamber of 
Commerce estimated that 20 232 people were employed in the sector in 1984 and 23 462 in 1986. 
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reserves of Alaska crude, which must be transported through the pipeline in order to reach the East 
Coast, and instead to temporarily import cheaper oil from the Middle East. 
The economic activity of the Panama Canal itself rose by 6% as the freight transported 
increased. This was due to the intensification of deep-draft vessel traffic and to the movement of a 
larger number of vessels per day. Most of the variables relating to traffic passing through the Canal, as 
well as the revenue collected by the Canal Commission from tolls, increased to unprecedented levels, 
surpassing those reached in the preceding fiscal year (August to September). The main factor 
underlying the expansion in 1986 was the substantial increase in the number of ships transporting 
automobiles, especially those coming from Asia. There was also a considerable increase in the 
movement of containers. Interoceanic traffic during this fiscal year grew by 3.2% to slightly over 
12 000 vessels. At the same time, there was an increase in the size of the ships, which meant that net 
tonnage passing through the Canal increased by 8% as compared to 1985, attaining a volume of 184 
million tons. 
Tolls rose by 7%, so that US$323 million was collected compared with US$301 million in the 
same fiscal period of 1985. 
There was a decline in the movement of bulk merchandise, but cargoes classified as low density 
increased due to the greater use being made of ships for containers and automobiles. This explains the 
relatively smaller increase observed in the tonnage of ships by comparison with the greater growth in 
other elements of Canal through-traffic. 
The main item, in terms of tonnage, continued to be petroleum and petroleum products, which 
accounted for 22% of the commercial cargo moved. Grains continued to occupy second place, despite 
their having declined for the fourth consecutive year, this time by 2.7 %. This occurred because wheat 
shipments from the United States to the Far East were shipped primarily from West Coast ports in 
the United States, thus avoiding passage through the Canal. Other significant grain cargoes, such as 
corn and soya, showed increases. 
The volumes of coal and coke, which made up the third major group of goods in 1986, decreased 
by 11%, due primarily to a drop in shipments to Japan. 
Despite the continued decline in trade between the East Coast of the United States and Asia, 
this continues to be the main route serviced by Canal traffic, accounting for 36% of the total cargo, 
although the tonnage transported declined by 3%. 
Given the Canal Commission's special characteristics, which stem from its being jointly 
administered by the Governments of Panama and the United States, there has been debate and 
negotiation over what the Canal's traffic has meant to the Panamanian economy. Part of the 
controversy has centered on the application of the pertinent North American legislation, especially 
the Public Law whereby North American investments are deposited in the United States general 
treasury fund as miscellaneous revenue, instead of going into the Canal Commission's fund.4 On the 
other hand, funds destined for construction contracts which are not yet completed and for purchase 
orders to be effected increased to US$40 million as of 30 September 1986, compared with US$26 
million for the same period in the preceding year. This reflects a new boost in maintenance works on 
the part of the Commission. 
Business activity in the Colón Free Zone increased its contribution to the national product by 
27%, thanks to the recovery of some traditional markets for re-exports to Latin America and the 
opening of new enterprises which took advantage of the new labour and industrial legislation. 
vi) Other services. Financial services pertaining to insurance, real estate and other services 
experienced growth of almost 5%, the greatest in the last five years (see table 9). The factors 
underlying this performance comprised the greater activity shown by banks operating under general 
licence,5 whose credit operations expanded for the first time in five years, the greatest volumes of 
financing being destined for the business sector, housing construction and industry. Simultaneously, 
4
 As of 1 January 1986, the interest generated by the Canal, amounting to almost US$7 million, was deposited primarily 
in the United States general treasury fund (around US$5 million). Income-generating United States investment declined from 
US$84 million to US$50 million between 1982 and 1986, based on the capital movements which occurred (income/expendi-
ture and net transfers of property). 
5
 The international financial centre of Panama is composed of i) banks under general licence, which may operate both 
inside and outside the country; ii) banks under international licence, which may only operate outside the country, and iii) field 
offices which are agents for foreign banks (see table 21 below). 
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demand deposits increased markedly (by 32%) and investment in securities grew by 96% as 
compared with 1985. 
The greater activity shown by real estate and the increase in ownership of dwellings reflected, 
in part, the increase in the construction of rental housing. The expansion in wholesale trade, after the 
drop in recent years, meant that there was a partial recovery of historic levels and retail business was 
able to market surplus stocks which had accumulated in previous periods. 
Commerce and tourism contributed US$254 million, representing an upturn of 4% (see 
table 9). These activities have been affected in recent years by growing competition from Caribbean 
countries. In effect, there has been a decline both in the number of tourists and in-transit travellers as 
well as in the average duration of stays. All the same, spending by tourists and in-transit travellers 
increased slightly. 
c) Employment 
Out of a potential labour force of 719 000 persons, open unemployment came to around 74 000 
(see table 10). A noteworthy fact is that, according to the household survey carried out in August 
1986, the growth rate of the labour force has decreased, which is probably why the labour market 
participation rate of the population 15 years and over dropped from 57% in 1985 to 55% in 1986. 
This phenomenon could well be due to the fact that the labour force exerted less pressure on the 
labour market because part of it shifted to the informal market. Based on the survey in question, 
unemployment decreased by almost 14 700 persons, giving a rate of 10%. In 1986 18 400 jobs were 
created in the entire country, almost all in the metropolitan region. Although complete statistical 
information was not available, it can be stated that migration from the countryside to the city 
increased faster than the growth rate of the rural population. This appears to have been due to the 
decrease in agricultural and stock-raising activity. 
As already indicated,6 the reforms which have been made in the labour code allowed for 
increased flexibility in hiring procedures and contributed to the shift of part of the labour force to the 
informal sector. Among the changes made was a reduction in overtime pay, with the application 
instead of a single overtime payment of 25% of the basic wage in small industrial enterprises, in 
agriculture and stock-raising, and in firms devoted entirely to export. In addition, the new law 
permitted piecework, home employment without the generation of permanent job status, and the 
payment of bonuses, not incorporated into wages, for increased production. 
3. The external sector 
The expansion of international trade in 1986 reflected an upturn in exports, including those of 
services, and their net contribution to the economy was the greatest in the decade (see table 11). 
The trade imbalance between exports and imports of merchandise was significantly reduced 
during the year, falling from 753 million balboas in 1985 to 542 million in 1986 (see table 12). If only 
the total for national exports (excluding re-exports) and national imports (excluding those destined 
for the free zones)7 is taken into account, the merchandise trade deficit rises to 822 million balboas in 
1986, but even so this is a lower figure than that for 1985, which exceeded 1 090 million balboas. 
The terms of trade improved markedly due to the rise in the unit value of exports (especially 
those of coffee) and the reduction in the average price of external purchases. Thus, the significant rise 
registered in the volume of exports was further strengthened by their greater purchasing power. 
6ECLAC, Notas para el estudio económico de America Latinay elCaribe, ¡985. Panamá (LC/MEX/LA0), 10 December 
1986. 
7
 Given the importance of the value of the imports and re-exports made through the Colón Free Zone, and on the basis 
of international recommendations on the matter, these transactions are registered in the balance of payments, even when the 
enterprises whose capital is the property of non-residents are considered as engaging in direct foreign investment. The value of 
these imports and re-exports recorded in the external sector accounts, corresponds to the "transaction value", which does not 
necessarily coincide with the FOB or CIF values. In turn, in the case of the estimation of the gross domestic product, it does not 
correspond exactly with the totals of re-exports and imports referred to. In effect, methodologically speaking, the calculation of 
Panama's gross domestic product only includes the profits from operations in the country by all firms, together with the profits 
from the overseas operation of firms whose capital belongs to residents; it does not represent the total added value generated in 
the Free Zone. 
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With regard to tariffs, legislation passed in 1985 eliminated the quota system and incorporated 
specific and ad valorem duties which gave a relatively high level of protection. As of 1986, this level 
began to diminish, however, and within a period of five years should reach 60% over the CIF value of 
products imported for industries already in existence, and 90% in the case of some industries rated as 
being important to the country. For those industries which start operating after the law is promul-
gated, protection may not exceed 20% ad valorem, except in the case of agricultural and livestock 
products, in which case it could reach 30%. 
Possibly as a consequence of this change in foreign trade policy, external purchases imported 
into the country decreased, while purchases for the free zones surpassed the growth rate of the 
preceding year, so that the overall trend in the performance of imports of goods did not vary from 
that of the last two years. 
a) Trade in goods 
According to preliminary estimates, total exports increased by 23% as compared with those of 
1985 (see table 13). This resulted from an expansion of almost 26% in re-exports (which account for 
more than 85% of goods leaving the country). Sales of Panamanian products grew by almost 9%, 
mainly through exports of coffee, shrimp and shell grit (conchuela), since those of other traditional 
exports declined. Shell grit, a non-traditional product, ranked among the four main export items, 
reaching a total of US$18 million up to the third quarter (sales of shellfish in 1985 were estimated at 
US$6 million). 
As a consequence of droughts occurring in the coffee-growing areas of Brazil, coffee prices 
experienced a sharp rise, followed by a temporary suspension of the quota system. This allowed the 
Panamanian coffee producers, as well as those of other countries in the region, to gain greater access 
to markets, causing the total value of coffee exports to double. 
Also contributing to the improved trade balance was a decrease in the value of imports 
(excluding those into the free zones, which instead recorded the greatest growth of the decade) (see 
table 14). A significant factor in this result was the combination of lower prices and smaller imports 
of hydrocarbons, which caused the oil bill to drop by more than US$ 130 million. Only in capital goods 
was there an increase (7%) due to the dynamism shown by the construction sector and to the 
expansion of public investment which occurred during the year. 
With regard to the trade in goods, it should be noted that this involves, on the one hand, the 
trade carried out in the free zones (i.e., re-exports less imports), which gave a surplus of more than 
US$280 million in the year, and, on the other hand, domestically produced exports and effective 
imports of goods into the country. The latter showed a deficit of more than US$800 million. Although 
this exceeded the figure for national exports by a factor of more than 2.5, however, it was considerably 
lower than the figures for the previous two years. It should be noted that in the Panamanian economy 
a high ratio between the deficit and exports of goods is usual, being due to the development pattern 
followed by the country, in which the trade balance depends to a high degree on exports of services 
(more than 35% of external sales). The surplus on the trade in services came to a little more than the 
deficit on the trade in goods (US$839 million and US$822 million, respectively), so that the balance 
on goods and services (including the free zones) was positive by almost US$300 million (see 
table 15). 
b) Trade in services 
As already indicated, the determining element in the balance of trade continued to be sales of 
services. To income from the trans-Isthmian oil pipeline was added income from the Canal tolls and 
the value added in the Colón Free Zone. These three sources of foreign exchange accounted for 53% 
of total exports of services. Fiscal revenue from the oil pipeline fell by US$20 million, but this drop 
was more than offset by the increases in the other two items, with income from tolls increasing by 
almost US$22 million and the value added in the free zones surpassing that of the preceding year by 
more than US$16 million. Other items which contributed to the growth in the value of exports 
included direct sales to non-residents, consisting mainly of tourist expenditure, and purchases made 
in the United States military zone located in the country, which together exceeded US$202 million. 
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c) External indebtedness 
At the end of 1986 the external public debt came to 3 882 million balboas (see tables 16 and 17). 
Given the characteristics of the Panamanian financial sector and the special features of the way 
the transactions of the banking centre are recorded, it is difficult to make a proper estimate of the 
private external debt. 
The composition of the external debt has changed slightly over the last three years: while in 
1984 60% corresponded to private sources, in 1986 this share had dropped to 57%. This decrease 
resulted from the financial policy followed by the government since 1984, which consisted of 
increasing the participation of international agencies, thus achieving an improvement in the debt 
profile, especially with regard to interest rates and periods of payment. 
A reduction was achieved in the burden of public debt servicing as a proportion of exports of 
goods and services (14% compared with 16% in 1984), but because of a drop in new resources 
obtained, the ratio of servicing to disbursements rose to a level similiar to that of 1980. 
Another change in the debt structure was the growing weight of currencies other than the 
dollar, due to the devaluation of the United States currency. This also contributed to the increase in 
the burden of debt servicing in those other currencies, when expressed in dollars. 
In December 1986, following the signing of a structural adjustment agreement, a new loan was 
obtained from the World Bank for US$100 million. This is the second credit granted by that 
organization to the country within the last three years. Disbursement was to be in two payments of 
US$50 million each: the first one in the same month (December) and the second one six months 
later. According to World Bank estimates, this loan will cover 10% of the country's total gross 
external capital needs during the period 1986-1987. 
A US$60 million loan was obtained from private sources (Bank of America) for the 1986-1987 
public investment fund, to be disbursed on a quarterly basis, and on 30 December the first installment 
of almost US$20 million was received. At the same time, refinancing of the 1985-1986 external debt 
for US$577 million was negotiated with the Bank of America, and US$34.5 million of this was 
received during the year. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Due to the very open nature of the Panamanian economy and to the fact that monetary 
conditions are largely determined by external operations, prices have traditionally been very closely 
tied to world inflation. Thus, since 1981 there has been a moderate increase inprices, and during 1986 
the average growth rate of the consumer price index was practically zero, since the drop in some 
prices (especially those of oil), offset other price rises. 
Among the main components of this index, foodstuffs and beverages rose somewhat over 2% 
in the period from December to December, while the annual mean was -0.4% (see table 18). This 
could indicate that in the last months of the year prices of these items rose more rapidly than the 
annual mean. If this trend continues, it could affect the population at lower income levels, since food 
has greater weight in their spending patterns. It should be noted that prices of both the "other 
products" group and those of the transportation (miscellaneous) item dropped on average by 2% and 
5.5 %, respectively. The latter drop is significant, since it implies a decrease in an item of great weight 
in the popular budget and could partially offset the increase in foodstuffs. 
The wholesale price index recorded a drop of more than 16% between annual averages and 
18% from December to December (see table 18). The difference between these results and those of 
the consumer price index are worthy of note.8 The national index of imported products dropped by 
more than 22%. 
8In 1986 the wholesale price index was calculated using a new methodology. It may be noted that when this index was 
calculated using the previous methodology for the period 1980-1985, it was more or less in linewith the consumer price index 




Although minimum wages have not been readjusted since 1983, average nominal salaries in the 
private sector increased by nearly 3% in 1986. The largest increases were observed in average 
nominal remunerations in the international banking centre, which primarily employs highly-
qualified and qualified personnel, but wages in the Colón Free Zone have gradually dropped since 
1982, by an annual average of 4% between that year and 1986, and by 9.2% in the last-named year 
above. This could be due to the fact that there is a large unemployed labour force available for work in 
that zone, while unionized groups are few in number. 
Nominal and real wages in the private sector evolved in a very similar manner, both rising by 
close to 3% (see table 19). In contrast, minimum wages have remained frozen since 1983. Since in 
1986 general prices remained almost stable it could be said —if one takes into account only this 
indicator— that their purchasing power has been maintained, but in fact the cumulative effect of 
price and wage trends has meant that minimum wages have stayed at practically 1980 levels, while 
average real salaries have improved 10 points in the index (a real average annual increase of 1.6% 
over the last six years). 
5. Fiscal and financial policies 
In 1986 four elements affected economic performance: the drop in international interest rates (which 
directly affect those observed in the country), the drop in oil prices, the short-term incentives granted 
by the government to reactivate the construction sector, and the increase in credit extended by the 
banking system to the private sector (12% between 1985 and 1986). 
Within its programme of adjustment and rationalization of public expenditure, the govern-
ment continued to be bent on meeting the commitments contracted with the international financial 
institutions in their second phase. Thus, the central government's fiscal deficit, as a proportion of the 
gross domestic product, was reduced from 13% in 1984 to 8% in 1985 and to 7% in 1986. Current 
expenditure decreased by 5.6%, investment expenditure increased by 19-4% (in contrast with a drop 
of 29-3% in 1985), public employment grew less, and the wage component in total expenditure 
declined. 
a) Financial policy 
There was a recovery in financial deposits, especially those placed by foreign banks. At the same 
time, the banking system's liabilities increased by US$2 600 million (10% more than in 1985), due 
primarily to increases in external deposits. The expansion of the domestic component, made up of 
individuals' savings and time deposits, was one of the consequences of the improvement by two 
percentage points in the interest rate paid on savings deposits larger than 3 000 balboas as of 
1 January 1986, as decided by the National Banking Commission (see table 20). Lowering of the 
minimum amount required for fixed-term deposits also had a favourable effect. These elements 
partially compensated savers for the drop in international interest rates. 
Total assets increased once again (this time by 9%) after having decreased in the period 
1982-1984 (see table 22). Although the levels existing at the beginning of the decade were not 
regained, the external credit portfolio decreased less than in the last three years. Increases in the 
domestic credit portfolio were registered primarily in loans granted to the housing sector, for 
personal consumption, to businesses and for construction. In contrast, credits for industry contracted 
by 2.6%, although they still accounted for more than 7% of the resources loaned by the banking 
system. 
Borrowing for housing grew mainly as a result of the incentives established by the State since 
1985, especially the law pertaining to prime rates. Participation by Panamanian private banks was on 
the increase, accounting for around 33% of the total amount loaned. 
Personal consumption borrowing was stimulated by the drop in interest rates as well as by the 
greater dissemination of credit cards. 
The recovery of the commerce sector was due to the a greater buoyancy of domestic activity and 
to import and export credits of the Colón Free Zone. Loans for agricultural, cattle raising and fishing 
activities together accounted for only 3 % of the total, with virtually no change from the overall figure 
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for the previous year despite the great increase in loans to the fishery sector (see table 23). In 
agriculture, this result was due primarily to the decrease in credits for the cultivation of rice and sugar 
cane. 
There was also a marked increase in the banking system's investment in foreign securities. The 
external credit portfolio declined once again, although not as fast as in the immediately preceding 
financial years. 
In the last few years, the Panamanian banking system has significantly reduced its external 
credit portfolio. Because of the recession which Latin America is experiencing, the region has become 
less attractive for banks as far as the granting of credits is concerned. For this reason, the composition 
of the system's assets has changed and the domestic credit portfolio has increased by about 6% per 
year since 1982, the 1986 growth rate being 6.8%. This does not imply however, that the external 
credit portfolio has ceased being the item of highest value among the system's assets, since in 1986 it 
accounted for 42% of the latter and more than 50% of loans granted during the year. 
The increase in investment in securities as a proportion of total assets which has been observed 
for several half-year periods reached a total of US$2 259 million at the end of the year, 96% more 
than in 1985 (see table 22). This type of investment has increased especially in the form of debt 
bonds. These have become part of the external debt of some countries, taking the form of instruments 
designated in national currencies. Purchase of this type of document expanded especially fast in 1986, 
with investments in securities rising from 6% of total investment in 1985 to 11% in 1986. 
Finally, there are indications that some circles overseas, have pressed for the adoption in 
Panama of certain control mechanisms on the international financial centre's operations. The reason 
for this appears to be the fear that, by taking advantage of the ease of financial movements and the 
confidentiality of operations, large amounts of resources stemming from illicit activities abroad could 
be deposited through the financial Centre.9 
b) Fiscal policy 
The public finances were managed in an austere manner thanks to customs reforms, the 
reformulation of the investment programme in terms of both size and composition, and greater 
control over the management of the public debt. Other measures adopted by the government 
involved a review of the integrated health system and of the Social Security Fund, whose actuarial 
viability was questioned in the light of external evaluations carried out during the year. 
Current tax revenue increased by 9-4% with respect to 1985 (see table 24). This was due, inter 
alia, not only to the growth of the product but also to an improvement in collection procedures and to 
the effect of the fiscal measures in effect since 1985. The remainder of the current income registered 
in the official accounts included US$484 million in capital income, made up of both domestic 
financing (from the decentralized sector, the National Bank of Panama and the Social Security Fund), 
and of official external resources (US$84.3 million) and private resources (US$320 million from 
external banks and financial consortia). Taking these items into account within the capital account, 
this gives a final deficit of the order of US$340 million, which was slightly lower than that of 1985. 
Since March 1985, various measures have been implemented, such as a 10% surcharge for two 
years on corporate income tax and the incorporation of representation expenses into the salaries of 
public employees for income tax purposes. At the same time, the import tax exemption previously 
granted on government purchases was eliminated. These measures began to have their full effect in 
1986. 
Another measure adopted was the change in the basis for measuring import tax, so that tariffs 
are calculated on the OF and not the FOB value. As a result of this amendment, which was in effect 
throughout the year, the collection of indirect taxes rose by 13%. 
If current capital income is subtracted from non-tax income, the collection of the latter is seen to 
be lower, due to the drop in the profits of State enterprises and of the operation of the trans-Isthmian 
oil pipeline. The profits from the pipeline went down despite the increase in the rate charged per 
barrel transported through the pipeline, as provided for by Law 14 of 2 July 1981.10 Within non-tax 
''Press release from the National Banking Commission (NBC), quoted in Inforpress, No. 697, 10 July 1986. 
10
 Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy, Inforviación Económica y Social de Panama, 1986, p. 43. 
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income, the item for rates and duties grew by 16%. This was due in part to an increase in the charge 
for the right to fly the Panamanian flagon merchant ships andto the greater collection of corporation 
tax, which came to 16 million. 
Total expenditure rose by only 1 %, out of which 44% corresponded to remunerations together 
with the purchase of goods; 3 8 % to debt-related payments (interest, principal and other expenses) 
and 18% to the investment programme. 
It should be noted however, that the government was able to save US$23 million on the amount 
budgeted for operating expenses. The saving basically corresponded to two items, personal services 
and payment of the public debt. The authorities felt that the savings on payment of the public debt 
servicing could have been larger had it not been for the revaluation of the yen, which entailed extra 
disbursements of the order of US$8.6 million. The operations of the decentralized entities caused a 
deficit of 89 million balboas, in contrast with surpluses of 130 million in 1985 and nearly 170 million 
in 1984. Of this negative balance, close to 77 million balboas corresponded to the Social Security Fund. 
Table 1 
PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986° 
Indexes (1980= 100) 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Unemployment rate 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries' 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 






































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. Wages and salaries at national level. 
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Table 2 
PANAMA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 












Gross domestic investment 71.9 
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PANAMA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AT MARKET PRICES 







Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. Including livestock, forestry and fishing. 
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Table 4 
P A N A M A : INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Index of agricultural 














































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Thousands of tons. 'Figures estimated by ECLAC on the basis of qualitative official 




PANAMA: INDICATORS OF FISHERY PRODUCTION 
































































































































PANAMA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Index of manufacturing 
production (1971 = 100) 130.5 138.0 137.2 ... ... -1.3 -0.6 
Food, beverages and tobacco 158.9 168.2 166.5 173.4 179.1 0.1 -0.1 4.2 3.3 
Footwear, clothing and 
leather products 138.9 123.0 132.1 147.3 161.5 -20.3 7.4 11.5 9.6 
Wood, furniture and fittings 69.5 75.5 80.6 89.5 93.3 -7.1 6.8 11.0 4.2 
Paper, printing and 
publishing 110.0 138.9 142.6 147.7 142.5 11.2 2.7 3.6 -3.5 
Chemicals and petroleum 
products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Basic metal industries 
Metal products 
Other manufactures 





Rum and "seco" 
Carbonated beverages' 










Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Figures estimated on the basis of information for the third quarter, compared with the same period of the preceding 
year. ^Thousands of tons. 'Millions of litres. ''Millions of units. 'Thousandsofpairs. /Millionsof 














































































































































PANAMA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Dwellings 
Value of constructions 
(millions of balboas) 
Production of some 
construction materials 
Structural steel 
(thousands of tons) 



































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. According to building permits requested. 1 Household survey data. 
Table 8 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF ELECTRICITY 




































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office, and 
electricity statistics of the Institute of Water Resources and Elearification (IRHE). 
"Preliminary figures estimated on the basis of data up to the month of October. 'Millions of kWh. 'Megawatts. 
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Table 9 
PANAMA: INDICATORS OF SELECTED SERVICES 
Gross domestic product 
Transport , storage and 
communications services 
Pipelines and other water 
transportation services 
Panama Canal Commision 




Ownership of dwellings 
Others 
Commerce and tourism 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Restaurants and hotels 
Other indicators 






Income from premiums 
Claims paid 
Tourism 
Expenditure by tourists 

































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the 



























































































nd Census Office. 































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the 1980 National Population Census; household surveys performed by the 
Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. 
"Preliminary figures. Population 15 years and over. 'Economically active population as a percentage of the 
working-age population (15 years and over). Figure estimated on the basis of performance of the metropolitan area. 
'Figure estimated on the basis of performance of the rest of the country. 
Table 11 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 


























































































PANAMA: EXTERNAL TRADE BALANCE (GOODS AND SERVICES) 
(Millions of dollars) 
Expon 
Total goods (FOB) 
From free zones 
(or re-exports)' 
Domestically produced goods 
Services (non-factor) 
Imports 
Total goods (FOB) 
From free zones 
To the country 
Services (non-factor) 
Balances 
Total balance (goods) 
Balance from the free zones 
Domestic balance 

















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. Estimates by difference 
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Table 13 
PANAMA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
PANAMA 
Total'' 
Re-exports from free 
zonesc 
Subtotal 































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Estimates on the basis of the third quarter. Taken from the balance of payments. 'Estimates by difference. 
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Table 14 
PANAMA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Total 
Free zones 
Into the country, 
according to tariff 
sections 
Food products 
Beverages and tobacco 
Non-edible raw materials, 
except for fuels 
Fuels and lubricants, 
minerals and allied 
products 
Oils and fats of vegetable 
origin, except for edible 
margarine and lard 
Chemical products 
Manufactured articles, 
according to material used 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 
Others 


































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures on the basis of the third quarter. As of August 1985, Panama changed the tariff nomenclature. 




P A N A M A : BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 










































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official figures. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Including other non-factor services. 'Including net loans granted and 
other assets and liabilities. Equal total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
Table 16 
P A N A M A : INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
External public debt 









External public debt/exports 
of goods and services 

























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. 
current account. 
Refers to external public debt. ' Refers to "interest paid" item of the balance-of-payments 
Table 17 
P A N A M A : EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT" 
(Millions of balboas) 
Total 







Commission and other expenses 
Adjustments to interest and commission 




























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 




P A N A M A : EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES 
PANAMA 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986° 
Consumer price index 
Food 





Consumer price index 
Food 




























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Preliminary figures. ' in 1986 the base year for the wholesale price index was changed from 1961 to 1975. The figures 
refer to the new index prepared by the government. cFrom 1980 to 1985 the December-December variation of the 
previous index (base year 1961) was 13.8%, 8.9%, 7.4%, 1.3%, 2.1% and 4.6%. The annual mean for the same period was 
15.3% 10%, 8.3%, 2.4%, 1% and 3.8%. 
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Table 19 
P A N A M A : EVOLUTION OF WAGES 






Colón Free Zone 
























































Indexes (1980 = 100) 
Average and minimum wages 
Nomina) 
Average mean wage 
Average public sector wage 
Average private sector wage 
General minimum wage 
Panama City 
Rest of country 
Keal 
Average mean wage 
Average public sector wage 
Average private sector wage 
General minimum wage 
Panama City 
Rest of country 
Nominal 
Average private sector wage 
General minimum wage, 
Panama City 
General minimum wage, rest 
of country 
Real 
Average private sector wage 
General minimum wage, 
Panama City 






























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the Comptroller-General of 
the Republic. 




PANAMA: SHORT-TERM BANK INTEREST RATES" 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
1986 (quarters) 


























19-98 15.77 14.47 10.75 12.05 9.88 8.29 9.33 8.50 7.83 7.50 
19.50 13.29 12.93 9.81 10.83 8.43 6.78 7.83 6.96 6.15 6.16 
15.42 15.67 14.89 10.35 10.60 11.05 10.90 10.52 10.64 
15.82 18.88 16.37 12.79 13.60 12.18 10.73 11.05 10.77 
16.02 19.23 16.15 12.60 13.84 12.73 10.81 11.41 10.89 
13.44 15.47 14.54 12.42 12.69 11.64 10.98 12.17 10.76 
14.13 17.04 16.22 12.71 13.25 11.80 10.30 11.20 10.33 
17.25 19.67 16.52 12.83 13.73 13.25 12.00 
1.43 1.99 3.26 4.90 7.15 8.32 7.54 
1.25 2.69 3.93 6.11 8.58 12.05 12.01 
12.00 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the National Banking Commission. 
"Average for the period. Average rate for loans under one year. 'According to Law 20/80, the National Banking 
Commission fixes a discount for agricultural loans of between 3 and 4 point on the average reference rate, for which banking 
entities are compensated. As of 1986 there is an interest bracket (%) which is the borrower is not charged and which 
the Ministry of Finance passes to the bank as a tax credit (law 3 of 20 May 1985). 'Deflated by the mean annual inflation 
rate (variation in the national consumer price index). 
Table 21 
PANAMA: COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CENTRE" 
Total number of establishments 
Official 
Under general licence 
Under international licence 
As field offices 
Total assets of the Centre 
(billions of balboas) 
Assets of the national banking 

































Source: National Banking Commission and Banco Nacional de Panamá. 
"At December of each year. 
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Table 22 
PANAMA: CONSOLIDATED BALANCE OF THE 




Other liquid assets 
Domestic 
External 
Deposits in banks 
Demand deposits 
Time deposits 



















Other liabilities, capital 
and reserves 
International reserves of 

































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the National Banking Commission and the Comptroller-General of the 
Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Refers to a total of 70 banks (17 Panamanian and 5} foreign) which operate under general licence in the country. 




PANAMA: CREDITS GRANTED BY THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, 





















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Nacional BankingCommission and reports from the Banco Nacional de 
Panama. 
"Preliminary figures. *Based on the evolution of credits up to June 1986, compared with the same period in 1985. 
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Table 24 
PANAMA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Non-tax income 
2. Current expenditure 
Salaries and wages 
Operational and management 
expenditure 
Debt interest and expenditure 
3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Amortization payments on debt 
5. Total expenditure (2+4) 
6. Fiscal deficit 
(or surplus) (1-5) 
Net domestic financing 
Credit received 
Bond placements 





Current saving/capital expenditure 




Net domestic financing/deficit 
Net external financing/deficit 

























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Comptroller-General of the Republic, Statistics and Census Office. 
"Estimated figures. 
financing obtained. 
Includes the cash balance of banks and the discrepancy between the deficit registered and the 
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1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
According to statistics compiled by the Central Bank of Paraguay, the revival of activity in the 
Paraguayan economy came to a halt in 1986. The gross domestic product stagnated, after having 
recovered during the two preceding years from the recession of 1982/1983 (see table 1 and figure 1). 
At the same time, both the rate of unemployment and inflation rose slightly, while real average wages 
again deteriorated. The worsening situation with respect to domestic imbalances was accompanied by 
a widening of the resource gap, according to Central Bank figures, as well as by a further and sharp 
decrease in official holdings of external assets. Nevertheless, the expansion of the net external debt 
slowed markedly, as the growth rate of the gross external debt fell to the lowest figure recorded in 
many years. 
The country's economic performance was thus poorer in spite of the improvement in the 
external environment. Brazil's and Argentina's demand for Paraguayan products and services rose 
sharply, and exports of livestock products and incoming tourism reached unprecedented levels, while 
exports of forestry products were the highest in terms of volume that they had been since 1980. In 
addition, the steady devaluation of the dollar gave a marked impetus to sales of Paraguayan products 
on European and Japanese markets. Simultaneously, in spite of the considerable fall in the prices of 
the country's two principal export products, a slight improvement occurred in the terms of trade 
thanks to the notable decrease in the price of petroleum. Furthermore, the average level of import 
prices dropped, and international interest rates again fell appreciably, thereby helping to ease 
pressure on the rate of exchange and to increase Paraguay's import capacity. 
However, in contrast to the preceding two seasons, when weather conditions were extremely 
good, the harvest for the 1985/1986 agricultural year was substantially smaller, mainly on account of 
the prolonged drought which affected the country during the second half of 1985. The value added by 
the crop-farming subsector fell by approximately 13% in 1986, after having led the 1984/1985 
recovery with a growth rate of almost 14%. Furthermore, the sharp fall in the harvest of raw 
materials such as cotton brought down production in the manufacturing sector, despite the stimulus 
provided by the spectacular increase in tourism and the acceleration of construction work on the 
Yacyretá hydroelectric dam. Both forestry and electricity generation showed significant increases 
which, together with the moderate expansion of trade, offset most of the recessionary impact of the 
drop in the harvest of the main crops. 
During the first quarter the level of consumer prices rose at the fastest rate recorded in the last 
25 years in spite of the fall in the level of import prices. In contrast, and notwithstanding the 
application of expansionary monetary and wage policies throughout 1986, the consumer price index 
stabilized during the last two months of the year, mainly as a result of the direct and indirect effects of 
the sustained fall in the parallel exchange rate. Readjustments in the minimum wage increased its 
purchasing power by 11%, but real average wages deteriorated for the fifth year running. 
Following the adjustments to which the economy had been subjected the year before, the gap 
between absorption and the product again widened markedly due to a considerable increase in the 
volume of imports and the sharp decrease in the harvests of the two main export products. Thus, as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product.it rose from 1% in 1985 to 4.2%, according to Central Bank 
external trade statistics. Although part of the real increase in the trade deficit was offset by the 
improvement in the terms of trade and the marked fall in profit remittances, the already rapid decline 
in international reserves gathered speed, inasmuch as the net inflow of external financing was barely 
higher than the year before. 
Consequently, official holdings of external assets fell to a level equivalent to less than four 
months of imports, which was the lowest proportion recorded since the beginning of the preceding 
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Figure 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. b Annual average rate. Percentage variation from December to 
December. ^Millions of dollars. Percentages. 
decade. This figure still left the authorities with some manoeuvering room, but if arrears in payments 
are taken into account, then the net holdings of international reserves were sufficient to finance only 
1.2 months of imports. As a result of the suspension of the disbursement of loans by the World Bank 
during the first eight months of the year and the accounting reduction made in the State-guaranteed 
private external debt, the gross medium- and long-term disbursed external debt rose by less than 4 %. 
In the course of the year the government drew up a series of adjustment programmes, but failed 
to implement a policy that was in keeping with a narrowing of the gap between national savings and 
domestic investment or with the type of structural changes needed to permit sustained growth. 
During the second half of the year, however, the authorities did apply a policy which was successful in 
increasing the inflow of external financing from multilateral sources, thereby giving the country the 
capability to sustain a larger deficit on the balance-of-payments current account. Towards the end of 
1986 the government also managed to reverse the steep rise in inflation recorded during the first half 
of the year, although both the rate at which means of payment were created during the closing 
months of 1986 and the steepness of the increase in prices during the early part of 1987 suggested that 
this achievement was only temporary. 
The nominal official rate of exchange for exports was adjusted by more than 50% between the 
end of 1985 and the end of 1986 with a view to increasing the amount of foreign exchange taken in by 
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the Central Bank. However, no significant change occurred in the rate actually received by exporters, 
since valuation levels —the minimum export prices set by the Central Bank for foreign exchange 
earnings from external sales— were increased by a proportion similar to the rises in the exchange 
rate. As the real effective official exchange rate worsened during the first quarter while the parallel 
exchange rate fell, the rate of return on both unregistered exports and the production of importable 
goods also took a turn for the worse. 
As a consequence of the drop in the market exchange rate, the gap between it and the average 
official exchange rate actually received by exporters narrowed. Nevertheless, the proliferation of 
different official exchange rates for exports, accentuated the instability of relative prices, and thus had 
a negative impact on the efficiency of resource allocation. Furthermore, the readjustment of the 
exchange rates at which the Central Bank sold foreign exchange to the non-financial public sector was 
lower than the adjustment made in its buying rate, and government exchange subsidies therefore 
increased, thereby augmenting the creation of liquidity generated by the system of exchange rates. 
However, in August the government reached an agreement with the World Bank in respect of the 
exchange rate to be applied to disbursements of its loans, which had been suspended since the year 
before as a result of the Bank's dissatisfaction with the widening gap between the market rate of 
exchange and the rate used by the Central Bank for disbursements of external loans. In November, a 
similar agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank opened the way to a renewal of 
lending by this agency. 
In view of the time lag experienced during a considerable part of the year between the initiation 
of new public investment projects and the completion of other major projects, as well as of the 
shortage of external funds for those already under way —which can be attributed to the exchange 
policy that was in force— in practice, the government followed a clearly procyclical fiscal policy, in 
that it cut back its investments by approximately 20% in nominal terms and by 40% in real terms, 
thereby reducing such investment to the lowest level registered in the present decade. Furthermore, 
most public investment continued to be channelled towards the production of non-tradeables and of 
capital-intensive importable goods, whereas a growth-oriented structural adjustment would require a 
reallocation of investment to projects designed to promote the production of exportable goods and 
efficient import substitution. In contrast, public saving increased by almost 28% in nominal terms, 
due to the marked contraction of current expenditure by the non-financial public sector in terms of 
the gross domestic product. Consequently, the unadjusted State deficit fell sharply for the third year 
running (2.1% of the gross domestic product in 1985; 0.6% in 1986). However, if exchange subsidies 
are taken into account, the public-sector deficit rose slightly, although as a percentage of the gross 
domestic product it fell from 39% to 3-2%. As net external financing was once again down sharply, 
issues deriving from State operations expanded from a figure equivalent, in 1985, to 32% of the 
monetary base existing at the end of 1984 to a level of 39% in 1986. 
The growth of domestic means of payment rose steeply beginning in April, on account of both 
the direct expansion of net domestic credit from the Central Bank and of the expansion of exchange 
subsidies. The growth rate of direct net domestic credit from the Central Bank climbed from an 
annual pace of 15% in December 1985 to 18% in April 1986, almost 51% injulyand70% in October, 
before falling to 60% in December. This pattern mainly reflected the extraordinary increase (154%) 
in the subsidized credits provided by the Central Bank to commercial banks and the jump of 115% in 
those which it supplied to the Banco Nacional de Fomento in line with a policy adopted by the 
economic authorities in an effort to check the depressionary impact of the drought and the exchange 
policy on the profitability of the production of tradeable goods. Exchange subsidies to the State, for 
their part, increased by 80% and financed four-fifths of its global deficit, as against 47% in 1985, as a 
result of the marked shrinkage in net external financing and the authorities' continuing reluctance to 
resort to explicit tax increases or to the realignment of the rates charged by State enterprises. 
Although the expansion of the monetary base in 1986 far exceeding that which occurred in 1985 
(38% and 14.5% respectively), it was nevertheless considerably lower than the increase in net 
domestic credit granted by the Central Bank owing to the steep decline in international reserves. 
Furthermore, the money supply (M,) rose by a smaller amount (26.5%) than the preceding year 
(28%). In contrast, M2 grew by 27% as against 19.5% in 1985. Finally, the government pursued an 
expansionary wage policy and for the first time in many years granted adjustments for the minimum 
wage which were higher than the cumulative rate of inflation. 
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2. Trends in economic activity 
a) The product and income 
In 1986, economic activity remained at a similar level to that of the year before. Hence, the per 
capita product fell by approximately 3%, and was 11% below the peak attained in 1981, while the 
production gap —i.e., the difference between the effective and the potential gross domestic 
products— widened to an estimated figure of somewhat more than 26% (as against 21% the 
previous year). In turn, the gross national product rose slightly, due to the fall in remittances of 
profits abroad, and gross national income increased by almost 1 %, thanks to the improvement in the 
terms of trade1 (see table 2). 
b) Absorption and saving 
The almost 3% increase in domestic absorption was financed by using a considerable propor-
tion of the reserves left over from the major boom which occurred in 1973-1981 and reflected a slight 
upturn in investment as well as an increase in consumption (see tables 4 and 5). Following the 10% 
revival recorded in 1985, private investment continued its brisk recovery (15%), based on a 
substantial increase in bank credit at rates of interest markedly below the prevailing level of inflation 
and on a resumption of construction work on the Yacyretá hydroelectric dam. 
Even so, private capital formation was barely half that recorded in the final year of the boom 
(see table 5). State investment, for its part, fell sharply, to the lowest level of the decade, due to the 
suspension during the first eight months of the year of the disbursement of loans already arranged for 
with the World Bank, which was compounded by the refusal of both this agency and the Inter-
American Development Bank to consider funding new investment projects as a result of differences 
with the Paraguayan authorities over the exchange rate applicable to such operations. The govern-
ment insisted on maintaining an exchange rate of 160 guaraníes to the dollar for disbursements of 
external public-sector loans, even though the parallel exchange rate had been over 700 guaraníes to 
the dollar ever since the third quarter of the preceding year; the World Bank and the IDB, for their 
part, insisted on an exchange rate similar to that applied to exports. The government finally accepted 
this position in respect of World Bank disbursements in August and did so a few months later in 
respect of those of the Inter-American Development Bank. 
The substantial increase in the collection of import duties, together with the positive impact 
during the first half of the year of the updating, decreed in 1985, of the rates charged by a number of 
the principal State enterprises and the considerable reduction of expenditure in real terms, helped to 
bring about a major rise in nominal government saving. However, this mainly served to alleviate the 
non-financial public-sector deficit, given the acute shortage of external financing for investment 
projects which prevailed throughout most of the year. Thus, the gap between investment and public 
saving fell from a figure equivalent to 2.4% of the product in 1985 to 0.7% in 1986.2 
Despite the maintenance of markedly negative real interest rates, private-sector financial 
savings increased by somewhat more than 2% in real terms, thanks to the persistent fall in the 
parallel exchange rate. Nevertheless, real private savings fell slightly, according to the statistics 
provided by national accounts; as a result, and mainly on account of the increase in investment, the 
private-sector balance saw an increase in the deficit from the equivalent of just 0.2% of the gross 
domestic product in 1985 to almost 4% in 1986. When measured as a percentage of the product, 
external savings climbed from 4.6% to 5.7% (see table 5). This would seem to reflect both the 
repatriation of savings by residents in order to take advantage of the effects which the steady decline 
in the parallel exchange rate had on the rate of return in dollars on investments made in the local 
currency, as well as the government's success in attracting a considerable flow of short-term 
commercial credits. 
' It should be borne in mind that the national accounts prepared for the Paraguayan economy are somewhat imprecise 
in a number of areas, especially as regards the statistics on the external sector (there have been cases where foreign trade has 
been underestimated by as much as 50Ç? ) and on absorption and its financing. (For analysis of this problem, see Richard Lynn 
Ground, "Las cuentas nacionales del Paraguay", Revista Paraguaya de Sociología, vol. 19, No. 5, September-December, 
pp. 27-50.) 
2
 However, if the exchange subsidies given to the government by the Central Bank in the form of preferential exchange 
and interest rates are taken into account, then the deficit amounted to i.2'/t of the product, in comparison to hS)'7c in 1985. 
549 
c) Sectoral trends in the product 
The economic recovery was halted by a fall of almost 4% in the production of goods. In contrast, 
the growth rate in the value added by the basic services production sectors was the highest since 1982, 
while non-basic services grew at rates similar to the expansion of the labour force (see table 6). 
The diminished output of goods was essentially attributable to the disappointing performance 
of agriculture, which shrank by over 12% (see table 7). The cotton harvest, which had doubled 
between 1983 and 1985, fell by over 32%, while the soya harvest, which had expanded by 50% during 
the same period, dropped by almost 29%. The decline in these two items, whose dynamism directly 
accounted for almost one-half of the upturn in economic activity observed during the two preceding 
years, brought about a drop of slightly more than 2% in the gross domestic product. Production of 
most of the other principal items also decreased, including beans (-29%), cassava, sweet potatoes, 
sugar cane and tung. 
The drought which affected the country in the closing months of 1985 and the early months of 
1986, i.e., during the sowing and the growth period of the main crops, left its mark both in terms of 
the amount of land harvested and the yields obtained. By way of example, the land area planted with 
soya which was harvested fell by 25%, whereas the area sown had expanded by 4%; and the yield of 
cotton per hectare harvested declined by over 26% (see table 8). However, the losses attributable to 
the drought would have been even higher if it had not been for the effort that was made to resow, 
which was supported by the extension of subsidized credits. 
In a departure from this trend, the harvest of wheat (a winter crop which is grown on part of the 
land devoted to soya cultivation in summer), which was unaffected by the drought, increased by no 
less than 66%, and production was consequently great enough, for the first time, to satisfy domestic 
demand. Thus, a target was met that had been set many years before, when the government launched 
its wheat-production campaign, which was supported by an abundant supply of subsidized credits 
and, more recently, by the substantial rise in the parallel exchange rate. 
The actual prices paid to the producers of the principal crops worsened in most cases during the 
sowing period, but moved back up during the harvest itself in spite of the downward trend in their 
international prices and the drop in the parallel exchange rate thanks to the substantial reductions 
made in the valuation levels set by the Central Bank. These changes in valuation levels had the effect 
of raising the exchange rates actually received for the main export products and, consequently, their 
domestic prices. Thus, while the actual domestic price of soya fell by more than 33% between 1984 
and 1985, during the first half of 1986 it rose by 36.5% in comparison with the price recorded during 
the second half of the preceding year, even though on the international market its price continued to 
decline. An appreciable upturn was also seen in the actual domestic prices of sugar cane, maize and 
cassava, while that of cotton barely rose at all and that of tung continued its steep decline. The actual 
domestic price paid to producers of wheat, for its part, once again dropped slightly (see table 9). 
Up until the end of the year a preferential exchange rate of 240 guaraníes to the dollar was 
maintained for imports of agricultural inputs. However, the greatest support for crop-farming 
production came from an unprecedented expansion in the supply of subsidized credit to the sector. 
Domestic bank financing for agricultural activities expanded by over 120%, i.e., by 68% in real terms. 
The interest rates on these operations fluctuated between 16% below the prevailing rate of inflation 
in June and 6% below in December. This policy should have more than offset the depressionary 
impact which the drought, the downturn in international prices and the fall in the real effective 
exchange rate had on the profitability of agricultural production. Nevertheless, it led to an overall 
expansion of bank credit which was far higher than that which would have been compatible with a 
more lasting decrease in inflation, as well as giving rise to instability in relative prices and a sharp 
restriction of the supply of credit for other activities, without having a proportional impact on 
agricultural production, with the exception of wheat. In addition, the real prices of agricultural land 
again dropped (see table 10). 
The value added by the manufacturing sector also declined, mainly due to the large decrease in 
the production of raw materials, as well as to the reduction of over 25%, in real terms, in the 
allocation of credit to the sector. However, some branches grew rapidly, thanks to the stimulus 
provided by the huge rise observed the year before in the real effective market exchange rate, which 
was the one that applied to most imports of manufactured goods, as well as because of the striking 
550 
PARAGUAY 
expansion in tourism and the increase in demand for industrial products on the part of the Yacyretá 
binational enterprise, which was constructing the new dam on the Paraná River (see table 12). 
In contrast, forestry increased by nearly 12% —thus exhibiting genuine growth for the first 
time since 1981. This was chiefly a result of the dynamism of external demand, which was in turn 
attributable to maladjustments in relative prices and to the extraordinary expansion of Brazilian and, 
to a lesser extent, Argentine demand following the implementation of unorthodox stabilization 
programmes in those countries. This same factor also provided a stimulus for stock-raising produc-
tion, although this sector only recorded a 2% increase in its value added (see table 7). 
The production of basic services also rose appreciably, owing to the steep increase in the 
generation of electrical power at Itaipú (see table 13). 
The boom in tourism, which was attributable to the substantial increase in the parallel 
exchange rate in 1985 as well as to the marked rise in spending by residents of neighbouring 
countries, made it possible for commercial activities to maintain a modest growth rate, in spite of the 
steep fall in the harvest of the main crops. Furthermore, the increased demand stemming from the 
execution of engineering works for the Yacyretá hydroelectric dam gave rise to a slight increase in the 
value added by the construction sector, thereby halting the downward trend observed ever since the 
completion of the main works of the Itaipú hydroelectric dam in 1981 (see table 6). 
Although the gross domestic product remained at a standstill, the Central Bank calculated that 
the rate of open unemployment at the national level only climbed from 8% to 9% of the labour force. 
In addition, the rate of open unemployment in the Asunción metropolitan area rose only very slightly 
from 5.2% in November-December 1985 to 6.1% in June-August 1986, according to the household 
surveys sporadically carried out by the Department of Statistics and Censuses (see table 14). 
3. The external sector 
a) The main trends 
The official balance of payments showed a deficit for the fifth year running. The loss of external 
assets by the Central Bank to which this gave rise was the largest in the past five years and was equal 
to one-quarter of its holdings as of the end of 1985 and to 3.3% of the gross domestic product. Gross 
international reserves thus fell to a level which —given the rate of official external purchases 
recorded in 1986— was only sufficient to finance less than four months of imports of goods and 
services (see table 15). If delinquent payment and non-transferable reserves are also taken into 
account, it then becomes apparent that —unless an unexpected and unusually large rise in the terms 
of trade were to take place— it may soon become impossible to continue to provide the State with 
foreign exchange at rates of exchange below the prevailing market rate and, consequently, to 
maintain the prices of the goods and services provided by the public sector at levels far below those of 
the market. 
Towards the end of 1986, the authorities considerably narrowed the gaps existing between the 
market exchange rate and the official exchange rates applied to imports and to the servicing of the 
external debt of almost all State agencies —with the exceptions being the two most heavily indebted 
enterprises. Moreover, they also raised a number of public rates and charges sharply. However, they 
did not correct the asymmetry of the exchange rate system, and the changes made had the effect of 
increasing exchange subsidies and the creation of liquidity. 
As in 1985, when holdings of external assets accumulated during the 1973-1981 boom were 
used to mitigate the harshness of the adjustment of the external imbalance, the widening gap 
between saving and investment in 1986 was financed by a huge loss of reserves, despite the economic 
authorities' announcement of a variety of adjustment programmes during the course of the year. 
Indeed, the balance-of-payments trade account deficit recorded by the Central Bank reached a level 
equivalent to 4.2% of the gross domestic product, which was four times that of the year before. The 
volume of imports of goods and services rose by 8% following the fall in the real effective exchange 
rate, while the volume of external sales declined by 5%, mainly on account of the drought. The 
increase in the deficit on current account was considerably lower, due to the sharp fall in the 
international price of petroleum and the marked drop in remittances of profits abroad which 
accompanied the shrinkage of exports. However, the net inflow of external financing was only 
551 
marginally higher than the low figure registered in 1985. External borrowing by the government 
from commercial sources of short-term credit barely balanced the impact of the suspension of loan 
disbursements from the World Bank and the freeze on the initiation of new investment projects with 
the Inter-American Development Bank resulting from the differences over exchange policy which 
had arisen between the Paraguayan authorities and these two institutions. Together with the 
accounting reduction of the private State-guaranteed external debt, this led to the lowest growth rate 
for the medium- and long-term gross disbursed external debt recorded since the 1960s and for the 
first time since the onset of the crisis, it declined in relation to the gross domestic product. In addition, 
the debt of the State steel enterprise, Aceros del Paraguay ( ACEPAR), with the Banco do Brasil was the 
object of the first formal external debt renegotiation to take place. 
In view of the deterioration in the international prices of the principal export products, the rise 
in domestic production costs and the slump in yields, during the harvest period the Central Bank 
decided to raise the exchange rate that was actually received in this connection and, hence, the 
domestic prices of these products also increased. In order to accomplish this, it relied almost 
exclusively on a reduction in the minimum export prices. Thus, although the exchange rate applied to 
foreign exchange export earnings remained in the region of 320 guaraníes to the dollar during the 
first half of the year (see table 16), the rate actually received by exporters ranged between 482 
guaraníes for cotton and 688 guaraníes for wood. At the same time, the rates of return on the main 
exportable items improved, as commercial banks were encouraged to increase considerably the loans 
they provided to producers at subsidized interest rates. 
This exchange policy relieved pressure on the exchange rate and on price levels, as it diverted a 
greater proportion of foreign exchange earnings to the parallel market. It also made it possible to 
avoid expanding exchange subsidies and/or to postpone increasing public rates and charges, which 
would have been tantamount to outright adjustments, such as those decreed in previous years in the 
official exchange rates. And since the parallel exchange rate did in fact begin to weaken, owing both to 
these measures and to the boom in tourism, expectations of such increases began to subside. 
Such considerations might well have proved decisive, in the light of the spectacular surge in the 
parallel exchange rate between the beginning of 1985 and the beginning of 1986 and the jump in 
inflation to an annual figure of over 40% by the end of the first quarter of 1986. However, this policy 
naturally sped up the decline in the Central Bank's international reserves. In view of this fact, and of 
the constriction of the flow of financing from multilateral institutions, together with the sustained 
downturn in the parallel exchange rate and the levelling off and subsequent steep fall of inflation 
during the second half of the year, steps were taken to increase the valuation levels set by the Central 
Bank and to readjust the official exchange rates. Consequently, a large proportion of the earnings 
from recorded volumes of external sales were deposited in the Central Bank, but the exchange rates 
actually received by exporters did not change significantly. 
Although the gap between the average official exchange rate actually applied to exports and the 
parallel exchange rate narrowed in comparison to what it had been at the end of 1985, the new 
exchange policy had the effect of increasing the number of official rates applied to export products, as 
well as the differences among them. Furthermore, the highly undervalued rates at which the Central 
Bank provided foreign exchange to the non-financial public sector were raised substantially, and steps 
were taken to eliminate part of the gap between the going rate and the exceedingly low prices charged 
for public goods and services by phasing in adjustments of around 40% in these charges beginning in 
December 1985. However, as the rise in the exchange rates applying to State operations was lower 
than the increase in the Central Bank's average purchase rate, the unwarranted creation of liquidity 
resulting from the system of exchange rates increased considerably, thereby exerting further pressure 
on the exchange rate and the level of prices, rather than a sustainable adjustment being applied. 
Indeed, while towards the end of the year the exchange rate used for imports by public agencies was 
increased from 240 to 400 guaraníes to the dollar and the rate applied to the servicing of the public 
external debt was raised from 160 to 240 guaraníes (with the exception of certain State bodies which 
retained lower rates), the average Central Bank purchase rate was increased from around 310 to 550 
guaraníes. Thus, for example, each dollar sold by the Central Bank to the non-financial public sector 
for the purposes of servicing its external debt signified a loss of 300 guaraníes (or more), as against 
the previous figure of 150 guaraníes. 
The real effective official exchange rate for exports remained at an average level similar to that 
of the preceding year; in other words, it remained far below the rate prevailing during the major 
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boom of the previous decade. The rate for imports fell by 10%, which brought it back down to the 
level it had reached before economic performance had taken a sharp turn for the worse in 1981. The 
real effective parallel exchange rate, for its part, fell markedly, thereby eroding the profitability of the 
production of tradeables in general and of unregistered exports and import substitutes in particular 
(see table 17). In the final analysis, then, the exchange policy tended to accentuate macroeconomic 
disequiiibria rather than facilitating a structural adjustment aimed at restoring a sustainable form of 
growth in economic activity. 
In August an agreement was finally reached with the World Bank regarding the exchange rate 
to be applied to pending disbursements loans already arranged for with the Bank, which amounted to 
US$137 million, US$20 million more than the surplus recorded on the balance-of-payments capital 
account in 1986. The new exchange rate was set at 320 guaraníes to the dollar up until the end of 1986, 
which brought it up to the level nominally in force at the time for exports, and at 400 guaraníes to the 
dollar as from January 1987. During the last quarter of the year, the government reached a similar 
agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank. However, another dispute arose in 
December, when the government raised the nominal exchange rate for exports to 550 guaraníes to 
the dollar. In the end, the rate applying to loan disbursements was readjusted to 550 guaraníes as well, 
thereby definitively normalizing the country's access to financing from the two above-mentioned 
multilateral institutions. 
On another front, at the beginning of 1986, following protracted negotiations, the authorities 
signed an important agreement with the Brazilian government. This arrangement provided for the 
application of a readjustment factor to the nominal values of the fees established in the 1973 Itaipú 
Treaty; this treaty governs the operation of the hydroelectric dam of the same name, which is owned 
by both countries. Accordingly, the fee to be received by Paraguay for transferring its half of the 
power generated by Itaipú to Brazil was readjusted from US$650 per gigawatt-hour to US$2 275 in 
1985/1986, US$2 327 in 1987, US$2 379 in 1988, US$2 431 in 1989, US$2 483 in 1990, US$2 535 in 
1991 and US$2 600 in 1992. Moreover, the parties agreed to defer the payment of 100% of the fees 
due from 1985 until the beginning of the coming decade, as well as 71.6% of those corresponding to 
1986 and a considerable proportion of the fees for 1987. Consequently, Paraguay was to receive its 
first fees for Itaipú, some US$9 million, in 1987. 
b) External trade and the balance of payments 
The current value of exports shrank by 23.5% according to preliminary figures provided by the 
Central Bank (see table 18).3 
This drop was brought about by the sharp fall in the value of soya seeds (-56%) and of cotton 
fibres (-43%), the two main export items. The volume of soya seeds recorded by the Central Bank fell 
by almost 11 %, which was considerably less than the decline in its harvest, while the volume of cotton 
fibres fell by 30%, an amount similar to the decrease in production. In turn, the valuation level set for 
the former crop was cut by 49%, while its international price fell by 7%; the valuation level for fhe 
latter crop was lowered by 18%, as against a 15.5% reduction in its international price (see table 19). 
In contrast, the current value of exports of livestock products reached US$44 million, in 
comparison to the US$7 million recorded the year before and an average of less than US$9 million for 
the period 1980-1985, thanks to Brazil's unusually large demand for these items. This was the highest 
level of income from exports of meat products to be recorded since 1973, while the volume of these 
exports, which was eight times greater than in 1985, was the highest ever. Similarly, external sales of 
wood increased fivefold, thus representing the largest volume since 1980, once again on account of 
the exceptional demand from Brazil. 
Trends in tourism also helped to offset part of the harmful repercussions of the drought on the 
value of exports. The number of tourists increased by 41% to the unprecedented level of 371 000, 
owing to the maladjustment of relative prices, the boom in expenditure by residents of neighbouring 
countries and the sharp rise in the parallel exchange rate which occurred during the second half of 
1985. Consequently, for the first time income from tourism exceeded that obtained from any 
'This figure does not take into account what are referred toas "unregistered" exports or the sales made by Paraguay to 
the Itaipú and Yacyretá binational enterprises. These are, however, included in the balance of payments shown in table 23. 
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individual export product (see table 20). Taken together, the increases in exports of livestock 
products and timber and the higher income from tourism were equivalent to almost two-thirds of the 
fall in the value of external sales of cotton and soya. 
Despite the slump in recorded exports, the current value of merchandise imports rose by over 
15%, according to Central Bank figures (see table 21).'' This increase principally reflected the 
unusually marked expansion of external purchases of machinery, equipment and engines. Imports of 
durable consumer goods also rose by an exceptional amount, particularly in the case of electrical 
appliances. In contrast, imports of intermediate goods shrank for the fourth year running, mainly as a 
result of the decline in the prices of hydrocarbons. 
Thanks to the downturn in import prices, which fell to a level below that of 1980, and to the 
drop in the parallel exchange rate, the terms of trade improved in spite of the deterioration in the 
international prices of the principal export items (see table 22). Together with the sharp reduction in 
payments for factor services, this counteracted a considerable portion of the marked growth in the 
resource gap, and the balance-of-payments current account deficit therefore increased by substantially 
less (from US$231 million in 1985 to US$280 million in 1986) than it otherwise would have. On the 
other hand, net external financing increased by only US$14 million due to the drop in disbursements 
by multilateral institutions, in spite of heavy short-term borrowing by the State. Hence, another large 
overall balance-of-payments deficit was recorded (see table 23). 
If the operations of the Itaipú and Yacyretá binational enterprises are excluded, then the 
growth of the current account deficit turns out to be lower, and the increase in the capital account 
surplus turns out to be greater. When considered on this basis, the global deficit barely rose at all, 
although it remained at an unsustainable level, inasmuch as it was equivalent to 60% of the Central 
Bank's remaining holdings of external assets (see table 24). The direct contribution made by the 
construction of the Itaipú project to the balance of payments decreased substantially once again as 
work progressed according to schedule. In contrast, the contribution made by Yacyretá increased, due 
to the gradual normalization of its financial position. Furthermore, due to the new method adopted in 
respect of foreign exchange inflows for financing this project's expenditures in Paraguay, which had 
been agreed upon by Paraguay and Argentina the year before, the Central Bank's figures underesti-
mate its actual contribution, since a considerable proportion of such foreign exchange was liquidated 
on the open market. 
c) The external debt 
The gross contracted external debt shrank by almost 3% to US$2.43 billion as a result of the use 
of a new method for quantifying the State-guaranteed private external debt, which was valued at 
US$30 million, as against US$145 million in 1985. Simultaneously, the State virtually ceased to 
contract for any fresh medium- and long-term credits due to its disagreements with multilateral 
lending agencies (see table 25). 
Although the gross disbursed medium- and long-term external debt continued to grow, it did so 
at the lowest rate recorded since 1963. Furthermore, in spite of the further loss of external assets, the 
expansion of the net external debt slowed down to less than 7% at current prices, as against an 
increase of almost 18% in 1985 and of 31 % in 1984. Nevertheless, the net external debt was 19 times 
greater than it had been in 1980, when it was less than US$100 million. 
In real terms the gross disbursed external debt fell slightly if it is measured in terms of the 
variation in the index of export prices. If it is deflated on the basis of the index of import prices, 
however, then a real increase of around 6% is shown. The corresponding figures for the net external 
debt are 3-6% and 10% (see table 26). 
Even though economic activity remained at a standstill, the gross external debt fell in relation to 
the gross domestic product for the first time since 1981. The net debt also shrank, following its 
spectacular increase over the previous five years, inasmuch as the gross external debt represented 
4These figures do not include unrecorded merchandise imports or the half of the imports made by the Itaipú and 
Yacyretá binational enterprises, which are entered on Paraguay's accounts. Nor do they include imports financed by external 
loans, unrequited official transfer payments or direct foreign investment. The latter items are, however, taken into account in 
the balance-of-payments statistics appearing in table 2V 
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50% of the gross domestic product at the weighted average official exchange rate or almost 70% at 
the parallel rate, as compared to 56% and nearly 76%, respectively, in 1985. In turn, at the weighted 
average official exchange rate, the net external debt fell to less than 47% of the gross domestic 
product (50% in 1985) and to 65% at the parallel rate (67.5% the preceding year). The departure 
from the previous trend (in a five-year period the gross external debt burden had trebled and that of 
the net external debt had increased thirtyfold) was attributable both to the drop in the real effective 
exchange rate and to the slower growth of the debt. In its turn, debt servicing also stabilized in 1986 
(see tables 25 and 26). 
For the first time, the government held formal renegotiations during 1986 in respect of its 
external commitments, reaching an agreement with the Banco do Brasil to reschedule US$50 million 
in maturities corresponding to part of the debt owed by the State steel enterprise, Aceros del Paraguay 
( AŒPAR), to the above-mentioned bank. In actual fact, this debt, which alone represented one-sixth of 
the disbursed external public debt as of the end of 1986, was apparently not being serviced. 
4. Prices and wages 
During the first quarter inflation again picked up sharply, after having diminished towards the close 
of 1985. During the first three months of the year the level of consumer prices surged by more than 
15%, thereby bringing the level of inflation as measured over 12 months to 40% in March, almost 
double the December rate and the highest since I960 (see figure 2). The rise in the level of wholesale 
prices was even greater (43%), bringing it near to an annual rate of almost 55% in March, as against 
one of 16% in December 1985 (see tables 27 and 28). However, the upward trend in consumer prices 
underwent a sharp turnaround in April, and in the following eight months the increase in the 
relevant Central Bank index was not even half that recorded in the first three months of the year. 
During the last two months price levels remained virtually stable. Consequently, the 12-month 
increase in this index (24%) was barely higher than it had been the year before. For its part, the rate 
of increase in wholesale prices fell to somewhat less than 11 % between March and September, while 
in October-December the absolute level of wholesale prices declined by almost 7%. 
The inflationary spiral seen early in the year largely reflected the jump in the prices of food 
products, attributable in its turn to the impact of the drought on the production of the main crops. In 
terms of consumer prices, this led to a 27 % rise in food prices between December and March, whereas 
the increase in wholesale prices of agricultural products was over 66%. By way of example, the price 
of maize almost doubled between the last quarter of 1985 and the first of 1986, while the prices of 
cassava and sweet potatoes rose by 56% and 39%, respectively. 
As far as costs are concerned, the increases in the minimum wage decreed in November 1985 
(20%) and January 1986 (15%) contributed to the resurgence of inflation. For the first time in many 
years the minimum wage was adjusted by a higher percentage than inflation and at a time when the 
rate of price increases had fallen off sharply. Between January 1985 and January 1986 the minimum 
wage was increased by 38%, whereas the cumulative level of inflation was 27%. Moreover, the 15% 
readjustment made in mid-January 1986 was well above the cumulative rate of inflation as of that 
date, since the level of prices had stabilized during the last two months of 1985, according to the 
Central Bank index. 
On the demand side, towards the middle of 1985 the Central Bank had introduced an exception-
ally restrictive monetary policy with a view to stabilizing the exchange rate —which had risen by 
more than 100% between the end of 1984 and August 1985 as a result of the implementation of 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies— as well as to reversing adverse expectations. The parallel 
exchange rate did indeed fall by nearly 20% during the closing months of 1985, as harsh monetary 
restrictions compelled firms and individuals to restructure the currency composition of their financial 
assets in order to cover their working capital and current expenditures. Once the exchange rate began 
to decline, speculative operations continued to exert downward pressure until the end of the year. 
Given these circumstances, price levels stabilized, but the reduction in liquidity tended to depress the 
level of economic activity, particularly once the drought had generated additional demand for credit. 
In the last two months of the year, the Central Bank loosened the credit restrictions applying to 
commercial banks, although, in any case, part of the upturn in liquidity during this period was due to 
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seasonal factors. In addition, the public sector's demand for fresh credit rose during the closing 
months of the year, after having been frozen between April and July. 
This renewed growth of liquidity may have played a part in the sharp rise in price levels 
observed during the first quarter, especially through the further and considerable rise in the exchange 
rate. However, prices subsequently tended to stabilize, despite the fact that throughout most of the 
year the Central Bank maintained a clearly expansionary monetary policy. Furthermore, between 
December 1985 and February 1986, a period during which the rise in price levels was over 15%, the 
Central Bank supply of net domestic credit did not expand. In contrast, between February and 
December, when the level of consumer prices rose by a little less than 11%, net domestic credit 
increased by 61% (see table 28). 
A considerable proportion of this increase was counterbalanced by the huge loss of interna-
tional reserves sustained by the Central Bank between March and November. After expanding 
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sharply during the first two months of the year, the monetary base shrank between June and October 
and its 12-month increase was no higher than that recorded at the beginning of the year, although this 
trend was reversed in December, when it rose steeply (by almost 20%). Meanwhile, the means of 
payment grew rapidly between March and May, following their January contraction, but during the 
following eight months the money supply again shrank, before expanding by over 14% in December. 
Finally, the growth of quasi-money (6%) was not even half that recorded the preceding year. 
On the cost side, the further and persistent drop in the market exchange rate —following the 
20% rise recorded in January and February— also helped to bring down inflation and, eventually, to 
stabilize price levels. Between March and December the parallel exchange rate fell by almost 23%, 
reaching its lowest level since June 1985. (In contrast, in the June 1985-December 1986 period, the 
level of consumer prices rose by over 46%.) 
The authorities maintained a price freeze on public goods and services or allowed only minor 
adjustments, once again resorting to this means of absorbing part of the inflationary pressure created 
by the excessively expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Thus, for example, the real prices of 
electricity, water and telephone service fell by around 24% and the rates for electricity and telephone 
service thus dropped to less than half what they had been before the onset of the economic crisis (see 
table 34). However, in December it became necessary to make a series of major readjustments in 
public rates and charges due to the rise in the official exchange rates. 
In addition, price controls were tightened up on goods and services provided by the private 
sector which carried significant weight in the consumer price index. Finally, the further fall in the 
level of import prices also helped to stabilize prices, as did the boom in tourism from Brazil and 
Argentina, owing to its depressionary effect on the parallel exchange rate. However, this stability 
seems to have been rather transitory, since the level of consumer prices again rose sharply during the 
first months of 1987 (almost 9% in January-February). 
For the second year running, legal minimum wages improved in real terms (see table 29). 
While the increase received in 1985 (6%) reflected the slowdown of inflation, as readjustments were 
similar to the past rate of inflation, in 1986 the sharp rise in real legal minimum wages (11%) was the 
outcome of a new wage policy. This policy involved the granting of readjustments in excess of the 
cumulative variation in consumer prices. Furthermore, in contrast with what had hitherto been the 
norm, minimum wages were readjusted before cumulative inflation reached 15%. Thus, a 15% wage 
increase was granted in January, while the cumulative level of inflation (from November, the month 
of the previous readjustment) was 5.6% and a 20% rise was decreed injury, while the cumulative rate 
of inflation was 11 %. In early 1987 this new method of readjustment was maintained: injanuary the 
minimum wage was once again readjusted by 20%, whereas the variation in the consumer price index 
since July had been only 11%. 
Nonetheless, the new wage policy did not lead to a real improvement in average wages. On the 
contrary, the purchasing power of the average manual worker's wage in Asunción declined for the 
fifth year in a row, falling by somewhat more than 4% to a level 15% lower than in 1981. Average 
daily wages in agriculture, for their part, remained at a standstill in relation to the average annual rise 
in prices (the daily wage which did not include meals rose by 1.5% and the wage including meals fell 
by 1.5%). Consequently, the above-mentioned wages were worth only 70%, 71% and 76%, respec-
tively, of those paid before the onset of the economic crisis. On the other hand, as a result of the sharp 
increases of the past two years, the real minimum wage was 6.6% higher than in 1981. In comparison, 
gross national income was about 1% less than the figure recorded five years before. 
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Table 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Indexes ( 1 9 8 0 = 100) 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Unemployment rate c 
Consumer prices 
December to December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real salaries and wages 
Money (M,) 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Global balance/total expenditure 
of central government 
Global balance of central 
government/GDP 
Global balance of non-financial 
public sector/GDP 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services)' 
Factor services^ 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 
Gross external debt disbursed* 

































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 'Annual average rate in Greater Asunción. Real wages of manual 
workers in Greater Asunción. 'New series. The base figures for the former series (up to 1983) and the new series (from 
1984) are no comparable. Includes unrequited private transfer payments. 'Medium- and long-term public and 
State-guaranteed private debt. 'Gross external debt disbursed less holdings of net foreign assets. 'Adjusted for 




PARAGUAY: SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS ON THE PRODUCT, 
EXPENDITURE AND INCOME 
(Millions of dollars at constant 1980 prices)" 
Gross domestic product 
at factor cost 
Indirect taxes, less 
subsidies 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Net imports of goods 
and services1 
Net factor payments from 




Gross national product 




























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Exchange rate calculated by the International Monetary Fund. 
factors. ''includes unrequited private transfer payments. 
Preliminary figures. 'Not attributable to 
Table 3 
PARAGUAY: SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 

































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 








































































































ments figures in 
current dollar, which were then converted to constant 1980 values using unit value indexes calculated by ECLAC for the 
purpose. 
Table 4 
PARAGUAY: STRUCTURE O F TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
° At market prices in constant 1980 dollars, using the parity exchange rate. Preliminary figures. cThe figures for 
exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments data expressed in dollars at current prices, 
which were converted to constant 1980 values through deflation based on price indexes calculated by ECLAC for the purpose. 
Table 5 
PARAGUAY: ORIGIN, COMPOSITION A N D F I N A N C I N G O F 
GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
(As a percentage of the gross domestic product)" 
1970 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 




Machinery and equipment 
Changes in stocks 
Gross domestic saving 
Net factor payments ' 
Terms-of-trade effect 
















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Technical Planning Office. 
°At market prices in constant 1980 dollars at the exchange rate calculated by the International Monetary Fund. 
'Preliminary figures. 'Includes State enterprises, except Itaipu Binacional and Yacyretá Binacional. 




PARAGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY K I N D OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT 1980 MARKET PRICES 







Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 









































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: These series were calculated on the basis of official figures which were re-weighted on the basis of the strutureof current 
1980 prices. Consequently the results do not necessarily coincide with those published by the countries in their 
calculations at constant prices. 
"Preliminary figures. Including livestock, forestry and fishing. 
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Table 7 

















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Preliminary figures. 
'Thousands of head. 




PARAGUAY: AREA CULTIVATED, AREA HARVESTED 
AND YIELDS OF THE MAIN CROPS 
1983 1984 1985 1986 
1983 
Growth rates 

































































































































































































































































Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
"Thousands of hectares. Kilogrammes per hectare. 
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Table 9 
PARAGUAY: NOMINAL AND REAL PRODUCER PRICES 
FOR THE MAIN CROPS 
(1980 = 100) 
Rice Cotton Maize Cassava Soya * Coconuts Tunc Wheat 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Agricultural Marketing and 
Economics, and the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"The annual averages may not coincide with the quarterly averages owing to the frequency of the observations or errors in 




PARAGUAY: NOMINAL AND REAL PRICES 
IN THE RURAL LAND MARKET 






























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supply by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Department of Agricultural Marketing and 
Economics, and the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Calculated by deflating the nominal prices by the consumer price index, the base year of which is 1980. 
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Table 11 
PARAGUAY: AGRARIAN REFORM INDICATORS 
1956-1985 
Total awards" 
Number of lots 
Surface area (thousands of hectares) 
Average (hectares) 
Crop-farming awards 
Number of lots 
Surface area (thousands of hectares) 
Average (hectares) 
Stock-raising awards 
Number of lots 
Surface area (thousands of hectares) 
Average (hectares) 
Final title deeds 
Number of recipients 




Surface area (thousands of hectares) 
Nationalized and expropiated 




















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Institute for Rural Welfare, Report (several years) and Juan Manuel Frutos. Con 
el hombre y la tierra hacia el bienestar rural. Cuadernos Republicanos, Asunción, 15)82, and from figures provided by 
the Institute for Rural Welfare, Department for Land and Colonies and Department of Planning. 















Paper and paper products 
Printing and publishing 
Leather and fur products, 
except footwear 
Chemical industry 





Iron and non-ferrous 
metals 




and transport equipment 
Other 
Handicrafts 
Production of some of the 
main manufactures 






































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
Iminary figures. 
'Millions of litres. 
Thousands of metres. 'Thousands of packets. Thousands of litres. 
Table 13 
PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY 




Electrical energy generation' 
Gross 
Net 
Net imports of electrical 
energyc 

















































































































Percentage of population 
receiving electrical 
energy service 10.9 29.0 31.5 37.7 39.5 41.2 42.8 45.5 
Source: National Electricity Administration (ANDE), Compilación Estadística, 1960-1981, Asunción, 1982, and other 
statistics also supplied by ANDE. 
"Preliminary figures. Thousands of ItW. 'Millions of kWh. Excluding sales of Paraguayan energy from 
ltaipu to Brazil. 'Includes commercial consumption (a new category included in Rates List No. 4 of 
1/8/1984). •'includes "undefined" (a new category included in Rates List No. 4 of 1/8/1984). "Includes 
government, municipal, trams, public lighting, and, as from 1983, "rural" (a new category included in Rates List No. 4 of 
1/8/1984). 
Table 14 


































Source: On the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics and 
Censuses. Encuesta de Hogares (several issues), and information supplied to ECLAC. 
" Preliminary figures. Estimate by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 'In addition to Asunción, includes Fernando de la 
Mora, Lambaré and the urban areas of Luque and San Lorenzo up to 1982. As from 1983, includes, in-addition to Asunción, the 
urban areas of San Lorenzo, Lambaré, Fernando de la Mora, Villa Haya and the urban and rural areas of Villa Lisa, San 
Antonio, Ñenby, Luque, Limpio and Mariano Roque Alonzo. First half of year. 'Average of the months of 
September, October and November. Average of the months of August, September and October. * Average of the 
months of November and December. Average of the months of June, July and August. 
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Table 15 
PARAGUAY: MAIN EXTERNAL SECTOR INDICATORS 
PARAGUAY 
1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Volume of exports of goods 
and services0 
Purchasing power of exports of 
goods and services0 
Net payments for factor 
services' 
Purchasing power of net imports 
of capital 
Total import capacity 
Volume of imports of goods 
and services0 
Gross international reserves 
Index* 
In months of imports 
Gross external debt disbursed 
Volume of exports of goods 
and services0 
Terms-of-trade effect 
Net payments for factor 
services' 
Purchasing power of net imports 
of capital 
Total import capacity 
Volume of imports of goods 
and services0 
Trade balance' 
Current account balance 
Global balance 
Gross international reserves 
Gross external debt disbursed 


























41.5 100.0 113.2 120.0 
8.1 100.0 103.0 92.2 
2.1 10.9 10.0 7.8 
55.1 100.0 107.4 132.9 













129.2" 215.1'* 205.0 
151.8" 192.6" 195.2 
1554.2" 2112.5*' 795.8 
83.4" 32.9'' 26.9 
122.6" 118.7" 121.1 
140.3J 150.7" 162.7 
97.0 71.8 60.1 
7.6 5.1 3.8 







































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. 41980 prices. "Non-factor. ''As from May 1984 commercial banks were authorized to 
operate on the parallel exchage market. Based on information obtained on these commercial-bank operations, the Central 
Bank began to draw up a new series for external trade in goods and non-factor services. This series is, of course, not 
compatible with the previous one. 'Includes unrequited private transfers. 'Positive balances. ^Deflated by 
the index of import prices for goods and non-factor services. Gross international reserves and imports of goods and 
services for each year. 
effect. At the parallel exchange rate. 
At market prices in 1970 dollars; at parity exchange rate. ^Excluding terms-of-trade 
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Table 16 
PARAGUAY: OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATES 
(Guaraníes per dollar at the end of each period) 
Current account 











Fruits and vegetables 
Feed-cake and expellers 









Petroleum and its products 































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 
"These exchange rate apply to the valuation levels set by the Central Bank, which may differ from the actual international 
prices. Average exchange rate for the year. cIn December the exchange rate for public-sector imports of goods 
was raised to 400 guaraníes to the dollar, with the exception of imports for the National Elearicity Administration (ANDE), 
the National Sanitary Corporation and the State Merchant Fleet, which were left at 240 guaraníes to the dollar. The 
exchange rate applied to the Central Government is 160 guaraníes to the dollar. 'Imports of non-factor services by the 
central government remained at 240 guaraníes to the dollar, with the exception of freight and insurance, which were raised to 
400 guaraníes to the dollar. The exchange rate for disbursements of public-sector loans (including State-guaranteed 



























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, based on information from the Central Bank of Paraguay and the 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
"As from 1982 the average exchange rate was used. As from 1982 the average exchange rate was used. However, the 
figures concern imports authorized by the Central Bank, i.e., they do not represent the true average rate. 'Relates to the 
average for the indexes of the real exchange rate for the guaraní against the currencies of Paraguay's main trading partners, 
weighted by the relative significance of the registered trade flows, to or from these countries, as appropriate. Between 1970 
and 1980 these weightings correspond to the average for the 1975-1979 period, and from 1981, to the average for 1982-1985. 
Official exchange rates were used in these calculations as well as wholesale price indexes, whenever possible. In the case of 
Paraguay this latter index was used. For the methodology and sources used, see the technical appendix to the Economic Survey 
of Latin America, 1981. ''These indexes correspond to a weighted average for the indexes of the real exchange rate in 
respect of the Federal Republic of Germany, Argentina, Brazil, the United States, France, Italy and Japan, based on their share 




PARAGUAY: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB" 
Total 











Feed-cake and expellers 
Fruits and vegetables 
















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 




PARAGUAY: EXTERNAL PRICES OF THE MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS 
(1980 = 100) 






































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of UNCTAD, Monthly Commodity Price Bulletin, various volumes, and International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
"United States, No. 2 yellow, CIF, Rotterdam. 'The nominal prices were deflated by the export prices of the 
industrialized countries. 'All origins, crude oil, FOB, ex-works, Netherlands. Mexican , medium grade, CIF, 
Northern Europe. 'Tropical, wholesale price, United Kingdom. 
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Table 20 
PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF TOURISM 




From United States 
From Japan 
From Uruguay 
From other countries 




(millions of dollars)' 
Supply of rooms 
(number)' 
Supply of beds (number)' 
Average occupation rate 
Of rooms (percentage) 








































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Department of Tourism, Ministry of Public Works and Communications 
and the Central Bank. 
"The total number of tourists was calculated on the basis of tourist cards, and includes only persons over 12 years of 
age. The distribution of tourist by country of origin was calculated on the basis of hotel registers. For 1972, the 
distribution refers to the nationality of the tourists; subsequently it refers to their point of departure. 'From the balance 
of payments. Preliminary figures. 'Refers to hotels, motels hostels and boarding houses regarded by the 
















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Includes only those imports which appear in the exchange record, plus imports with deferred payments and those carried out 
with long-term external loans. 'includes paperboard and cadboard products, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and 
textiles and textile manufactures. 'Includes jeeps and rural vans. Includes iron and iron manufactures (with the 
exception of hardware), ordinary metals and their manufactures, stones, earth and earth manufactures, cement, asphalt and 
wood and its manufactures. 'Excludes automobiles, jeeps and rural vans. Includes agricultural implements and 
accessories, hardware and animals on the hoof. 
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Table 22 
PARAGUAY: ANNUAL GROWTH OF TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Percentages) 

























Terms of trade (goods) 
(FOB/CIF) 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
Purchasing power of exports of 



























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Non-factor. cAs from May 1984 commercial banks were authorized to operate on the 
parallel exchange market. On the basis of information obtained on these commercial-bank operations, the Central Bank 
began to draw up a new series for external trade in goods and non-factor services. This series is, of course, not compatible with 




PARAGUAY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services1 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services' 







Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 






























































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures, subject to revision. As from May 1984 commercial banks were authorized to operate on the 
parallel exchange market. On the basis on information obtained on these commercial-bank operations, the Central Bank 
began to draw up a new series for external trade in goods and non-factor services. These operation have been classified under 
"other services" in the absence of precise information thereon. This series is, of course, not compatible with the previous 
one. 'Includes other non-factor services. Includes net loans granted and other assets and liabilities. 'Equal 
to the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 24 
PARAGUAY: DIRECT EFFECTS OF THE ITAIPU A N D YACYRETA 
B I N A T I O N A L ENTERPRISES ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMESTS" 

































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Does not include imports of goods and services by the binational enterprises which are imputable to the balance of payments, 
with the exception of profits from investments by the Itaipú binational enterprise in Paraguay. Similarly, it does not include 
the capital flows which finance those imports (which are also imputable to the balance of payments). Therefore, the 
accounting system used for this table is the same as that used for table 23, on the balance of payments, the original source for 
which is the Central Bank of Paraguay. 'Preliminary figures. cAs from May 1984 a new series for external trade in 
goods and non-factor services began to be drawn up. See note ;,, table 23. Shows the cumulative impact on the overall 




PARAGUAY: A M O U N T OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
(Millions of dollars) 
External debt contracted 
Public sector 
Private sector 







Net foreign assets 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Net external debt 
Public sector 
Private sector 
Gross external debt service 
Amortization payments 
Interest 






























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
" Preliminary figures. Medium- and long-term public and State-guaranteed private debt; end-year balance. 'The 
amount of the State-guaranteed private external debt was revised in 1986; consequently the figures for that year may not, 
strictly speaking, be comparable with those of previous years. Net external assets of the Central Bank and of the 
National Development Bank. 'Adjusted by delinquent payments. External assets less short-term external 
liabilities of private commercial banks. 'Interest and amortization payments made, less interest recived. 
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Table 26 
PARAGUAY: INDEXES AND RATIOS OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
Disbursed gross external 
debt4 
At current prices 
Deflacted by export prices 
Deflacted by import 
prices 
Disbursed net external 
debtc 
At current prices 
Deflacted by export prices 
















62.8 100.0 107.4 132.9 171.0 213.4 205.9 
Disbursed gross external 
debt4 
At weighted average 




172.7 100.0 148.9 584.1 1 169-3 1 528.4 1 797.7 1 938.6 
539.5 100.0 119.9 504.9 1073-0 1271.3 1767.6 1830.5 
613.0 100.0 127.7 488.6 1 031.1 1 698.2 1 797.7 1 980.2 
official exchange rate 
At parallel exchange rate* 
Disbursed net external debt 
At weighted average 
official exchange rate 
At parallel exchange ratee 








































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. ''Medium- and long-term public and State-guaranteed private debt; balance at end of each 
year. 'Gross disbursed external debt, less holdings of external assets (see table 25). Calculated by the Central 





PARAGUAY: DOMESTIC PRICES 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 





Wholesale price index 
Agricultural 
Index of implicit prices of the 



































































10.0 19.8 16.8 16.1 5.2 
Variation from December to December 









































































Source: Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Base year; 1980. fcBase year: 1972. 'At market prices. Base year: 1982. 
Table 28 
PARAGUAY: SHORT-TERM TRENDS IN SELECTED MONETARY 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Of the Central Bank. 4The composition of the monetary base differs slightly from that shown in table 34. 






Wages of manual 




Electricity, gas and water 


















Electricity, gas and 
water 











































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. Department of Economic Studies; Ministry of 
Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Marketing and Economics; and Ministry of Justice and Labour, Department 
of Human Resources. 
"Average of months of June and December. The nominal values were deflated by the consumer price index. 
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Table 30 
PARAGUAY: SUMMARY OF PUBLIC-SECTOR FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 
Current income 
Current expenditure 




Transfers to the public sector 
Net loans 
Global balance 
Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
Current income 







Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
Current income 








Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
Current income 







Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
1983 





















































































































































































































































































































Table 30 (concluded) 
PARAGUAY 
Current income 








Net domestic financing 








Net domestic financing 
Central Bank 
Other 





Adjusted global balance 
























































































































































































































Source: Paraguay, Ministry of Finance, Technical Secreatriat and Budget Office, Central Bank of Paraguay and International 
Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. As from 1982, includes operations of PETROPAR, the new state enterprise responsable for 
importing, 
subsidies. 
refining and distributing petroleum products. 
'Net domestic financing plus exchange subsidies. 
See table 33. Global balance plus exchange 
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Table 31 




On personal income 
On corporate earnings 
On assets 
Indirect taxes 
On external trade 
Imports 
Exports 
On exchange transactions 






Wages and salaries 
Goods and non-personal services 
Interest payments 
Transfers 
To the private sector 






Purchase of assets 
Transfers 









Rest of banking system 
Other'' 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Paraguay, Ministry of Finance, Technical Secretariat and Budget Office and the Internationa] Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes supplier credits, issue and amortization of bonds and amortization of commitments 




PARAGUAY: SUMMARY OF PUBLIC-SECTOR FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
(Percentage of gross domestic product)" 
Current income 
Current expenditure 




Transfers to the public sector 
Net loans 
Global balance 
Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
Current income 







Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
Current income 








Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
Current income 







Net domestic financing 
Net external financing 
government 





















































































































































































































































































Table 32 (concluded) 
Current income 










Net domestic financing 








Net domestic financing 
Central Bank 
Other 





























































































































































Ajusted global balance1 





















Source: IMF and Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Current market prices. As from 1982, includes the operations of PETROPAR, the new State enterprise responsible for 
importing, refining and distributing petroleum products. 'Includes only those exchange subsidies specified in the 
Central Bank's monetary programme which reflect the difference between the exchange rate paid by the Central Bank on 
purchases of foreign currency and the rate at which it sells it to the public sector for servicing its external debt. Includes 




PARAGUAY: PUBLIC-SECTOR SUBSIDIES" 
Exchange subsidy 
1. For servicing the 
external public debt 
2. For imports by government 
institution' 
3. Total ( 1 + 2 ) 
Credit subsidy 
4. In respect of the rate 
of interest of the 
minimum portfolio 
5. In respect of the rate of 
inflation' 
Total subsidy 
( 3 + 4 ) 
(3 + 5) 









































































Source: On the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Provisional figures subject to revision. Equal to the difference between the average exchange rate paid by the Central 
Bank on purchases of foreign currency and the exchange rate at which it sells it to the public sector for servicing of its external 
debt. 'Equal to the difference between the average exchange rate paid by the Central Bank on purchases of foreign 
currency and the average exchange rate at which it sells it to the public sector for its imports. Equal to the difference 
between the interest rate paid by the non-financial public sector on net Central Bank credit and that paid by the non-financial 
private sector on credit having a term of less than 240 days under the Minimum Portfolio System. 'Equal to the 





























GUAY: : RATE S CHARGED FOR SELECTED BASIC SERVICES 
PROVIDED BY PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 








































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay 
"National Electricity Administration (ANDE). ' 
Telecommunications Administration (ANTELCO) 
Sanitary Works Corporation (CORPOSANA). c National 
Nominal index deflated by the index of consumer prices. 
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Table 35 
PARAGUAY: PUBLIC DEBT 
PARAGUAY 
Gross debt 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Domestic 
External 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Asset holdings 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Domestic 
External 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Net debt 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Domestic 
External 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
1976 1980 1981 1982 































Indexes of real va 
Gross debt 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Domestic 
External 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
As a 
Gross debt 
At average official exchange rate 
At market exchange rate 
Net debt 
At average official exchange rate 









































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"The nominal figures were deflated by the index of consumer prices. At market prices. 
591 
Table 36 
PARAGUAY: PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
AND IMPLICIT WAGES 
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 






Financial public sector 
Public sector 















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Technical Planning Secretariat. 
"Does not include the Ministry of Defence. Implicit nominal wages were calculated on the basis of the wage bill and of 




PARAGUAY: EXECUTION OF THE MONETARY PROGRAMME 
Monetary base 
Sources 









Net domestic assets 
Exchange adjustment' 
Net domestic credit 




Autonomous institutions and 
State enterprises* 
Banking sector 
National Development Bank 
Private commercial banks 
Other net domestic assets 
Uses 
Currency in circulation 




































































































































































































































































Source: On the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
"Valued at the exchange rate of 126 guaraníes to the dollar (see notes *and c below). ''Until June 1984 the Central Bank 
applied an exchange rate of 126 guaraníes to the dollar to its foreign assets and liabilities apart from its net IMF position; 
from July 1984 to November 1986, it applied a rate of 160 guaraníes to the dollar, and since December 1986, a rate of 320 
guaraníes to the dollar. The difference between the rate of 126 guaraníes to the dollar and the new rates reflects theeffect of 
the variation in the exchange rate on the value of the external assets and liabilities concerned. 
'Until July 1985 the Central Bank applied an exchange rate of 126 guaraníes to the dollar to its net IMF position; from August 
1985 to November 1986, it applied a rate of 160 guaraníes to the dollar and from December 1986, a rate of 320 guaraníes to 
the dollar. Changed from a negative to a positive value. 'Represents the difference between the exchange rate 
paid by the Central Bank on purchases of foreign currency and the rate at which it sells it to the public 
sector. •'Estimates. * Includes the Livestock Fund. 
the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
Excluding cash in banks. ' Definition laid down by 
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Table 38 
PARAGUAY: MONETARY COEFFICIENTS 
(At the end of each period) 
Cash outside banks/ 
demand deposits 







M J Monetary base 
M2/Monetary base 
Velocity of circulation 
GDP/M, 
GDP/M2 

















































Source: Based on figures provided by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
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Table 39 







Special development fund 
To the public sector 
Central government 
National Development Banks' 
Other public bodies 





Special development fund 
Commercial portfolio 




Saving (demand deposits) 
Fixed-term deposits 





Nominal rates" Real rates 
1984 1985 1986 1984 1985 1986 
























































12 18 12 18 12 18 14 18 




















































































































































Source: Central Bank of Paraguay and the International Monetary Fund. 
"Includes "commissions" and "premiums", as applicable. Does not include any other charge or payment. As fromthesecondhalfof 1983, theCentral Bank has fixed all the interest rates, 









PARAGUAY: INDICATORS OF COMMERCIAL BANK PORTFOLIOS" 
Total portfolio 
Portfolio of overdue debts 
Capital and reserves 
Contingency funds 
Overdue debts/total portfolio 
Overdue debts/capital and 
reserves 
Capital and reserves/total 
portfolio 
Contingency funds /overdue debts 
End-of-year balances, in 
billions of guaraníes 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
120.3 130.0 155.5 170.1 
18.0 26.2 26.4 25.5 
36.1 38.7 36.4 38.1 




























15.0 20.1 16.9 15.0 11.0 
50.0 67.6 72.4 66.9 57.9 
30.0 29.8 23.4 22.4 19-0 
17.6 16.8 21.4 22.3 24.9 
Source: Superintendent of Banks. 




PARAGUAY: CREDIT PROGRAMME; SECTORAL ALLOCATION 































































































































































































































































































Source: On the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Paraguay. 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
During 1986 Peru made substantial progress towards the principal objectives laid out in the July 1985 
Emergency Economic Programme. Nevertheless, this progress was achieved at a certain cost. The 
heterodox economic policy implemented by the government did indeed reduce some imbalances 
—the excess of idle installed capacity, high unemployment, inflation, depressed real wages, the 
large-scale dollarization of the economy, and the heavy burden represented by the service on the 
external debt— but this was done at the expense of exacerbating the imbalances in other spheres of 
the economy. 
Economic activity made a brisk recovery, inasmuch as the gross domestic product increased by 
8.1%, the highest figure since 1974 (see figure 1). All sectors contributed to this expansion except 
mining. The special attention given to agriculture in the form of the widespread use of support prices 
and special credits led to an improvement in the terms of trade between rural and urban areas and to 
an historically high growth rate (4.5%) in this sector. The strong growth of the economy and the 
special programmes for absorbing labour which were sponsored by the government contributed to a 
decrease in non-agricultural unemployment from almost 12% in 1985 to a little more than 8% in 
1986 for the country as a whole and from 10% to 5.4% in Metropolitan Lima. 
Along with the economic recovery, the inflation rate was reduced to half (78%) its former level, 
falling to less than three digits fro the first time in four years (see table 1). In mid-1985, the 
government had diagnosed the inflation problem as being a cost-push spiral that was fostered by the 
oligopolistic structure of the industrial market, inasmuch as this made it possible for business 
enterprises to pass on cost increases to prices. Accordingly, during 1986 the government's stabiliza-
tion policy stressed the control of costs and inflationary expectations. Since the existence of a large 
amount of idle capacity was one of the factors putting pressure on costs, the authorities felt that the 
economic recovery would itself help to reduce inflation. The other main component of the stabiliza-
tion policy was the freezing —and even the lowering— of key prices on the basis of administrative 
decisions. The most notable exception to this policy were wages, which were allowed to increase by 
20% in real terms in order to stimulate domestic demand and growth. 
Although administrative controls were successful in holding down the upward trend in prices, 
they did have a number of side-effects. The maintenance of controls over a wide range of goods caused 
some supply shortages towards the end of the year and prompted some producers to market a portion 
of their output in the informal sector, where prices could not be effectively controlled. In addition, 
administrative measures brought down domestic interest rates —which were considered to be one of 
the principal cost-push factors, and to be of greater importance in this respect than as a spur to 
saving— to even more markedly negative levels than those existing when the economic programme 
began to be applied. 
The exchange rate was maintained throughout the year at the level established in August 1985. 
The setting of this rate was one of the main factors that helped to control inflation, given the relative 
openness of the Peruvian economy. The freezing of the exchange rate and the establishment of legal 
limits on withdrawals of national deposits expressed in dollars increased, the appeal of securities 
denominated in the local currency and contributed to a striking change in liquid holdings. Thus, by the 
end of 1986 only 12% of the sum of money plus quasi-money was in foreign currency, compared to 
50% two years earlier. 
The policy of maintaining the inti-dollar parity constant caused the effective exchange rate to 
diminish by more than 20% in real terms, and its year-end level was thus one of the lowest of the 
decade. To soften the effects of this phenomenon, a higher exchange rate, which had originally been 
used only for financial transactions, was applied to an increasing percentage of exports and imports of 
goods and services. 
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The country's external accounts deteriorated markedly as a consequence of the unfavourable 
trend in the international economy and of the repercussions of the emergency economic programme. 
The value of merchandise exports, which had already decreased in 1985, was reduced by a further 
15%. Two-thirds of this decrease was due to a drop in the international prices for Peru's export 
products, especially petroleum. Nevertheless, the volume of exports also declined (-4%) as a result, to 
some extent, of an unattractive exchange rate which caused mining companies to experience financial 
difficulties and which prompted the diversion of non-traditional exports to the domestic market. The 
drop in export earnings aggravated the protracted crisis in the external sector, whose persistence was 
reflected in the fact that the volume of exports in per capita terms was 30% less in 1986 than it had 
been in 1970. On the other hand, the considerable expansion of domestic demand (17%) and the fall 
in the real exchange rate led to a 45% increase in the volume of merchandise imports, whose value, 
however, rose by somewhat less (35 %) due to the drop in their unit price. Because of this and of the 
increase in the deficit on the services account, the trade balance went from an average surplus of 
almost US$900 million per year in the period 1984-1985 to a deficit of somewhat more than US$300 
million in 1986. 
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The negative trade balance caused the deficit on current account, which had been only US$70 
million in 1985, to rise to more than US$1 billion. This heightened, in turn, the vulnerability of the 
economic programme, since the increased size of the deficit on current account meant that it could no 
longer be financed solely by virtue of the official limitations imposed in July 1985 on the servicing of 
the debt. Hence, even though use was made of the existing flows of external capital —whose scarcity 
has been further aggravated by the national policy of unilaterally restricting service payments on the 
debt— and despite the accumulating of arrears, the available financing was still insufficient, and it 
was therefore necessary to draw upon international reserves. Indeed, net international reserves were 
drawn down by one-third, with the result that by the end of the year they had fallen to US$950 
million, an amount equivalent to three months of imports. The decrease is less marked, however, if it 
is measured in terms of gross international assets, which went down by only 14% to US$2.1 billion, 
which was equivalent to seven months of imports. This figure may be a more suitable measurement 
of the coverage of imports, since, in order to offset the effects of its negative net loans, the country 
began to accumulate considerable arrears with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The failure to 
meet the service on these commitments, which are traditionally debited from gross reserves in order 
to arrive at the figure for net reserves, produced a corresponding increase in the available amount of 
foreign exchange. Nevertheless, the delay in making these payments created certain difficulties, 
inasmuch as in August the International Monetary Fund declared Peru ineligible for new loans. The 
continuation of the policy adopted in July 1985 of not participating in the Fund's standby credit 
programmes mitigated the practical effects of this declaration. 
The public sector's performance also suffered setbacks, to such a point that the global deficit 
doubled to 6 % of the product (see table 1 ). The lower international prices that were paid for minerals 
and hydrocarbons produced by State enterprises partly accounted for this deterioration. The sector's 
financial position also, however, reflected the effects of fiscal policies intended to control inflation, as 
well as to reactivate the economy, primarily by relying on private enterprise. For example, the prices 
of many goods and services produced and marketed by public enterprises were frozen or reduced. 
Central government accounts were also affected by rate and tax reductions and an increase in 
subsidies. Restrictions on spending helped to curb the increase in the public deficit, but had a 
disproportionately large effect on public investment, and may therefore be detrimental to economic 
growth in the medium term unless the private sector substantially increases its capital formation. The 
public sector deficit was financed internally in large part, principally through issues of notes and coins 
and delays in servicing the external debt. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Overall supply and demand 
The total supply of goods and services increased by 12%, but, because of the drastic drop seen in 
supply in 1983 and its virtual stagnation during the following two years, it barely regained its 1982 
level. 
The sharp increases in the gross domestic product (8%) and in the volume of imports of goods 
and services contributed to the expansion of supply. The volume of imports climbed by 41%, after 
having fallen steeply during the preceding three years (see table 2). 
The growth of the product was exclusively due to the increase in domestic spending (17%), 
since the volume of exports went down by 6%. This was a reversal of the situation which had existed 
during the preceding two years, when external demand had been the factor which had given a boost 
although a very modest one, to economic activity. 
Consumption increased strikingly (14%) and per capita consumption thus grew forthe second 
consecutive year, after having declined in the three-year period 1982-1984. The expansion of 
consumption was due primarily to greater private spending, whose growth rate almost trebled that of 
the public sector. The strong upturn in domestic capital formation (28%), after four years of steady 
decreases, was, for its part, due exclusively to greater private investment, since public sector 
investment continued its downward trend begun in 1983. Even so, total investment was over 30% 
less than at the beginning of the decade. 
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b) The main sectors 
Activity expanded in all sectors of the economy except mining. Growth was especially pro-
nounced in construction, manufacturing and commerce as a result of the impact of greater domestic 
spending and the utilization of the considerable idle capacity existing in these sectors (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. In spite of problems caused by poor weather conditions in the first half of the 
year, the sector grew at a satisfactory rate (4.5%), thanks to a firm support policy and a marked 
increase in the purchasing power of the population. 
The authorities' economic policy gave priority to agriculture with a view to expanding the 
domestic food supply and raising peasants' incomes. The crux of the agricultural policy was the 
setting of guaranteed prices for a range of products in order to encourage their production, thereby 
achieving a clear turnaround in the terms of trade between rural and urban areas which favoured the 
former (see table 4). At the same time, credit was channelled to the sector at preferential interest 
rates, and the Agrarian Bank increased its lending to the private sector by 53% in real terms. Lastly, 
tariffs on agricultural imports were reduced. 
As a result, production of the main crops noticeably increased, especially of soya, sorghum, and 
hard maize. The exceptions were rice and sugar cane, which suffered the effects of a drought in the 
north of the country. In the case of potatoes, the growth of production was hindered because less of 
this crop had been sown in 1985 due to adverse weather conditions (see table 5). 
In the livestock subsector, vigorous growth in the output of poultry and eggs (14% and 22%) 
was once again recorded. Factors contributing to this included the short period of time required for 
investments in poultry-raising activities to mature, the increase in the real income of the population, 
and the decrease in the relative price of poultry meat on the domestic market. In contrast, beef and 
mutton production continued to suffer the effects of the 1983 drought, as a result of which stocks were 
substantially reduced. 
The fishing subsector continued to expand notably (27%), with its output more than doubling 
that of 1983 (see table 6). This was due to the existence of fewer labour strikes and to the 
normalization of sea temperature, which permitted the anchoveta catch to reach its highest level in 
recent years. However, due to the termination of contracts with the Soviet Union for fishing in 
Peruvian waters, the production of frozen fish dropped sharply. 
ii) Mining. Following a cumulative increase of 10% during the preceding two years, the 
aggregate value of the mining sector fell by 4% in 1986. The production of copper —which 
represents 50% of the total value of the metal subsector— went down as a consequence of labour 
conflicts, financial problems resulting from the low quotations for copper on international markets, 
and an unfavourable exchange rate. Similar financial difficulties led to a reduction in activity in most 
of the other components of the metals subsector as well (see table 7). The fall of 6% in hydrocarbon 
production, for its part, was a reflection of the progressive depletion of reserves in the various fields. 
The administrative problems experienced by a major company that had been nationalized the 
previous year were also a factor. 
iii) Manufacturing. Manufacturing production soared by 17 % (the highest figure recorded since 
the 1970s), thus showing a full recovery from its drastic fall of 1983 (see table 8). 
Almost all branches of manufacturing grew briskly, and the expansion was exceptionally strong 
in the production of machinery, non-metallic minerals and fish meal. Some branches, such as the 
food, beverages, textiles, industrial chemicals, petroleum refining and plastics industries, used almost 
all of their installed capacity. Others —for example, footwear— were restricted by input shortages. 
The production of non-ferrous metals —the only branch of manufacturing whose level of activity 
decreased— was hurt by problems in the mining sector. 
iv) Construction. After suffering severe setbacks between 1983 and 1985, in 1986 construction 
became the most dynamic sector of the economy, growing by 24%. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, 
the sector's product was barely higher than it had been in 1980 (see table 9). The notable dynamismof 
this activity was essentially due to greater private spending, since the number of private construction 
permits for Metropolitan Lima climbed by 134%, while those corresponding to the public sector rose 
by only 44%. 
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c) Employment 
Employment increased appreciably, and non-agricultural unemployment therefore fell to 8% 
nationwide to 5% in Metropolitan Lima, the lowest level in the 1980s (see table 10). 
The growth of employment in Metropolitan Lima was led by manufacturing. Employment in 
this sector —which was boosted by the hiring of manpower in the textile, chemical and machinery 
industries— jumped by 10% between the last quarter of 1985 and the same period of 1986. 
Employment in commerce also grew considerably (6%). Even so, at the end of 1986 employment in 
both manufacturing and commerce was still lower than it had been at the beginning of the decade. 
Also, as in 1985, almost 43% of the work force was underemployed. 
The improvement in the employment situation was mainly caused by the vigorous expansion of 
the economy and the introduction of multiple shifts in manufacturing. In addition, the Emergency 
Employment Programme, which was launched in July, permitted entrepreneurs to contract tempor-
ary personnel, for terms of up to two years. During 1986,21 000 contracts were signed in Lima under 
this provision. Employment was also boosted by the Temporary Income Support Programme (PAIT) a 
special public employment plan introduced during the second half of the previous year. By the end of 
1986,155 000 persons (83 000 in Lima and 72 000 in the rest of the country) had signed up with PAIT, 
the overwhelming majority of them being women (80%). 
Despite the increase in wages, labour conflicts were more frequent in 1986. After having 
decreased by 11 % the year before, the number of man/ hours lost due to such conflicts went up by 
almost 40% in 1986. The most seriously affected sectors were mining and manufacturing (see 
table 11). 
3. The external sector 
a) External trade 
i) Merchandise exports. After having dropped by 6% in 1985, the value of exports fell by a 
further 15% as a result of decreases in both their volume and their unit value. Export earnings were 
therefore 36% lower than in 1980 (see tables 12 and 13). 
The only exports which did not decrease were fish meal, coffee and chemicals (see table 14). 
External sales of petroleum —which in recent years had represented one-fifth of the total value of 
exports— declined particularly sharply (-63%), signifying a loss of over US$400 million. 
External as well as domestic factors contributed to this downward trend. Low quotations for 
primary products on the international market were the most important external factor in this 
connection. In particular, the prices of most mining products —which represent 40% of total export 
value— continued to follow the downward trend of previous years. The price of copper, Peru's most 
important metal export, was 40% less than in 1980. Petroleum quotations also plunged (-55%). On 
the other hand, the price of fish meal partially recovered, and the international price for coffee rose 
steeply (see table 15). 
The volume of exports was 4% less than in 1985, partly as a result of constraints as regards the 
supply available for export. As indicated earlier, the production of large-scale mining enterprises was 
limited by labour stoppages and financial problems, while the supply of petroleum for export 
diminished as a result of the depletion of reserves. External sales of cotton and sugar were limited by 
adverse weather conditions and their substitution by other crops whose domestic prices were more 
attractive. Finally, non-traditional exports went down because of a reduction in the exchange rate and 
a sharp rise in the domestic demand for some products. Other negative factors included the growing 
protectionism in industrialized countries and the drop in sales of merchandise to socialist countries 
under agreements providing for the payment of the external debt in kind. 
ii) Merchandise imports. In marked contrast to the trend in exports, imports showed a strong 
expansion (35%) after four years of steady decline. This upturn was due to a significant increase in 
the volume of such purchases (45%), since their unit value fell by 7%. Nevertheless, their volume 
was only 4% more than in 1980 (see table 13). 
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The growth of imports was basically due to the trend in foreign purchasing by the private 
sector. The substantial increase (56%) in private-sector imports was primarily a reflection of the 
considerable reactivation of private spending, which was complemented by the effect of the deterio-
ration of the real exchange rate. However, the tendency of importers to over-invoice —in order to 
evade government controls on the movement of foreign exchange— was also a factor, as was the fact 
that many businesses tended to augment their inventories of imported goods. 
Public-sector imports rose less steeply (15%). The increase was mainly due to the larger food 
purchases that were made in order to cover shortages of various products on the domestic market, 
which were in turn, the result of poor weather conditions early in the year, as well as of the recovery of 
effective mass consumer demand. On the other hand, public-sector imports of capital goods fell for 
the fourth consecutive year due to cutbacks in the public investment programme. Defence-related 
imports also declined (see table 16). 
iii) The terms of trade for goods and the purchasing power of exports. As in the preceding two 
years, the unit values of both exports and imports went down in 1986. However, the rate of decline of 
the former was considerably greater and thus gave rise to a further deterioration in the terms of trade 
for goods (-6%). The corresponding index was therefore almost one-fifth lower than in 1980. 
Because of this and of the decrease in export volumes the purchasing power of exports dropped 
sharply to its lowest level thus far in the 1980s (see table 13). 
iv) Exchange policy. The policy of maintaining a fixed exchange rate, which was established in 
August 1985 as part of the anti-inflationary programme, was continued in 1986. Thus, the basic 
exchange rate —that of the so-called Unified Exchange Market (MUC)— fell substantially in real 
terms as a result of the considerable difference between domestic and external inflation. In fact, in the 
last quarter of 1986 the effective real exchange rate was more than one-third lower than in the third 
quarter of 1985 —the highest of the decade— and 26% lower than in 1980 (see table 17). 
In response to this deterioration, and with a view to improving the situation of the external 
sector without endangering the stabilization programme, the government decided to broaden the 
scheme that had been adopted in the second half of 1985. In practice, this meant establishing a system 
of multiple exchange rates. Under this plan, it became possible to liquidate a portion of the earnings 
from exports —the percentage varied according to the type of transaction— at a higher exchange rate 
than that prevailing in the MUC. In the beginning, this higher rate was applied only to financial 
transactions. 
Towards the end of July exporters received a fixed percentage of the value of their exports in the 
form of what were called "Freely Negotiable Certificates", which could be sold on the foreign 
exchange market. These securities were later replaced by Foreign Currency Certificates, which were 
convertible at the exchange rate prevailing on the government-regulated Controlled Financial 
Market (MFI). Access to the financial market exchange rate, which was determined as a percentage of 
export earnings was differentiated according to product category. The different access levels were 
increased five times during the year, bringing the overall scale up from a range of 0%-30% injanuary 
to one of 35%-120% by December. 
This system for converting export earnings into the local currency produced a relatively 
complex system of multiple exchange rates (see table 18). Preferential access to foreign-currency 
certificates was given for non-traditional exports and the earnings from such exports were therefore 
liquidated at a higher nominal exchange rate. The access percentage was readjusted in December 
1986 from 50% to 120% for "priority" exports, and to 110% for "non-priority" exports. Hence by 
the end of the year, the average exchange rate for non-traditional products was almost the same as the 
conversion rate on the Controlled Financial Market (MFI). 
On the other hand, traditional exports received a much less favourable exchange rate. The 
lowest rate for exports in this category corresponded to external sales of hydrocarbons; it was not 
until the last quarter of the year that authorization was given for the conversion of 10% of such 
earnings at the financial-market exchange rate, and consequently, during almost the whole of the year 
petroleum exports were subject to the MUC exchange rate. Small- and medium-scale mining benefit-
ted from an effective exchange rate somewhat higher than that granted to the rest of traditional 
exports. 
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In their turn, the bulk of imports were progressively transferred from the MUC to the MFI. Thus, 
by the end of the year less than 30% of all external purchases —mostly imports of food and essential 
medicines or their inputs— were subject to the basic fixed exchange rate. 
Lastly, national and foreign tourist expenditures were converted on the free exchange market at 
an even higher rate than that of the MFI. 
The selective and partial application of the MFI to exports and imports increased the effective 
exchange rate for most external transactions. In all, the maximum increase registered by the 
conversion rate between the last quarter of 1985 and the same period of 1986 was 19% for exports 
(high priority, non-traditional) and 26% for imports (products transferred from the MUC to the MFI). 
Therefore, the multiple conversion rate system only mitigated the loss of international competitive-
ness caused by the maintenance of the exchange rate in the MUC. 
b) Current account balance and capital movements 
Because of the marked decrease in exports and, above all, the strong increase in imports, the 
merchandise trade balance underwent a sharp turnaround as the large surplus of more than US$1 
billion recorded in 1984 and 1985 was replaced by a small deficit in 1986. At the same time, the trade 
deficit in real services doubled, passing the US$300 million mark. This was largely due to the large 
volume of imports and to the negative balance shown by the travel account for the first time in 10 
years. Hence, the trade account showed a deficit of US$320 million, which was a marked deterioration 
in relation to the average annual surplus of US$870 million of the preceding two-year period. 
In contrast, net factor payments diminished by 19%, basically as a result of the decrease in 
international interest rates. Nevertheless, the drop in remittances only partially offset the marked 
deterioration in the trade balance. Thus, the current account went from a small deficit (US$73 
million) in 1985 to one of over US$1.1 billion in 1986. 
Only 60% of the deficit on current account was financed by net capital receipts, most of which, 
moreover, were derived from arrears in the servicing of the external debt.1 Thus total deficit in the 
balance of payments thus amounted to US$450 million. Consequently, net international reserves fell 
by 33% between the fourth quarter of 1985 and the same period of 1986. At the end of 1986, net 
foreign exchange holdings were equivalent to 26% of the country's imports of goods and services, 
compared to 52% one year earlier (see table 19); 
c) The external debt 
In 1986 the government expanded upon its policy of unilaterally limiting the servicing of the 
external debt, which, by the end of the year, had reached almost US$ 14.5 billion (see table 20). In late 
July the authorities decided to extend for 12 more months the restriction introduced in mid-1985 
whereby the servicing of the medium- and long-term public debt contracted prior to July 1985 was 
limited to 10% of the value of exports. Also, with a view to holding down the deficit in the balance of 
payments and protecting the supply of foreign exchange, the servicing of the medium- and long-term 
private debt was suspended for a period of two years, as were remittances of profits and dividends on 
direct foreign investment, as well as royalties and other such payments. No limits were placed, 
however, on the servicing of the short-term debt or the payment of debts in kind. 
Service payments on the total debt were about US$730 million, of which around US$230 
million corresponded to amortization payments, US$265 million to interest payments and nearly 
US$240 million to the payment of arrears (see table 21). These remittances were equivalent to 22% 
of the value of exports, as compared to 28% in 1985 and 32% in 1984. Excluding payments made on 
the debt in kind, the public sector paid out almost US$260 million in interest and amortization, which 
was equivalent to 8% of exports. If the payment of arrears is taken into account, then total 
public-sector payments bordered on US$500 million, which was equivalent to 15% of the value of 
external sales. This last coefficient was slightly less than that recorded for the preceding two-year 
period and was much less than those corresponding to the three-year period 1980-1984 (see table 21). 
1
 These arrears account for most of the official sector's large net short-term capital inflows during the period 1984-1986 
which are shown in table 12. 
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The actual amount paid out to service the external debt in 1986 was only one-third of what had 
been programmed. The arrears corresponded almost entirely to the public sector and amounted to 
US$1.9 billion, which was 11% more than in 1984 and 1985. Accumulated arrears since 1984 —part 
of which originated during the previous government— thus reached almost US$5 billion, of which 
more than US$1.5 billion corresponded to interest. 
Because of the tradition of solidarity among the country's creditors, these arrears in debt 
payments resulted in a general reduction in Peru's access to fresh credit. Private banks, whose loans 
represent 30% of the medium- and long-term public debt were the creditors most severely affected by 
the policy of restricting payments. No medium-term loan agreements with private banks were 
reached by the public sector for the third consecutive year. Medium-term loans from other creditors 
steadily diminished, representing only one-fifth of the credit contracted in 1983. In contrast, 
shor-term credit arrangements increased by almost 20%, following several years of declines (see 
table 22). 
The arrears in the servicing of the debt also caused problems with the International Monetary 
Fund. Indeed, the IMF demanded payment of US$190 million in arrears before 15 August. Neverthe-
less, the Peruvian authorities decided to pay only US$35 million. The Fund responded by declaring 
Peru ineligible for new loans. By the end of 1986, the accumulated arrears with the International 
Monetary Fund had reached about US$250 million. 
Finally, external debt payments in kind decreased to US$110 million, a reduction of 30% from 
1985. This decline was partly due to the termination of payment agreements with the socialist 
countries. 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
The rate of inflation noticeably diminished in 1986. The average annual variation in the 
consumer price index in Metropolitan Lima was 78%, half the rate of the year before. The 
December-to-December variation (63%) was also considerably lower. Wholesale price rises slowed 
down even more: the average increase was 60% (compared with 174% the year before), while the 
December-to-December variation decreased from 166% to 37% (see table 23). 
However, in the last quarter of 1986 a reversal was seen in the declining trend exhibited by the 
inflation rate since October 1985. Indeed, starting in October 1986 an upturn was observed, although 
only a moderate one, in the 12-month variation in the consumer price index (see figure 2). 
The slowdown of the inflationary process was due to the stabilization programme which was 
launched in July 1985 and contained throughout 1986. From the very beginning, an effort was made to 
curb expectations by means of a fixed exchange rate, price controls on a wide range of products, and a 
programmed reduction of domestic interest rates. These measures were supplemented in February 
1986 with a reduction of the sales tax and of the prices of fuel, electrical power and inputs for 
agricultural products. The anti-inflationary programme was also bolstered by a drop of 7% in the 
average price of imported goods. 
In spite of this complex package of measures, prices continued to rise at a considerable rate as a 
result of various factors. Firstly, the maintenance of an adaptive monetary policy and the improve-
ment in the real incomes of the population prompted a strong increase in domestic demand, 
especially for essential goods and services. The resulting pressure was reflected the most clearly by the 
prices of uncontrolled agricultural goods and by those of services, which are generally difficult to 
regulate. 
Secondly, the transfer of selected imported goods from the MUC to the MF1 contributed to an 
increase in the cost of inputs. The authorities tried to offset this by reducing the prices of some of the 
goods and services provided by State enterprises. However, they were obliged to adjust the prices of 
some products in order to avoid supply shortages. In addition, the price control system suffered from 
some administrative difficulties which resulted in "unauthorized" increases in the prices of some 
goods and services. Lastly, growing expectations of a devaluation throughout the year also put upward 
pressure on prices. 
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b) Wages 
After several years of steady declines, a notable and widespread increase in real wages was 
observed. The government's wage policy was decidedly expansionary, and was directed towards the 
dual goals of reactivating the economy and improving income distribution. Hence, the periodic wage 
readjustments which were decreed for public-sector and non-unionized private-sector workers more 
than compensated for the effects of inflation. These official wage increases, together with the strong 
reactivation of domestic demand, influenced private-sector collective labour negotiations, which also 
resulted in considerable increases in remunerations. 
Figure 2 
PERU: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
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Thus, real wages and salaries in the non-unionized private sector increased substantially (by 
21 % and 27%, respectively), after three consecutive years of decreases (see table 24). Real remunera-
tions in the public sector grew for the first time in the last six years, although more moderately (7%). 
In all, average real salaries were only 7% higher than in 1979, while real wages and remunerations of 
public employees were 14% and 38% lower than they were in that year. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The nominal growth rate of monetary aggregates diminished noticeably. However, the mone-
tary base grew by 4% in real terms, while money and quasi-money in the national currency increased 
even more sharply (29% and 27%, respectively). In contrast, quasi-money in foreign currency 
continued to contract, in line with a trend which began in mid-1985 (see table 25). 
In the first six months of the year the money supply maintained the high growth rate it had 
exhibited since the year before; the external sector's exchange surplus and the conversion of local 
deposits denominated in foreign currency to deposits in national currency contributed to this trend. 
The conversion of deposits, which was a result of the "de-dollarization" policy, was encouraged by the 
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate and of nominal interest rates of around 30%, which made 
deposits expressed in intis relatively more profitable. The "dollarization" coefficient thus went down 
to only 12%, after having been almost 50% in 1984. 
During the second half of the year the external sector showed a deficit, and thus became a 
contractionary factor. At the same time, the impact of the "de-dollarization" process began to ebb. ' 
The growth rate of the money supply therefore slowed down noticeably during the second part of the 
year. Nevertheless, the monetary base and money continued to grow, thanks to the government 
support provided to the Agrarian Bank and to the expansionary impact of the financing of the fiscal 
deficit in the last quarter. 
The authorities that took office in July 1985 felt that the high nominal interest rates on loans 
that were prevalent at the time were a major inflationary factor. Therefore, in order to reduce the 
strong pressure that the high cost of credit was exerting on business costs and to dampen inflationary 
expectations, the nominal interest rate on loans was lowered from 213% to 45% between July and 
October 1985. In February 1986, another reduction was decreed, and this variable was thereafter 
frozen at a level of 40% until the end of the year. Thus, interest rates continued to be one of the main 
tools used by the anti-inflationary programme (see table 26). 
Interest rates on deposits followed a similar trend. The rate for short-term deposits (up to 180 
days) was reduced from 27% to 25.5% in February 1986 and was then frozen for the rest of the year. 
On the other hand, in order to encourage long-term saving, rates for less liquid deposits were raised. 
The nominal yield of deposits for 720 days or more therefore rose from 28% to 31 % in February, and 
to 34.5% in May. Nonetheless, rates on both deposits and loans continued to be highly negative in 
real terms. 
b) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy was decisively used to reactivate the economy. Nevertheless, the measures adopted 
caused a more marked decrease in income than in spending, and the public deficit therefore doubled in 
relation to the product, reaching 6% (see table 27). 
The increase in the revenue of the central government was substantially less than the rise in 
prices. The reduction of the taxes on hydrocarbons and, especially, the General Sales Tax (which was 
cut by half in February 1986) caused a drop in real terms in the revenues from taxes on production and 
consumption. Tax receipts from foreign trade also diminished in real terms due to lower tariffs and 
the impact of the fixed exchange rate, which eroded the tax base. The effect of these policies was only 
partially offset by a marked increase in income tax revenues. As a result, the tax burden declined from 
17% to 15%, one of the lowest coefficients of recent years. 
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Current spending decreased slightly in real terms, although the trends in its components varied 
considerably. Due to the expansionary nature of the policies on wages, employment and production 
subsidies, real expenditures on remunerations and transfers went up noticeably. A similar trend was 
seen in real expenditures for goods and services. In contrast, real outlays in the form of interest 
payments plummeted as a result of the decrease in national and international interest rates. In fact, as 
a consequence of the policy of reducing the cost of domestic credit, interest payments on the domestic 
public debt fell by 10% in absolute terms (see table 28). 
The considerable increase in real capital expenditure (24%) was principally due to the marked 
expansion in transfers to decentralized State bodies. Gross capital formation by the central govern-
ment, for its part, remained low and was equivalent to only 2.8% of the gross domestic product. On 
the other hand, the share of social pending on eduction, health, and housing climbed significantly. 
Under these circumstances, the central government's deficit grew from 2.6% to 4% of the 
gross domestic product; this was still lower, in any case, than the 5% level recorded in 1984. 
About one-third of the central government deficit was financed by means of arrears in interest 
payments on the external debt. The rest of the financing was obtained through lending operations 
with the Central Bank and the Banco de la Nación. 
State enterprises also operated at a large deficit. The low international quotations for minerals 
and petroleum, the fixed exchange rate and controls on public rates and charges led to a considerable 
drop in the real income of this sector. This was only partly offset by a programme designed to limit 
spending, which had a disproportionately heavy impact on the capital account. Indeed, gross capital 
formation was equivalent to just 2 % of the gross domestic product, compared with 4% in 1985 and an 
average of almost 6% between 1982 and 1984. 
Arrears in external debt payments were also the chief source of financing for the deficit of State 




PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
PERU 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Rate of unemployment c 
Consumer prices 
December-December 






Public-sector deficit/gross domestic 
product 
Current value of exports of 
goods and services 
Current value of imports of 
goods and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in international reserves 
Total external debt 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 



































































































































s of dollars 
-869 -743 
1 020 1 034 
-1 889 -1 776 






























9 595 9 606 11465 12 445 13 338 13 721 14 468 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. 
public sector. 
Percentages. cNon-agricultural sector. Consolidated accounts of the non-financial 
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Table 2 
PERU: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery 



































































































































































PERU: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 







Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis 
Indexes 









































































































































































PERU: RURAL-URBAN TERMS OF TRADE 
(Indexes: 1979 = 100) 
1. Prices of agricul-
tural products 
2. Prices of manu-
factured products 






























Source: Ministry of Agriculture and the National Statistical Institute. 
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Table 5 
PERU: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Indexes of agricult 













































































































































































































PERU: INDICATORS OF FISHERY PRODUCTION 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Index of fishery production 
(1977 = 100) 75.0 109.7 125.3 159.5 
Thousands of tons 
-29.7 46.3 14.2 27.3 
Deep-sea fishing 




For drying and salting 





For drying and salting 




































































































PERU: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Index of mining production 
(1979 = 100) 
Total 
Mining of metals 
Hydrocarbons 
























































































































Source: Ministry of Energy and Mines. 
"Preliminary figures. Kilograms. 
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Table 8 
PERU: INDEXES OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION" 
Total manufacturing production 
Fishmeal 




Texti les and clothing 
Textiles 
Leather and footwear 
Paper, pr int ing and publishing 







Non-metall ic mineral 
products 
Glass and glass products 
Non-metallic mineral 
items 
Basic metal products 
Iron and steel 
Non-ferrous metals 
Machinery and metal products 





























































































Source: Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism and Integration. 
























































































































































PERU: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product of 
construction 
(index: 1980 = 100) 
Sales of construction 
materials 
Index of volume (first 
quarter 1977 = 100) 
Sales of some construction 
materials 
Cement 
Steel rods for building 
Index of construction 
material prices 
(1982 = 100) 
Source: National statistical Institute. 


















































































Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
"Excluding domestic workers. Estimate. 'Preliminary figures. 
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Table 11 
PERU: TRENDS IN LABOUR DISPUTES" 
Total 
By economic activity: 




Transport, storage and 
communications 




Reinstatement of employees 
Economic and financial policy 




Rise in the cost of living 































































































































































Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
"All values are expressed in thousands. Preliminary figures. 'Of man/hours lost. 
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Table 12 
PERU: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
PERU 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 
































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official figures. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. 
assets and liabilities. 
'Includes net loans granted and other 
Is equal to the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 13 









Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 

















































































































Metal products and 
machinery 
Chemicals 
Iron and steel products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Other'' 




































































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. 'includes silver content. 'Includes mainly gold and minor metals. 




PERU: VALUE, VOLUME AND PRICES OF MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS" 




































































































































































































































Value 792 690 719 544 618 645 236 
Volume* 22.4 19.9 22,8 20.5 23.5 27.1 22.0 
Price' 352 34.6 31.6 26.6 26.3 23.9 10.7 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
° Values in millions of dollars; volumes in thousands of tons, unless otherwise indicated; prices as indicated. Preliminary 
figures. 'Dollars per ton. Thousands of quintals. 'Dollars per quintal. U.S. cents per 
pound. 'Millions of long tons. Dollars per long ton. 'Millions of troy ounces. ^Dollars per troy 
ounce. ^Millions of barrels. Dollars per barrel. 
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Table 16 


















Imports of the main 
food items' 
Wheat 























































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. 'Defence equipment non-monetary gold and other imports. 
intermediate goods, as appicable. Rice and sugar. 
'Includes under consumer or 
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Table 17 

































































































































Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of data from the International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics. 
Note: A: The domestic product sub-index of the wholesale price index was used. 
B: The consumer price index was used. 
"Corresponds to the average of the indexes of the real exchange rate for the inti vis-a-vis the currencies of Peru's main trading 
partners, weighted according to the relative size of exports or imports, as thecase may be, to or from these countries. Between 
1970 and 1980 these weightings correspond to the average for these same years; from 1980 onwards, they correspond to the 
average for the 1982-1985 period. In these calculations, wholesale price indexes were used whenever possible. For the 
methodology and sources used, see the statistical appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 
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Table 18 
PERU: EXCHANGE RATE, BY TYPE OF TRANSACTION 
(Intis per dollar; quarterly) 




Small- and medium-scale 
mining 
Low priority non-traditional 
exports 
High priority non-traditional 
exports 
Average exchange rate 
for imports 
Memorandum: 
Unified exchange market 
(MUC) 













































































Source: Central Reserve Bank. 
"December. 
Table 19 
PERU: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 


















































































































reserve as a 
percentage of 









Source: Central reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Gold held by banks, either in vault or in custody abroad, and the country's contribution in gold to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 'Special Drawing Rights. 'Demand and time deposits in foreign currency, in banks and with 
agents abroad, and other international assets, such as bonds in the World Bank, contribution to the Andean Reserve Fund and 
deposits in local banks. On average, the latter represented 5% of the amounts recorded in this column during 1982 and 
1983. Mainly liabilities with the International Monetary Fund, short-term liabilities with foreign banks, and balances 
with ALADI. 'Preliminary figures. 
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Table 20 
PERU: EXTERNAL DEBT 
PERU 
(Millions of dollars at end of period) 
Total external debt 
Medium long-term 
Public sectorc 
Central Reserve Bank 
Private sector 
Short-term 
Public and private enterprises 
Banking system 
Central Reserve Bank 
Banco de la Nación 
Other banks 
Medium long-term public external 
det, by financial source 
Total 



































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Up to 1982, includes adjustments for variations in the exchange rates of foreign currencies. 
cCentral government and public enterprises. Commercial and financial credits with or without the guarantee of the 
banking system. 
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Table 21 
PERU: EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICING" 
(Millions of dollars) 


























































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Includes debt payments in kind, which totaled US$160 million in 1985 and US$111 million in 1986. 'Preliminary 
figures. 'Interest and amortization on the total medium- and long-term debt plus interest on the total short-term debt. 
Also includes the regularization of overdue payments. Includes regularizations. 'Includes interest on the short-
term debt. ^Symbols: TD = total debt; X = exports of goods and services; TDS = total debt services; TDSP = total debt 
service paid; PDS = public debt service; PDSP = public debt service paid; I = gross interest on the total debt; IP = gross 
interest paid on the total debt. 
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Table 22 
PERU: CREDIT AGREEMENTS BY FINANCIAL SOURCE" 
Source: Central Reserve Bank. 
"Medium and long-term. 







































: DOMESTIC PRICES" 
(Percentages) 
1980 1981 1982 





















































































































































Consumer price index 
Food* 







Consumer price index 
Food* 







Source: National Statistical Institute (INE). 
"Metropolitan Lima. Preliminary figures. ' Includes food, beverages and tobacco. 
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Table 24 
PERU: EVOLUTION OF REAL AVERAGE REMUNERATIONS 
Remunerations 







































































































Source: Ministry of Labour. 
"Preliminary figures. Survey of establishments with 10 workers or more. 
'Excluding unilateral increases by employers. 
'Intis per month. Intis per day. 
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Table 25 





In foreign currency 
In national currency 
Money plus quasi-money (M2) 
Total domestic credit (net) 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Other accounts 




Circulation velocity: GDP/M, 
End-of-year balances 
























































































Source: Central Reserves Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Or "primary issue", in accordance with the terminology employed in Peru. 
the share of M2 represented by quasi-money in foreign currency. 
'Equivalent to 
Table 26 
PERU: SELECTED COMMERCIAL BANK INTEREST RATES 
1982 1983 1984 1985 
1986 
I II III IV 
Interest rate on loans 
Nominal 
Effective' 
Nominal interest rates 
on deposits 
Deposits for 90-180 days 








56.7 60.3 56.8 
57.9 
42.5 40.0 40.0 40.0 
26.3 25.5 25.5 25.5 
29.5 31.5 34.5 34.5 
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Up to 360 days. 6No data are available from August 1985 onwards. 'Includes the effect of capitalization. 
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Table 27 
PERU: DEFICIT AND FINANCING OF THE CONSOLIDATED 




Rest of public sector 
N e t financing 






Deposits frozen in 


























Source: Central reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. 



























































































































PERU: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
A. Total income 
1. Current income 
a) Tax revenue 
Income tax 
Property tax 
Tax on external 
trade 
Taxes on production 
and consumption 
(Fuels) 
Other tax revenue 
Credit documents 
b) Non-tax revenuec 
2. Capital income 
B. Total expenditure 
1. Current expenditure 
Remunerations 






2. Capital expenditure 
Gross capital formation 
Transfers 
Other 
Savings on current account 

































































































































































































































Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru. 
"Preliminary figures. Mainly tax reimbursements for non-traditional exports, tax capitalization and tax payment 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
In 1986 the economy of the Dominican Republic showed a slight improvement. The gross domestic 
product increased by nearly 2%, thus regaining its 1983 level, while fiscal and balance-of-payments 
maladjustments were reduced and inflation fell sharply. However, the per capita product, which in 
the preceding biennium had dropped by 6%, declined again (-1 %) , falling to a level lower than that of 
1979, the year before the crisis broke out (see table 1 and figure 1). 
This recovery was based on the dynamism of construction, which was stimulated primarily by a 
slight upturn in manufacturing and an increase in public investment. The latter, however, had only a 
partial influence on private investment, which declined again, although at a much lower rate than in 
the preceding year. The decrease in capital accumulation by the private sector reflected the trends 
often seen in times of crisis, when resources are diverted from productive areas to the financial sector. 
However, in 1986 the effects of the presidential campaign were also a factor. 
The favourable performance of the external sector was reflected in the terms of trade as the 
prices of the main export products increased while oil prices dropped. In addition, whereas the value 
of exports of goods and services grew, that of external purchases remained virtually stable. This 
prompted a decline in the current account deficit, whose size in relation to the product fell to just 
14%, after having been over 50% at the beginning of the decade. 
In spite of price increases, the value of merchandise exports contracted somewhat, as a 
consequence of a decrease in the volume of sales of sugar and minerals. In contrast, the value of 
services grew substantially, boosted by earnings from tourism and, to a lesser extent, by those of the 
inbond subcontracting industry. 
Imports of goods declined by 2%, although their volume expanded by 5%. The decrease in the 
oil bill permitted a 17% increase in the purchase of other goods. 
A certain lag was to be detected in the capital account balance. The recorded inflow of short- and 
long-term capital, which has been declining since 1983, was minimal (US$94 million). In their turn, 
grants and donations, which had accounted for 40% of net capital inflows the year before, dropped 
drastically. Only direct investment, which has been recovering since 1983, increased. 
A further drop in the external debt, together with the expansion of foreign sales, resulted in a 
decline in the debt/export ratio. However, interest payments increased, and the debt service 
represented over 50 % of the value of exports of goods and services, thus constituting one of the major 
obstacles to the implementation of an economic reactivation policy. The country's shortage of foreign 
exchange and the change in the position maintained in respect of external indebtedness by the new 
government led to a suspension of debt servicing in the last quarter of the year. 
Inflation, which had been very high during the past biennium, dropped from nearly 40% to less 
than 10%, basically as a consequence of a fall in the prices of petroleum products and of the stability 
exhibited by the exchange rate during almost the whole of the year. In the last quarter there was 
simultaneously an upturn in inflation and an expansion of monetary variables, which was brought 
about with a view to reactivating the economy. 
Although nominal wages remained stagnant in 1986, average real wages followed a favourable 
trend.1 This upturn signified, however, no more than a slight improvement, given the drop seen in 
the real income of wage-earners in former years. 
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Figure 1 (conclusion) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^December - December percentage variation. cBillions of dollars. 
¿Percentages. 
The sharp rise in central government income, which was far greater than the increase in 
expenditure, resulted in a significant drop in the fiscal deficit and in a decline of the fiscal deficit/pro-
duct ratio to less than 1 %, one of the lowest coefficients in the region. In addition, the higher priority 
assigned to capital expenditure was evidenced in an increase of almost 80% in public investment. 
In the monetary and financial area some maladjustments were to be observed. The elimination 
midway through the year of a number of measures aimed at curbing the increase in liquidity, which 
had been spurred by the establishment of a single exchange rate in 1985, and the need for the State to 
reactivate the economy by means of monetary issues and by relying on external resources resulted in 
rapid expansion of the money supply. Thus, liquidity exceeded the demand for credit given the 
moderate rate of economic activity, and resources were therefore directed towards financial invest-
ment and an increase in bank reserves. 
Economic policy in 1986 was marked by a change in government. In the first part of the year the 
outgoing administration continued to apply a restrictive policy until the country's agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expired in April. Subsequently, some measures which had 
influenced the money supply were annulled and the ban on the entry of certain imports was lifted, 
leading to a substantial increase in external purchases of consumer goods. 
The new authorities, who took office in August, assigned a high priority to economic recovery. 
Steps were taken to increase the flow of credit to agriculture and to the sugar industry, and public 
investment was increased, but the growth in current expenditure was reduced in order to avoid an 
expansion of the fiscal deficit. In order to bolster some of these measures, the authorities resorted to 
monetary issues, commercial bank credit and external financing. It was also decided that external debt 
servicing would be adjusted according to resource availability, but without sacrificing economic 
development. 
Finally, an examination of the redefinition and reduction of the State's role in society was 
undertaken. It should be stressed that the new government, as its predecessor did, continued to 
promote economic development in tourism, agro-industry and the inbond subcontracting industry, 
activities for which it received financial support from abroad. 
In spite of the slight upturn in activity, economic development continued to run up against 
formidable obstacles. The deteriorating trend in the external sector posed severe limitations. 
Seventy-five per cent of external sales of goods was based on four agricultural products and two 
minerals, for which the general outlook was highly unfavourable.Although efforts have been made to 
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boost non-traditional exports, they have not grown fast enough to offset the drop in traditional 
exports. The trend in exports contrasted with the country's growing need for imports to fuel the 
economy's performance and with its requirements for foreign exchange in order to cover its debt 
service. 
Furthermore, although the adjustment policy applied in earlier years managed to ease the 
country's fiscal and external imbalances and to realign the exchange market, it also involved a 
deterioration of real wages (nearly 20% below the 1979 level), a fact that has had a detrimental effect 
on the well-being of broad sectors of the population. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply recovered from its fall of the preceding year, thanks mainly to the increase in 
imports of goods and services (4%) and a partial recovery in the product (see table 2). 
Domestic demand regained only half of the ground it had lost in 1985, while exports declined by 
6% after having expanded sharply during the preceding year. This fall primarily resulted from a 
steep reduction in volume —chiefly owing to the decline in the quantum of sugar and mineral sales— 
and was associated with an increase in services, which has, for a number of years now, been based on 
the expansion of tourism. 
Although public investment showed a sharp rise, this was mitigated by a deterioration in 
private capital formation (-5%) and gross fixed investment therefore rose by only 5%. The whole of 
this increase was due to a boom in construction, which expanded by 13%. The continued upward 
trend in public investment brought it back up to the absolute levels and significance in respect of the 
product recorded in 1980. 
The economic reactivation and the increase in real wages helped to raise private consumption 
by 3%. Nevertheless, in per capita terms, private consumption remained at its very low 1985 level, 
following two successive declines. 
b) Tbe main sectors 
The slight economic upturn was basically the result of the recovery made by construction (16%) 
and manufacturing (4%), whose effects spread to the rest of the economy. Nonetheless, the 
production of goods barely rose by just 1%, since agriculture, the most influential sector in the 
product, declined by 2% (see table 3). 
i) Agriculture. In 1986 this sector's product contracted by 2%, after a decline of nearly 4% the 
preceding year. Crop-farming output dropped at a rate similar to that of the preceding year (4%), 
Stock-raising diminished slightly and only fishing and forestry, the least influential subsectors, 
managed to show an increase (see table 4). 
Although the sector's performance was affected by short-term factors, its basic problems are of 
a medium-term character. Some of the chief ones are the deterioration in the international prices of 
some of the country's main export products; the lowering of its sugar quota in the United States 
market; the reduction in real credit flows, particularly during the implementation of the adjustment 
programme; low support prices for the major domestic consumer goods; the taxes and specific 
exchange rates applying to traditional exports; and the insufficient level of public investment, which 
has affected the agricultural infrastructure and channels of communication. 
The above obstacles were compounded in 1986 by a drastic drop in Haitian manpower supply 
—which delayed the beginning of the 1985/1986 sugar cane harvest and led to higher costs— as well 
as by poor weather conditions, which chiefly affected the bean, tobacco and sugar cane crops. 
As regards production for the external market, the main decreases were seen in tobacco (-16%) 
and sugar cane (-9%). The harvest volumes of these items have been diminishing since 1983 and, 
therefore, their joint share in the total fell from 36% in 1980-1982 to 25% in 1986. Thus, the overall 
share represented by production for export declined frorn. 50% to 43%. 
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This latter drop was basically associated with the deterioration of the world commodity market. 
Another factor, however, was domestic policy, since both exchange measures and the duties levied on 
traditional products had the effect of lowering exporters' earnings and producer prices. At the same 
time, due to the rise in the quotation for the dollar on the open market the cost of inputs and capital 
goods went up —in spite of the implementation of some short-range measures designed to mitigate 
this problem. As a result, profit margins were either eliminated or considerably reduced, thereby 
discouraging production and capital accumulation. 
The difficult financial situation of the State Sugar Council (CEA) —a public enterprise account-
ing for approximately two-thirds of production— grew worse since, besides maintaining subsidies 
for domestic sugar consumption, it passed on only part of its earning losses to producers. 
Early in the year the surcharge on exports was lowered and a few months later it was abolished, 
but this was not reflected in the 1986 fiscal year. The decline in sugar production was due to the CEA's 
financial problems, a shortage of manpower to work in the harvest, and the drought. 
In view of the poor outlook on the external sugar market, the CEA carried forward its 
production diversification programme. This public enterprise has been entering into partnerships 
with domestic and foreign private firms with the aim of growing other crops in place of sugar cane.2 
In addition, in order to resolve its financial problems, the company was making arrangements to sell 
1 800 hectares of land to the Central Bank, which would use them for tourism projects and for the 
establishment of industrial customs-free areas. 
Tobacco production in 1986 was less than one-half the amount recorded in 1982. Over the past 
four years the crop first suffered the effects of a plant disease called blue mould (after whose 
eradication producer prices fell substantially), and, then, the consequences of the droughts which 
have occurred during a number of years, including 1986. 
Notwithstanding the plantation renewal programme that was carried out in 1983, two-thirds 
of the area under cultivation is still covered with native cocoa plants growing under poor shading and 
fertilization conditions which are conducive to plant diseases and pests and which negatively affect 
yields. Furthermore, a drop in the crop's international price over the past two years has discouraged 
its production. Nevertheless, the output of this crop increased by 3% in 1986. 
High prices were paid for coffee on the international market until midway through the year. 
Nonetheless, coffee production climbed by only a moderate amount (4%), due to the coffee-growing 
cycle's influence on the figures, inasmuch as a small (1985/1986) harvest was combined with a large 
one (1986/1987). 
Production for the domestic market declined for the second year running as a consequence of 
the drop in rice production, which accounts for one-fourth of total output. In 1976-1982, rice 
production increased at an average rate of nearly 13%, thanks to the introduction of a new variety of 
seed and an adequate credit flow, which made it possible to become self-reliant in this crop. However, 
in 1983 production stagnated and in the 1985-1986 biennium it contracted by 16%. This downtrend 
stemmed from a continuation of credit constraints and soaring costs, the latter being a result of the 
devaluation of the peso. 
The dwindling flow of credit has affected production for domestic consumption. The latter 
relies almost entirely on small-scale producers, who have limited access to financing from private 
banks, which, moreover, assign to agriculture only approximately 8% of the loans they grant. The 
funds of the Agricultural Bank, the main government source of financing for the sector, diminished 
by 43% in real terms between 1983 and 1985, leading to a severe contraction of lending to small 
farmers. In the case of rice, 70% of whose supply is provided by small and medium-sized producers, 
an additional credit source are millers, who finance about 40% of the sowing and who sell the 
processed grain to the Price Stabilization Institute (INESPRE).' The financial problems suffered by 
2
 In 1986, the CEA signed a contract with the largest domestic orange producer for the planting of approximately 2 000 
ha of orange trees. The Council will manage 35% of the stock in the new company. 
' According to INESPRE regulations, each private mill is the sole legal buyer in its vicinity. Millers grant credit with the 
object of ensuring an adequate supply, and these loans are in great demand among farmers because of the speed with which 
they are processed and obtained. 
639 
INESPRE made it necessary for this body to delay its payments to millers, who, in turn, reduced the 
credit they supplied to small and medium-sized producers.4 
In 1986 the credit resources of the Agricultural Bank increased by 33% in real terms, and a 
payment agreement was arranged between the government and millers. However, this occurred 
during the last four months of the year, and thus it had an effect only on the December sowing. The 
Ministry of Agriculture also implemented a programme aimed at substantially increasing the area 
under cultivation. 
Except for maize and bean production which also showed negative growth rates, the remaining 
commodities for domestic consumption maintained their upward trend of recent years. As the 
relative importance of some crops such as pigeon peas, sweet potatoes, yucca, tomatoes and pumpkins 
has been showing a steady increase, these products are being oriented towards the United States 
market to cover the demand of Latin Americans residing on the Gulf of Mexico coast. Furthermore, 
relatively high support prices were being paid for peanuts, since they provide a substitute for imports 
of other oilseeds. 
Livestock production stagnated, following a 3% decline in 1985. The increase in cattle, pig and 
poultry slaughtering failed to offset the fall in milk production, which stemmed from a deterioration 
in real prices and an inadequate credit flow. 
In order to relieve shortfalls in agricultural supply for domestic consumption, the new 
government adopted a number of measures as from September. Firstly, the flow of credit was 
increased substantially, with more resources being provided to the Agricultural Bank. Secondly, the 
Agricultural Co-ordinating Commission was created, which will be responsible for an emergency 
plan aimed at increasing the sector's production. Finally, the system of rice subsidies was modified; 
although, on the one hand, there was a 4% decrease in the prices received by producers, on the other 
hand fertilizers, fuels and other agricultural inputs representing 45 % of total costs began to be made 
available to producers at subsidized prices. The Agricultural Bank also took the place of INESPRE in 
the grain market and was to be responsible for distributing inputs to farmers. 
ii) Mining. In keeping with the fluctuating and downward trend which has characterized 
mining activity since the late 1970s, production declined by 11% (see table 5). 
Ferronickel, the only product capable of giving a boost to the sector, contracted by 13% due to a 
drop in the international price and to a labour strike in the second quarter. 
The depletion of the reserves of the country's gold and silver mine was reflected in a steady 
decline in the output of these metals (13% and 14%, respectively). Early in the year, however, work 
was completed on a feasibility study concerning the possibility of obtaining the US$440 million in 
financing needed for a project which had been submitted to the IDB for extending the useful life of the 
mine, through the processing of gold and silver residues by means of oxidation. 
iii) Manufacturing. After a cumulative decrease of 7 % in the preceding biennium, manufactur-
ing showed a 4% upturn. Except for the production of sugar and its derivatives, which declined for 
the fourth year in a row (-9%), manufactures expanded at an average rate of 5%, spurred by the 
recovery of domestic demand, an appreciable increase in credit an adequate supply of inputs and an 
increase in exportable production, as in the case of processed coffee (see table 6). 
The unfavourable situation and outlook of the external sugar market compelled producers to 
reduce their supply by closing down sugar mills or shortening the harvest. Thus, after four years of 
declining output, production in 1986 was 30% lower than in 1982. 
In the category of food, beverages and tobacco, the only items which decreased were those which 
lacked an adequate supply of raw materials. Such was the case of rice processing and milk 
pasteurization. 
4
 INESPRE has been experiencing financial problems for some time, and these difficulties grew worse with the 
application of the adjustment programme. Thanks to a relative balance between purchase and sales prices, INESPRE had 
succeeded in showing a surplus up to 1979. Since then, however, it has begun to show a growing deficit, since, with the 
contraction in real wages, it has become necessary to subsidize and increasingly high percentage of the price in order to 
safeguard the consumption level of the population. This imbalance has been manifested in an inadequate readjustment of 
producer prices and a lack of financial resources. 
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Paint production increased by 20% and that of reinforcement rods by nearly 40% in response 
to an upsurge in construction. In contrast, cement production dropped by 8% due to decreases in two 
of the three factories —one of them State-owned— which manufacture this input. The severe 
financial problems which have affected this State enterprise for a number of years have led to a 
systematic deterioration of its facilities. The drop in domestic supply at a time of growing demand 
made it necessary to import this item. 
Agroindustry and the inbond subcontracting industry continued to perform well. The former 
benefited from fiscal incentives and special financing, which to a large extent came from external 
credits. In 1986, authorization was given for the establishment of 38 new enterprises involving a 
planned investment of 175 million pesos. This activity generated slightly over 3 500 new jobs. 
As regards the inbond subcontracting industry, 20 new enterprises were set up, providing jobs 
for moije than 6 000 workers. The total employment generated by this activity amounted to about 
42 000 jobs, i.e., approximately 4% of the employed population. 
The profile of the inbond subcontracting industry has changed in recent years. The average size 
of these enterprises, as measured by the staff they employ, jumped from 200 workers per plant in 
1983 to more than 300 in the last fiscal year. In addition, the origin of investors has been growing 
more diversified, as shown by the following breakdown of the total employment generated by the 20 
new enterprises in 1986: 37% corresponded to United States firms, 35% to Panamanian companies, 
25% to Dominican investors and almost 3% to South-East Asian countries. The domestic firms 
involved were private enterprises which provided foreign investors with industrial bays and man-
power. This allows foreign firms to experiment with this location on the basis of very limited 
investments and risks.5 
If the installation of twin plants with the help of the Puerto Rican government continues, the 
future of this activity seems bright. An attempt is being made to make use of the funds derived from 
the retention of the profits of subsidiaries of United States enterprises located in that country which 
are exempt from United States income tax provided they keep their funds in the island for a number 
of years as a source of low-cost financing. Proposals have been made for the annual investment of 
about US$100 million from this source in twin plants, as one means of putting the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative into action. Due to the country's proximity to Puerto Rico and the large wage differential 
between the two,6 locating the labour-intensive stage of the work in the Dominican republic, while 
carrying out the capital-intensive stage in Puerto Rico, is a very attractive proposition. 
In order to protect this young industry and to promote its development, since the 1960s a series 
of tax incentives have been provided to investors, depending upon the nature of the activities they 
would benefit. These incentives basically consisted of a total or partial exemption from import duties 
on capital goods and raw materials and the cancellation or reduction of income taxes. In view of the 
need to obtain more resources for priority projects and the fact that this industry has received 
sufficient protection, the new government decided that, taken as a whole, the incentives granted to 
individuals or corporations investing or reinvesting part or all of their income could no longer exceed 
50% of their net assessable income annually; previously, this figure could be as high as 100%. 
iv) Construction. Construction activity expanded very rapidly, offsetting its fall of the preceding 
year. This was due to the stimulus provided by the public sector as a result of the change of 
government. A determined effort was made to finish work in progress and, once the new administra-
tion had taken office, emphasis was placed on the construction of public works. This reactivation did 
not, however, include residential building, which, when measured on the basis of the permits granted, 
showed a 28% drop (see table 7). 
Although the supply of most construction materials responded well to the increased demand, 
the fact that the availability of such a basic input as cement was inadequate and had to be imported 
raised building costs by 27%. 
5
 Using this system, in 1986 Westinghouse established one of the largest plants in the country. 
6In the Dominican Republic the man/hour cost, including all benefits, is US$0.62, whereas in Puerto Rico it amounts to 
US$3.35. 
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3. The external sector 
a) General features 
In 1986 the deficit on current account declined by 10% to US$200 million —the smallest thus 
far in the 1980s— and thus represented just 14% of exports of goods and services, whereas in 1982 
this figure was 40%. 
As the level of imports of goods and services was very similar to that of 1985, this reduction in 
the external imbalance was the result of a strong expansion in exports, and more specifically, in 
services (18%). The favourable performance of the latter was lessened by an increase in disburse-
ments for factor services, as interest payments increased and unrequited private transfer payments 
held steady, after having grown steadily in recent years. 
Although current transactions showed a smaller deficit than in 1985, the inflow of capital was 
the lowest since 1974. Grants and donations, which had supplemented external financing the year 
before, fell sharply. 
The value of exports of goods declined by 2 %, adding to the drop recorded the preceding year. 
The 1986 decrease resulted from a steep decrease in volume (-11%), since their unit value went up by 
10%. The value of external purchases also declined by 2 %, in spite of a 5 % expansion in volume, due 
to the 6% reduction in their unit value, which was chiefly a consequence of the drop in oil prices (see 
table 8). 
The rise in export prices and the drop in import prices were reflected in a 17% improvement in 
the terms of trade, thereby lessening the erosion suffered since 1982. This improvement in the terms 
of trade was greater than the drop in export volume, and the purchasing power of exports therefore 
went up by 4%. 
Furthermore, following the realignment of the exchange market the year before, the exchange 
rate tended to remain stable at three Dominican pesos per dollar. 
During the first seven months of 1986, probably as a consequence of the slower pace of 
economic activity typical of an election period, the exchange rate tended to decline, reaching 2.70 
pesos per dollar, which was 30 centavos less than that prevailing in December 1985. As from August 
the exchange rate began to climb, reaching 3.05 pesos per dollar in the last two months of the year, 
which was 13% higher than the price recorded in July. This change in trend was linked to a 
reactivation of the economy and to a significant increase in the amount of money in circulation, as 
well as to the speculative pressures inherent in a change of government. 
The average dollar quotation dropped by 7%, although it registered a December-to-December 
increase of 2%. Domestic prices rose faster than external prices, so the undervaluation oí the peso 
was reduced from 20% to 10% (see table 9). 
b) Merchandise 
i) Exports. The value of exports of goods declined by 2 %, after a 15 % fall in 1985 (see table 10). 
The category of traditional products showed a decrease once again (-6%), although it was much less 
than that of the preceding fiscal year (-42%), since this time only sugar, tobacco and minerals 
declined. Sales of non-traditional products, most of which were agroindustrial items, increased for the 
third year in a row, thus bringing their relative share up to nearly one-fourth of the total. 
The value of sugar exports declined again (-15%), although less steeply than in 1985. This 
resulted from a further contraction in the exported volume (-20%), which was not fully offset by a 
rise in the unit value (23 % ). The drop in the exports of this commodity in the past two years has been 
so sharp that its 1986 level amounted to practically one-half of that recorded in 1984 (see table 11). 
The outlook for the sugar market became increasingly bleaker. Although international market 
prices increased, they remained below production costs, as has been the case since early in the decade. 
Sugar supply exceeds demand, and the only way to reverse the declining trend in prices would 
therefore be for large exporters —among them the Dominican Republic— to reduce their production 
and to diversify both their production and their sales. 
The country had managed to cope with the prolonged deterioration of the world sugar market 
by directing nearly 80% of its exports to the United States market, where prices are far above the 
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international level. However, with a view to protecting its producers, whose costs are higher, in 1982 
the United States placed quotas on sugar imports from supplier countries. As sweetener consumption 
in the United States has been declining, its external sugar purchases have dropped and, along with 
them, the quotas for supplier countries. The quota for the Dominican Republic fell from a little over 
490 000 tons in 1982/1983 to 302 000 in 1985/1986. 
Even though the country still has the highest quota among exporters to the United States 
market, the cutback has been especially damaging, since sugar continues to be its main export 
commodity, representing one-fifth of the total value of its foreign sales. 
The value of foreign sales of coffee rose considerably (30%), thanks to a substantial price 
increase, while the exported volume was similar to that of 1985. Although production grew, part of 
the output was held in storage as producers waited for higher prices and hoped for a cancellation of 
the tax increase on this commodity which had been decreed in the first quarter of the year. 
The expansion in the exported volume of cocoa and tobacco far exceeded the decline in their 
prices, thus leading to an increase in the value of sales. In the case of cocoa, the price drop was 
accounted for by the saturation of the international market. As regards black tobacco, which is the 
type exported by the Dominican Republic, the sharp contraction in demand was due a change in 
consumer taste, which now exhibits a preference for blonde tobacco. 
External mineral sales continued to follow the downward trend of previous years. Ferronickel 
exports dropped by 36% due to the combined effect of a more or less similar reduction in their unit 
value and* their exported volume. The decline in gold and silver production, resulting from a 
progressive depletion of deposits, prevented producers from responding adequately to the rise in 
prices on the international market. 
Non-traditional exports went up again (12%), although at a slower rate than during the 
preceding two years. Two factors have favoured this development: the country's proximity to the 
United States East Coast market, which has a large hispanic population that generates an increasing 
demand for Caribbean products; and tariff incentives deriving from the Generalized System of 
Preference (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
Since 1976, when the GSP first provided duty-free access to the United States market for a 
range of products, the exports made under this system began to grow rapidly (23% annually, on 
average, between 1979 and 1983). In 1984, when the CBI got underway, the external sales included in 
this system of exemptions, except for sugar,7 expanded at an average rate of 34%, whereas those 
included under the GSP grew more slowly and, in fact, decreased in 1986. In 1986, 45% of the total 
exports made on the basis of tariff incentives corresponded to the CBI. 
External sales (excluding sugar) made under the GSP and the CBI in 1986 amounted to US$235 
million, which represents half of those bound for the United States. Approximately 50% of these 
exports were natural animal and vegetable products or semi-manufactures, while, among the 
remainder, articles made from leather and skins and jewelry figured prominently. Owing to the rapid 
growth of these items, the share of total external sales corresponding to exports to the United States 
rose from 60% in the 1981-1983 triennium to 70% in the 1984-1986 period (see table 12). 
With a view to market diversification, late in the year arrangements were made with the Soviet 
Union for the sale of 300 000 tons of sugar at a slightly higher price than that prevailing on the world 
market. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was also approached with the aim of exploring the 
possibility of the country becoming a permanent member of the organization, in which it currently 
holds only an observer status. Finally, trade links with Puerto Rico were being strengthened, and as a 
result this country's share in the Dominican Republic's total exports increased from 5% in the first 
five years of the decade to more than 10% in 1986. 
Early in the year the 36% exchange surcharge on traditional exports and the 5% surcharge on 
non-traditional exports, which have been in force since April 1985, were reduced by one-half. It is 
hoped that the total elimination of these duties, approved half way through the year, and government 
pressure will induce exporters to fulfil their obligation to change their foreign exchange earnings 
from external sales in the Central Bank. 
'Sugar exports are included in this item so that they may enter duty-free to the United States. 
643 
ii) Imports. After the slight upturn seen the year before and a very swift expansion during the 
first half of 1986 which accounted for almost two-thirds of total imports, external purchases declined 
by 2%. However, if the oil bill (which dropped by nearly 40% due to a fall in oil prices), is deducted, 
then imports grew by 17% (see table 13). 
The figures up to mid-year indicate that imports of consumer goods nearly trebled, possibly 
because of a substantial increase in purchases of consumer durables, since basic food items maintained 
a similar level to that recorded in the same period of the preceding year. Purchases of raw materials 
and intermediate goods grew by 7%, but since the oil bill dropped, the increase in the remaining 
inputs must have been far greater. Finally, imports of capital goods contracted by 17%, due to the 
delay in capital accumulation characteristic of an election period and a change in government (see 
table 13). 
According to indirect indicators, the dynamics and structure of imports changed in the last four 
months of the year. The more rapid pace of investment contributed to an increase in purchases of 
capital goods, while limitations on motor vehicle imports reduced those of durable consumer goods.8 
c) Real services and factor payments 
In keeping with the trend observed since the beginning of the decade, earnings from travel 
services increased once again (12%). This raised their share in exports of goods and services —which 
amounted to 14% in 1980— to 36%. 
Thanks to the support received from both the public and private sectors and to the availability 
of domestic and external financing, the supply of services has been expanding. Hotel capacity, which 
at the end of the 1970s was a little over 5 000 rooms, has increased to such a point that it was more 
than double that figure in 1986. Consequently, the Dominican Republic together with Puerto Rico, 
ranked third in hotel capacity among the Caribbean islands, exceeded only by the Bahamas and 
Jamaica. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to promote longer-stay tourism —seaside holidays— the regional 
distribution of hotel capacity has been modified. Whereas 52% of hotel rooms were located in the 
capital —which, although it is a port, has no beaches— and only 32% were located in beach areas in 
1979. In 1986 these proportions had shifted to 19% and 60%, respectively. This relocation permitted 
the average stay to rise from eights nights per guest in 1979 to 13 in 1986. 
Tourist demand has responded favourably. The number of foreign visitors travelling to the 
country by air (these primarily being the tourists who use the hotel infrastructure)9 climbed from 
about 100 000 in 1972 to 300 000 in 1980 and to a little over 550 000 in 1986. As for the origin of 
demand, although United States tourists predominate, they dropped from 64% of the total in 1982 to 
43% in 1985; this has been offset by a greater inflow of Canadian and Puerto Rican tourists, whose 
relative proportions increased in the same period from 4% and 3% to 18% and 15%, respectively. 
Travel service disbursements —since the decline they showed at the beginning of the 1980s due 
to a rise in the exchange rate— have remained at around US$90 million. 
The expansion of the inbond subcontracting industry was reflected in the net foreign exchange 
earnings derived from this activity —included under the "other services" entry—which increased by 
50% to US$140 million; this figure represents about 10% of external sales of goods and services. 
Net factor payments rose by 33%, basically due to the increase in interest payments (US$64 
million). The significance of this item in respect of exports of goods and services grew from 15% to 
19% (see table 14). 
8
 Beginning on 7 July, unlimited imports of motor vehicles and heavy machinery were allowed for five days. In October, 
the entry of these goods was again authorized until the end of the year; however, a ceiling of 6 000 units, for a total FOB value of 
US$30 million, was set. 
'Incoming tourists are divided into the following categories: a) foreigners arriving by air; b) foreigners arriving by sea, 
mainly on cruise ships, who seldom use lodgings and therefore spend very little (approximately US$20 per stay); c) Domini-
cans residing abroad who travel to the country on vacation and do not usually use the hotel infrastructure, but who spend a great 
deal (approximately one-third of earnings from travel services). 
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Unrequited private transfer payments, which mainly consist of remittances sent by Domini-
cans residing abroad, stagnated. As a large percentage of Dominicans who migrate to the United 
States do so illegally, this result appears to be associated with the expectations created by the 
Simpson-Rodino Act, which is aimed at restricting immigration to the United States. Due to the 
rapid growth of this item in recent years, in 1985 such transfers were equivalent to 18 % of exports of 
goods and services. 
d) The deficit on current account and its financing 
Although the current account deficit declined and the ratio between it and exports of goods and 
services showed a clear improvement, net capital inflows dropped by 24%, in line with the trend 
observed during the last three years. This decrease was the result of a drop of nearly 40% in short- and 
long-term capital inflows, since direct investment grew at a similar rate. Unrequited official transfer 
payments, which in 1985 made a significant contribution to the financing of the deficit, also fell 
sharply. In spite of this drop in external resources, reserves grew by US$30 million; this phenomenon 
was attributable to capital re-entry, which should probably be included under the errors and omissions 
entry (see table 14). 
e) External indebtedness 
In 1986 the total external debt declined slightly for the first time since the mid-1960s, to almost 
US$3.65 billion. Medium- and long-term indebtedness grew by 7%, whereas short-term indebted-
ness decreased by 16% (see table 15). 
The debt breakdown by type of creditor exhibited an unfavourable trend for the country, since 
two-thirds of the loans came from bilateral sources and commercial banks, and only 30% was secured 
on soft terms from multilateral agencies. 
Differing trends were to be seen in the indicators of indebtedness. The debt/exports ratio 
remained at a high level, as it has since 1982, although it did show some improvement in that it fell to 
259%, which was 20 points lower than in 1985. On the other hand, the net interest/exports ratio 
climbed from 14% to 18% because of the increase in interest payments (23%). 
Debt servicing amounted to US$765 million —one-fourth of this amount corresponded to 
interest payments—, a sum which was equivalent to 54% of external sales of goods and services. 
Arrears as of 31 December came to almost US$230 million in payments on principal and to US$88 
million in interest; if these payments had been made, then debt servicing would have amounted to 
US$1 083 billion, i.e., 77% of exports. 
During the first eight months of the year the authorities' policy on external indebtedness 
consisted of meeting only those commitments undertaken in the renegotiation of the debt. The new 
authorities adopted a different position. On several occasions they declared that the country lacked 
the capacity to make the scheduled amortization and interest payments and that the debt would 
therefore be serviced only in so far as it did not affect the country's economic development. 
In view of the achievements attained by other countries in recent negotiations, steps were 
initiated to arrange for another rescheduling of the external debt which would include improvements 
in terms of repayment periods, grace periods and interest rates, as well as for its partial conversion 
into investment. It has also been proposed that this renegotiation should only include a "supervisory" 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which would not compel the country to adopt 
the severe adjustment programme that this agency has proposed in similar cases. 
4. Prices and wages 
After the steep increase in prices seen in 1985, inflation began to slacken in the final months of that 
year, and in early 1986 it came to a complete standstill; indeed, in the February-April quarter, prices 
actually declined by 4%. In May they showed a slight upturn of less than 1%, and then remained at 
that level until August. However, in the last four months of the year prices once again exhibited an 
upward trend, with a cumulative increase of 7%. On average, consumer prices rose by only 10%, as 
against 38% the year before (see table 16 and figure 2). 
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The drop in prices in the early months of the year and their subsequent stability until 
September were linked to a decrease in the domestic prices of petroleum products10 and to a decline in 
the exchange rate. Their later increase was partly due to the reinitiation of the devaluation process 
and to the price increase applied to agricultural products in order to promote production. 
The index for the category of food, beverages and tobacco —which is given a weighting of 52 % 
of the total— increased at the higher-than-average rate of 15 %. Factors contributing to the rise in the 
prices of the basic shopping basket included the increase seen in farm products and the speculation 
that was sparked by occasional temporary shortages. 
Figure 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
10The reductions observed in the prices of petroleum products were 24% for gasoline, 38% for gas-oil, 17% for 
kerosene and 10% for liquified gas. 
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The prices of clothing and footwear, which have a large imported component, rose faster than 
the average due to the rise in the dollar. In contrast, the item "other", which includes transport, 
climbed by only 2%. 
Price increases were concentrated in food items, which represent a larger relative proportion of 
expenditure among the low-income strata of the population. The upturn in prices was therefore felt 
more keenly by poor families, as may be seen by the fact that the increase was 11 % for families in the 
50-200 peso income bracket, whereas it was 9% for the 200 peso and over bracket. 
The minimum wage, which in July 1985 had been raised to 250 pesos per month, remained 
unchanged throughout 1986. Nevertheless, since average wages rose when calculated on a 12-month 
basis and inflation dropped considerably, the real average wage improved by 7%. Nonetheless, it was 
still 14 percentage points lower than this wage was in 1980 (see table 17). 
The deterioration of the economy in recent years has deepened the unemployment problem. 
According to a survey carried out in September 1986, the open unemployment rate reached 30% in 
rural areas and 27% in urban areas, which was three percentage points higher than the rate recorded 
in November 1984. 
5. Fiscal and monetary policy 
a) Fiscal policy 
The fact that the growth rate in expenditure was lower than that of income led to a 45 % drop in 
the 1986 fiscal deficit, which thus dropped to one-half (0.7%) of its former, already low level in 
respect of the product (see table 18). 
Tax revenue increased by 32 %, a much higher rate than the growth of the product as measured 
at current values (12%). This growth was based on an expansion of indirect taxes (42%), and, to a 
lesser extent, of taxes on foreign trade (27%). 
The rise in indirect taxes was due to a nearly 70% tax increase for petroleum products, which 
could be applied thanks to a drop in their international prices. The collection of taxes on the 
remaining items under this heading (cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and the value added tax) rose by 
29%. On the other hand, the share of indirect taxes represented by the value added tax was only 12%, 
despite the expansion of its coverage. 
The increase in international coffee prices was reflected in a substantial rise in revenues from 
export taxes. In contrast, import duties only increased by 16%, since during the first eight months of 
the year a large number of exemptions were granted. Nevertheless, given their relative weight in 
foreign trade taxation (around 85%), their contribution in absolute terms was higher. The cancella-
tion of a 36% exchange surcharge on traditional exports and of one of 5 % on non-traditional exports 
did not affect this item, since this tax was collected and administered by the Central Bank. 
The increased receipts from direct taxation (24%) stemmed from a rise of the same size in 
income tax collection; this was attributable to an expansion of the tax base, which in turn was a 
consequence of the inflation recorded in the preceding year. Thus, in 1986 tax receipts went up by 
25 %, whereas the domestic product at current prices grew by 12%, resulting in an ex-post elasticity 
of 2.1%. A provision under which the tax base for individuals would include all income from the 
various businesses in which they might be involved also contributed to the rise in the amount 
collected. 
In order to limit the income tax exemptions granted to encourage investment, it was decided in 
December that, taken as a whole, the incentives granted to individuals as corporations could not 
exceed 50% of their total taxable income, which was one-half the ceiling effective up to that time. The 
effects of this measure were expected to be felt in 1987. 
Non-tax revenues expanded by 19%. Payments by the Rosario Dominicana mining company 
—which account for over 50% of the total— increased by 35 %, notwithstanding a 2 % decline in the 
value of exports. 
Current expenditure rose at a much lower rate than income (16%), and current savings 
therefore more than doubled. Expenditure on remunerations increased by 14%; this was due 
exclusively to wage adjustments, since the number of employees declined by 1% and supplies 
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contracted by 7%. Current transfers were the most dynamic item, since they expanded by almost 
40%; this was a consequence of the central government's allocation of resources to the State Sugar 
Council (CEA) and to the Dominican Electricity Corporation (CDE), public enterprises which have 
been suffering from acute financial imbalances. 
Capital expenditure expanded by 42%. Real investment again soared (79%), after having 
jumped by 68% the preceding year. Capital transfers grew by 45 %, a much lower rate than that of the 
preceding fiscal year (107%). This entry, basically included United States grants and donations, 
which are channelled to private enterprise through the Central Bank, and the government funds 
provided to the CDE in order to finance its deficit of capital. 
The fiscal imbalance was largely covered, as in the past two years, with external resources, 70% 
of which were grants or donations. 
Although in 1986 the taxation coefficient showed a slight upturn, rising to 12.5%, which was 
four percentage points above the 1982 historical minimum, it is still among the lowest in Latin 
America. The large number of exemptions and the use of specific rates have made the system inelastic 
and have eroded the tax base. Furthermore, as three-fourths of the receipts come from indirect taxes, 
the system is highly regressive. 
b) Monetary policy 
Two different trends were to be seen in monetary and financial policy during the year. In the 
first half of the year they generally followed the restrictive line of the preceding year, but in the second 
half they were clearly expansionary. 
In order to control the means of payment, a 100% marginal reserve requirement was estab-
lished in January for deposits, attracted by commercial banks, but this provision was abolished in June. 
In addition, the exchange surcharge of 36% on traditional exports and of 5% on non-traditional 
exports that had been instituted in 1985, were reduced by one-half in January and were cancelled 
entirely in mid-year. Both the cancellation of the marginal reserve requirement and the elimination 
of the exchange surcharge led to an increase in liquidity. 
In August, when the new government took office, funds were needed both to settle the debt 
owed to rice millers so that credit would be made available to rice producers to start up the sugar cane 
harvest, as well as to revive the economy by means of a public works programme. These disburse-
ments were covered by grants and donations and by external borrowing, credit from commercial 
banks and monetary issues. The supply of credit for financial and non-financial public bodies 
increased by 14%; and as that allocated to the central government declined by 2%, public-sector 
financing grew by only 6%. 
In contrast to the situation in the preceding fiscal year, in September a policy was initiated 
which was aimed at reducing interest rates on loans and deposits. The Investment Fund for Economic 
Development (FIDE), which operates as a "second tierbank", lowered the rates it applied to financing 
for agroindustry and the inbond subcontracting industry from 20% to 17%. Likewise, the Central 
Bank reduced the fee it charged for rediscounts and loans by two percentage points, to 16%. 
The yields of the main instruments used by the Central Bank to attract resources also declined 
by two percentage points. Thus, the yield of financial certificates fell to 16% and that of stabilization 
bonds, to 14%. Because the supply of funds, exceeded the economy's needs, this measure had an 
influence on the rest of the financial sector, whose interest rates also diminished. 
The economic recession affecting the country in recent years reduced investment opportunities 
in productive activities. This has given rise to a shift in investment from production sectors to the 
financial sphere, thereby encouraging the development of both formal and informal financial bodies 
and favouring speculation. In order to reverse this trend, the monetary authorities raised the amount 
of capital required for the operation of banks, mortgage societies and development banks. In addition, 
likewise, the granting of permits for opening new financial institutions was temporarily frozen. 
Late in the year, with a view to curbing excess liquidity the Central Bank authorized the issuance 
of 100 million pesos in stock certificates, and "stabilization certificates" for an amount equivalent to 
5% of the money in circulation. 
During 1986 the money supply expanded by 43%, whereas the product at current values grew 
by about 12%. This was basically due to the increased earnings received by exporters as a result of the 
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reduction of taxes on external sales of traditional products; the conversion into national currency of 
foreign loans and donations; and the use by the government of funds deposited in the Central Bank 
(273 million pesos). Although credit increased by 24%, its growth rate was lower than that of the 
money supply. This led to a surplus of liquidity, which was reflected in an 86% growth in time 
deposits and an almost threefold increase in commercial bank reserves. The rapid growth of the 
amount of money in circulation, given the moderate pace of economic activity and the decline in 
inflation, led to a drop of nearly three percentage points in the velocity of circulation (see table 19). 
Approximately 85% of the increase in the credit flow generated in 1986 went to the private 
sector, and its share in the total therefore rose from 48% in 1984 to 59%. The distribution of loans 
granted by commercial banks indicates a dissemination of financing to all sectors, although a larger 
percentage of the increase went to manufacturing and commerce. A large share of these resources was 
also used to finance the public sector (see table 20). 
Table 1 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A. Basic economic indicators 
1980 1981 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
Gross domestic product at market prices 100.0 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-term economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Consumer prices 
December-to-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real minimum wages 
Money 
Current income of government 
Total expenditure of government 
Fiscal deficit/total expenditure of 
government 
Fiscal deficit/gross domestic product 
Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international reserves 

















































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 
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Table 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 


























































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from IMF balance-of-
payments data expressed in dollars at current prices, converted to constant 1980 values by means of unit value indexes 
calculated by ECLAC for this purpose. 
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Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 













DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY 
KIND OF ECONOMY ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 





















































































Electricity, gas and water 115.5 121.2 126.8 0.5 0.5 3.9 12.5 4.9 4.6 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 


































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes the livestock, forestry and fisheries sectors. 
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Table 4 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Index of agricultural 
production (1970 = 100) 
Crop farming 
For export 
For domestic consumption 
Stock-raising 
Fishing and forestry 















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican 








































































































DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Index of mining production 
(1970 = 100) 



















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
Preliminary figures. Thousands of tons. 'Thousands of troy ounces. 
Table 6 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 




















Other indicators of 
manufacturing production 






































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supply by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of tons. 
unit packages. Millions of kWh. 
c
 Thousands of quintals. Millions of litres. 'Millions of 20-
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Table 7 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CONSTRUCTION INDICATORS 
Area constructed 
(thousands of m2) 
Housing 





























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. Building permits granted. 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of gallons. 
Table 8 










Terms of trade 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 

































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic and the International Monetary 
Fund. 
"Pesos per dollar. 'Base 1970 = 100. 
655 
Table 10 
















































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 11 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: EXPORT VOLUME 


















Tons Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986° 1983 1984 1985 1986° 



















































2 583 988 1 682 162 1 545 746 1 909 296 1 641 698 -34.9 -8.1 23.5 -14.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 




D O M I N I C A N REPUBLIC: EXPORTS TO THE U N I T E D STATES 
MADE U N D E R TARIFF INCENTIVES SYSTEMS" 
Total 


























1980 1981 1982 






















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Glastaff Institute. 
"Includes both goods and the value added by the in bond subcontracting industry, which figures in the balance-of-payments 
under the "services" entry. Articles 806 and 807 of the United States tariff schedule refer to products sent abroad for 
assembly which are subsequently returned to the United States. The figures which appear in this table represent the 
difference between the value of the returned assembled product and that of the component materials originally 
exported. "The Caribbean Basin Initiative has been in operation since 1984. It offers the Caribbean and Central 
American countries the opportunity to place their products, tax free, on the United States market. Sugar exports are included 
in this initiative so that they may enter the United States duty free. However, since they are traditional exports, they were not 
taken into account in this table. 
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Table 13 






Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance'' 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 













































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, June 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
Preliminary figures subject to revision. 
assets and liabilities. 
Includes other non-factor services. Includes net loans granted and other 
Equals the total variation in reserves (of opposite sign) plus counterpart items. 
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Table 15 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Total external debt 
Balances 
Long and medium term 
Short-term 
Interest* 
Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Net interest payments /exports 
of goods and services 
1980 1981 1982 






































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 
" Preliminary figures. Total public and guaranteed private external debt. 'Corresponds to the "interest paid" entry 
on the balance-of-payments current account. Corresponds to the net item of thé balance-of-payments. 
Table 16 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: DOMESTIC PRICES 
Consumer price index 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Housing 
Wearing apparel and footwear 
Other 
Consumer price index 
Food, beverages and tobacco 
Housing 




















































































DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: THE MINIMUM WAGE 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Pesos 
Minimum monthly 
wage 125.0 125.0 125.0 125.0 158.3" 212.5* 250.0 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
Nominal 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 126.6 170.0 200.0 
Real 100.0 93.0 86.4 80.8 82.2 80.2 86.0 
Growth rates 
Nominal . . . . 26.6 34.2 17.6 
Real -4.8 -7.0 -7.1 -6.5 1.8 -2.4 7.2 Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Raised to 175 pesos as from May Raised to 250 pesos as from July. 
Table 18 
D O M I N I C A N REPUBLIC: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME A N D EXPENDITURE 




On foreign trade 
Other taxes 
Non-tax revenue 
2. Current expenditure 
Wages and salaries 
Current transfers 
Other expenditures 
3. Current saving (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Capital transfers 
Other capital expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal deficit (1-5) 
7. Financing of deficit 
Net domestic financing 
Credit received 
Less amortization payments 
Sale of bonds 
Net external financing 
Credit received* 


































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic. 





DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MONETARY INDICATORS 
Monetary base 
Money (M,) 
Currency outside banks 
Current account deposits 
Quasi-money 












































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic and the International 
Monetary Fund. 
"Preliminary figures. Annual averages were used in calculating the ratios. 
Table 20 












































































































































1. Recent economic trends 
a) Introduction and summary 
The reactivation of production which had begun during the second half of 1985 was consoli-
dated in 1986. The gross domestic product grew by 6.6 % ; international reserves increased considera-
bly; the public-sector deficit declined to less than 5 % of the product; and once again wages increased 
and unemployment dell. The most significant negative feature was the persistence of a high annual 
inflation rate of approximately 70% (see table 1 and figure 1). 
The main factors contributing to the favourable performance of the economy derived from the 
external sector. The slump in oil prices brought in its wake a marked decline in the value of fuel 
imports, which in 1985 had represented 30% of total external purchases of goods. The reduction of 
international interest rates also helped to bring about an improvement in the balance on current 
account. At the same time, the devaluation of the dollar against the other strong currencies stimulated 
exports to the European Economic Community, especially to the Federal Republic of Germany, while 
the introduction of the Plan Cruzado led to a strong demand from Brazil for Uruguayan imports. 
These changes boosted beef sales in particular because, together with the sharp increase in the 
amount sold, there was a sizeable increase in the prices of an item representing 15% of merchandise 
exports. Lastly, introduction of the Plan Austral in Argentina helped to augment the number of 
tourists from that country in the summer of 1985/1986. 
Furthermore, because of the greater income generated by the expansion of domestic activity, 
the lower level of transfers abroad and the improvement in the terms of trade, domestic demand 
expanded, thus reinforcing the growth of economic activity. Consequently, gross domestic income 
rose by 9%, after four years of consecutive decreases which had brought it down by 18%. In turn, the 
wage-earning sector benefited both from the increase of almost 6% in average real remunerations 
and from the slide of over two percentage points in the average unemployment rate. This rate had 
fallen to 9% by the end of the year, the lowest figure recorded since 1981. 
The fiscal adjustment was again a striking feature of the economy. The positive trend in the real 
income of the central government and the maintenance of the real level of its expenditure paved the 
way for a further reduction of the fiscal deficit, which was thus equivalent to 7% of its expenditure. 
The balance of payments showed particularly favourable results. Trade in goods closed the year 
with a surplus of almost US$300 million, and consequently there was also a positive balance on 
current account for the first time since 1973. With capital inflows amounting to nearly US$190 
million, the reserves of the monetary authority increased by US$250 million. 
The gross external debt increased by 6% to US$5.2 billion by the end of the year. However, the 
profits derived from the increase in world gold prices and the expansion of the banking system's 
international reserves resulted in a marked reduction in net indebtedness which declined by 11 % ; the 
net external debt at the end of 1986 was thus equivalent to only 1.7 times the country's exports of 
goods and services. 
The increase in the consumer price index declined from 83% in 1985 to 71% in 1986. The 
variation between annual averages was, in contrast, somewhat more in 1986 (76%) than in the 
preceding year (72%). Even though the inflation rate did tend to slacken during the course of the 
year, the progress made in this respect was very limited. This was partly due to the fact that the sharp 
rise in international reserves caused the actual expansion in the money supply (77%) to be 
substantially greater than planned (51%). 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1 (concluded) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. b Average annual rate in Montevideo. cAugust 1974 to February 1975. 
¿December - December percentage variation. eMillions of dollars. ^Percentages. 
b) The economic and financial programme for 1986 
In mid-1985 the Uruguayan authorities had formulated an economic and financial programme 
for the period from July 1985 to December 1986. Support for this programme was received from the 
International Monetary Fund in the form of a stand-by credit arrangement and from the country's 
foreign creditor banks, which agreed to refinance the external debt on a multi-annual basis. The 
arrangement with the Fund and with the creditor banks included two partially overlapping 
"programme-years". The first covered the period from July 1985 to June 1986, while the second 
covered the 1986 calendar year. In this way, the targets to be met in 1986 were set ahead of time 
within the overall framework of the global adjustment programme. Nevertheless, the improvement 
in the international situation, the domestic response and the growing confidence of economic agents 
led to the introduction of a number of changes, especially in the monetary area. 
i) Objectives: Generally speaking, the plan included the quantitative targets which had been 
established in mid-1985 for the main variables that could be controlled. Thus, it retained the target of 
reducing inflation to a rate of 50% per year and that of obtaining an increase in the gross domestic 
product from 2% to 4 % . In order to achieve these goals it was, in turn, deemed necessary: a) to reduce 
the public-sector deficit to less than 5 % of the gross domestic product, which would involve an 
imbalance of 13 billion new pesos in the non-financial public sector, assistance to the Banco 
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Hipotecario del Uruguay (Uruguayan Mortgage Bank) (BHU) and a para-fiscal deficit for the Central 
Bank of Uruguay (BCU) of around 27.5 billion new pesos. This deficit was financed with US$126.5 
million in external resources and 19 billion new pesos from domestic sources; b) to raise the net 
international reserves of the BCU by US$50 million; c) to restrict the growth of the public sector's net 
external indebtedness to a maximum of US$186 million; and d) to restrict the increase in the 
domestic credit of the BCU to a maximum of 11 billion new pesos, which would entail increases of 
52% in the monetary base and of 51% in the means of payment and in M2 (means of payment plus 
time deposits in national currency within the banking system). 
However, the behaviour of some variables during the second half of 1985 and especially in the 
first quarter of 1986 meant that some adjustments had to be made in the original programme. 
Specifically, the favourable external environment, the increase in the confidence of economic agents 
and the responsiveness of domestic supply and demand prompted an increase in the Central Bank's 
international reserves during the first half of 1986 which was much higher than had been forecast. 
Consequently, while an increase of US$50 million had been projected, the actual expansion during 
this period was US$120 million. The monetization of this increase in reserves within a climate of 
greater confidence and, therefore, one in which the demand for money was maintained, implied the 
creation of a much greater amount of money than forecast. As this could prove to be incompatible 
with the government's anti-inflation targets, the monetary authorities adjusted the programme in an 
attempt to sterilize a portion of the money created as a result of the increase in reserves through the 
compulsory purchase by the banking system of what were referred to as Monetary Regulation Notes, 
which functioned rather like an interest-bearing cash reserve. Since the interest rates paid on these 
notes were kept at levels competitive with those offered on time deposits in the banking system, there 
was a considerable volume of voluntary purchases of these public securities in the private non-
financial and banking sectors. 
The authorities also set a number of targets with respect to exchange rates and wages. In these 
two cases the policies were aimed at, as a minimum, maintaining the real exchange rate and the 
purchasing power of wages. 
Another policy applied during most of the year concerned the reduction of interest rates in 
national currency. In this connection, the measures taken by the Banco de la República (BROU) to 
reduce the nominal rates on loans and deposits produced satisfactory results up to mid-way through 
the third quarter of the year, during which time the inflation rate also showed a downward trend. 
However, the perception by economic agents of a change in this trend had the effect of halting (and 
event partly reversing) this reduction of interest rates at a level where an equilibrium was maintained 
with the rates of inflation and devaluation. 
ii) The impact of external changes. The external environment for the Uruguayan economy in 
1986 exhibited a series of favourable circumstances at both the world and regional levels. 
First of all, the successive reductions of the LIBOR rate —which was that applying to most of the 
external debt contracted at a floating rate— together with the completion of the negotiations with 
the creditor banks —during which a new payments schedule and a narrower spread were agreed 
upon— markedly reduced external interest payments. At the same time, the also considerable slump 
in oil prices resulted in a sharp decrease in the oil bill. Lastly, the changed parity of the dollar in 
respect of the European currencies contributed to an increase in European purchases of products 
whose prices on the world market are usually set in dollars. 
Simultaneously, regional demand exhibited a sudden dynamism which was linked to the 
stabilization plans of Argentina and Brazil. The Plan Austral, which was instituted by the Govern-
ment of Argentina in mid-1985, had a favourable effect on the expectations of economic agents in 
that country and improved Uruguay's terms of trade during the 1985/1986 tourist season. There was 
thus a marked increase in the number of Argentine tourists visiting Uruguay, and this created 
substantial additional demand in the domestic market and helped to generate a sizeable increase in 
national income. 
For its part, the stabilization plan implemented in Brazil as from March 1986 led to a 
considerable expansion of the Brazilian demand for Uruguayan exports, principally of food and 
especially of meat. This rapidly spurred growth in the livestock sector, which was in the process of 
building up its stocks of cattle and which had excess stocks of sheep. Thus, exports to Brazil doubled, 
making that country Uruguay's major foreign buyer, with a share of over 25% of its total exports. 
668 
URUGUAY 
During the first half of the year, the external boom, the increase in confidence domestically and 
the existence of an interest rate in national currency which was higher than the sum of the increase of 
the exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar plus the international interest rate were all conducive to a major 
capital inflow. It is likely that an appreciable part of this inflow corresponded to the funds that were 
returning to the country in order to finance an increase in the floating capital of companies for which 
the outlook was promising in terms of both external and internal demand. The return of capital was 
further encouraged by the decline in international interest rates and by the domestic credit squeeze 
which was in part caused by excessive corporate borrowing from the banking system. 
Given this situation, the authorities had to decide whether the external changes that had 
occurred were of a temporary or permanent character. If they were regarded as permanent, then the 
logical conclusion was that, within the framework of the floating exchange rate system in force at the 
time, the Uruguayan currency would appreciate in value. However, if such a conclusion were 
subsequently proven to be wrong, the necessary adjustment might bring about a repetition of the 
cyclical phenomenon of the periods 1979-1981 and 1982-1984, during which there was, respectively, 
a huge boom and then a marked slump in economic activity. 
If, on the other hand, the authorities decided that the boom was temporary, then measures 
should be adopted to keep the growth rate of domestic credit below that of the rate of issue which 
would be produced as a consequence of the increase in reserves in the event that some ways were 
found to avoid a revaluation of the peso. In this scenario, the growth of economic activity would be 
less than if the external boom were regarded as permanent, but it would not, subsequently, have such 
a negative effects if the boom later turned out to be temporary. 
On various occasions the monetary authorities expressed the opinion that the external boom 
was temporary in nature, and they opted for the establishment of a hybrid exchange rate system. At 
the same time, they tried to reduce primary expansion deriving from the purchase of international 
reserves by the Central Bank through the sale of compulsory Monetary Regulation Notes within the 
banking system. 
iii) Investment and its financing. The financial programme achieved most of its objectives and, 
thus, by the end of 1986 the main macroeconomic variables were closer to equilibrium than they had 
been at the beginning of the year. For example, the variation in domestic prices, the exchange rate and 
the interest rate were all compatible with one another; the product, real wages and employment were 
on an upward trend; and the fiscal deficit had been reduced appreciably within a context of fiscal and 
monetary restraint combined with an external equilibrium. Nevertheless, two circumstances con-
tinued to restrict the growth process: the trend in investment and the level of internal and external 
indebtedness. 
The response of business enterprises to the increased external and internal demand which 
began to be seen in the second half of 1985 was largely based on a fuller use of installed capacity, which 
until then had been considerably underutilized. The behaviour of business enterprises was less 
satisfactory in respect of new investments, and public investment also failed to react with great 
dynamism. In fact, gross fixed capital formation remained too low to meet the objective of sustained 
growth. Indeed, although investment grew by 6%, it represented less than 8% of the gross domestic 
product. The investment coefficient was thus similar to that of the year before, and net investment 
was again negative (see table 2). However, the upturn seen during the year in both construction and 
the importation of machinery and equipment would seem to indicate that towards the end of 1986 net 
investment had attained positive levels. 
The main factors determining the behaviour of entrepreneurs had to do with their uncertainty 
as to the future trend of demand and with a number of financial constraints, which greatly influenced 
their decisions. One of the principal ones was the very limited progress that was made towards 
resolving the difficult problem of domestic overindebtedness. Although considerable efforts were 
made in the institutional sphere, in practice the general moratorium remained unchanged for most of 
those concerned. The efforts made during 1986 were directed particularly towards applying the legal 
mechanisms adopted in late 1985 with a view to solving this problem. Thus, the Financial Analysis 
Commission —which examines the viability of debtors submitting applications under the provisions 
of the General Debt Refinancing Act— made notable progress in the classification of debtors, which 
is an important step in the process leading up to the application of the refinancing mechanism. Initial 
steps were also taken for launching the National Development Corporation, a long-term lending 
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agency that would also be able to reactivate enterprises considered to be economically viable but 
which are experiencing major financial problems. 
Nonetheless, the mutual problem of creditors and debtors remained. For the creditors, this 
meant confronting liquidity constraints, while for the debtors, it meant facing some degree of 
uncertainty as to the ownership of the enterprises that they managed. In this context, the decision to 
undertake investments to expand production capacity confronted entrepreneurs with the twofold 
problem of credit constraints and doubt as to their future ownership of the companies in question. 
The constraint posed by heavy external indebtedness was also a prime factor in preventing 
external savings from being used to finance new investments. In fact, while the transfer of net 
reserves abroad declined, it was still considerable. 
The capital inflow recorded during 1986 exhibited some novel characteristics. The balance-of-
paymentsdata show an amount of US$175 million under the item "errors and omissions", which can 
be equated with unrecorded private capital inflows. This sizeable inflow of capital from abroad could 
be accounted for by the repatriation of capital by residents of the country in the light of the new 
conditions existing in both the domestic market (greater confidence, increased demand, adequate 
remuneration) and the external market (a striking drop in the interest rates paid by international 
banks). This capital was apparently channelled in two main ways: it would seem that some was paid 
into deposits in the financial system while some probably helped to finance increases in both floating 
and fixed capital.1 
Another factor which limited the private sector's response in the area of gross capital formation 
was the uncertainty prevailing as to the future development of external markets. 
As has already been mentioned, one of the chief factors which contributed to the growth of 
exports in 1986 was Brazilian demand. It should be recalled, furthermore, that Uruguay had signed 
two economic complementarity agreements with Argentina and Brazil2 whose reactivation was 
expected to contribute to a marked expansion of the demand for Uruguayan products. However, the 
stabilization programmes in both countries raised doubts among entrepreneurs as to the future 
development of regional demand. Although progress was made in respect to CAUCE during the second 
half of the year, Brazilian demand appeared to have a large cyclical component and towards the end of 
the year difficulties were encountered in finalizing pre-arranged exports due to the formidable 
non-tariff barriers (non-shipment of import waybills) raised by the Brazilian authorities. Within this 
context, some manufacturers decided to make investments in order to increase their exports to Brazil, 
while others waited to see how events would unfold in connection with the Plan Cruzado. This latter 
attitude was reinforced by the situation in the world financial market and particularly by the sharp 
fluctuations in exchange rates and the increase of protectionism in the industrialized countries. 
Lastly, public investment expanded very little due to the government's policy of curbing its 
expenditure as part of its economic and financial programme. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
a) Total supply and demand 
Total supply grew by 9% during 1986 as a result of significant increases in both the gross 
domestic product (6.6%) and the volume of imports (28%) (see table 2). Nevertheless, the supply of 
goods and services barely exceeded that of 1978 and was 14% lower than the high point achieved in 
1981. 
The marked expansion of external purchases reversed the steady downward trend displayed by 
the import coefficient since 1981; nonetheless, this coefficient was still much lower than it had been 
in the years prior to the crisis. By contrast, the also considerable increase in exports (12%) raised the 
1
 The return of capital is an extremely important phenomenon, in that some sources of information estimate that 
Uruguayan funds abroad amount to over USÎ 1.5 billion. If the flow were to be sustained, it would constitute a major source of 
financing for private investment and thereby ease one of the main constraints holding the country back from generating an 
ongoing process of growth. 
2These are the Uruguayan-Argentine Economic Co-operation Agreement (CAUCE) and the Trade Expansion 
Protocol (PEC) agreed upon by Uruguay and Brazil. 
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export coefficient to the highest level (22%) recorded in recent history. As a consequence of these 
changes —which signalled the resumption of the process of opening up the economy to the 
exterior— in 1986 the ratio of exports plus imports to the gross domestic product was the highest it 
had been in the last 10 years save for 1980 (see table 3). 
The trade surplus for goods and services was equivalent to 7.4% of the gross domestic product, 
which also reflected the considerable export effort that was made. Available goods and services thus 
grew less than the product, even though domestic demand increased by more than 8 %, following five 
years of successive decreases during which it had contracted by 27%. 
A change was also seen in 1986 in the trend of gross domestic investment, which climbed by 6% 
after having fallen sharply and steadily since 1981. Some major changes also occurred in the financing 
of what was still a very low level of gross domestic investment. First of all, transfers abroad declined, 
both as a consequence of the terms of trade and in respect of net factor payments; despite this, the sum 
of the two represented an outflow of resources equivalent to around 6% of the gross domestic 
product. The country's favourable external current account, on the other hand, signified a negative 
external savings of somewhat more than 1% of the product. Consequently, in order for the 
investment coefficient to reach the extremely modest level of 8%, gross domestic savings equivalent 
to 15% of the product were required (see table 4). 
Lastly, total consumption increased by 8.5%. Personal consumption rose by almost 9% as a 
result of the increase in income deriving from favourable domestic developments (increase in real 
wages, profits and employment) and external factors (improvement in the terms of trade and the 
balance of factor services). At the same time, and notwithstanding the fiscal adjustment,government 
consumption increased by almost 8% since, thanks to the reduction of the international interest rate, 
some of the resources previously earmarked for servicing the external debt could be transferred to the 
domestic market. 
b) Growth of the main sectors 
The gross domestic product maintained an upward trend in almost all sectors throughout the 
year. Minor reductions were recorded only in fishing (-2%) —although output was still more than 
double that obtained in 1978— and in construction (-1.5%) —despite the rising trend in this activity 
beginning in the second quarter of the year. The greatest increases were recorded in manufacturing 
(12%), commerce (10%) and transport, storage and communications (10%) (see table 5). 
i) The agricultural sector. Agricultural output grew by somewhat more than 3%. Despite this, it 
was still 5% lower than in 1981, when it reached its peak level of the last 10 years. Both the 
crop-farming and stock-raising contributed to this growth: agriculture expanded by 2.6% and 
livestock production climbed by 3.8% (see table 6). 
There were very considerable increases in the production of soya (47%) and sugar beets (37%) 
due to the considerable extension of the area sown with both crops and to the fact that soya yields 
were higher than expected. The harvests of wheat (6%), maize (3%) and sunflowers (8.4%) were 
also better than in 1985. By contrast, the harvests of flax (-9%), malt barley (-3%) and rice (-4%) 
declined, mainly because of reductions in the area under cultivation.3 
As in the preceding year, good weather conditions during the winter of 1986 favoured a 
continued development of pasturelands and therefore led to a good performance by the stock-raising 
sector. Cattle production recorded a further increase of almost 3%, and output was thus higher than 
in 1985. This increase coincided with an upward phase in the cattle cycle and with an increase in the 
average weight of the animals, which was due to the availability of pasturage. Strong external demand 
led to a significant increase in the number of animals slaughtered and in the price paid for the animals 
for fattening and slaughtering. Consequently, the average price per kilo of live animal virtually 
doubled between the end of 1985 and December 1986, going from US$0.37 to US$0.70 per kilo on the 
hoof, thereby reaching a level which had not been obtained since 1982. 
Due to the favourable weather conditions of recent years, together with the strong external 
demand for meat and wool, inventories of cattle and sheep were the highest ever recorded in the 
'These variations correspond to those used in the calculation of the gross domestic product, which is done according to 
calendar years. Table 7, on the other hand, shows the variations between crop years. 
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country, standing at 33 million head, of which 9.3 million were cattle and 23.9 million were sheep (see 
table 7). This was also indicative of a better utilization of the country's forage capacity. In point of 
fact, stock-raising performance is determined by four major factors: genetics, health, management 
and feeding. The progress made in respect of stocks and output in recent years has primarily been due 
to the advances made in relation to the first three of these variables. Feeding, however, is still based 
on intensive grazing of natural pastures, and weather conditions therefore play a decisive role in this 
regard. 
With respect to sheep product exports, there was progress in the production of both mutton 
and wool. Although wool production is the main activity in Uruguay, the trends in the supply and 
demand for beef cattle and the high level of sheep stocks, together with the considerable level of 
Brazilian demand, stimulated the slaughtering of sheep for domestic consumption and for export. 
Exports thus amounted to 16 400 tons —the highest figure in the last 10 years— and domestic 
consumption reached 48 000 tons —which represented an increase of 13% over the preceding year 
and of more than 30% over the average for the period 1979-1984. At the same time, the output from 
the 1986/1987 wool clip, which was carried out in September-October 1986, was 6% more than that 
of the previous clipping and was close to the record high. 
Milk production was once again boosted by the mild weather conditions that prevailed and by 
mounting external demand, increasing by 4%. Domestic demand, however, remained relatively 
stagnant. 
Poultry breeding was the only item of livestock production which declined (-8%), owing to a 
significant reduction in egg collection. However, the fact should be borne in mind that this was a 
decline from the historically very high level registered the year before. 
Finally, a notable occurrence within the sector was the decrease in the prices of agricultural 
inputs in terms of sectoral prices, in that this resulted in a higher value added per output unit value. 
ii) Fishing. Fishery output fell by 2% in 1986 because of a number of problems relating to the 
catch which were encountered during the first half of the year; the catch suffered from the negative 
impacts of the withdrawal of schools of fish to more remote locations and of labour conflicts. 
Nonetheless, towards the end of the period the level of activity in this sector was substantially higher 
than the average for the preceding year. 
iii) Manufacturing. The manufacturing sector grew by 12% in 1986, but even so its level of 
activity was still lower than that reached in 1977. The expansion, which derived from widespread 
growth in the different branches of industry, was concentrated in the six months from April to 
September, when industrial output expanded by 20%. 
The production of food, beverages and tobacco grew by 4.5 % owing to the large number of 
cattle slaughtered, the processing of the greater volume of agricultural production and the increase in 
domestic demand that stemmed from the growth of income. Brazilian demand, for its part, stimu-
lated meat, rice and beer production and the manufacture of malts in particular. 
Textiles and clothing production went up by almost 15%. The buoyant external demand for 
these goods was matched by an abundant supply thanks to the substantial provisions of wool obtained 
during the year. The manufacture of leather clothing and footwear also increased considerably (see 
table 8). 
The manufacture of paper and paper products rose by 12% in response to the increase in both 
domestic demand (especially by business enterprises) and the demand from Argentina within the 
framework of the CAUCE agreement. 
Chemical products also saw a major increase. The improved performance of stock-raising 
activity encouraged the manufacturing of fertilizers and pesticides, which climbed by 28%. The 
production of paints, varnishes and lacquers continued its upward trend; the substantial increase in 
exports —which more than doubled those of the preceding year— and the increase in domestic 
demand —which stemmed from the reactivation of the automobile and leather industries— contrib-
uted to the 32% expansion of this activity. 
The rise in both domestic and external demand also had a positive impact on the motor vehicle 
type industry (32%) and on the manufacture of plastic articles (17%). The former reflected the dual 




The manufacture of non-metallic mineral products rose by 32%. The fastest-growing activities 
in this branch —one in which a strong domestic demand was combined with growing exports— were 
the production of pottery, earthenware and chinaware (55%) and glassware (31%). 
The metals and machinery and equipment industries also showed significant growth. The main 
items contributing to this expansion were the manufacture of motor vehicles (32%) and domestic 
appliances (58%), as well as the construction of radio, television and communications equipment and 
appliances (44%). 
There was also a significant growth in ship building and ship repair (28%) —which was 
influenced by the construction of a ferry that was to be used between Colonia and Buenos Aires— and 
the manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles (70%). 
One of the few sectors in which activity declined was petroleum refining. Its 10% decline was 
attributable to the shutdown of a processing plant for maintenance and to a labour union conflict 
which was so severe that it became necessary to purchase petroleum products abroad. As this item 
carries considerable weight in total industrial output, the extent of its decline, when compared with 
the growth of the manufacturing sector, serves to highlight the marked dynamism of the other 
industrial subsectors. 
iv) Construction. After a continued and steep decline which by 1985 had brought this activity 
down to less than half of the level recorded at the beginning of the decade, in 1986 a reversal of the 
trend in construction was observed. In fact, between the first and the last quarters of the year, this 
sector saw an increase of 9%. Even so, the average for the year was 1 % lower than in 1985. This result 
was due to a 5% increase in public construction and a 9% decline in private construction. However, 
towards the end of the year private construction also began to grow, and this was manifested in a 
decline in unemployment in the sector —which dropped from 20% during the first quarter of the 
year to 7% in the final quarter— and in the fact that there was some difficulty in meeting the demand 
for specialized personnel. This revival of private construction was in large part occasioned by a 
change in economic agents' portfolios, which was in turn prompted by the decline of interest rates in 
both foreign and national currencies and by the upward trend in real estate values, which in dollar 
terms made a substantial recovery during the year from the very low levels recorded since the 1982 
crisis. 
v) Services. Services were in step with the recovery observed in the goods-producing sectors. 
The output of electricity, gas and water expanded by 7%, and both commerce and transport grew by 
10%. Financial, personal and government services increased by a lesser amount (3%). 
c) Employment and unemployment 
The unemployment rate —which in 1985 had already dipped slightly— had, by the end of the 
year, fallen to its lowest level since late 1981. For its part, the employment rate in Montevideo 
climbed from 51.5% as of the end of 1985 to 54.1% in December 1986, which was the highest figure 
registered ever since statistical records have been kept. Even though the manufacturing industry grew 
by 12%, the unemployment rate in that sector remained virtually unchanged during most of the year. 
The greatest decline in unemployment occurred in construction, especially during the final quarter 
(see table 9). 
The trend in the average number of hours worked, broken down by type of activity, was quite 
different. Between the first and last quarters of the year, this coefficient rose in the manufacturing 
industry (from 41.2 hours per week to 44.8 hours) whereas it fell in construction (from 43.4 hours to 
41.8 hours per week). Overall, the number of hours worked per week climbed from 39.6 to 43.2; this 
indicated that, generally speaking, the entrepreneurial response to the increase in demand was 
oriented towards expanding employment and lengthening work schedules. 
3. The external sector 
a) Main features 
As previously noted, the favourable situation in the external sector was the most significant 
force behind the development of the economy in 1986. The reduction of both the international 
interest rate and the spread applied to payments on the debt owed to the foreign banking system 
resulted in savings of around US$80 million in remittances of interest abroad. Regional demand 
673 
constituted another important stimulus. The steep rise in private consumption in Brazil led to a 
major expansion of Uruguayan exports, thereby prompting increases both in prices and in the 
quantities involved. The Plan Austral had a similar effect during the early months of the year thanks 
to the sizeable increase in the number of Argentine tourists. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the exchange rate for the dollar increased substantially less 
than domestic prices and wages, the effective real exchange rate deteriorated only slightly because of 
the sharp devaluation of the dollar against the yen and the European currencies which occurred at the 
same time (see table 10). 
Due to the change in the external environment, together with the increase in the confidence of 
economic agents and the imbalances between the interest rates paid on national and foreign currency 
during the first half of the year, the showing of the country's balance of payments was very 
encouraging. 
Indeed international reserves rose by US$250 million as a result of a surplus on current account 
of US$66 million —the first since 1973— and a positive capital account balance (including the item 
"errors and omissions") of almost US$190 million (see table 11). 
Even so, the country again made a net transfer of resources abroad. As has been the case since 
1982, the net capital inflow was not enough to cover net factor payments, with the result that there 
was a negative net transfer of just over US$90 million. Consequently, during the period 1982-1986, 
the country paid out more than US$1.2 billion, which was equivalent to approximately one-fifth of its 
gross domestic product and one-fourth of the gross external debt as of the end of 1986 (see table 12). 
b) External trade 
i) Exports. In 1986 exports of goods and services increased by 20% in current dollars, while 
merchandise exports grew by more than 27%. This expansion was almost entirely due to the increase 
in volume (see table 13). 
An increase in external sales was recorded both for traditional exports (37%) and for 
non-traditional exports (22%). The share of the latter therefore fell in 1986 to 63% of the total, 
although it was still higher than the average for the 10-year period of 1976-1985 (see table 14). 
Among the main items, a marked increase was seen in beef exports (49%), two-thirds of which 
was sold in the form of frozen meat. Sales of mutton trebled, thanks to Brazilian demand. Exports of 
hides, skins and leather products, whose value increased by 30%, were also very significant. Textiles 
and manufactures rose by 21 %, with the sales of tops being particularly notable. Fishery exports also 
made a good showing, increasing by 24%. By contrast, external sales of cereals (rice) and other crops 
fell by 5 %. Exports of chemical products (particularly paints and varnishes) grew by 35 % during the 
year and came to represent 5% of the total. Another item which experienced strong growth was the 
food, beverages and tobacco industries, which soared by 58%. 
Exports of services also exhibited dynamism. Tourism grew by 10% in current dollars owing to 
the large influx of Argentine summer vacationers (480 000 during the 1985/1986 season). 
ii) Imports. External purchases of goods also increased substantially. 17% in value and 36% in 
volume. 
The drop in the price of oil greatly eased the country's foreign exchange situation, inasmuch as 
the oil bill decreased by US$83 million. In contrast, the other imports grew at a rapid pace due to the 
greater dynamism of the economy and the renewal of stocks, which had been greatly reduced during 
the preceding years. Raw materials and intermediate goods other than petroleum increased by 36%, 
while consumer goods grew by 55% and capital goods by 76% (see table 15). Nevertheless, the total 
value of merchandise imports was equivalent to one-half of that recorded in 1980, when the oil bill 
was more than three times as high as in 1986. 
Expenditures outside the country by Uruguayan tourists increased by 7% owing to the fact that 
they had a greater amount of disposable income. 
iii) The terms of trade. As a direct consequence of the sharp drop in the price of hydrocarbons, 
the terms of trade improved substantially, regaining all of the ground lost since the end of the 
preceding decade. The unit value of imports fell by 14%, while that of exports increased by 1.5% (see 
table 12). Dissimilar trends were to be observed among the latter: whereas beef obtained better prices 
as a result of the increase in Brazilian demand, the international prices of wool and rice declined. 
674 
URUGUAY 
c) The external debt 
The net external debt was reduced by US$137 million, which was a decline of 11% compared 
with the balance at the end of 1985. This reduction was due to the considerable growth of 
international reserves, since the gross debt climbed by almost US$300 million (see table 16). Indeed, 
the gross international reserves of the financial system —with gold being valued at market prices— 
increased by US$600 million, of which US$509 million corresponded to the public banking system. 
Public-sector indebtedness increased by nearly US$280 million (7.8%), whereas that of the 
private sector remained virtually unchanged. Thus, at the close of the year the total external debt was 
equivalent to three and one-half times the value of exports, while the service on this debt was 
equivalent to one-third of this. The latter proportion represented a notable reduction from the figure 
of 47% recorded the previous year. This drop was mainly attributable to an almost two-point decline 
in the international interest rate. The reduction of the interest rate spread which was agreed upon 
when the debt was refinanced resulted in only small decreases during the year, but its impact will be 
more significant in the years to come. 
One striking fact was the high level of sales of public securities during the year. There was a 
strong demand for new issues of treasury bonds and treasury bills despite the policy of lengthening 
the terms and reducing the interest rates of successive bond issues and of the narrowing of the spread 
in the interest rate paid on treasury bills which, at the end of 1986, were being sold briskly at rates 
equivalent to the LIBOR plus 0.5% annually. US$92 million in non-resident funds were obtained 
through the sale of these types of securities and the external debt corresponding to this item was thus 
slightly more than US$700 million at the end of the year. 
The public sector's foreign currency debt to residents increased by US$175 million. The main 
financial instruments used in this connection were deposits in the official banking system and the sale 
of public debt denominated in dollars to economic agents. 
As a result, as of 31 December 1986 the public-sector debt in foreign currency stood at US$5.21 
billion, which was an increase of 9.5% over the year-end balance for 1985 (see table 16). 
4. Prices and wages 
a) Prices 
Although the variation in the consumer price index between December 1985 and December 
1986 was less than that recorded in the preceding 12 months (71% and 83%, respectively), it was 
higher than the target set in the financial programme announced at the beginning of the year. 
Moreover, the variation between annual averages was higher in 1986 than in 1985 (see table 18). The 
trend of the inflation rate changed markedly during the year. The 12-month variation in consumer 
prices followed a downward trend during the first five months of 1986, reversed that trend as they 
rose between May and October, and then began to slow down late in the year (see figure 2). 
Food prices increased the most (92%), whereas housing services climbed much less (43%). In 
the first case, the main reason was the rise in beef prices4 and, to a lesser extent, the price increases in 
a number of farm products. These changes were also reflected in the wholesale price index for 
domestic products. Thus, the prices of livestock products skyrocketed by 130%, those of farm 
products climbed by 79%, but the prices of manufactured goods rose by only 56%. However, since in 
1985 these prices had followed diametrically opposite trends, the variation recorded during the 
1984-1986 biennium for the prices of agricultural goods and manufactures was very similar. Housing 
services, on the other hand, rose much more slowly as a result of the provisions adopted in 1986 under 
an emergency law which regulated the procedure for adjusting rents in line with the devaluation of 
the currency. 
4
 The buoyant Brazilian demand for meat recorded from the beginning of the year onward, plus the limited nature of the 
supply of meat —due to the fact that production was then in the upward phase of its cycle—caused the price of beef on the hoof 




After increasing by 14% in 1985, real wages rose by almost 6% in 1986. The purchasing power 
of remunerations was thus 21 % higher than that of 1984. However, because of its steep fall during 
the 1983-1984 period, its level was still 15% lower than that of 1978 (see table 19). 
The wage policy was different in some respects from the one applied the year before. As regards 
private-sector wages, the system of four-monthly agreements between entrepreneurs and wage 
earners continued to be used within an overall framework, defined by the government, which set the 
maximum percentage that could be passed on to prices. During 1985, this ceiling was based on the 
past level of inflation. Wage readjustments in the public sector were carried out directly by the 
government and were set at percentages close to the maximum that could be transferred to 
private-sector prices. The way in which such readjustments were determined changed substantially in 
Figure 2 
URUGUAY: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(Percentages) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
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1986, in that two different categories within the private sector were created. In one of them, 
medium-term agreements —of up to two years— provided for automatic adjustments based on past 
inflation, to which, in some cases, adjustments for lags in real wages or for increases in productivity 
were added. This type of agreement was used generally in sectors linked to export activities which 
accounted for around 40% of private wage earners. In the rest of the private sector, the procedure for 
four-monthly adjustments was retained, but the maximum amount that could be transferred corres-
ponded to the average of past inflation and the inflation rate projected by the economic authorities. 
Nevertheless, in practice, adjustments higher than those suggested by the government were included 
in the agreements reached. Finally, for the public sector, wage adjustments were primarily based on 
the inflation rate projected for the subsequent four-month period. 
This policy led to different wage trends in the various activities and, at the same time, to the 
indexation of a sizeable portion of private-sector wages. Consequently, there was a considerable 
difference between the variations in the nominal wage in the public sector (73% from December 
1985 to December 1986) and the private sector (82% for the same period). In fact, the wage 
guidelines set by the government were systematically exceeded by the variation in the average 
private-sector nominal wage index. The four-monthly variation of this index for its part, was very 
similar to the inflation rate of the preceding four-month period and, except for the adjustment made 
in June, was higher than the variation in the price index for the subsequent four-month period (see 
table 20). 
Consequently, the real remunerations of wage earners in both the private and public sectors 
rose during the year. Between the beginning and end of 1986, real wages in the private sector rose by 
6.4% and in the public sector they increased by somewhat more than 1%. As measured in dollars, 
wages grew by 23% during this time, inasmuch as wages in the local currency climbed by 78% and the 
dollar quotation by 45%. 
5. Monetary and fiscal policy 
a) Monetary policy 
The good performance of the external sector decisively influenced monetary policy. As the large 
increase in reserves contributed to the growth of the monetary base, and since the economic 
authorities felt that much of the external improvement was of a short-term, cyclical nature, the 
Central Bank made it mandatory for the commercial banks to purchase Monetary Regulation Notes, 
which then served as a form of interest-bearing cash reserve; the amount of such notes to be 
purchased was linked to the value of the bank's local-currency deposits. At the end of the year, the 
ratio of notes to deposits was 12.5%, although most of this amount (7.5%) could be resold by the 
banks to their customers. 
Owing to the mandatory purchase of such notes in the banking system —in addition to 
voluntary purchases, since the Central Bank paid a very competitive interest rate during the year— 
the net credit of the Central Bank was considerably reduced. In fact, by the end of the year the sale of 
Monetary Regulation Notes was equivalent to 50% of the issues existing at the beginning of 1986. 
Thus, the increase in the monetary base was due entirely to the acquisition of international reserves: 
the US$256 million increase in the Central Bank's reserves, which at the average exchange rate for 
the year was equivalent to around 39 billion Uruguayan pesos, corresponded quite closely to the 
increase of 37 billion Uruguayan pesos in the monetary base. 
However, the mechanisms for offsetting the impact of the issues stemming from the increase 
in reserves were inadequate to keep the creation of money within the limits specified in the 
programme. Indeed, since the level of the exchange rate was a function of a given international parity 
based on past inflation, the amount of money was determined by demand. As a result of this, there 
were increases of 106% in issues,84% in the amount of money outside banks, 77% inMj and6l% in 
M2 (see table 21). 
However, the introduction during the year of substitutes very similar to money was a factor 
which should be borne in mind. In point of fact, the Monetary Regulation Notes voluntarily held by 
the public constituted an instrument very similar to a time deposit. In addition, there were the 
Certificates of Deposit in national currency, which were readjusted in accordance with variations in 
the consumer price index, that were offered by the Banco Hipotecario de Uruguay (Uruguayan 
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Mortgage Bank). These certificates, which had 12- and 18-month terms, were transferable on the 
stock exchange and had characteristics that were also very similar to time deposits. These certificates 
proved to be a very attractive instrument in mid-year when nominal interest rates fell and inflation 
went up, since this meant that the real interest rates paid on bank deposits were negative, whereas the 
12- and 18-month Certificates of Deposit offered real returns of 10% and 13%, respectively. 
As the annual variation in M2 (61%) was less than mat of prices (71%), the amount of real 
money declined in real terms and its velocity of circulation increased. Nevertheless, if the concept of 
M2 is broadened to include the voluntary-purchased Notes and the Certificates of Deposit, then the 
real demand for money remained virtually constant between December 1985 and December 1986.' 
At the same time, the international reserves of the commercial banking system increased 
appreciably (US$ 154 million). Consequently, the gain in international reserves in the banking system 
as a whole was US$411 million, an amount equivalent to almost 40% of the country's exports of 
goods. 
The ratio between the credit granted by the banking system to the private sector and the 
product again fell, although it was still relatively high in historical terms. This ratio dropped from 
39% in 1985 to 34% in 1986, which was a level similar to that of 1981, i.e., before the domestic 
payments crisis. For its part, the share of total credit represented by credit in the local currency 
remained at the level of around 28% that had been recorded during the past five years (see table 22). 
The decline in international interest rates, in conjunction with the trend of inflation and of the 
exchange rate in the country, led to a reduction of interest rates in both local and foreign currency. The 
preferential interest rate on loans in foreign currency within the banking system fell from around 
13% at the end of 1985 to less than 10% at the end of 1986, and by year's end the rates on deposits 
paid by the financial system were between 5 % and 5.5 % annually. In turn, the rates in local currency 
paid by the banking system declined by somewhat more than 10 percentage points, going from 
around 74% at the end of 1985 to 60% in December 1986. The rates on loans fell somewhat less: 
whereas the private banks reduced the preferential rate from 80% to 73%, the BROU (Bank of the 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay) lowered it from 79% to 69% (see table 23). 
The actions of the official banking system had a major impact on nominal market interest rates. 
During the greater part of the year, the BROU pursued a policy of reducing interest rates, and the 
private banks followed its lead until public expectations as to a decline of inflation changed during the 
course of the second quarter. The BROU continued its policy of lowering interest rates almost until the 
end of the year, whereas the Central Bank reversed this trend with the rate it paid on Monetary 
Regulation Notes, raising it from 60% to 63% annually in November and to 67% in December. 
The real interest rate fluctuated during the year. In the private banking system, rates on both 
loans and deposits rose during the first quarter because the nominal rates fell less rapidly than 
inflation. However, the subsequent increase in inflation brought down real rates during the greater 
part of the second and third quarters until the nominal rate again rose, causing the rates on loans to 
become positive once again in real terms and the rates on deposits to become less negative. 
b) Fiscal policy 
The strict adjustment of fiscal accounts was continued in 1986. The overall deficit of the public 
sector was less than 5% of the gross domestic product, after having represented almost 7% of the 
GDP the year before and 10.5% at the start of the 1985/1986 programme. The extent of the 
adjustment was also reflected in the fact that the central government's deficit fell, even in nominal 
terms. In fact, this deficit was reduced to the equivalent of 1.2% of the gross domestic product 
(compared with 2.9% in 1985), the lowest figure recorded since the 1982 crisis. This contraction of 
the deficit resulted from the combination of the increase in tax burden (which rose from 14.9% to 
15-9%) and the reduction of almost one percentage point in the ratio of central government 
expenditure to the product (see table 24). 
Current income climbed by almost 11 % in constant terms during 1986 and this increase was all 
the more significant given that a 12% increase had been observed the preceding year. Consequently, 
fiscal income increased by almost 25 % in constant values during this two-year period (see table 25). 
5
 M2, according to this broader concept which includes money substitutes, grew by 69% during the year, while the 
consumer price index increased by 71%. 
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The taxes which increased the most were those on foreign trade. This was due in part to the 
effect of the marked expansion of merchandise imports. However, a significant proportion of the 
increase in taxes was attributable to the change made in the tax on crude petroleum and petroleum 
products owing to the substantial decline in its international market prices. In effect, the legislation 
governing the tax on fuel sales placed a ceiling of 100% on the value before taxes. As in the case of 
gasoline the tax had amounted to 80% at the beginning of the year, the sharp drop in the purchase 
price of hydrocarbons entailed a major reduction in this source of income despite the raising of the 
tax.6 
Moreover, as has already been said, the authorities felt that the changes in the external 
environment were of a temporary nature. On the basis of this view, they decided to distribute the 
external savings deriving from the drop in the oil bill between consumers and the fiscal sector, which 
in turn required that they increase taxes above the legal maximum. In order to do this, the authorities 
had to raise the surcharge (the tax on imports), which in the case of petroleum was at the minimum 
level (10%), to 50%. The tax collected on fuels was therefore the sum of the domestic tax plus the 
import surcharge. Because of this, the change in the tax structure did not have a great impact. 
In turn, as part of the governments export promotion policy, towards the end of the year the 
authorities decided to make a 5% across-the-board reduction in tariffs and to lower the maximum 
tariff rate from 60% to 50%. In addition, purchases of machinery and equipment for the export 
sector were exempted from taxes. 
Domestic taxes —both indirect and direct— also increased more than did price levels. The VAT 
and income taxes rose by around 4.5 %, while the tax on wealth grew by 11 % in constant terms. The 
increase in receipts from the latter tax was due to the fact that the taxes were collected earlier than 
they had been the year before, and this led to a better economic performance in real terms. 
The increase in real domestic taxation was also attributable to the use of more effective tax 
collection mechanisms thanks to a number of modifications in administrative procedures and the 
raising of sanctions, which helped to reduce tax evasion. The refinancing of taxes owed which was 
carried out during the year was also a factor. Lastly, the Budget Act created a tax on short-term bank 
assets —which began to be collected during the third quarter— and changed the procedures for the 
payment of agricultural rent. 
On the other hand, the central administration's total expenditure remained at the same level as 
that of the preceding year in real terms (see table 25). Current expenditure was marginally reduced as 
a result of some substantial decreases in: i) financial assistance for social security (10% in real terms); 
ii) interest payments on the public debt (also 10%), as a result of the combined effect of lower 
interest rates and a slower rise in the dollar than that in price levels; and iii) transfers to other public 
agencies (17%). These reductions were offset by a real increase of 6% in the payment of remunera-
tions to public workers and by a considerable expansion (29%) in the purchase of goods and services. 
These modifications changed the composition of fiscal expenditure. The proportion of total 
expenditure represented by wages rose from 30% in 1985 to 32% in 1986 and non-personal 
expenditures rose from 12% to 16%, while the proportions of the remaining items of current 
expenditure decreased. Investment, for its part, was 4% higher than in 1985 at constant values. Even 
so, it represented only 9% of total expenditure (see table 26). 
In the financing of the central administration's deficit, priority was once again given to 
borrowing in the form of bonds and securities in foreign currency, as had been the case since 1984. 
The sale of debt securities denominated in dollars brought in 80% more in funds than the fiscal 
imbalance, and there was thus a contraction of credit both from the monetary authority (BROU-BCU) 
—in an amount very close to the total deficit— and from other external loans (see table 25). 
The rates and charges of public enterprises increased between 55% and 65% during the year, 
except for the prices charged for petroleum products, which varied by around 16% for the reasons 
already outlined. The prices of public services therefore rose somewhat more slowly than the general 
level of prices. However, the increase in sales resulting from the expansion of economic activity and 
lower costs (in the case of petroleum) meant that, on the whole, these enterprises broke even or 
showed a slight surplus. 
6
 For example, if an 80% tax was being levied on fuels on the basis of a previous oil price of US$28 per barrel and this 
price then fell to one-half that level, then even if the tax were raised to the legal maximum of 100%, this would still result in 
receipts equivalent to only 63% of the amount previously collected. In real terms, then taxation would have decreased by 37%. 
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Table 1 
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
prices (index: 1980 = 100) 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(index: 1980 = 100) 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Rate of unemployment' 
Consumer prices 
December-December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries 
Money 
Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government 
expenditure 
Current value of exports of 
goods and services 

























95.1 100.0 100.8 90.1 
Growth rates 





























93.7 77.5 42.2 -8.0 































1.5e 0.5e 0.5 36.4 20.1 28.3 16.0 
30.8 27.8 10.5 -22.7 -0.2 -0.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Gross national product plus terms-of-trade effect (goods and services). 













goods and services 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 
C. External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payment of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 





































































/ (+) indicates an increase. 




URUGUAY: TOTAL SUPPLY A N D D E M A N D 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Construction 
Machinery and equipment 




Exports of goods and 
services 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments 
data expressed in dollars at current prices, which were converted to constant 1980 values using price indexes calculated by 
ECLAC for the purpose and expressed in indexes. 
Table 3 
URUGUAY: COEFFICIENT OF OPENNESS OF THE ECONOMY 
























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
Indexes 







































































































































URUGUAY: FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross national saving 
Gross domestic saving 




Gross domestic investment 
Gross national saving 
Gross domestic saving 




1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 

























































































































URUGUAY: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT 1980 MARKET PRICES 







Electricity, gas and water 






insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 
Community, social and 
personal services 
Government services 









































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Note: These series were calculated on the basis of official figures, which were then re-weighted according to the structure of 
current 1980 prices. Therefore, the results do not necessarily coincide with those published by the countries or with 
their calculations based on constant prices. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes livestock, forestry and fishing. 
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Table 6 
URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 












Indicators of livestock 
production 




































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. Agricultural year. 'Thousands of tons. 
hoof. 'Millions of litres. Millions of units. 
Thousands of tons on the 
Table 7 













































URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
production 
Food 



















Basic ferrous metals 
Basic non-ferrous metals 
Metal products 
Electrical machinery, 
appliances and supplies 
Transport equipment 
Scientific, professional 















































































































































































Unemployi ment rate 

















































































Source: Department of Statistics and Censuses, Uruguay. 




URUGUAY: EXCHANGE RATES 
Indexes of effective real 
Annual and Nominal exchange exchange rate" 
quarterly rates 





































































































Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, on the basis of information from the International Monetary Fund, 
International financial statistics. 
"Corresponds to the average of the indexes of the effective real exchange rate for the peso with respect to the currencies of 
Uruguay's main trading partners, weighted by the relative significance of exports or imports to or from those countries, as 
appropriate. From 1975 to 1979, these weightings correspond to the average for those years and from 1980 onward, to the 
average for the period 1980-1983. Wholesale price indexes were the indexes used in these calculation whenever possible. For 
information on the methodology and sources used, see the technical appendix to the Economie Survey of Latin America, ¡981. 
Includes the major petroleum-exporting countries. ' Excludes the major petroleum-exporting countries. 
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Table 11 
URUGUAY: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current account 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 






Unrequited private transfer payments 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Net errors and omissions 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 



































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures subject to revision. Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted andother 




URUGUAY: NET EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(Millions of dollars) 






























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
Table 13 
URUGUAY: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of 
exports 
Quantum of exports 






















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 14 













Fats and oils 
Food products, beverages 
and tobacco 
Mineral products 
Plastics and rubber 
manufactures 
Hides, skins and 
leather products 
Skins and leather 
Processed hides 
Furs and fur products 






Footwear and other 
Other 










































































































































































































































































URUGUAY: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Consumer goods 
Raw materials and 
intermediate goods 














































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
Table 16 
URUGUAY: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
(Millions of dollars) 




Private debt not guaran-





of goods and services 
Public-sector external 
debt/exports of goods 
and services 
Total external debt/ 



























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
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Table 17 
URUGUAY: PUBLIC-SECTOR COMMITMENTS IN FOREIGN CURRENCY 
(Millions of dollars) 
1. Gross external debt 
of the public sector 
2. Foreign currency 
commitments to the 
resident private sector 
Central Bank 





3. Total public sector 
commitments in foreign 





































































URUGUAY: DOMESTIC PRICES 
(Percentages) 






















1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 














































































































































































































Source: Central Bank of Uruguay and Department of Statistics and Censuses. 
"Corresponds to the new price index (base: December 1985), involving a different breakdown. 
Table 19 





















1979 1980 1981 
Indexes (1980 = 100) 
100.4 100.0 107.5 
94.4 100.0 107.1 
106.7 100.0 107.9 
Growth rates 
-8.1 -0.4 7.5 
-7.1 5.9 7.1 




































Source: Department of Statistics and Censuses, Uruguay. 
"Calculated on the basis of the minimum increases decreed by the government up to October 1980 and of the wages actually 
paid thereafter. 
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Table 20 











Variation in wages 
in subsequent 
four-month period 












Source: ECLAC, un the basis of official figures and press releases. 
Table 21 


















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay. 
"Based on annual averages calculated using the subtotals of year-end data. Local currency. 'Foreign currency. 
Table 23 
































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Uruguay and the Department of Statistics and Censuses. 
"Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay. 'Central Bank of Uruguay. 'Annualized variation in the consumer 
price index in the following quarter. Estimates. 
6 9 5 
Table 24 



































































































URUGUAY: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Current income 
Domestic taxes 









Less: documents received 
Taxes on external trade 
On imports 
On exports 




Social security contributions 
and financial assistance 
Purchase of goods and services 





Total deficit (-) or 
surplus (+) 
Financing 
Net Central Bank/BROU credit 
Net sale of securities 
Other 
External loans 



























































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data provided by the Central Bank of Uruguay and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
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Table 26 
URUGUAY: STRUCTURE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
(Percentages) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Remunerations" 53.0 63.5 63.9 30.7 30.0 26.4 29.9 31.8 
Contributions and transfers 
to the social security system 





Source: Up to 1981, Office of the Accountant-General. As from 1982,combined figures prepared by the National Treasury and 
the Office of the Accountant-General. 
"Up to 1981, remunerations include contributions and transfers to the Social Security System. Includes: advances, 
















































1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
The most important event in the economy of Venezuela in 1986 was the sharp decline in the 
international price of petroleum, which is by far its main export product. When oil prices fell by more 
than 50% during the first half of the year, the country's foreign exchange income shrank considera-
bly, triggering off a dramatic turnaround in the current account of the balance of payments and 
causing a decline of over US$3.8 billion in the international reserves (see table 1 and figurei). The 
limited amount of foreign exchange available also made it difficult to meet the rescheduling 
agreement of the external debt signed in February, and as a result negotiations with the creditor banks 
were resumed in mid-year. Finally, during 1986 pressures on the exchange rate increased markedly. 
Consequently, the price of the dollar on the free market rose by almost 60% to a level more than three 
times that of the official exchange rate. Under these circumstances, the authorities increased the 
official exchange rate by almost 100% in mid-December and at the same time tightened controls on 
exchange operations. 
Nevertheless, the sudden decline in the country's external position did not immediately affect 
domestic activities. In fact, the gross domestic product grew by more than 3 % in 1986, with the result 
that the per capita product increased for the first time in the last eight years. Because of the enormous 
decline in the terms of trade, however, the national income dropped by almost 12%. 
The recovery in economic activity reflected on the one hand the expansion of the import 
substitution process and on the other, the effects of a clearly expansionary fiscal policy. As a matter of 
fact, public investment increased considerably in 1986, so that the fiscal exercise showed a moderate 
deficit after two consecutive years of large surpluses. The monetary and wages policy similarly 
furthered the expansion of domestic demand (see table 2) through the granting of credit facilities and 
selective salary readjustments. The inflationary pressures created by the greater domestic demand 
were partially offset, however, by the stability of the official exchange rate and the extension of the 
price control system, with the result that inflation increased only moderately —from 9% in 1985 to 
13% in 1986. 
Furthermore, the recovery was quite widespread (see table 3). The public investment policy 
particularly assisted construction, which had been in a deep recession since 1979. Agriculture, mining 
and manufacturing also showed considerable dynamism and succeeding in expending their share of 
the national market at the expense of imported goods. Owing to this higher level of domestic activity, 
unemployment fell sharply although it still remained above the figure recorded three years 
previously. 
2. Trends in economic activity 
In 1986, the gross domestic product grew by 3 3 % , the highest rate recorded since 1977. This 
performance was in contrast to the difficulties encountered by the petroleum sector due to the 
deterioration in international oil prices. Non-petroleum activities, and especially goods-producing 
activities, however, expanded notably thanks to the extension of the import substitution process and 
the impact of a clearly expansionary fiscal policy. 
After four years of gradual decline, the international price of petroleum began to fall sharply 
late in 1985, and in the following six months it registered a drop of over 50%. Consequently, although 
there was a slight recovery towards the end of the year, the average price of Venezuelan hydrocarbon 
exports was the lowest since 1978 (see figure 2). This dramatic fall was partly offset by the active 
marketing policy pursued by Petróleos de Venezuela, which enabled the volume of external sales to be 
increased by almost 15 %. The devaluation of the petroleum exchange rate early in the year also made 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 1 (concluded) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
aAnnual growth rate. ^Nationwide u r r j a n average annual rate. Percentage variation 
December to December. ^Billions of dollars. Percentages. 
possible an increase in income in terms of national currency.1 Despite this, however, both the total 
income and the net profits of Petróleos de Venezuela shrank by more than one-fifth in comparison 
with the year before (see table 4). 
In order to achieve greater stability in future sales, in 1986 the petroleum industry stepped up 
its internationalization programmes, which came to account for almost one-third of crude petroleum 
exports.2 It also considerably increased its investment expenditure, with special emphasis on the 
projects for the production and distribution of natural gas for the domestic market. 
The non-petroleum product, for its part, showed vigorous growth. Particularly outstanding 
were the marked increases recorded in construction (12%) and agriculture (7%). 
1
 As announced the previous year, on 1 January 1986 the exchange rate in effect for the petroleum industry and for iron 
ore exports was raised from 6 to 7.5 bolívares per dollar, bringing it level with the official trade exchange rate. 
2These programmes provide for the acquisition by Petróleos de Venezuela of share capital in refinery and distribution 
installations located in the consumer countries, thus guaranteeing a sizeable part of its external sales. In 1986 Petróleos de 
Venezuela bought share capital in two foreign companies (Citgo of the United States and Nynas of Sweden), increased its 
participation in the capital of the German company Veba Oel, and also negotiated the purchase of share capital in another 
United States company. 
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For the second consecutive year, the agricultural sector showed great dynamism. As in 1986, 
this sector enjoyed a favourable price, subsidies and official credit policy. The production of cereals 
(especially sorghum and maize) and sugar cane increased considerably, so that the need to import 
these products was substantially reduced. Moreover, the favourable exchange rate situation encour-
aged the production and export of tropical fruits and fishery products (see table 5). 
Satisfactory results were also registered in the mining sector, thanks to the fact that iron ore and 
coal production experienced a recovery and gold production continued its rapid increase (see table 6). 
The moderate growth observed in industrial activity (3 %) derived both from the private sector 
and from the public enterprises. Among the latter, petrochemical production (especially of fertilizers 
and related products) was outstanding, while there was also continued vigorous expansion in the 
production of steel and to a lesser extent of aluminium (see table 7). Both sectors benefitted from the 
greater demand for inputs on the local market, due to the recovery in the construction sector. On the 
other hand, although a larger volume of these products was sold on the external market, their prices 
slumped (-20% for iron ore and -35% for aluminium). 
Construction, which expanded by more than 12%, was the most dynamic activity in the entire 
economy. As it had suffered a steady and considerable decline over the previous eight years, however, 
its product was still almost 50% lower than at the beginning of the decade. Its current recovery was 
due essentially to the expansion of public investment programmes, since private construction 
continued to contract (see table 8). 
In contrast, the production of services grew much more moderately. The increase in agricultural 
and manufacturing output had a positive impact on commerce and on the provision of public utility 
services, which grew by 5% and 7%, respectively. The other service activities, however, almost 
stagnated and there was even a slight drop in the provision of community, social and personal 
services (see tables 3 and 9). 
As a result of the reactivation of the economy, employment levels improved substantially in 
1986. Thus, employment in the construction sector rose by almost 20% and that in industry by 11%. 
Notwithstanding this, unemployment in the construction sector —although appreciably less than in 
previous years— still affected almost a quarter of the labour force. At the national level, the open 
unemployment rate also fell perceptibly (from 13% to 11%), but even so it remained at a much 
higher level than that recorded before the onset of the recession (see table 10). 
3. The external sector 
The external sector's performance in 1986 was negatively affected by the very severe drop in the 
international price of petroleum from the beginning of the year. Because of this, the terms of trade 
deteriorated by almost 47% and income from hydrocarbon sales contracted by 43%, sinking to the 
lowest level in the last 11 years. Exports of steel and aluminium also faced an unfavourable 
international climate, and the increase in the quantities exported failed to offset the decline in the 
international price of these products. As a result, despite the increase in external sales of iron ore and 
of coffee and other agricultural products, the total export income was 40% lower than the previous 
year (see tables 11 and 12). 
Imports, for their part, grew moderately (4%) as a result of two opposing movements. On the 
one hand, external sales of consumer goods, and especially of foodstuffs, fell sharply (-18% and -51%, 
respectively), as a result of import substitution in agriculture and manufacturing industry. Imports of 
capital goods, on the other hand, increased significantly (32%) and came to represent almost half the 
total external purchases. The bulk of this increase can be attributed to early purchases by the private 
sector in view of the growing expectations of devaluation, which also contributed to the marked 
increase (18%) in imports of consumer durables (see tables 13 and 14). 
As a result of these changes, the trade balance on merchandise slumped considerably, reaching 
only US$1 billion, which was less than one-seventh of the figure recorded the previous year (see 
figure 3). In contrast, due to the decline in the international interest rates, the deficit on the services 
account decreased by almost one-third, although it still exceeded US$2.5 billion. As a result, after 
three consecutive years of surpluses, current transactions recorded a negative balance of US$1.6 















Price of petroleum 
products 
D Price of crude 
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D Total exports of 
petroleum 
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Source: ECLAC, based on figures provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela and by Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. 
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combined impact of these two deficits led to a decline of a little over US$3.8 billion in the country's 
international reserves, which thus fell to their.lowest level in the last five years (see tables 16 and 17). 
The negative balance on the capital account reflected the restrictive external financing situation. In 
fact, the total external debt went down for the third consecutive year, due to the punctual amortiza-
tion of the public debt owed to national and international public financial bodies and to the 
speeding-up of payments of principal on the private debt (see table 18). 
At the beginning of 1986, an agreement was signed with the international banks for refinanc-
ing the public debt. Under this agreement, the amortization payments were restructured with a term 
of 12 1/2 years and an interest rate of 1 1/8% above LIBOR. An initial payment of US$750 million was 
stipulated, to be made during the second half of 1986. 
However, the subsequent slump in petroleum income prevented the country from complying 
fully with the payments schedule thus laid down, and as a result negotiations with the creditor banks 
Figure 3 
VENEZUELA: EXTERNAL TRADE INDICATORS 
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were resumed in the second half of the year.3 These negotiations culminated in February 1987, in the 
signing of a new agreement extending the term for amortization payments to 14 1/2 years and 
reducing the spread over LIBOR to 7/8%. Even so, the external debt servicing was still equivalent to 
more than half of the export income: an unprecedentedly high level for Venezuela. 
Independently of the negotiations with the creditor banks, a new payment scheme for the 
private external debt was established under a new exchange agreement between the Central Bank and 
national debtors. The maximum length of time during which foreign exchange will be supplied for 
amortization payments was increased from 5 to 8 years, and at the same time debtors were given the 
possibility of obtaining a guaranteed stable exchange rate (75 bolívares per dollar) during this period, 
subject to the payment of a coverage premium in bolívares. 
The striking drop in foreign exchange income had an unfavourable effect on the quotation of 
the bolivar on the free market. The exchange rate on this market soared by almost 60% between 
December 1985 and December 1986, and as there was no change in the official exchange rate, the gap 
between the two rates grew to over 200%. In these circumstances, it was decided in mid-December to 
raise the official exchange rate by almost 100%, and controls over the exchange rate operations were 
tightened. Thanks to these measures, and especially to the increase in the exchange rate applicable to 
the petroleum sector and to the devaluation of the dollar vis-a-vis other hard currencies, the real 
effective exchange rate rose by 8%. Even so, however, it still remained lower than in the previous 
decade (see tables 19 and 20). 
4. Prices and wages 
Consumer prices rose by 13% between December 1985 and December 1986: a somewhat faster rise 
than that recorded the previous year. The growth rate of wholesale prices over 12 months also went 
up, from 13% to 19% (see table 21). 
In both cases, this speeding-up was due basically to the greater flexibility introduced into the 
price control system. Thus, in order to promote domestic production in sectors such as agriculture and 
manufacturing, producer prices were readjusted several times during the year. Consequently, the 
prices of domestic products rose more steadily than those of imported goods, even though a growing 
number of goods which had previously been imported through the official market were transferred to 
the free exchange market. The ever-increasing devaluation of the bolivar on the free exchange 
market did, however, have an inflationary impact by encouraging the legal or clandestine exportation 
of part of the agricultural production to neighbouring countries, triggering off an increase in the 
prices of several food products. As a result, throughout the year the prices of foodstuffs showed 
increases well above the average (see figure 4). 
With the aim of offsetting the negative effects of these increases on the lower income groups, 
the prices of 30 basic consumer items were frozen as from July. A more expansionary wage policy was 
also adopted, which included several partial increases in wages and special bonuses with the express 
aim of helping those workers receiving the lowest wages. Thus, at the beginning of the year the 
salaries of lower-rank public officials and of workers who were not subject to collective bargaining 
were increased, as were agricultural wages. On the other hand, the minimum wage was not readjusted 
until the end of the year. However, in June a special bonus was instituted for workers receiving less 
than 3 000 bolívares a month, and a number of social programmes to assist the lower-income groups 
were started. As a result of these changes, average real wages increased slightly in 1986. Nevertheless, 
in all the cases for which statistical information is available they continued to be much lower than 
those recorded five years previously (see table 22). 
'Of the US$750 million in amortization payments envisaged in the February 1986 agreement with the international 
banks, only US$670 million were disbursed. The remaining amortization payments on the external public debt included in 
table 18 correspond to the non-refinanced debt (bonds, bilateral and multilateral debt). 
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Figure 4 









Twelve-month variations in consumer prices 
„* Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 
/ 
General index 
i i • i i i i i i i i i i • • i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 
1984 1985 1986 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
VENEZUELA 
5. Fiscal and monetary policies 
Both fiscal and monetary policies became clearly expansionary in 1986. This was in keeping with the 
aim of sustaining the process of domestic reactivation which had begun to be observed at the end of 
the previous year. Thus, central government investment more than doubled, and was concentrated on 
special programmes designed to boost domestic demand and employment, primarily in the construc-
tion sector. Current expenditure, on the other hand, went down slightly. As a result of these changes 
total government expenditure rose by 4% (see table 23). 
Fiscal income, for its part, fell by 6%. The expeditious tax collection policy which was pursued 
succeeded in halting much of the contractive effect of the drop in international petroleum prices on 
government income. On the one hand, the devaluation of the petroleum exchange rate and the 
increase in the domestic price of gasoline partly offset the direct effect of this drop on petroleum 
income, which nevertheless still contracted by 30%. On the other hand, revenue from sources other 
than petroleum increased as a result of the rise in several indirect taxes and the continuation of the tax 
inspection programme started in 1985. Thanks to this, it was possible to streamline the fiscal tax 
collection system and significantly reduce tax evasion and delays in payment. Because of these 
changes, petroleum income came to represent less than half of total fiscal income: the lowest 
proportion recorded in more than half a century (see table 24). 
The fiscal year thus closed with a relatively moderate deficit of 2 billion bolívares, a figure 
equivalent to only 0.5 % of the gross domestic product, but nevertheless in sharp contrast with the big 
surpluses recorded in the previous two years. This negative balance was financed almost entirely 
through the use of the reserves accumulated by the Treasury during the 1984-1985 biennium. 
As in the case of the central government, the public enterprises also substantially increased 
their investment expenditure (12%). The result was that the public sector operations, which in the 
previous two years had generated considerable surpluses, closed the year in 1985 with a deficit 
equivalent to 3% of the product (see table 25). 
The expansionary effect on the monetary base of this turnaround in the public sector accounts 
more than compensated for the contractive effect of the decline in the international reserves. As a 
result, the monetary base grew by 10%, and this increase was also due in part to a clearly expansionary 
credit policy which was reflected in the 36% increase in rediscounting operations and in Central Bank 
prepayments. Given this situation, domestic credit virtually doubled —basically as a result of the 
increase in loans by the commercial banks— and the money supply grew by 23%: the highest growth 
rate in the last three years (see table 26). At the same time, the maximum and minimum interest rates 
set by the issuing institution remained unchanged, so that towards the end of the year they became 
negative in real terms (see table 27). 
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Table 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
A. Basic economic indicators 
Gross domestic product at market 
Indexes (1980= 100) 
prices 
Gross national income 
Population (millions of inhabitants) 
Per capita gross domestic product 
B. Short-run economic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 
Urban unemployment rate c 
Consumer prices 
December - December 
Variation between annual averages 
Real wages and salaries' 
Money 
Current government income 
Total government expenditure 
Fiscal deficit/total government 
expenditure 


















































































































Current value of exports of goods 
and services 
Current value of imports of goods 
and services 
Terms of trade 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Variation in net international 
reserves 
External debt 


























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Percentages. 'Average for two half-years. 1986, second half. In the Caracas 
Metropolitan Area. 'Average urban income, deflated by the variation in consumer prices in the Caracas Metropolitan 
Area. Average for two half-years. 1986, second half. Fiscal surplus. 
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Table 2 
VENEZUELA: TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
VENEZUELA 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 




Gross domestic investment 


























































































































Source: ECLAC, based on data provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. 
Table 3 
VENEZUELA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Gross domestic product 
Goods 
Agriculture' 






Electricity, gas and water 
Transport, storage and 
communications 
Other services 
Index at constant 

































































































































insurance, real estate 
and business services 
Ownership of dwellings 




Less: bank service charges 
Plus: imports duties 
101.5 96.2 93.4 98.4 8.2 8.6 1.7 -5.3 -2.9 5.3 
104.2 111.6 113.1 116.0 14.9 18.4 -0.3 7.2 
107.0 108.1 109.8 113.1 9.3 11.3 0.2 1.0 
96.2 96.4 94.9 94.4 16.6 16.7 -2.7 0.2 
99.1 98.7 96.8 95.0 11.8 12.0 -1.8 -0.4 
102.7 118.0 125.4 129.9 5.2 
33.9 25.4 25.6 26.1 2.5 
7.1 -0.1 14.9 













Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Index at constant 1980 market prices. 
sectors. Including petroleum refining. 



























Profits of petroleum 
enterprise 













































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mines and by Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 
"Preliminary figures. 'including condensate. 'Millions of barrels. ''Corresponds to domestic and industrial 
consumption, including that of the petroleum industry. 'Percentage. Billions of barrels. 'Revised 
figures. *In years. Calculated by dividing total reserves by crude oil production in the corresponding year. ' Billions 
of cubic metres. 'Dollars per barrel. 'Billions of bolívares. After deduction of tax. 
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Table 5 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 











For domestic consumption 
Cereals 
Pulses 
Fibres and oilseeds 













Eggs, for consumption 









































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Index at constant prices (1980 = 100). 'Thousands of tons. Thousands of 




VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF MINING ACTIVITY 
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Growth rates 
1983 1984 1985 1986" 
Indexes of mining 
production1' 
(1980 = 100) 100.0 68.6 793 88.4 93.1 -16.6 15.6 11.5 5.3 








Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Value of the sector's production at 1968 prices. As different sources were used, these figures do 
not correspond exactly to those given in table 3. cMillions of tons. Thousands of tons. 'Kilogrammes. 
















































VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Index of manufacturing 
production 
Foodstuffs, beverages and 
tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and 
leather goods 
Wood and furniture 





Basic metal industries 


























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela and various industrial enterprises. 
Preliminary figures. Excluding public enterprises. Indicates the value of output deflated by the corresponding 




VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY 
Index of sectoral production 








Indicators of activity 
Domestic sales of steel' 
Domestic sales of cement' 
Domestic sales of hardware 








































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Housing construction permits granted. Thousands of square metres. 'Thousands of 
units. In addition to dwellings, includes popular building plots for gradual urban development. 'Thousands of 
tons. In the Caracas Metropolitan Area. Index in real terms, 1980 = 100. 1986, January-September 
average. "Loans to builders and purchasers. Millions of bolívares. Thousands of persons. 
Table 9 










Index of commercial sales' 
Employment 









































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Office for Statistics and Information and the statistical 
annex of the message of the President to Congress, 1987. 
"Preliminary figures. Millions of kWh. 
Area. Index in real terms, 1980 = 
'Billions of kWh Thousands of tons ' h i the Caracas Metropolitan 
:
 100. 1986,January-October average. 'Thousands of persons. "Including financial 
activities. Second half of each year. 'First half. 
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Table 10 
VENEZUELA: EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
Work force 
(thousands of persons) 










Electricity, gas, water 
and sanitary services 
Tertiary sector 
Commerce' 





























































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from household surveys conducted by the Central Statistics and Información Office 
(OCEI). 
"Preliminary figures. Work force as a percentage of the population aged 15 years and over. 'Includes financial 




VENEZUELA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS 








Terms of trade (goods) 
Purchasing power of 
exports of goods 
Volume of exports 
Volume of imports 






















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Volume of exports of goods or of goods and services, as appropriate, adjusted by the 
corresponding terms-of-trade index. 
Table 12 























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of officii 
"Preliminary figures. 




































































































VENEZUELA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Total 
Consumer goods 
Foodstuffs and beverages 
Other consumer goods 
Durables 
Non-du rabies 





Fuels and lubricants 
Building materials 
Capital goods 
Machinery and tools 
Transport equipment 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis 
"January-September. J¡ 







































































































































he Central Statistics and Information Office (OCEI). 





































VENEZUELA: ORIGIN OF IMPORTS AND 











































































































Others 362 471 266 
Exports 

























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of statistics provided by the Central Statistics and Information Office, the Central Bank of 




VENEZUELA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Balance on current accounts 
Trade balance 
Exports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 
Transport and insurance 
Travel 
Imports of goods and services 
Goods FOB 
Real services 







Unrequited private transfers 
Balance on capital account 
Unrequited official transfers 
Long-term capital 
Direct investment (net) 
Portfolio investment (net) 














Errors and omissions (net) 
Global balance 
Total variation in reserves 
(- sign indicates an increase) 
Monetary gold 
Special Drawing Rights 
IMF reserve position 
Foreign exchange assets 
Other assets 









































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1980-1985: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, April 1987; 1986: ECLAC, on the basis of 
official data. 
"Preliminary figures. Includes other non-factor services. 'Includes net loans granted and other assets and 




VENEZUELA: TOTAL I N T E R N A T I O N A L RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 



































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Includes part of the reserves of the Venezuelan Investment Fund which are administered by the Central Bank. 
Preliminary figures. 
Table 17 
VENEZUELA: CENTRAL B A N K FOREIGN EXCHANGE RECEIPTS A N D OUTLAYS 









































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Includes receipts from the Venezuelan Investment Fund. Imports of goods and services. Includes foreign currency 
expenditure by Petróleos de Venezuela and agreements. Excludes imports at the free market exchange rate. 'Includes 
Central Bank sales of foreign exchange on the free market. Position at the end of the period, including adjustments for 
changes in exchange rates for Special Drawing Rights and reserve currencies with respect to the US dollar. 'Includes 
the effect of the centralization of the foreign-exchange assets of the petroleum industry. ^Preliminary figures. 
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Table 18 
VENEZUELA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Total external debt 
External public debt 
Medium and long-term 
Short-term 
Private external debt 









Total external debt/exports 
of goods and services 
Debt servicing/exports of 
goods and services 
Net interest payments / 




























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela and international financial agencies. 
" Preliminary figures. According to the Law on Public Credit. This includes the direct debt (i.e., the debt deriving from 
loan contracts entered into by the State, as well as that deriving from bonds sold on behalf of the State) and the indirect debt 
(i.e., the debt deriving from loan contracts, with or without State guarantee, entered into by autonomous public institutions 
and State enterprises, as well as from the sale of securities issued by these bodies). 'Estimates based on the relevant 
balance-of-payments entries. 
positive. 































































































Indexes of the real 











































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the International Monetary Fund. 
"As from 1983, the average exchange rate corresponds to the exchange rate weighted on the basis of the foreign exchange 
movements recorded by the Central Bank of Venezuela. Correspond to the average of the indexes relating to the real 
exchange rate for the bolivar with respect to the currencies of Venezuela's main trading patterns, weighted according to 
relative magnitude of exports to or imports from these countries, as appropriate. From 1970 to 1980 the weightings 
correspond to the average for the period 1975-1979; from 1981 they correspond to the average for the period 1982-1985. 
These calculations have been conducted primarily on the basis of wholesale price indexes, and in the case of Venezuela the 
subindex for domestic products within this index was adopted. For information on the methodology and sources used, see the 
Technical Appendix to the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981. 'Preliminary figures. 
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Table 20 
VENEZUELA: CENTRAL BANK FOREIGN EXCHANGE MOVEMENTS 
ACCORDING THE EXCHANGE RATE 
Total 
Exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar 
.30 6.00 7.50 14.50 Free 


































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. For the total of foreign exchange operations. 
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Table 21 
VENEZUELA: DOMESTIC PRICE TRENDS 
VENEZUELA 
Consumer price index 
Food 








Consumer price index 
Food 




































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 



































VENEZUELA: INCOME TRENDS 
1983 1984 1985 















































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela, the Ministry of Labour and the 
Central Office of Statistics and Information (OCEI). 
"Preliminary figures. Monthly wages, annual averages. 'Monthly income, annual averages. Second half of 
year. ' First half of year. ^Deflated in the case of the minimum wage, by the consumer price index for the Caracas 
Metropolitan Area corresponding to the quartile of households with the lowest income, and for other incomes, by the general 




VENEZUELA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 










Other non-tax income 




On external debt 
On domestic debt 
Current transfers 
Other current expenditure 
3. Current savings (1-2) 
4. Capital expenditure 
Real investment 
Other capita] expenditure 
5. Total expenditure (2 + 4) 
6. Fiscal surplus (1-3) 
Financing of deficit 
(or use of surplus) 
Domestic 
Central Bank 
Sale of securities 
Amortization 
Variation in reserves 




























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 




VENEZUELA: COEFFICIENTS RELATING TO FISCAL MANAGEMENT 












Fiscal deficit (or surplus)/GDP 



























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Fiscal surplus. 
Table 25 
VENEZUELA: CONSOLIDATED N O N - F I N A N C I A L 













Financing of deficit 
























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela and the Central Office of the Budget 
(OCEPRE). 
"Includes the central government, the Venezuelan Investment Fund, the Foreign Exchange Clearing Fund, Petróleos de 








Money plus quasi-money (M2) 
Domestic credit 
To central government 





Velocity of circulation 
GDP/M, 
Year-end balances 
















































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Preliminary figures. Annual averages. 
Table 27 
VENEZUELA: DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES" 

































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of information provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela. 
"Average annual rates. Preliminary figures. 'Annual rates, quarterly averages. Preliminary figures. rfOn 
term deposits with commercial banks. "On commercial bank loans and discounts. On saving certificates in 
denominations from 5 000 bolívares and terms from 30 to 180 days in a mortgage bank. 'Loans for housing 
purchases. Deflated by the variation in the consumer price index for the Caracas Metropolitan Area. 





ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
Casilla 179-D Santiago. Chili 
PERIODIC PUBLICATIONS 
CEPAL Review 
CEPAL Review first appeared in 1976 as part of the 
Publications Programme of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, its aim being to make a 
contribution to the study of the economic and social 
development problems of the region. The views expressed 
in signed articles, including those by Secretariat staff 
members, are those of the authors and therefore do not 
necessarily reflect the point of view of the Organization. 
CEPAL Review is published in Spanish and English versions 
three times a year. 
Annual subscription costs for 1989 are US$ 16 for the 
Spanish version and US$ 18 for the English version. The 
price of single issues is US$ 10 in both cases. 
Estudio Económico de Economic Survey of Latin 














vol. I 693 pp. 
vol. II 199 pp. 
vol. I 694 pp. 
vol. II 179 pp. 
vol. I 702 pp. 






1982. vol. 1 
1982. vol. II 
1983. vol. 1 
1983. vol. II 
1984. vol. 1 











(También hay ejemplares de años anteriores) 
Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe/ 
Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(bilingüe) 
1980, 617 pp. 
1981, 727 pp. 
1983. (1982/1983) 749 pp. 
1984. 761 pp. 
1985, 792 pp. 
1986, 782 pp. 
1987, 714 pp. 
1988, 782 pp. 
1 Manual de proyectos de desarrollo económico, 1958, 
5o ed. 1980, 264 pp. 
/ Manual on economic development projects. 1958, 
2nd. éd. 1972, 242 pp. 
2 America Latina en el umbral de los años ochenta, 
1979, 2" ed. 1980, 203 pp. 
3 Agua, desarrollo y medio ambiente en América Latina, 
1980,443 pp. 
4 Los bancos transnacionales y el financiamiento 
externo de América Latina. La experiencia del Perú. 
1965-1976. por Robert Devlin, 1980, 265 pp. 
4 Transnational banks and the external finance ofL atin 
America: the experience of Peru, 1985, 342 pp. 
5 La dimensión ambiental en los estilos de desarrollo de 
América Latina, por Osvaldo Sunkel, 1981. 2" ed. 
1984, 136 pp. 
6 La mujer y el desarrollo: guia para la planificación de 
programas y proyectos, 1984, 115 pp. 
6 Women and development: guidelines for programme 
and project planning, 1982, 3rd. ed. 1984, 123 pp. 
7 Africa y América Latina: perspectivas de la coopera-
ción interregional, 1983, 286 pp. 
8 Sobrevivencia campesina en ecosistemas de altura, 
vols. I y II, 1983, 720 pp. 
9 La mujer en el sector popular urbano. América Latina y 
el Caribe, 1984, 349 pp. 
10 A vanees en la interpretación ambiental del desarrollo 
agrícola de América Latina, 1985, 236 pp. 
11 El decenio de la mujer en el escenario latinoameri-
cano, 1986, 216 pp. 
// The decade for women in Latín America and the 
Caribbean: background and prospects, 1988 
215 pp. 
12 América Latina: sistema monetario internacional y 
financiamiento externo, 1986, 416 pp. 
12 Latin America: international monetary system and 
external financing, 1986, 405 pp. 
13 Raúl Prebisch: Un aporte al estudio de su pensa-
miento, 1987, 146 pp. 
15 CEPAL, 40 años (1948-1988), 1988, 85 pp. 
16 América Latina en la economia mundial, 1988, 322 
pp. 
17 Gestión para el desarrollo de cuencas de alta mon-
taña en la zona andina, 1988, 187 pp. 
18 Políticas macroeconómicas y brecha externa: A méríca 
Latina en los años ochenta, 1989, 201 pp. 
19 CEPAL, Bibliografía, 1948-1988, 1989, 648 pp. 
20 Desarrollo agrícola y participación campesina, 1989, 
(in press) 
21 Planificación y gestión del desarrollo en áreas de 
expansión de la frontera agropecuaria en América 
Latina, 1989. 113 pp. 
22 Transformación ocupacional y crisis en América 
Latina, 1989, (in press) 
MONOGRAPH SERIES 
Cuadernos de la C E P A L 
1 América Latina: el nuevo escenario regional y 
mundial/Latín America: the new regional and world 
setting (bilingüe). 1975, 2° éd. 1985, 103 pp. 
2 Las evoluciones regionales de la estrategia interna-
cional del desarrollo, 1975, 2° éd. 1984, 73 pp. 
2 Regional appraisals of the international development 
strategy, 1975, 2nd. ed. 1985, 82 pp. 
3 Desarrollo humano, cambio social y crecimiento en 
América Latina, 1975, 2° ed. 1984, 103 pp. 
4 Relaciones comerciales, crisis monetaria e integra-
ción económica en América Latina, 1975, 85 pp. 
5 Síntesis de la segunda evaluación regional de la 
estrategia internacional del desarrollo, 1975, 72 pp. 
6 Dinero de valor constante. Concepto, problemas y 
experiencias, por Jorge Rose, 1975, 2° ed. 1984, 
43 pp. 
7 La coyuntura internacional y el sector externo, 1975, 
V ed. 1983, 106 pp. 
8 La industrialización latinoamericana en los años 
setenta, 1975, 2° ed. 1984, 116 pp. 
9 Dos estudios sobre inflación 1972-1974. La inflación 
en los países centrales. América Latina y la inflación 
importada, 1975, 2° ed. 1984, 57 pp. 
s/n Canada and the foreign firm, D. Pollock, 1976,43 pp. 
10 Reactivación del mercado común centroamericano, 
1976, 2a ed. 1984, 149 pp. 
11 Integración y cooperación entre países en desarrollo 
en el ámbito agrícola, por Germánico Salgado, 1976, 
2a ed. 1985, 52 pp. 
12 Temas del nuevo orden económico internacional, 
1976, 2a ed. 1984, 85 pp. 
13 En torno a las ideas de la CEPAL: desarrollo, industria-
lización y comercio exterior, 1977, 2" ed. 1985, 
57 pp. 
14 En torno a las ideas de la CEPAL: problemas de la 
industrialización en América Latina, 1977, 2° ed. 
1984, 46 pp. 
15 Los recursos hidráulicos de América Latina. Informe 
regional. 1977, 2" ed. 1984, 75 pp. 
15 The water resources of Latin America. Regional 
report 1977, 2nd. ed. 1985, 79 pp. 
16 Desarrollo y cambio social en América Latina, 1977, 
2" ed. 1984, 59 pp. 
17 Estrategia internacional de desarrollo y estableci-
miento de un nuevo orden económico internacional, 
1977, 3o ed. 1984. 59 pp. 
17 International development strategy and establish-
ment of a new international economic order, 1977, 
3rd. ed. 1985, 70 pp. 
18 Raices históricas de las estructuras distributivas de 
América Latina, por A. di Filippo, 1977,2° ed. 1983, 
64 pp. 
19 Dos estudios sobre endeudamiento externo, por 
C. Massad y ñ. Zahler, 1977, 2" ed. 1986, 66 pp. 
s/n United States — L at in American trade and financial 
relations: some policy recommendations, S. Wein-
traub, 1977, 44 pp. 
20 Tendencias y proyecciones a largo plazo del desarro-
llo económico de América Latina, 1978, 3° ed. 1985, 
144 pp. 
21 25 años en la agricultura de América Latina: rasgos 
principales 1950-1975, 1978, 2° ed. 1983, 124 pp. 
22 Notas sobre la familia como unidad socioeconómica, 
por Carlos A. Borsotti, 1978, 2" ed. 1984, 60 pp. 
23 La organización de la información para la evaluación 
del desarrollo, por Juan Sourrouille, 1978, 2° ed. 
1984,61 pp. 
24 Contabilidad nacional a precios constantes en Amé-
rica Latina, 1978, 2° ed. 1983, 60 pp. 
s/n Energy in Latín America: The Historical Record, J. 
Mullen, 1978, 66 pp. 
25 Ecuador: desafíos y logros de la política económica 
en la fase de expansión petrolera, 1979, 2° ed. 1984, 
153 pp. 
26 Las transformaciones rurales en América Latina: 
¿desarrollo social o marginación?, 1979,2° ed. 1984, 
160 pp. 
27 La dimensión de la pobreza en América Latina, por 
Osear Altimir, 1979, 2" ed. 1983, 89 pp. 
2 8 Organización institucional para el control y manejo de 
la deuda externa. El caso chileno, por Rodolfo Hoff-
man, 1979, 35 pp. 
29 La política monetaria y el ajuste de la balanza de 
pagos: tres estudios. 1979, 2" ed. 1984, 61 pp. 
29 Monetary policy and balance of payments adjust-
ment: three studies, 1979, 60 pp. 
30 América Latina: las evaluaciones regionales de la 
estrategia internacional del desarrollo en los años 
setenta, 1979, 2° ed. 1982, 237 pp. 
31 Educación, imágenes y estilos de desarrollo, por G. 
Rama, 1979, 2" ed. 1982, 72 pp. 
32 Movimientos internacionales de capitales, por R. H. 
Arriazu, 1979, 2" ed. 1984, 90 pp. 
33 Informe sobre las inversiones directas extranjeras en 
América Latina, por A. E. Calcagno, 1980, 2° ed. 
1982. 114 pp. 
34 Las fluctuaciones de la industria manufacturera 
argentina, 1950-1978, por D. Heymann, 1980, 
2" ed. 1984, 234 pp. 
35 Perspectivas de reajuste industrial: la Comunidad 
Económica Europea y los países en desarrollo, por 
B. Evers, G. de GrootyW. Wagenmans, 1980, 2° ed. 
1984, 69 pp. 
36 Un análisis sobre la posibilidad de evaluar la solven-
cia crediticia de los países en desarrollo, por 
A. Saieh, 1980, 2" ed. 1984, 82 pp. 
37 Hacia los censos latinoamericanos de los años 
ochenta, 1981, 146 pp. 
s/n The economic relations of Latin America with 
Europe, 1980, 2nd. ed. 1983, 156 pp. 
38 Desarrollo regional argentino: la agricultura, por J. 
Martin, 1981. V ed. 1984, 111 pp. 
39 Estratificación y movilidad ocupacional en América 
Latina, por C. Filgueira y C. Geneletti, 1981, 2" ed. 
1985, 162 pp. 
40 Programa de acción regional para América Latina en 
los años ochenta, 1981, 2" ed. 1984, 62 pp. 
40 Regional programme of action for Latin America in 
the 1980s. 1981. 2nd. ed. 1984, 57 pp. 
41 El desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones 
en la educación. Alfabetismo y escolaridad básica, 
1982, 246 pp. 
42 América Latina y la economia mundial del café, 1982, 
95 pp. 
43 El ciclo ganadero y la economía argentina, 1983, 
160 pp. 
44 Las encuestas de hogares en América Latina, 1983, 
122 pp. 
45 Las cuentas nacionales en América Latina y el Caribe, 
1983, 100 pp. 
45 National accounts in Latín America and the Carib-
bean, 1983, 97 pp. 
46 Demanda de equipos para generación, transmisión y 
transformación eléctrica en América Latina, 1983, 
193 pp. 
47 La economía de América Latina en 1982: evolución 
general, política cambiaría y renegociación de la 
deuda externa, 1984, 104 pp. 
48 Políticas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda 
externa en América Latina, 1984, 102 pp. 
49 La economía de América Latina y el Caribe en 1983: 
evolución general, crisis y procesos de ajuste, 1985, 
95 pp. 
49 The economy of L atin America and the Caribbean in 
1983: main trends, the imped of the crisis and tha 
adjustment procasses, 1985, 93 pp. 
50 La CEPAL, encarnación de una esperanza de América 
Latina, por Hernán Santa Cruz, 1985, 77 pp. 
51 Hacia nuevas modalidades de cooperación económica 
entre América Latina y el Japón, 1986, 233 pp. 
51 Towards new forms of economic co-operation bet-
ween Latin America and Japan, 1987, 245 pp. 
52 Los conceptos básicos del transporte marítimo y la 
situación de la actividad en América Latina, 1986, 
112 pp. 
52 Basic concepts of maritime transport and its present 
status in Latin America and tha Caribbeen, 1987, 
114 pp. 
53 Encuestas de ingresos y gastos. Conceptos y métodos 
en la experiencia latinoamericana. 1986, 128 pp. 
54 Crisis económica y politicas de ajuste, estabilización y 
crecimiento, 1986, 123 pp. 
54 The economic crisis: policias for adjustment stabili-
zation and growth, 1986, 125 pp. 
55 El desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe: escollos, 
requisitos y opciones, 1987, 184 pp. 
55 Latín American and Caribbean development: obsta-
cles, requirements and options, 1987, 184 pp. 
56 Los bancos transnacionales y el endeudamiento 
externo en la Argentina, 1987, 112 pp. 
57 El proceso de desarrollo de la pequeña y mediana 
empresa y su papel en el sistema industrial: el caso de 
Italia, 1988, 112 pp. 
58 La evolución de la economia de América Latina en 
1986, 1988, 100 pp. 
58 The evolution of the Latín Amarican Economy in 
1986, 1988, 106 pp. 
59 Protectionism: regional negotiation and defence 
strategies, 1988, 261 pp. 
60 Industrialización en América Latina: de la "caja 
negra" al "casillero vacío", 1989, 176 pp. 
61 Hacia un desarrollo sostenido en América Latina y el 
Caribe: restricciones y requisitos, 1989, 94 pp. 
62 La evolución de la economía de América Latina en 
1987, 1989, 88 pp. 
Cuadernos Estadísticos de la CEPAL 
1 América Latina: relación de precios del intercambio, 
1976, 2" éd., 1984,66 pp. 
2 Indicadores del desarrollo económico y social en 
América Latina, 1976, 2" ed. 1984, 179 pp. 
3 Series históricas del crecimiento de América Latina, 
1978, 2o ed. 1984, 206 pp. 
4 Estadísticas sobre la estructura del gasto de consumo 
de los hogares según finalidad del gasto, por grupos 
de ingreso, 1978, 110 pp. (Out of print; replaced by 
No. 8 below) 
5 El balance de pagos de América Latina, 1950-1977, 
1979, 2" ed. 1984, 164 pp. 
6 Distribución regional del producto interno bruto 
sectorial en los paises de América Latina, 1981, 
2"ed. 1985, 68 pp. 
7 Tablas de insumo-producto en América Latina, 1983, 
383 pp. 
8 Estructura del gasto de consumo de los hogares según 
finalidad del gasto, por grupos de ingreso, 1984, 
146 pp. 
9 Origen y destino del comercio exterior de los paises 
de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración y del 
Mercado Común Centromericano, 1985, 546 pp. 
10 América Latina: balance de pagos 1950-1984,1986, 
357 pp. 
11 El comercio exterior de bienes de capital en América 
Latina, 1986, 288 pp. 
12 América Latina: indices del comercio exterior, 1970-
1984, 355 pp. 
13 América Latina: comercio exterior según la 
clasificación industrial internacional uniforme de 
todas las actividades económicas, 1987, Vol. I, 
675 pp; Vol. II, 675 pp. 
14 La distribución del ingreso en Colombia. 
Antecedentes estadísticos y características 
socioeconómicas de los receptores, 1988, 156 pp. 
Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL 
1 Nicaragua: el impacto de la mutación política, 1981, 
2o ed. 1982, 126 pp. 
2 Perú 1968-1977: ¡apolítica económica en un proceso 
de cambio global, 1981, 2" ed. 1982, 166 pp. 
3 La industrialización de América Latina y la 
cooperación internacional, 1981, 170 pp. (Out of 
print, will not be reprinted.) 
4 Estilos de desarrollo, modernización y medio 
ambiente en la agricultura latinoamericana, 1981, 
4o ed. 1984, 130 pp. 
5 El desarrollo de América Latina en los años ochenta. 
1981, I" ed. 1982, 153 pp. 
8 Latín American development in the 1980s. 1981, 
2nd. ed. 1982, 134 pp. 
6 Proyecciones del desarrollo latinoamericano en los 
años ochenta, 1981, 3° ed. 1985, 96 pp. 
6 Latin American development projections for the 
1980s, 1982, 2nd. ed. 1983, 89 pp. 
7 Las relaciones económicas externas de América 
Latina en los años ochenta, 1981, T ed. 1982, 
180 pp. 
8 Integración y cooperación regionales en los años 
ochenta, 1982, T ed. 1982, 174 pp. 
9 Estrategias de desarrollo sectorial para los años 
ochenta: industria y agricultura, 1981, 2° ed. 1985, 
100 pp. 
10 Dinámica del subempleo en América Latina. PREALC, 
1981, 2" ed. 1985, 101 pp. 
11 Estilos de desarrollo de la industria manufacturera y 
medio ambiente en América Latina, 1982, 2° ed. 
1984, 178 pp. 
12 Relaciones económicas de América Latina con los 
países miembros del "Consejo de Asistencia Mutua 
Económica", 1982, 154 pp. 
13 Campesinado y desarrollo agrícola en Bolivia, 1982, 
175 pp. 
14 El sector externo: indicadores y análisis de sus 
fluctuaciones. El caso argentino, 1982, 2° ed. 1985, 
216 pp. 
15 Ingeniería y consultoria en Brasil y el Grupo Andino, 
1982, 320 pp. 
16 Cinco estudios sobre la situación de la mujer en 
América Latina, 1982, 2° ed. 1985, 178 pp. 
16 Five studies on the situation of women in Latin 
America. 1983, 2nd. ed. 1984, 188 pp. 
17 Cuentas nacionales y producto material en América 
Latina, 1982, 129 pp. 
18 El financiamiento de las exportaciones en América 
Latina, 1983, 212 pp. 
19 Medición del empleo y de los ingresos rurales, 1982, 
2"ed. 1983, 173 pp. 
19 Measurement of employment and income in rural 
areas, 1983, 184 pp. 
2 0 Efectos macroeconómicos de cambios en las barreras 
al comercio y al movimiento de capitales: un modelo 
de simulación, 1982, 68 pp. 
21 La empresa pública en la economia: la experiencia 
argentina, 1982, 2° ed. 1985, 134 pp. 
22 Las empresas transnacionales en la economía de 
Chile. 19741980. 1983, 178 pp. 
23 La gestión y la informática en las empresas 
ferroviarias de América Latina y España, 1983, 
195 pp. 
24 Establecimiento de empresas de reparación y 
mantenimiento de contenedores en América Latina y 
el Caribe, 1983, 314 pp. 
24 Establishing container repair and maintenance 
enterprises in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
1983, 236 pp. 
25 Agua potable y saneamiento ambiental en América 
Latina, 1981-1990/Drinking water supply and 
sanitation in Latin America, 1981-1990 (bilingüe), 
1983, 140 pp. 
26 Los bancos transnacionales, el estado y el 
endeudamiento externo en Bolivia, 1983, 282 pp. 
27 Política económica y procesos de desarrollo. La 
experiencia argentina entre 1976 y 1981, 1983, 
157 pp. 
28 Estilos de desarrollo, energía y medio ambiente: un 
estudio de caso exploratorio, 1983, 129 pp. 
29 Empresas transnacionales en la industria de 
alimentos. El caso argentino: cereales y cama, 1983, 
93 pp. 
30 Industrialización en Centro América, 1960-1980, 
1983, 168 pp. 
31 Dos estudios sobre empresas transnacionales en 
Brasil. 1983, 141 pp. 
32 La crisis económica internacional y su repercusión en 
América Latina, 1983, 81 pp. 
33 La agricultura campesina en sus relaciones con la 
industria, 1984, 120 pp. 
34 Cooperación económica entre Brasil y el Grupo 
Andino: el caso de los minerales y metales no 
ferrosos, 1983, 148 pp. 
35 La agricultura campesina y el mercado da alimentos: 
la dependencia externa y sus efectos en una 
economia abierta, 1984, 201 pp. 
36 El capital extranjero en la economía peruana, 1984, 
178 pp. 
37 Dos estudios sobre política arancelaria, 1984,96 pp. 
38 Estabilización y liberalización económica en el Cono 
Sur, 1984, 193 pp. 
39 La agricultura campesina y el mercado de alimentos: 
el caso de Haití y el de la República Dominicana, 
1984, 255 pp. 
40 La industria siderúrgica latinoamericana: tendencias y 
potencial, 1984, 280 pp. 
41 La presencia de las empresas transnacionales en la 
economía ecuatoriana, 1984, 77 pp. 
42 Precios, salarios y empleo en la Argentina: 
estadísticas económicas de corto plazo, 1984, 
378 pp. 
43 El desarrollo de la seguridad social en América Latina, 
1985, 348 pp. 
44 Market structure, firm size and Brazilian exports, 
1985, 104 pp. 
45 La planificación del transpose en países de América 
Latina. 1985, 247 pp. 
46 La crisis en América Latina: su evaluación y 
perspectivas, 1985, 119 pp. 
47 La juventud en América Latina y el Caribe, 1985, 
181 pp. 
48 Desarrollo de los recursos mineros de A m erica L atina, 
1985, 145 pp. 
48 Development of the mining resources of Latin 
America, 1989 160 pp. 
49 Las relaciones económicas internacionales de 
América Latina y la cooperación regional, 1985, 
224 pp. 
5Q América Latina y la economia mundial del algodón, 
1985, 122 pp. 
51 Comercio y cooperación entre países de América 
Latina y países miembros del CAME, 1985, 90 pp. 
52 Trade relations between Brazil and the United 
States, 1985, 148 pp. 
53 Los recursos hídricos de A mérica Latina y el Caribe y 
su aprovechamiento, 1985, 138 pp. 
53 The water resources of Latín Ameriee and the 
Caribbean and their utilization. 1985, 135 pp. 
54 La pobreza en América Latina: dimensiones y 
politicas, 1985, 155 pp. 
55 Politicas de promoción de exportaciones en algunos 
países de América Latina, 1985, 297 pp. 
56 Las empresas transnacionales en la Argentina, 1986, 
222 pp. 
57 El desarrollo frutícola y forestal en Chile y sus 
derivaciones sociales, 1986, 227 pp. 
58 El cultivo del algodón y la soya en el Paraguay y sus 
derivaciones sociales, 1986, 141 pp. 
59 Expansión del cultivo de la caña de azúcar y de la 
ganadería en el nordeste del Brasil: un examen del 
papel de la política pública y de sus derivaciones 
económicas y sociales, 1986, 164 pp. 
60 Las empresas transnacionales en el desarrollo 
colombiano, 1986, 212 pp. 
61 Las empresas transnacionales en la economía del 
Paraguay, 1987, 115 pp. 
62 Problemas de la industria latinoamericana en la fese 
critica, 1986, 103 pp. 
6 3 Relaciones económicas internacionales y cooperación 
regional de A mérica Latina y el Caribe, 1987.272 pp. 
63 International economic relations and regional co-
operation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1987, 
267 pp. 
64 Tres ensayos sobre inflación y políticas de 
estabilización, 1986, 201 pp. 
65 La industria farmacéutica y farmoqulmica: desarrollo 
histórico y posibilidades futuras. Argentina, Brasil y 
México, 177 pp. 
66 Dos estudios sobre América Latina y el Caribe y la 
economía internacional, 1987, 125 pp. 
67 Reestructuración de la industria automotriz mundial y 
perspectivas para América Latina, 1987, 232 pp. 
68 Cooperación latinoamericana en servicios: 
antecedentes y perspectivas, 1988, 156 pp. 
69 Desarrollo y transformación: estrategia para superar 
la pobreza, 1988, 114 pp. 
69 Development and change: strategies for vanquishing 
poverty, 1988, 114 pp. 
70 La evolución económica del Japón y su impacto en 
América Latina, 1988, 88 pp. 
71 La gestión de los recursos hídricos en América Latina 
y el Caribe, 1989, 256 pp. 
72 La evolución del problema de la deuda externa en 
América Latina y el Caribe, 1988, 77 pp. 
72 The evolution of the external debt problem in Letin 
America and the Caribbean, 1989, 69 pp. 
73 Agricultura, comercio exterior y cooperación 
internacional, 1988, 83 pp. 
73 Agriculture, externei trade and international co-
operation, 1989, 80 pp. 
75 El medio ambiente como factor de desarrollo, 1989, 
123 pp. 
Serie INFOPLAN: Temas Especiales del Oesarrollo 
1 Resúmenes de documentos sobre deuda externa, 
1986, 324 pp. 
2 Resúmenes de documentos sobre cooperación entre 
países en desarrollo, 1986, 189 pp. 
3 Resúmenes de documentos sobre recursos hídricos, 
1987,290 pp. 
4 Resúmenes de documentos sobre planificación y 
medio ambiente, 111 pp. 
5 Resúmenes de documentos sobre integración 
económica en América Latina y el Caribe, 1987, 
273 pp. 
6 Resúmenes de documentos sobre cooperación entre 
países en desarrollo, II parte, 1988, 146 pp. 
V J.U; y)l vXJl > W* (J-^ .1 . |JUl .Wl j _ - . y
 e>Ji »>> OLXJI ^ ¿-^—>• f-Vi ol>^- J» J^JI ¿C. 
«. £«***«*«****>flew»»»*)**«. a*fl«»M**(iHn!<i*nAJunuftornsn. 
HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS 
United Nations publications may be' obtained from bookstores and distributors 
throughout the world.. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales 
Section, New York o.r Geneva. 
COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES 
Lés publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences 
dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous 
à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève. 
KAK nOJiyMHTb H3AAHHH OPrAHH 3AUHH OBT>EflHHEHHWX HAUHH 
HSA&HHH OpraHH3auHH OO'feeaHHeHHbix HauHfl MOKHO KynHTb B KHHMCHMX Mara-
SHHax H areHTCTBax BO BCex pafloHax MHpa. HaBOAHTe cnpaBKH oO HSAamiflji B 
BauieM KHHJKHOM Mara3HHe H/IH nHLuHTe no a/ipecy : OpramisauHfl O&beAHHeHHfcix 
HaUHft. CCKUHH no nponawe H3«aHHft, Htio-PlopK HIIH HCeHcBa. 
COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS 
Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas 
distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones 
Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra. 
Publications of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and those of 
the Latin American and the Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) can be 
ordered from your local distributor or directly through: 
United Nations Publications United Nations Publications 
Sales Section, — DC-2-866 Sales Section 
New York, NY, 10017 Palais des Nations 
USA 1211 Geneve 10, Switzerland 
Distribution Unit 
CEPAL —Casilla 179-D 
Santiago, Chile 
